Paradise of Submission

◆

A Medieval Treatise on Ismaili Thought

A New Persian Edition and English Translation of Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī's *Rawḍa-yi taslīm*

Edited and Translated by
S. J. BADAKHCHANI

One of the foremost Muslim scholars of the 7th/13th century, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī produced a large number of theological, philosophical and scientific works under Ismaili patronage and later amongst the Mongols.

Paradise of Submission (*Rawḍa-yi taslīm*), is Ṭūsī's most important and comprehensive Ismaili work. It consists of 27 chapters called *taṣawwurat* (meaning 'reflections' or 'representations') on a variety of themes such as the Creator and the cosmos, the nature of human existence, ethics and human relations, religion, eschatology, prophethood and imamate. Additionally, there are chapters on the varieties of human knowledge, the nature of language, different forms of worship, and the soul's progression from corporeality to spirituality.

The significance of this treatise arises not only from its comprehensive treatment of medieval Ismaili thought, with its characteristic synthesis of theology, philosophy and esotericism, but also from its unique status as the only major doctrinal work of the early Nizārī Ismailis to have survived the Mongol invasions of Iran in the 7th/13th century.

This new Persian edition and complete English translation of the *Rawḍa-yi taslīm* has been prepared by S. J. Badakhchani on the basis of several known as well as recently discovered manuscripts of the text, and accompanied with an introductory essay by Hermann Landolt and a philosophical commentary by Christian Jambet.

PARADISE OF SUBMISSION

The Institute of Ismaili Studies
Ismaili Texts and Translations Series, 5

Previously published titles:

1. Ibn al-Haytham, *The Advent of the Fatimids: A Contemporary Shi'i Witness*. An Edition and English Translation of Ibn al-Haytham's *Kitāb al-Munāẓarāt*, by Wilferd Madelung and Paul E. Walker (2000).
2. al-Shahrastānī, Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Karīm. *Struggling with the Philosopher: A Refutation of Avicenna's Metaphysics*. A New Arabic Edition and English Translation of al-Shahrastānī's *Kitāb al-Muṣāra'a*, by Wilferd Madelung and Toby Mayer (2001).
3. Ja'far b. Manṣūr al-Yaman, *The Master and the Disciple: An Early Islamic Spiritual Dialogue*. Arabic Edition and English translation of Ja'far b. Manṣūr al-Yaman's *Kitāb al-'Ālim wa'l-ghulām*, by James W. Morris (2001).
4. Idrīs 'Imād al-Dīn, *The Fatimids and their Successors in Yaman: The History of an Islamic Community*. Arabic Edition and English Summary of Idrīs 'Imād al-Dīn's *'Uyūn al-akhbār*, vol. 7, by Ayman Fu'ād Sayyid, in collaboration with Paul E. Walker and Maurice A. Pomerantz (2002).

Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī

Paradise of Submission

A Medieval Treatise on Ismaili Thought

A New Persian Edition and English Translation of Ṭūsī's

Rawḍa-yi taslīm

by S.J. Badakhchani

With an Introduction by Hermann Landolt
and Philosophical Commentary by Christian Jambet

I.B.Tauris *Publishers*
LONDON • NEW YORK
in association with
The Institute of Ismaili Studies
LONDON

Published in 2005 by I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd
6 Salem Rd, London W2 4BU
175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010
www.ibtauris.com

In association with The Institute of Ismaili Studies
42–44 Grosvenor Gardens, London SW1W OEB
www.iis.ac.uk

In the United States of America and in Canada distributed by
St Martin's Press, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010


ISBN 1 86064 436 8
EAN 978 1 86064 436 8

A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library
A full CIP record for this book is available from the Library of Congress

Library of Congress catalog card: available

Typeset in Minion Tra for The Institute of Ismaili Studies

Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin



The Institute of Ismaili Studies

The Institute of Ismaili Studies was established in 1977 with the object of promoting scholarship and learning on Islam, in the historical as well as contemporary contexts, and a better understanding of its relationship with other societies and faiths.

The Institute's programmes encourage a perspective which is not confined to the theological and religious heritage of Islam, but seeks to explore the relationship of religious ideas to broader dimensions of society and culture. The programmes thus encourage an interdisciplinary approach to the materials of Islamic history and thought. Particular attention is also given to issues of modernity that arise as Muslims seek to relate their heritage to the contemporary situation.

Within the Islamic tradition, the Institute's programmes seek to promote research on those areas which have, to date, received relatively little attention from scholars. These include the intellectual and literary expressions of Shiʿism in general, and Ismailism in particular.

In the context of Islamic societies, the Institute's programmes are informed by the full range and diversity of cultures in which Islam is practised today, from the Middle East, South and Central Asia, and Africa to the industrialised societies of the West, thus taking into consideration the variety of contexts which shape the ideals, beliefs and practices of the faith.

These objectives are realised through concrete programmes and activities organised and implemented by various departments of the Institute. The Institute also collaborates periodically, on a programme-specific basis, with other institutions of learning in the United Kingdom and abroad.

The Institute's academic publications fall into several distinct and interrelated categories:

1. Occasional papers or essays addressing broad themes of the relationship between religion and society in the historical as well as modern contexts, with special reference to Islam.
2. Monographs exploring specific aspects of Islamic faith and culture, or the contributions of individual Muslim figures or writers.
3. Editions or translations of significant primary or secondary texts.
4. Translations of poetic or literary texts which illustrate the rich heritage of spiritual, devotional and symbolic expressions in Muslim history.
5. Works on Ismaili history and thought, and the relationship of the Ismailis to other traditions, communities and schools of thought in Islam.
6. Proceedings of conferences and seminars sponsored by the Institute.
7. Bibliographical works and catalogues which document manuscripts, printed texts and other source materials.

This book falls into category three listed above.

In facilitating these and other publications, the Institute's sole aim is to encourage original research and analysis of relevant issues. While every effort is made to ensure that the publications are of a high academic standard, there is naturally bound to be a diversity of views, ideas and interpretations. As such, the opinions expressed in these publications must be understood as belonging to their authors alone.

Contents

Preface

When Wladimir Ivanow (1886–1970), the eminent pioneer of modern Ismaili studies, prepared the first edition and translation of Ṭūsī's *Rawḍa-yi taslīm* for publication, he was well aware of the defective nature of the two manuscripts at his disposal. In the Introduction to the book, he noted the numerous errors and discrepancies in the manuscripts that made the task of translation difficult for him. After a fruitless search for a more reliable text, he decided to proceed with the publication on the basis of the material he had at hand, in the expectation that 'my labours will not be completely wasted if, in the future, when good and older copies of this work are found, this my attempt would help the future student, and make his task easier.'[1] For the recovery and publication of this work and other foundational contributions to Ismaili studies, W. Ivanow deserves our most sincere gratitude.

The opportunity of identifying more accurate copies of the *Rawḍa-yi taslīm* came in 1981 when, during the course of my research on the Ismaili works of Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, I spoke to a group of friends in Mashhad of my efforts to find new manuscripts of the text. In response, Mr Ghiyāhth al-Dīn Mīrshahī, who was at the time a civil servant in Bīrjand, recalled the existence of a 'very old manuscript' in the possession of Mr Miḥrābī, a local leader of the Ismaili community in the village of Khushg near Bīrjand. Assenting to my request Mr Miḥrābī sent the manuscript to Mashhad, thus enabling me to make a photocopy of the text. This was, hitherto, the oldest known manuscript of the text, referred to here as

manuscript 'M'. Later in the same year, a copy of another manuscript 'Q' came to my attention while visiting Mr Akbar Karmali in Karachi. Subsequently these manuscripts, together with those consulted by Ivanow, formed the basis of a new critical edition of the *Rawḍa-yi taslīm* which I prepared for my doctoral thesis at the University of Oxford.[2]

At the time of my studies, I did not have access to another manuscript located in the Central Library of Tehran University that was identified by Prof. Hermann Landolt while attending the 800th anniversary celebrations of Ṭūsī's birth in 2001. My initial attempts to obtain a photocopy of this manuscript were not successful until I personally visited the Central Library in the summer of 2003 and was able (with the kind assistance of Dr Nasrullāh Pourjavadi, Director of the Iran University Press, and Mrs. Karam Riḍā'ī, the librarian), to make a copy of the *Rawḍa* and other Ismaili-related documents found in the collection (no. 8211), referred to here by the letter 'T'. It is indeed unfortunate that this codex contains only three of the 27 *taṣawwur* found in the other manuscripts of the *Rawḍa-yi taslīm*. Nonetheless, the fact that these chapters are among the longest and most problematic in the text with a number of properties unique to them has enabled the production of a more accurate edition and translation.

The oldest of these five manuscripts,[3] identified as 'M' from the name of Muḥammad al-Ṭūsī mentioned in the colophon, is dated 968/1560. This Muḥammad is not the copyist (who remains anonymous), but in all probability Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī himself. Written in good legible *nasta'līq* script, 'M' is the most carefully recorded manuscript of the *Rawḍa* to have been discovered so far. Its chapter headings are, in so far as I can judge from the copy at my disposal, in a different colour than the text. The text (which includes a number of fragmentary materials not part of the *Rawḍa*) comprises 127 folios (254 pages), with 18 lines of 8 centimetres length to each page. The first few pages, including the table of contents, are lost. Among the orthographical particularities of this manuscript are the writing of the Persian letters (*che* and *pe*) with one dot only, the addition of the word *istifhām* (question) at the end of some interrogative sentences, and the vocalisation of Arabic quotations.

The unique feature of manuscript 'M' is that it constitutes, in addition to Ṭūsī's 27 *taṣawwurāt*, twenty short treatises and fragments of between two and 18 pages scattered between different chapters of the text. The majority deal with the teachings or writings of the Ismaili Imams,

especially Ḥasan *'alā dhikrihi al-salām* (d.561/1166) and 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad (d. 653/1255), and there are several containing quotations of Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ (d. 518/1124). The fragments also include two *qaṣīda*s on the genealogy of the Imams, which mention Islam Shāh (d. around 829/1425) and Mustanṣir-bi'llāh II (d. 885/1480). Another interesting fragment of six pages, in a different handwriting, comes from the *Maqṣad al-aqṣā* of the Sufi thinker and scholar 'Azīz Nasafī (d. 7th/13th century).[4] The most likely explanation of the presence of these extraneous materials in the manuscript is that, owing to their inherent religious value, the scribe preserved them in the same codex as the *Rawḍa*, and they later became mixed up with the main text in the hands of those who later inherited it. It is also probable, as I have argued in my thesis (pp. 148–149) and discuss further below, that some of this material originated from Ṭūsī's autograph copy and may comprise the missing 28th *taṣawwur* which is mentioned but not included in the other manuscripts.[5]

Manuscript 'Q' was copied by Muḥammad b. Qāḍī Ṭayyib Parwāzī in the year 1175/1761 'in response to the request of the high position [and] dignified presence of Mīrzā Ūlūgh Beg and 'as a token of remembrance by the most humble servant of the rightly-guiding mission Khwāja Mīrzā Shāh.' This suggests that the copy was commissioned officially for use within the Nizārī Ismaili *da'wat* of the time. It consists of 131 folios (263 pages), of which page 43 is blank, with 11 to 14 lines to a page of 10–12 centimetre length. The *nasta'līq* script in which it is written, although a relatively inferior style, is on the whole legible and correct, except for the Arabic quotations which are arbitrarily vocalised. The text has been corrected in places, presumably by another hand, the mistakes being shown between the lines or in the margin, and some words and phrases are underlined.


In contrast to 'M' and 'Q', the manuscripts 'A' and 'B' that were available to Ivanow are of a more recent provenance. He described them as follows: 'The manuscript "A" ... is a volume of 129 pages, of mostly 21–22 lines to a page, 10 cm. long, closely written in that modern Badakhshānī handwriting which, though based on Central Asian models, shows much of Indian influence. Outside measurements are 23 by 15.5 cm., the text 17.5 by 10 cm. Transcribed in Baltīt by Ḥawlīdār Ṣafiyy Allāh Beg in 1353/1935 from an older copy dated 1177/1764, on Indian handmade paper, probably manufactured in Ahmadabad. The other copy, "B", is a volume of 239 pages (there are errors in pagination), on cheap English

foolscap paper, 32.5 by 20 cm., text: 22.5 by 12 cm., 14 lines to a page, in clumsy Badakhshānī handwriting, not very dissimilar in type to that of the first copy. Transcribed in 1342/1924, by Sayyid Munīr Muḥammad Qāsim Badakhshānī from the village of Khuf ... .'[6]

Manuscripts 'A' and 'B' probably have the same origin because it is only in these two manuscripts that the 28th *taṣawwur* is mentioned in their tables of content but missing in the text itself. The script in both cases is written in broken *nasta'līq* and the Arabic quotations are extremely distorted. There are, however, a few additional sentences in 'B' that are not found in 'A' or the other manuscripts, and it is unlikely that the copyist would have added them to the text. The transcription dates of the original version from which 'A' and 'Q' were copied are very close, 1175/1761 and 1177/1764 respectively, but since only the former mentions the 28th chapter, it may be deduced that they are derived from two different sources. Additional evidence supporting this conclusion lies in the existence of a number of sentences in 'A' that are missing in both 'Q' and 'M'. On the whole, manuscript 'Q' shows more affinity with 'M', both in correctness and precision of language, but it does not include any of the additional fragments contained in manuscript 'M'.

As for manuscript 'T' that was located most recently in Tehran, it forms part of a collection of 14 treatises comprising 148 folios, among which nine (nos. 4–8 and 10–13) are Ismaili works, attributed mostly to Ṭūsī, including a selection of the *Rawḍa* in no. 11.[7] It was copied by Muḥammad Shafī' son of Khwāja Muḥammad in fair *nasta'līq* and dated 1180/1767. Its outside measurements are 13.5 by 17 cm. The partial text follows the corresponding portion of manuscript 'M' fairly closely with minor differences that have been identified in the present edition. A particular feature of this manuscript, especially with regard to the 22nd *taṣawwur*, is that the scribe has amended the Persian translation of Arabic quotations by substituting some Arabic loan words commonly used in Iran with their Persian equivalents. This raises the possibility that the Persian translations may not have been part of the original text but inserted or modified subsequently by different generations of copyists. The existence of some Arabic quotations that remain untranslated in all the manuscripts appears to support this assumption.

The relationship between the five manuscripts and the present edition can be illustrated as follows:



One of the orthographical peculiarities of the *Rawḍa-yi taslīm*,[8] which was noted by Ivanow and has been preserved in various degrees by all the scribes, is its use of the conjunction and verbal prefix *hā*. Ivanow suggests that *hā* might have been either an abbreviated form of the Kurdish model particle *hāl*, or a dialect in Ṭūsī's speech that the copyists preserved out of extreme respect for him.[9] Since this verbal prefix also appears in the Persian translation of Shaykh al-Ṭūsī's[10] *al-Nihāya* (Tehran, 1343 Sh./1964), vol. 1, pp. 38, 42, etc., 'Abd al-Jalīl Qazwīnī Rāzī's[11] *al-Naqḍ* (Tehran, 1358s/1979), vol. 3, pp. 116, 302, 547, etc., as well in as the *Haft bāb-i Bābā Sayyidnā*,[12] which is now known to have been written by Ṭūsī's colleague and collaborator in the compilation of the *Rawḍa*, Ḥasan-i Maḥmūd, it would be safe to suggest that at the time of composition of these works, *hā* could have been a catchword or expletive in the dialect of the people of Qazwīn and north-western Iran (including Kurdistān, Ṭabaristān and Simnān),[13] and that in all probability it was Ḥasan-i Maḥmūd who added this verbal prefix to the text.

The informative colophon at the end of the oldest manuscript 'M' clearly indicates Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī's central role in the production of the *Rawḍa-yi taslīm*, as well as the collaboration of the 'chief of *dā'īs*' Ṣalāḥ al-Dawla wa al-Dīn Ḥasan-i Maḥmūd:

> On Tuesday in the middle of the month of Shawwāl in the year 640 [11th April 1243], and in the presence of the great master, chief of the *dā'īs*, Ṣalāḥ al-Dawla wa al-Dīn, master compiler of both poetry and prose (*munshī-yi jahān mubdi' al-naẓm wa al-nathr*), Ḥasan-i Maḥmūd – may his eminence continue – who is the compiler (*jāmi'*) of these highly useful, original, precious and incomparable themes of the mission (*da'wat*), an occasion arose

> to read the whole of this book and, in accordance with our aptitude, certain benefits were obtained.

This statement is of special significance because, in his closing remarks, as quoted by the scribe, although Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī claims that the whole book was narrated to him, he does not explicitly claim authorship of the work for himself, nor does he attribute it directly to Ḥasan-i Maḥmūd who is described as the 'compiler' of the text. In the Muslim tradition of authorship, the word *jāmi'* denotes someone who records, compiles and edits the work of someone else. This usually happens during the period of apprenticeship, a condition that could have not been applicable to Ḥasan-i Maḥmūd who, as his title suggests, was a senior dignitary of the Ismaili *da'wat*.

Ḥasan-i Maḥmūd (also known as Ḥasan-i Ṣalāḥ-i Munshī or Ḥasan-i Maḥmūd-i Kātib) was a highly talented poet whose *Dīwān-i Qā'imiyyāt*[14] has survived in a rare, hitherto unknown manuscript, the study of which is likely to throw fresh light on the intellectual and literary milieu of early Nizārī Ismailism before the advent of the Mongols. He is also to be acknowledged as the author of the prose *Haft bāb-i Bābā Sayyidnā*,[15] which has been wrongly attributed to Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ because of their common forename. A comparison between the style in the *Haft bāb*[16] which he composed in 602/1205, and the introduction to his *Dīwān-i Qā'imiyyāt* completed in 631/1233, shows many similarities of style. In the *Haft bāb* he states that he is not a good prose stylist and has no care for the niceties of literary form, which makes the probability of his being the author of *Rawḍa*, a precise, well-written and elaborate philosophical text, highly unlikely.

A fair assumption that would do justice to both Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī and Ḥasan-i Maḥmūd would be to accept the *Rawḍa-yi taslīm* as the outcome of some kind of an active, creative collaboration between them – that is to say, either the treatise is a collection of Ṭūsī's notes or lectures put together by Ḥasan-i Maḥmūd, or Ḥasan-i Maḥmūd served as an interlocutor and adviser to Ṭūsī on diverse issues, especially the doctrinal perspectives of the Ismaili *da'wat* of which, as mentioned, he was a senior official. Ṭūsī's acknowledgement of his colleague's contribution would seem to confirm the latter assumption. But the most reasonable explanation is that the poet performed multiple functions as a friend, guide, literary adviser and editor to the author.

As already noted, the singular feature of manuscript 'M' is that it contains a number of additional fragments. Christian Jambet has correctly observed, in his introduction to the French translation of *Rawḍa*, that some of this material differs in style, content and interpretation from the rest of the treatise.[17] Nonetheless, it is probable that one or two of these fragments comprised, in partial form at least, the material for the missing *taṣawwur 28*, which is mentioned only in the tables of content of manuscripts 'A' and 'B' available to Ivanow, but not found in any of the extant copies. The enigmatic status of this chapter requires further comment.

The descriptive heading given to this chapter according to Ivanow's edition ('On the questions which I have personally submitted to the August Hearing – may it never cease to listen [to the prayers of those in need] – and the answers which [the Imam] has given'), suggests that the seven-page document (pp. 243–249 of the ms.) containing the responses of the Ismaili Imam 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad to questions raised by Khwāja Muḥammad-i Bāsa'īd may have formed part of the missing chapter. The words attributed to the Imam appear to be a verbal transcript of his discourse and exhibit little or no intervention by the authors or the scribes. As is to be expected, Ismaili scholars are exceptionally careful not to alter the teachings of their Imams, which probably accounts for the fact that the recorder of these questions and answers left several sentences unfinished because he was unable to hear or recollect them adequately. The impression is given, therefore, of Ṭūsī and Ḥasan-i Maḥmūd intending to conclude their text with a chapter based upon this material, probably as a frame of reference rather than reproducing it verbatim, but for reasons unknown to us the chapter was either not completed or withdrawn from the text. In view of the close relevance to the *Rawḍa* of this fragment and another reporting the words of probably the same Imam (ms. pp. 193–194), the opportunity has been taken to publish them for the first time in the Annex to the present edition.

In this edition of *Rawḍa-yi taslīm*, apart from applying contemporary Persian orthographical conventions, I have corrected typographical errors, eliminated conjectural readings and, in a number of instances, reconstructed the text as indicated within square brackets in the original Persian and marked in the English translation. The most significant orthographical variations found in all the manuscripts, including some

changes introduced by W. Ivanow, are identified in the footnotes to the Persian text.

The English translation aims to be a close rendering of the original Persian text. Most technical terms in Arabic and Persian have been transliterated and italicised in parentheses, except for those words which have found their way into English dictionaries. Occasionally, to render a more coherent translation, I have added a word or phrase to the translation within square brackets. In the case of some key words and expressions that recur frequently or for which there are no precise English equivalents, I have preferred to retain them untranslated.

Since Ṭūsī was proficient in both Persian and Arabic, he expresses himself sporadically in Arabic. Occasionally, and this applies to the Arabic quotations taken from the Qur'an and other religious texts such as Imam 'Alī's *Nahj al-balāgha* and Imam Zayn al-'Ābidīn's *al-Ṣaḥīfa al-Ṣajjādiyya*, the text provides a Persian translation, which is reminiscent of Ṭūsī's style in the *Akhlāq-i muḥtashimī;* but as mentioned previously, these may have been inserted or amended by the scribes at a later stage. To avoid repeating these lines in English, I have in most cases translated directly from the Arabic, and Ṭūsī's gloss has been transferred to the notes where necessary. In so far as possible, Prophetic Traditions and sayings of the Imam have been identified in the English version. In a number of cases where Ṭūsī rephrases or amalgamates quotations, they have been left in their original form.

The system of transliteration adopted for Persian and Arabic scripts is a modified version of the one used in the new edition of the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, except for the letters d̲j̲, ḳ and č which have been replaced by *j*, *q* and *ch*, and the ligatures have also been dispensed with.

Dates are given according to both the Islamic and Christian calendars; in the notes and bibliography some publication dates are given according to the solar Islamic calendar in use in Iran and are marked 'Sh.' for Shamsī.

To facilitate cross-reference between the Persian and English texts, passages that deal with a single idea or with a cluster of related ideas have been numbered identically with [§].

I have consulted various editions and translations of the Qur'an for the purpose of this publication, but the verse numbers which are given only in the English translation follow Yusuf Ali's system.

Finally, it is my pleasure to acknowledge with deep gratitude the

generous assistance of many good friends and colleagues in producing this edition and translation of the *Rawḍa-yi taslīm*, both during my doctoral studies at Oxford University and subsequently its publication by The Institute of Ismaili Studies. The names of those who facilitated my search for new manuscripts of the text in Iran and Pakistan have already been mentioned earlier in this Preface. Additionally, I wish to record the considerable contributions of my academic supervisor at Oxford, Prof. Wilferd Madelung, as well as Dr Julie Scott Meisami and the late John Cooper for their keen interest and involvement in the early stages of the project; Prof. Hermann Landolt, whose advice in the finalisation of the Persian and English texts has been invaluable, and who has also contributed an Introduction to this book; Prof. Christian Jambet for permission to reproduce an abridged version of his Introduction to the French translation of the *Rawḍa* in the form of a Philosophical Commentary, together with Hafiz Karmali for rendering the same into English; as well as Dr Leonard Lewisohn for his help in converting difficult passages of the Persian into lucid English. I would also like to extend my thanks to Prof. Azim Nanji and Dr Farhad Daftary for sponsoring and encouraging the publication of this work; my colleagues Dr Faquir M. Hunzai, Hamid Haji and M.R. Jozi for their assistance; Kutub Kassam for his meticulous editing of the English text; and Nadia Holmes for preparing the manuscript for press.

My words of appreciation would be incomplete were I not to mention the support and inspiration that I received from my wife, Parichehr, without whom this work would not have materialised.

J.B.

Introduction

Hermann Landolt

The *Paradise of Submission* (*Rawḍa-yi taslīm*), also known as the *Taṣawwurāt* due to the key-word *taṣawwur* ('conception' or 'thought') which invariably introduces the title of each of its twenty-seven chapters,[1] is a masterful compendium of medieval Ismaili thought. More specifically, it is a unique source for the study of ideas and doctrines held by the Nizārī Ismailis under the second-to-last Lord of Alamūt, 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad III (r. 618–53/1221–55). As such, it reflects the vision of Islam that distinguished the Nizārīs at a time when two seemingly contradictory events in their recent history needed to be interpreted and harmonised: the proclamation of the Resurrection (*qiyāmat*) by Ḥasan II (known to Ismailis as Ḥasan *'alā dhikrihi al-salām*) in 559/1164 and the restoration of the formal observation of the *sharī'at* under Jalāl al-Dīn Ḥasan III in 607/1210. The *sharī'at* is evidently recognised in our text (paras 426–53), though only as a form taken by the spiritual Truth (*ḥaqāyiq*) in this material world of relative values (*iḍāfāt*) and is discussed at length in terms of the 'seven pillars of Islam' along classical Fatimid lines of interpretation. The present time, the author suggests (para 345), is a new 'epoch of concealment' (*rūzgār-i satr*), and as the Imams themselves have imposed 'prudence' (*taqiyya*) as a religious duty, the inner truth (*ḥaqīqat*) must remain hidden in the hearts of the believers. By referring to an 'epoch of concealment', he is apparently alluding to ancient mythological conceptions of cyclical time in Ismaili 'hiero-history',[2] which are explained earlier in the text (paras 173–75 and

319–21). These 'cycles' (*dawr*, pl. *adwār*) are, however, of rather cosmic dimensions since they involve altogether seven times seven thousand years, with major periods dominated by the rule of Prophetic Law or 'concealment' (*dawr-i satr*), being both preceded and followed each time by periods of Resurrection or 'unveiling' (*dawr-i kashf*). Yet, despite his appeal to 'concealment' and 'prudence' as applicable to the present time, our author is remarkably eloquent about the eternal reality manifest in the person of the Imam of the time (*muḥiqq-i waqt*), the ever present manifestation of the divine 'Word' (*kalima-yi a'lā*) or 'Command' (*amr*; e.g. paras 266–7 1, 330, 350–82), and he clearly reasserts the position of Ḥasan *'alā dhikrihi al-salām* as the 'Lord of Resurrection' (*qā'im*) who came 500 plus forty years after the Prophet as the 'second blast of the trumpet of the Resurrection' (i.e., forty years after Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ, d. 518/1124, the 'first blast of the trumpet'; paras 475–82).

Completed, as we now know, in 640/1243 under the supervision of a high-ranking Nizārī official, and with the written approval of the famous scholar Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (597–672/1201–74), this compendium undoubtedly owes something to Ṭūsī's own teaching at Alamūt. As is known,[3] Ṭūsī had spent nearly thirty years of his life as a protégé of the Nizārīs during the Mongol invasions of Persia. The Nizārī state was then still in a position to offer attractive libraries and relative security even to outside scholars, while Khwarazm and much of eastern Persia had already been conquered and severely devastated by the Mongols. It was, however, weakened not only by the pressure of the advancing Mongols and a generally hostile environment, but also by serious internal tensions within its leadership, which eventually led to the murder of the Imam 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad III in 653/1255, and, only one year later, to the surrender of his youthful successor, Rukn al-Dīn Khurshāh, to Hülegü. The downfall of the Nizārī strongholds of course affected the condition of the Persian Ismailis in the first place, but it also opened the way for the Mongol sack of Baghdad and the effective overthrow of the Abbasid caliphate in 656/1258.

Ṭūsī had evidently been a personal admirer of 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad III, whom he praised in a poem as the 'lord of mankind' (*mawlā al-anām*), suggesting that those devoted to him, having recognised his noble aim, will be triumphant in the ultimate world.[4] We also know that he exchanged correspondence on questions of philosophical theology with another personal protégé of this Nizārī Imam: the Sufi

Shaykh Jamāl al-Dīn al-Jīlī (or Gīlī, Gīlakī, d. 651/1253), one among the famous 'twelve disciples' of Najm al-Dīn al-Kubrā (d. 618/1221), who was residing in nearby Qazwin.[5] Under Rukn al-Dīn Khurshāh, however, Ṭūsī apparently judged the situation at Alamūt to have become totally untenable and chose to offer his services to the new masters of Persia. Disclaiming then any sympathies he might have had for the Ismailis, he soon became what he is mostly remembered for in Iran: a wise and powerful vizier in the Īlkhānid administration, a great scientist and astronomer, and a highly respected Twelver Shīʿī theologian and philosopher.[6] Yet the original versions of his most famous philosophical works such as the *Nasirean Ethics* and the *Asās al-iqtibās* (both in Persian), or the Arabic Commentary on Avicenna's *Ishārāt wa-tanbīhāt*, which was written mainly in defence of Avicenna against the 'misunderstandings' of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209), as well as several works on astronomy[7] were all written during his long-standing association with the Ismailis. During the same period he also wrote several small treatises revealing a profound Ismaili consonance in his own thinking, including an autobiography known as *Sayr wa Sulūk*. The latter leaves very little doubt indeed that he himself had adopted Ismailism at that time out of conviction, and it is accepted as one of his writings even by those who are reluctant to recognise it as a genuine expression of his religious allegiance.[8] But the case of the *Paradise of Submission* is quite different, not least because of its unusual style. Indeed it was mainly for linguistic and stylistic reasons that the distinguished Iranian expert on Ṭūsī's writings, M.T. Mudarris Raḍawī, rejected the attribution of this work to his pen categorically.[9]

Preserved within the Ismaili community up to the present day in manuscript copies ascribing it to Ṭūsī, our Persian text was published for the first time in 1950 thanks to the pioneering efforts of Wladimir Ivanow, along with an English translation and a lengthy introduction.[10] This previous edition was, however, based on two very late and defective manuscripts only; and the English translation, apart from being rather approximate in many places, could hardly be said to have been congenial. Better and older manuscripts having come to light in the meantime it became an urgent and challenging task for Ismaili scholarship to prepare a new edition and translation, and to gain a clearer picture of what Ṭūsī's own role in its production may actually have been. If as a result it has now been possible to present the *Paradise of Submission* on a more reliable

basis, this is first and foremost thanks to Dr Jalal Badakhchani's sustained research work, which was submitted for in an earlier version in 1987 as a PhD dissertation to the University of Oxford. Dr Badakhchani's 1987 text edition, partial translation and introduction led subsequently to the first modern translation into French by Christian Jambet, which was published with a new introduction and notes as *La convocation d'Alamût: Somme de philosophie ismaélienne* (Lagrasse, 1996). Professor Jambet's philosophical analysis as contained in his introduction has been made available in an abridged English version for the present volume as well (cf. Appendix), which, thus, in a sense constitutes the third stage of an ongoing process. Based now on five manuscripts, the present publication offers a newly revised edition of the Persian text along with a new translation, which aims to render the original as faithfully as possible while making it accessible in modern, readable English.

As is explained in more detail in the editor's Preface, the oldest manuscript known so far is a copy made according to its colophon in 968/1560 (referred to as 'M'). This copy has been preserved in separate portions of text found in various parts of a unique codex of Ismaili writings, which apparently contained the *Paradise of Submission* originally as its first item. However, an unknown number of folios at the beginning was evidently replaced at some point with nine folios containing two other items, namely, six pages of an extract from the *Maqṣad-i aqṣā* of the Sufi writer 'Azīz-i Nasafī,[11] followed by nine pages of poetry on the genealogy of Ismaili Imams up to al-Mustanṣir bi'llah II (also known as Shāh Qalandar under his Sufi name, d. ca. 885/1480). As a result, the text begins abruptly on p. 15 in the middle of *Taṣawwur* 3 (para 34), so that the preamble, the table of contents, all of the first two chapters and part of *Taṣawwur* 3 are unfortunately missing. Among other items contained in various places in this codex there are also some pieces of questions and answers which may cast a light on the milieu in which the *Paradise of Submission* was compiled or transmitted at an early stage without being part of it. They are not designated as *taṣawwur* in the manuscript; and there is no need to assume that they originally belonged to the mysterious *Taṣawwur* 28 whose very existence is suggested only by the table of contents of the manuscripts used by Ivanow. Two among these items, on spiritual oneness with the Imam[12] and on the hierarchy of knowledge,[13] have been added in the present volume as an Annex, as in the French translation by Christian Jambet.

One of the unique features of the manuscript copy M is that its colophon, placed at the end of *Taṣawwur* 27, reproduces a note written according to the copyist by Ṭūsī himself at the end of the *Rawḍa-yi taslīm*. Ṭūsī thereby in effect attested that he had read the entire work in the presence of its compiler (*jāmi'*), a high-placed dignitary, chief *dā'ī* and well-known writer of poetry and prose by name of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Ḥasan-i Maḥmūd, on Tuesday, 15th Shawwāl 640/7th April, 1243 (for a literal translation see pp. 170–171). This attestation appears to be genuine enough (the 15th of Shawwāl 640 A.H. was indeed a Tuesday!) and is certainly evidence of Ṭūsī's own involvement with this text. At the very least, it would seem to imply that he was being consulted when the final text was about to be released. However, its wording in no way establishes him as the author of the work. On the contrary, he rather seems to be delegating responsibility for it to Ḥasan-i Maḥmūd by referring explicitly to him as the 'compiler' – a term which could also mean 'author'[14] – and by congratulating this important *dā'ī* very politely for spiritual benefits obtained from it 'in accordance with his own aptitude'.

On the other hand, the heading of the preamble (which is not extant in 'M', as indicated above) certainly suggests to begin with that this work belongs to the discourse (*kalām*) of Ṭūsī himself. But then this heading was obviously added at some later stage, and the identity of the writer of the preamble remains unclear. Was it indeed Ṭūsī himself, or someone else, who introduced this text by indicating that it was he who 'transferred from speech to writing' whatever he had recorded and established in his mind from these 'thoughts' (*taṣawwurāt*), according to his own understanding; that he put it all into the form of a compilation (*majmū'a*), gave it the title *Paradise of Submission*, and sent it to 'dearest brother Badr al-Dīn Ḥusayn'[15] for consideration by the 'noble leaders of religion'? Ivanow's version, to be sure, has the writer of the preamble identify himself as 'Muḥammad b. Ḥasan-i Ṭūsī' (meaning, of course, Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Ḥasan-i Ṭūsī); but this dubious self-identification is not supported by the best available manuscripts ('Q' and 'A'), and has accordingly been omitted in the present edition.[16]

Now if the preamble was not written by Ṭūsī himself, then this obviously means that neither was he the one who put these *taṣawwurāt* into writing. This would seem to leave us again with the 'compiler' Ḥasan-i Maḥmūd to whom Ṭūsī himself refers in his attestation. Certain linguistic peculiarities found right from the beginning in the preamble as well as

here and there in the main body of the text, notably the frequent use of the dialectal particle *hā* which is a feature of all five extant manuscripts, make it unlikely anyway that Ṭūsī should have personally written down the text as we have it. This particle, which Ivanow had tried to explain as possibly reflecting Ṭūsī's own dialect, is not used by him in any of his unquestionably authentic Persian writings, Ismaili or otherwise, whereas it is found in such texts as the *Haft bāb-i Bābā Sayyidnā*, a much shorter Nizārī compendium that was written some forty years earlier.[17] A connection between the *Paradise of Submission* and this earlier Nizārī work can moreover be suggested on the basis of Dr Badakhchani's interesting observation that the *Haft bāb-i Bābā Sayyidnā* was in all probability written by the same Ḥasan-i Maḥmūd as an introduction to a collection of his own poetry, the as yet unpublished *Qā'imiyyāt*. Consequently, the possibility that this important *dā'ī* and established Nizārī writer of poetry and prose may have actually written down the *Paradise of Submission* himself, or, if the 'thoughts' were indeed Ṭūsī's own, that he rephrased them in his capacity as 'compiler' or first editor, can certainly not be excluded.

Such editorial work by Ḥasan-i Maḥmūd, or perhaps a team of editors directed by him and working with Ṭūsī in the background, would explain not only certain stylistic and linguistic oddities; it could also account for some unusually 'extremist' traditions cited in our text, for example the one about 'Alī as a world-conqueror (paras 473–74), which is found in the *Haft bāb-i Bābā Sayyidnā* in the first place.[18] Moreover, the way certain philosophical issues are presented also suggests that the editor must at times have exercised a certain discretionary power to suit his own taste or that of the intended readership. One case in point is the very short *Taṣawwur* 4, which squarely identifies the Prime Intellect with the Agent Intellect (*'aql-i fa''āl*). This identification, which is in accordance with Ismaili conceptions as defined by Nāṣir-i Khusraw (d. after 465/1072–73),[19] not only contradicts Ṭūsī's usual Avicennism; it also contrasts with other parts of our text itself, such as the discussion in *Taṣawwur* 2, which includes brief reminders of the classical Avicennian cosmology of the ten Intellects (with the Agent Intellect being the tenth from above; cf. paras 15, 18–20, 25–27). Similarly, the cosmology presented in *Taṣawwurāt* 5–7, with Intellect, Soul, Nature and Matter as major hypostasies, simply reproduces a Neoplatonic model such as the one known from the *Rasā'il Ikhwān al-Ṣafā'*, rather than offering

new philosophical or scientific arguments one might expect to see in an original work of Ṭūsī's, although he may well have accepted to go along with it for the purpose of this compendium. This model was basically shared by many Ismaili thinkers prior to Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-Kirmānī (d. after 411/1020), and subsequently restored in Persian Ismailism by Nāṣir-i Khusraw.[20]

An instructive example of what possibly comes close to a faithful reproduction of Ṭūsī's own 'discourse' at Alamūt can be seen in the sophisticated series of questions and answers that constitute *Taṣawwurāt* 1 and 2. *Taṣawwur* 1 argues the case for monotheism in a rational and subtle way which leads inevitably to the Ismaili thesis that ordinary rational arguments for the existence of God are at best incomplete and at worst equivalent to self-assertion or unbelief (*kufr*), because the utterly transcendent divine in itself cannot be proven by human reason and only the divine 'Command' or 'Imperative' (*amr*) can be recognised in the person of its holder (*mawlā, walī al-amr*), i.e. the Imam. This, then, leads to the extensive discourse in *Taṣawwur* 2 on the divine *amr* as the 'first cause' of existence in a metaphysical and cosmological sense. As is known, the position of the divine *amr* as a distinct metaphysical entity between God and the Prime Intellect was a more or less common feature of classical Ismaili thought prior to Kirmānī, and was taken up again by Nāṣir-i Khusraw.[21] This may be significant in itself as it would seem to indicate that Nizārī doctrine with its insistence on the 'present Imam' as manifestation of the divine *amr* was following this particular line rather than Kirmānī's, who systematically sought to de-emphasise whatever could give rise to 'temptations of divinity' (especially in the Druze case), and whose refined thought had on the whole a much greater impact on Ṭayyibī than on Nizārī doctrine. More importantly for our purpose, this chapter is indeed consistent with Ṭūsī's own thought, not only because of its Avicennian components, but precisely because of the philosophical necessity of the divine *amr* and its oneness that is being demonstrated. In fact, Ṭūsī himself argued succinctly and logically in his *Sayr wa Sulūk* for the metaphysical and epistemological necessity of this intermediary between God and the Prime Intellect. He there suggests that the philosophers, in ignoring it, simply failed to think through the consequences of their own emanationist system, and makes it clear that it was this doctrine of the *amr* which convinced him of the superiority of Ismailism in the first place.[22] A question of compatibility may, however,

arise with the Ismaili solution offered in *Taṣawwur* 3 to the age-old problem of how the many proceed from the One. This was an extremely important issue for Ṭūsī, who developed a mathematical model of his own in a number of treatises, including several pages of the *Commentary* on Avicenna's *Ishārāt*, in order to demonstrate that only one can indeed proceed directly from the One, as Avicenna had taught.[23] Although even in this philosophical *Commentary* the one emerging directly from the One is arguably the creative *amr* rather than the Intellect, as has been shown elsewhere,[24] the solution offered in *Taṣawwur* 3 is nevertheless somewhat different in nature, and indeed quite original. The Ismailis, our text suggests, put both the ordinary theologians (para 30) and the philosophers (para 31) in their place by arguing, first of all, that an emergence of anything from God can neither be asserted nor denied absolutely, so that no humanly conceivable solution will ever be absolutely true; and since the divine *amr* 'shines equally' upon all creation and existence, all individuals will ultimately depend on their relative existential rank and point of view. Therefore, only the Intellect is bound to say: 'only one can issue from the One', whereas the Soul (being placed in between Intellect and Body) will say: 'one *and* many issue from the One', and the Body can only say: 'nothing can issue from the One but the many'!

The main purpose of our compendium is not, however, to explain the origin of the universe, but to provide an all-inclusive orientation on man's place in this world and his ultimate becoming. This theme begins in *Taṣawwur* 8, on the human soul, which is essentially a summary of Avicennian notions of the soul, especially the human soul as an indivisible, immaterial substance governing the body and receiving intellectual forms (paras 51–4 and 57ff.). At the same time, it contains an interesting passage (paras 55–6) on the 'imaginal soul' (*nafs-i khayālī*) as an intermediary between the animal soul and the human soul, or between the sensible and the intelligible domains, and on the role of an 'imaginal body' (or shape, *hay'at*) retained by the soul after physical death. This passage actually prepares the ground for an original philosophy of bodily resurrection – 'bodily' in the sense in which the soul can be said to become the 'matter' of higher spiritual 'forms' it acquires in the process of its actualisation (cf. paras 63–64) – which is explained in more detail in *Taṣawwur* 21 (cf. paras 242 and 257ff.) and constitutes one of the major themes of this work. Although a somewhat similar idea about imagination surviving the death of the body can be found in Avicenna,[25]

the way it is put here considerably modifies Avicennian intellectualism and is not, in fact, taken from Avicenna. The whole passage, including the cryptic statement that 'in this world human beings are spiritual beings clothed in corporeal bodies, while in the next they are corporeal beings clothed in spirituality' (para 56) is clearly taken from one of the 'answers' given by Shahrastānī's 'Ḥanīfs' to the pagan philosophers called 'Sabians' in his *al-Milal wa'l-niḥal* (completed by 521/1127),[26] that is to say, doubtless from the unknown Ismaili source used by Shahrastānī for this famous 'dialogue';[27] and it is worth pointing out that the entire final chapter of our compendium reproduces that same source as well, and as a whole. As was noted by Hodgson,[28] a likely common source for Shahrastānī's 'dialogue' and the final chapter of our compendium is one of the lost writings of Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ (d. 518/1124) himself, especially as his doctrine of *ta'līm*, which is also known from Shahrastānī's *Milal*, is expressly evoked in paras 477f., just before the final *Taṣawwur* 27 begins. The ostensible purpose of this final chapter is to prove the superiority of the final outcome of creation, that is to say, the human being composed of spirit and body, over purely celestial or spiritual beings supposed to be closer to God. By implication, its purpose is evidently to show the appropriateness of worshipping God through the perfect manifestation of the Prime Intellect in a human body – in other words, the *ḥujjat*, the immediate deputy of the Imam (paras 514–8; cf. 254, 330, 356, 384, 399–401); and the *ḥujjat par excellence*, our text suggests, was no one else than Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ (cf. para 477). All this would seem to indicate that the spiritual teaching dispensed in our compendium owes probably more to Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ's doctrine than appears on the surface. Of course Ṭūsī may very well have enriched it with his own philosophical contributions, and cleverly woven it together with his Avicennism; but he was certainly not the only weaver of the carpet.

This Nizārī dispensation involves first of all a fundamentally Gnostic distinction between two totally different groups (cf. especially paras 129–34, 193ff., 238): the 'followers of truth' (*ahl-i ḥaqq* or *muḥiqqān*) and the 'followers of falsehood' (*mubṭilān*), also simply called the 'opponents' or 'people of discord' (*ahl-i taḍādd*). The 'followers of truth' are, however, themselves sub-divided into the 'people of unity' (*ahl-i waḥdat*) on one hand, and the 'people of gradation' (*ahl-i tarattub*) on the other, so that we have in fact a tripartite division of mankind, in accordance with a famous wisdom-saying traditionally attributed to 'Alī (cf. paras

80–82), and which also corresponds to the general distinction between Intellect, Soul and Body (paras 117f., 218–20, 262). The 'people of unity', that is, the Imam and the supreme *ḥujjat*, are those who have never left the domain of Oneness and Necessary Existence in reality, even though they do appear in flesh and blood depending on the circumstances in this material world of 'relativity' (paras 238, 262); they therefore have no need to 'return' (*ma'ād*) to their original domain. As for the 'opponents' or 'followers of falsehood', they have no 'return' to that domain either, but for opposite reasons: they never had any real 'origin' in the first place and are forever condemned to pure non-existence (*imtinā'*; cf. paras 229, 238 and 262). Thus, only the intermediary group, the 'people of gradation', have a chance as well as a duty to 'return' to the uncontaminated state of origin which is frequently referred to as *fiṭrat*, a Qur'anic term which has also philosophical connotations. These people are, of course, the rank and file of the Nizārī *da'wat*. The fact that they appear to be identical with the 'followers of religious law' (*ahl-i shar'*, para 118) does not contradict this point; it simply confirms the acceptance of the *sharī'at* by the Nizārīs in the sense briefly indicated at the beginning of this introduction.

The tripartite division of mankind is sometimes replaced by a four-fold structure, implying a difference between the *ḥujjat* and the Imam, especially where the hierarchy of knowledge (*Taṣawwur* 13; cf. also paras 390ff. and 454) and the structure of existence itself (*Taṣawwur* 20 and 21) are concerned. In one passage (para 235), the history of the Nizārī *da'wat* appears to be envisioned in terms of a gradual development in four stages, beginning with the summons to Paradise by the Prophet, and ending up with the summons to the 'Lord [of Resurrection] (*khudā*)'. The first summons required only the sacrifice of 'body and wealth' on the part of those being summoned. The second, namely, the call to 'knowledge' (meaning probably 'Alī) required in addition their sacrifice of 'anger and lust'. The third, which was the call to 'somebody' (*kasī*, meaning probably Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ, i.e. the *ḥujjat* also referred to as *kasī* in para 268), required in addition the sacrifice of their 'knowledge and intellect', while the fourth and final call, totalling all the previous requirements, was conditioned by their forsaking 'their own selves' (*khudī-yi khud*).

Although the message conveyed in this passage is highly allusive, and subject to different interpretations, it is important because it seems to provide a structural link between the self-image of the community on one hand, and, on the other, a more generalised philosophy of resurrection

through 'submission' (*taslīm*) which animates the whole compendium and constitutes indeed the main theme of *Taṣawwurāt* 20–24. As briefly outlined in paras 221–30, this philosophy involves the notions of a spiritual ascent (*taraqqī*, also called *mi'rāj* in para 283), from the animated material body to the 'resurrectional Intellect' (*'aql-i qiyāmatī*), and a gradual motion of existence itself (*wujūd*) towards perfection both material and spiritual, with every lower level of creation serving as 'body of resurrection' for the immediately superior one to which it 'submits' (cf. especially paras 257 and 300ff.).

It is not the purpose of this introduction to discuss this philosophy in any detail. A word on its significance as a Shi'i philosophy of resurrection may, however, be in order. As such, it could be seen as marking a transition between the radically 'resurrectionist' thought of Abu Ya'qūb al-Sijistānī (4th/10th century)[29] and the philosophy of 'being-toward-resurrection' elaborated much later by the celebrated Twelver Shi'i thinker Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī (d. 1050/1640–41).[30] It is not known whether the *Paradise of Submission* was available to Ṣadrā, but there is, in any case, a remarkable affinity between the philosophical ideas given expression in our text and Ṣadrā's key idea of the soul as being engaged in a process of actualisation and transformation from 'bodily origination' to 'spiritual permanence', or from being the 'form' of the body in this world to becoming the 'matter' of spiritual forms in the other.[31] On the other hand, it has been shown that Ṣadrā got much of his inspiration on eschatological matters from a definitely authentic treatise by Ṭūsī, the *Āghāz wa Anjām*, although he never identifies this source either.[32] What is remarkable about this mystical treatise on 'The Beginning and the End' is that, although not an explicitly Ismaili work like the *Paradise of Submission*, it is, in fact, replete with allusions to Ismaili ideas and specifically Nizārī terminology[33] – a fact which could hardly have escaped the attention of Twelver Shi'i readers. Even so, it was accepted already by the Shi'i Sufi Ḥaydar-i Āmulī (d. after 787/1385) as one of the highlights of 'esoteric' doctrine.[34] Thus, given Ṭūsī's knowledge of Ismailism, his personal involvement with the Nizārīs, and his influence as a Twelver Shi'i thinker later in his career, he could well have played an important role as a transmitter of originally Ismaili ideas to later Twelver Shi'i thought.

Rawḍa-yi taslīm
Paradise of Submission

He is God Almighty,
God, the Opener of all doors.
O Lord, make the task easier,
not more difficult.

This is the book *Rawḍa-yi taslīm*,[1] [consisting] of the lectures of the chief missionary (*dāʿī al-duʿāt*) and master of creation (*khwāja-yi kāʾināt*), chosen by the lord of the worlds, supporter of religion and faith, the scholar of Ṭūs, Muḥammad [Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī], may the mercy of God be upon him.

Preamble

Dearest brother Badr al-Dīn Ḥusayn,[2] may Allāh protect him and grant him success.

Following the recital of [my] salutations and greetings, may he [be pleased to] know that I have recorded from the deliberations (*taṣawwurāt*) concerning the origin (*mabda'*) and return (*ma'ād*) of man, ethics (*akhlāq*) and human relations (*mu'āmalāt*), what has been established in the mind of this most humble servant of the Ismaili mission (*da'wat*),[3] according to the measure of his deficient understanding and comprehension. This is because any oral discourse which is transferred from speech to writing will be better placed in the imagination, and from imagination it will better reach critical comprehension, whence it is better consolidated in the memory, and where – if God Almighty so wills – it will be better preserved.

It was my wish to send a little of this discourse to my dearest brother – may God protect him – so that he might read and benefit from it. God Almighty grants success to [His] servants and is the Guide to the right path.

Although the aim of this humble servant in making this compilation, which he has named *Rawḍa-yi taslīm*, was [primarily] that God may accept intercession for his imperfect soul through it, nevertheless, should it happen to be quoted in the assemblies of the noble leaders of religion and in the gatherings of the people of certainty, and be honoured by their consideration, the hope of this humble [servant] – who in this world is proud of their affection and likewise covets salvation in the Hereafter through the same means – is that, if they notice an oversight or error, in either expression or meaning, they will correct the defect, not blame [him] for its faults, thus earning heavenly rewards, if God Almighty so wills.

May God Almighty bless everyone with the benefit of what they know and the knowledge of what is beneficial to them. Praise be to God, and praise belongs to the thankful. Amen, O Lord of the worlds.[4]

Taṣawwur 1

Refutation of the argument of one who denies the Creator, the Sublime, the Exalted, or maintains that there are two deities or two eternal beings, and [demonstrating] that human beings cannot establish a proof for His existence.

[§1] If, God forbid, someone should voice his denial of the Creator (*ṣāniʿ*), the Sublime, the Exalted, he should be asked: 'Do the things of this world [exist] by themselves or through something else?' If he says that all [exist] by themselves, he has asserted that all are necessarily existent, because the meaning of the Necessary Existent (*wājib al-wujūd*) is that which exists by itself (*hast bi-khwud*).[5] And if he says that their existence depends on something else, that also would imply the existence of a Necessary Existent, because the Necessary Existent is that by which these things exist.

[§2] Again, he should be asked: 'Is there a cause for the things that have come, and are coming, into existence or not?' Inevitably, he will say, 'There must be [such a cause].' Then one should ask: 'Are you yourself that cause or is someone else?' If he says, 'It is I,' he has admitted that there is a god [as he has also if he says that it is someone else]. In both cases he has confessed to the existence of a god even though he may not be aware of his own confession.

[§3] The infidel (*kāfir*) is not called thus because he says there is no god (*khudā*); no infidel or polytheist (*mushrik*) says or has ever said that there is no god.

> Infidelity and religion, both are trotting along Thy path,
> Ever-repeating 'He is the One who has no partners.'[6]

He is called *kāfir* because the word '*kufr*' means 'to cover up', meaning that he has concealed from himself (*bar khwud bāz mipūshad*) what he cannot know; that is, he conceals his need of the Guardian-Lord of the [Divine] Command (*walī al-amr*) on God's behalf. He remains at the initial common creatural confession (*iqrār-i ʿāmm-i khalqī*) – [as said in the Qur'ān], '*If you ask them who has created them, they will certainly say, "God"*' (43: 87) – and refuses [to accept] the second exclusive confession [pertaining to the realm] of the Divine Command (*iqrār-i khāṣṣ-i amrī*) which – in accordance with [the revealed word], '*Allāh is the Master*

(mawlā)[7] *of those who believe, and the infidels have no Master' (lā mawlā lahum)*(47: 11) – distinguishes the infidel from the believer. He undoubtedly attains to the first, but does not reach the second confession; thus he is called an infidel.[8]

[§4] Similarly, if someone, God forbid, were to say, 'There are two deities,' he should be asked: 'These two of which you speak, are they always separate from each other?' Because if they are not separate from each other, they are one and not two. [Then, if he answers in the affirmative, he should be asked]: 'Now, if in your judgement, they are two, tell us whether their wills coincide? Are they equal in existence, power (*qudrat*) and omniscience (*iḥāṭat*), or is one superior to the other?' If he says, 'Their wills coincide, without any excess or deficiency,' then what is the sense of saying that they are two? And if he says that they disagree in their volition, it would necessarily mean that the same object [may] live and exist according to the will of one of them, and die and become extinct according to [the will of] the other, so that the same object is both alive and existent, and dead and non-existent (*ma'dūm*), at the same time. This is [called] the opposition of mutual contradiction (*muqābala-yi taḍādd*).[9]

[§5] [Again, the question may be posed]: 'Are they independent or is each in need of the other? If you say that both are independent of each other, it would entail that each of them is by its own essence (*dhāt*) a god, and to each one belongs a separate realm of command (*amr*) and creation (*khalq*), a separate realm of reward (*thawāb*) and punishment (*'iqāb*), and a separate heaven and hell, and that is impossible. If you were to say both are equal in existence, power and wisdom, then what would be the point of asserting that they are two? [And] if you were to say that one of them is superior to the other, this would necessitate an opposition of gradation (*muqābala-yi tarattub*) between the two, the meaning of gradation being that, [of two objects of the same kind], one is better than the other.

'Thus, it is established that of the two alternatives, one implies the opposition of mutual contradiction and the other a confrontation of gradation. But He, the Exalted, is far beyond contradiction and exalted above gradation.

'[On the other hand], if you were to say both are in need of each other, it would necessarily mean that each of them is, in some way, the creation of the other.'

[§6] 'Again, with regard to independence (*istighnā*) and need (*iḥtiyāj*), tell us, are they equal or different? If they are equal, it necessarily means that two gods exist, each in itself being both independent and needful, omnipotent and powerless. If you say that they are different, it necessarily means that they are two gods, one good and the other better. This is obviously an outrageous absurdity.

[§7] 'Again, this duality can be said to be through an attribute (*ṣifat*) [of the Divine]. Tell us, is that attribute through which the gods are two divine or created? If you say it is divine, it is applicable to one god only, or a different attribute is required [for the second deity]. And if you say the attribute is created, it necessarily means that – since it is inappropriate for an attribute of the essence of the exalted One to be created – this cannot be the attribute of the exalted One. Here the absurdity becomes even more outrageous, and the circles of error and confusion become so interwoven that none can make heads or tails of them.'

Thus, ultimately, this debate will conclude that God Almighty is One.

He is One, the One without partners;
He is He and not He, thus He is He.[10]

[§8] Again, if someone were to say that there are two eternal beings, he should be told: 'Since you apply the word "eternal" to both these two eternal beings, they both share [in eternity], but because of the distinction that exists between them – this being not that one, and that being not this one – they are distinct. Thus, they are composed of a shared element (*mā-bi-hi al-ishtirāk*) in which they both participate, and an element of distinction (*mā-bi-hi al-imtiyāz*) through which they are both separate. But what is composite is a created entity (*murakkab muḥdath bāshad*) and the individual elements (*mufradāt*) in a compound body must precede the existence of the supposed compound, while the truly eternal is that whose existence is not preceded by anything. Thus, it is clear that two eternal beings cannot exist.'

[§9] As for proving the existence of God Almighty, human beings cannot establish such a proof because He, the Exalted.One, is in reality the Founder of all established things. Anyone who says he can prove His existence, [therefore] claims to have comprehended the reality of the identity of the Transcendent Being. But such comprehension by created

beings is the supreme form of absurdity; and since comprehension of Him is impossible, the proof which they wish to establish is equally impossible. Godspeed to you (*wa al-salām*).[11]

Taṣawwur 2

On the procession of all things from His Almighty and Holy Command, [written] as a catechism.

[§10] Question: Some people say that the origin of existence is one, some say it is two, some say it is three, and some maintain it is four. How do you conceive of this?

Answer: I conceive the source (*mabda'*) of existence to be one, and that one [is] His Almighty and Holy Command (*amr-i ū ta'ālā wa taqaddas*), which is also called the Word (*kalima*). The first being, which came into existence through absolute origination (*ibdā'-i maḥḍ*) from the Command without any mediation, was the First Intellect (*'aql-i awwal*). Other things came into existence through intermediaries from the Command, such as the Soul (*nafs*) through the mediation of the Intellect, and Matter (*hayūlā*), Nature (*ṭabī'at*) and Body (*jism*) through the mediation of the Soul.

[§11] Question: Some have said the origination (*ibdā'*) which emanates (*fā'iḍ mīshawad*) from the Command of the exalted Originator (*mubdi'*), without mediation and timelessly, should be conceived of as being like the radiation of light from a lamp. Others have said that light comes from the lamp spontaneously (*bī-ikhtiyār*), and that if one conceives the meaning [of origination] in accordance with this example, one neither affirms the Originator nor the act of origination. What do you say about this?

Answer: When they state that the act of origination is just like the light of a lamp, they use the example of a human artefact which can be related either to human beings or to Him, the exalted One, so that humans, in accordance with their understanding and comprehension, may immediately be guided by this example to the productions (*maṣnū'āt*) of the Divine Command; they do not assume that, in reality, there is a strict correspondence with this example. The fact that in relation to Him people speak of Necessity, Unity, Simplicity, Will, Knowledge and Power, and likewise of [His] other attributes, is all because His exalted [Command] is

one pure light, one uncontaminated emanation (*fayḍ*), one bounty (*jūd*) and one generosity (*sakhā*) which, in the primordial past (*mafrūgh*), was the cause for the existence of the 18,000 worlds,[12] and, in the subsequent future (*musta'nif*) will be the cause for the perfection (*kamāl*) of their essences and of this [realm of] multiplicity, duality and plurality.[13] The fact that Necessity, Unity, Existence, Simplicity, Will, Knowledge, Power and other attributes are manifested differently, although in essence [all] are one, follows necessarily because the one making the description is a human being whose descriptions accord with created beings. How then can the involuntariness or voluntariness of which you speak apply to that [other] realm, and how should it be deemed necessary [there]?

[§12] Question: The origination of the first originated being from the [Divine] Command needs further explanation.

Answer: The explanation of this is that when God Almighty became conscious of Himself as Creator (*khāliq*), from His realisation that He is the Creator, creation became necessary, and that creation was the First Intellect. As the First Intellect was one by virtue of unity in every respect, the truth of the maxim, 'Out of the one can only issue one' (*lā yaṣdur 'an al-wāḥid illā al-wāḥid*), necessarily followed.

[§13] Question: How have you come to the conclusion that, when God Almighty became conscious of Himself as Creator, and from His realisation that He is the Creator, the First Intellect came into existence?

Answer: I argue so because in the whole of creation, whether in this world or the Hereafter (*ān jihān*), every being that speaks concerning God Almighty does so according to the existential status it has acquired from Him, the Exalted, and [according to] the impact of the emanation (*fayḍ*) from His exalted Command that it has witnessed by the effects of the spirit and the works of the flesh.

We say, for instance, that our Creator is wise (*ḥakīm*). We call Him wise because we, who are His creatures and are obedient to Him, are able to recognise and understand that there is a trace (*athar*) of [His] wisdom (*ḥikmat*) [within us]; and since wisdom is fittingly attributed to us, although we are His creation and obedient to Him, it is even more necessary that we should affirm that all wisdom is from Him. Similarly, in our own beings, we find that no action can originate from us in this world without a prior conception of it. Thus, when we see that our action is necessitated by our conception, in the same manner, when we speak of the works of Him, the Exalted, we cannot exceed the limits of such

reasoning, namely the degree of our own knowledge and comprehension; [and] in the initial stage one necessarily has to explain the subject in this manner.

[§14] Question: You have explained the origination of the First Intellect from the First Cause (*'illat-i ūlā*). How do you explain the origination of other things?

Answer: This question may be answered in two ways, summarily or in detail. The summary answer is that the First Intellect, with the power of the assistance of the sublime Word (*kalima-yi a'lā*), conceived the ultimate end of all physical or spiritual things – for example, that there should exist a universe from the outermost sphere (*falak al-muḥīṭ*) to the core of the earth in the same form and shape as it is now, one universal entity (*shakhṣ-i kullī*) with a holding and combining soul (*jānī dāranda wa mu'allif*) encompassing it. This conception (*taṣawwur*) became the cause of the origination of all things and of all their concomitants, such as the intellects and their illuminations (*ishrāqāt*), the souls and their governances (*taṣarrufāt*), the spheres and their dispositions (*tadbīrāt*), the elements (*arkān*) and their impacts (*ta'thīrāt*), the natural kingdoms and their congruous relations (*tanāsubāt*), with whatever their well-being required or was in the interests of their survival. It was analogous to being '*as the twinkling of an eye*'(54:50), that is to say that, in the very same instant that [the First Intellect with the assistance of the sublime Word] conceived this, all these things came into existence through origination (*ibdā'*) and by instantaneous creation (*ikhtirā'*). Both these modes were one origination, namely an intellectual [act], which came into existence from the Command without any mediation, and instantaneous creation, namely of the spiritual and bodily [forms], which came into existence from the Command through mediation of the Intellect and the Soul.

[§15] As for the detailed explanation: When the First Intellect – that is, the intellect of the sphere of spheres (*falak al-aflāk*), which is also called the Atlantic Sphere (*falak-i aṭlas*) or the Throne (*'arsh*) – conceived of its own cause, which stood in a nobler relation (*nisbat-i sharīftar*) [to it], that conception necessitated the creation (*ījād*) of another intellect. And when it conceived its own essence, which stood in an intermediate relation (*nisbat-i wasaṭ*) [to it] – that is, when it realised that it was necessary through something else – this conception was the cause of the creation of the Universal Soul (*nafs-i kullī*), that is, the soul of the sphere of spheres. And when it conceived its own possibility (*imkān*),

which stood in an inferior relation to it – that is, when it realised that it was possible in itself, that conception caused the existence of the [body of] the sphere of spheres.

[§16] Question: Since no physical body can come into existence without matter and form (*hayulā wa ṣūrat*), why did you describe the creation of the spheres without mentioning matter and form?

Answer: Matter and form became necessary when the Universal Soul conceived the essence of the First Intellect and realised its perfection. From the realisation of the perfection of the Intellect, form, which comes from the category of perfection (*ḥayyiz-i kamāl*), came into existence. And when it [the Soul] conceived its own essence and realised its deficiency, matter, which comes from the category of deficiency (*ḥayyiz-i nuqṣān*), came into existence. These two conditions were inevitable for the Soul, because it has two aspects: one [pointed] towards unity, [i.e., the realm of the Intellect], and the other towards multiplicity.

[§17] Question: Since unity is the special characteristic of the Intellect and multiplicity that of the Soul, how is it that you conceive of three [aspects] for the Intellect and [only] two for the Soul?

Answer: The reason is that where the Intellect is, there exists total perfection and all its relative aspects are one, and that one aspect is facing His exalted [Command]. Thus, its one conception is the totality of all conceptions, and all conceptions are one. But for the Soul the case is not like this, because it is lower than the Intellect and in its degree some imperfection is necessary.

[§18] Further discussions concerning intellects, souls, spheres, elements and the natural kingdoms. For the intellect of the sphere of spheres, three conceptions were necessary, in just the same manner as for the First Intellect. One conception necessitated another intellect, namely the intellect of the sphere of the Zodiac (*falak al-burūj*), also called the sphere of the fixed stars (*falak al-kawākib*) or the Pedestal (*kursī*). Another conception formed everything from the sphere of the Zodiac to the intellect of the sphere of Saturn (*zuḥal*). For each of the [ten] intellects – from [the intellect of] the sphere of Saturn to the intellect of the sphere of Jupiter (*mushtarī*); from the intellect of the sphere of Jupiter to the intellect of the sphere of Mars (*mirrīkh*); from the intellect of the sphere of Mars to the intellect of the sphere of the Sun (*āftāb*); from the intellect of the sphere of the Sun to the intellect of the sphere of Venus (*zuhra*); from the intellect of the sphere of Venus to the intellect of the sphere of

Mercury (*'uṭārid*); and from the intellect of the sphere of Mercury to the intellect of the sphere of the Moon (*qamar*) – the same three conceptions became necessary. Each of those conceptions necessitated the formation of another intellect, another soul and another sphere. The matter and form of each sphere were necessitated by the same two conceptions which each soul formed, namely its conception of the perfection of the intellect and of its own deficiency. Such was the decree of the Powerful, the Omniscient.

[§19] The creation of the world of spheres [is formed] on these nine rotating spheres. Each sphere is endowed with a governing soul (*nafsī mudabbir*) and each soul is endowed with a determining intellect (*'aqlī muqaddir*). The assignment of an intellect and a soul to each sphere was due to the fact that each needed both a detached (*mufāriq*) and an attached (*mubāshir*) moving agent (*muḥarrik*), intellect being the detached and soul the attached moving agent. The detached agent is like a magnet (*maghnāṭīs*) which is in itself unmoving but which moves iron and attracts it to itself; the attached moving agent is like the wind which shakes a tree by whirling around it.

[§20] The last intellect, namely that of the sphere of the Moon, is responsible for the actualisation of all potential things in this world, and is therefore called the Agent Intellect (*'aql-i fa''āl*); as the forms of these things are bestowed by it, it is [also] called the Form-giving Intellect (*'aql-i wāhib al-ṣuwar*).

[§21] Question: Some philosophers have criticised others on the ground that when the First Intellect reflected on its own possibility (*imkān*), that conception caused the formation of the sphere of spheres. They objected that potentiality is something related to non-existence (*amrī 'adamī*); how then can the conception of it necessitate the existence of something? As long as the Intellect conceives that, there will be [merely] a difference between a possibility and something possible in itself (*mubāyanat-i imkān wa mumkinī*). Thus, it is a possibility that conceives of a possible, but in the premise it was stated that possibility is something related to non-existence. How do you conceive this matter (*taṣawwur-i tū dar īn chīst*)?

Answer: I conceive of it as follows: Although possibility is not existent in all respects, neither is it non-existent in all respects. For if it were non-existent in all respects, the word 'existence' (*wujūd*) could not be applied to it in speech; and if it were existent in every respect, it would be

futile to conceive of it as being possible. Thus, there is a great difference and distinction between something intelligible, which exists in the mind, and something non-existent, which exists neither in the mind nor in the external world. By way of an example, the non-existence of the human form in sperm is not the same as its non-existence in a plant, because in the first it is merely a potential non-existence while in the latter it is the non-existence of something impossible.

Here it is not [the case of] something purely possible which conceives of something, rather it is a possibility immersed in necessity. A conception [of the mind] is something related to existence, not to non-existence. No one says that the possible, insofar as it is sheer possibility, can be a cause of the existence of anything. This is impossible to say, but it is correct to say that potentiality is the cause of receptivity for [the divine] emanation.

[**§22**] As for these three categories, namely the 'necessary' (*wājib*), the 'possible' (*mumkin*) and the 'impossible' (*mumtani'*):[14] Since the necessary is the bestower of all emanations it does not need to receive any emanation, and since the impossible is debarred in all respects from receiving an emanation it cannot be called its recipient. Inevitably, one has to say that the effusion of [divine] grace (*adā-yi fayḍ*) requires a recipient (*qābil*), because if there were no recipient there would be no truth [in the verse], '*Did you then think that We created you in jest?*' (23: 115). It is for this reason that the existence of created beings in this universe has become manifest through the contrast of truth and falsehood (*ḥaqq wa bāṭil*), that is to say, in the opposition of necessity and impossibility. In this universe, existence refers to those potential entities which must be located in between these two extremes, namely necessity and impossibility, and it can be said that the cause for their receptivity or non-receptivity to divine grace is themselves.

[**§23**] Any existent being we can conceive of is either a necessary existent, that is, necessary [by itself], or a necessary non-existent, that is, impossible; or neither necessary nor impossible, that is, possible. And wherever the existence of a possible entity follows as a concomitant, a preponderating agent (*murajjiḥ*) is needed to give support to the aspect of its existence over that of its non-existence; and this aspect of existence is nothing but the aspect of its receptivity to [the divine] emanation. For this reason it is correct to say that potentiality is the cause of [the entity's] receptivity to emanation.

[§24] Question: What comment would you make on this: Is the reason for the number of spheres being nine, no more and no less, that nine is the last of the single numbers, or because there was no more matter [remaining], or is there another reason?

Answer: The [magnitude] of this universe is such that '*Nor shall they compass aught of His knowledge except as He willeth*' (2: 255). One can only say that from His decree and wisdom, there arose the necessity that there should be nine spheres, twelve signs of the Zodiac, seven planets (*ābā'*, 'fathers'), four elements (*ummahāt*, 'mothers'), and three natural kingdoms (*mawālīd*, 'children').[15] Their quality and quantity is only known to the lords of truth (*khudāwandān-i ḥaqq*)[16] – may prostration ensue upon mention of them – who have a comprehensive and informed knowledge of the whole of creation. Such humble servants [as ourselves] can only discuss what they have heard from their summoners (*dā'iyān*, sing. *dā'ī*) and their proofs (*ḥujjatān*, sing. *ḥujjat*).[17] And guidance is from God and through Him comes success.

[§25] As for the elements and the natural kingdoms: The Universal Soul, with its innate yearning (*shawq*) for the perfect rank of the First Intellect and its imitation of the latter, holds the spheres in constant motion. Since the ultimate perfection and aim of the spheres' motion necessitated an animating force (*quwwat-i ḥayawānī*), which could only be through individual organisms (*ashkhāṣ*) composed from matter and form, and as they needed suitable and convenient provisions, the four elements – that is, fire, air, water and earth, which are the natural divisions (*aqsām-i ṭabī'ī*) – were arranged in the interior of the sphere of the Moon, in accordance with the order and arrangement of existence, through the yearning movement (*ḥarakat-i ishtiyāqī*) of the spheres orbiting their centre. Out of these four elements, the nearer each one is to the sphere, the lighter and finer is its substance. For example, fire, which is above air, is fine in comparison with air but dense in comparison with [the substance of] the sphere [i.e., ether]; air, which is above water, is fine in comparison with water, but dense in comparison with fire; water, which is above earth, is fine in comparison with earth, but dense in comparison with air; and earth is characterised as the densest because of its extreme distance from the sphere.

[§26] Thus, the emanation (*fayḍ*) of grace from the [Divine] Command (*amr*) through the act of origination (*ibdā'*) reached the Throne (*'arsh*), and then through the mediation of the Throne reached

the Pedestal (*kursī*), from whence it became attached to the sphere of Saturn. Likewise it attached itself to other spheres, one after the other, down to the sphere of the Moon. With the power of that emanation, the effusions and rays of the stars reached, through the mediation of the sphere of the Moon, the elements and necessitated their motion. From that motion certain reactions resulted which necessitated the composition and separation of the elements. The form of these coarse elements was broken down, each by the other, and they moved from mutual extremes of contradiction, namely excess and deficiency, to an intermediate position, which is the state of equilibrium. Thus, materials capable of accepting forms were produced.

[§27] The Form-Giver (*wāhib al-ṣuwar*), [i.e., the Agent Intellect], bestowed on each natural kingdom in this universe – namely the mineral, the plant, the animal and the human – suitable forms together with their own particular concomitants, elegant shapes, marvellous structures and wonders of constitution. Each of them received, according to its capacity, a trace (*athar*) of the impact of the Universal Soul, and radiation from the light of the First Intellect. For example, coagulation (*'aqd*) in the mineral [kingdom], growth (*numuww*) in the plant, sensation (*ḥiss*) and motion (*ḥarakat*) in the animal, and rationality (*nuṭq*) and discrimination (*tamyīz*) in man. The genera in the natural kingdoms comprised individuals, and individuals constituted species, which were separated from each other through essential differentia (*faṣl-i dhātī*).

[§28] The natural kingdoms began with solidification [of minerals], then [there came] plants, then animals and then human beings. The final stage of minerals was joined to the first stage of the plant kingdom, the final stage of the plant kingdom to the first stage of the animal kingdom, the final stage of the animal kingdom to the first stage of man, and the final stage of man to the first stage of the angelic kingdom. Since the chain of existence (*silsila-yi wujūd*), [causing] the return of all things to the Command of the Almighty, reached its completion in the perfect status of man, and since the ability to acquire such a perfection, [consisting of diverse] intellectual conveniences and physical tools, was particular to man, it is clear that, although the mineral, plant and animal kingdoms preceded him in [the temporal order of] existence, the ultimate aim of all of them was him. As it is said, 'The first in thought is the last in action.'

[§29] However, regarding the existence of different species of living beings (*aṣnāf-i khalāyiq*), it is so because the Almighty's will was such

that whatever was potential in the individual soul should be actualised through the spheres and the stars. The spheres are perpetually rotating with great speed; thus, the different effects of the aspects of the stars on the states of the natural kingdoms produce different forms. Godspeed to you.

Taṣawwur 3

Concerning the question that 'Out of one can only issue one.'

[§30] Some people say that everything in existence which can be called a quiddity (*māhiyyat*) has come forth from God Almighty. These people do not differentiate at all between unity and multiplicity in existence, nor between the one and many among existing entities, and neither avoid nor forbid imputing multiplicity to His essence.

[§31] Others, who have passed beyond this stage and whose natural constitution (*fiṭrat*)[18] has become more refined, say: 'In existence there are both unity and multiplicity, and among existing entities are both the one and the many. In the same way as unity and the one have come forth from Him, the Exalted, so has multiplicity and the many, but the emergence of the one from Him is essential (*bi-dhāt*) and that of the many accidental (*bi-'araḍ*).'

[§32] But the adherents of the *da'wat*, who follow the lord of all ranks and realms (*khudāwand-i hama-yi marātib wa akwān*) and who, with the power of his [divine] assistance (*ta'yīd*) – may salutations ensue upon mention of him (*li dhikrihi al-salām*) – consider the question from [a position] above both these realms, say: 'First tell us, is it appropriate to say that something can emerge from Him, the Exalted, or is it impossible and inappropriate?' If we were to say that the emergence of something from Him, the Exalted, is possible, we would have denied Him, because He, the Exalted, has absolutely no relation or attachment (*'alāqa wa ittiṣāl*) to things, and unless something has a relation or an attachment to Him it cannot issue from Him. If we were to attribute such a relation or attachment to Him, we would have denied His unity (*waḥdāniyyat*).

But if we were to say that the emergence of anything from Him, the Exalted, is impossible, we would be denying creation, because these things are existent through Him and are the objects of His knowledge. By saying that the emergence of things from Him, the Exalted, is impossible,

I would be saying that these things are neither objects of His knowledge nor existent through Him.

Thus, by saying that the emergence of things from Him, the Exalted, is impossible, I would be denying the figurative (*majāz*) and relative (*iḍāfa*) [reality of creation]. On the other hand, by saying that the emergence of things from Him, the Exalted, is possible, I would be denying the actual reality itself [of the Exalted]. [Alternatively], if I were to say [the emergence of things from Him] is possible from one aspect and impossible from another, I would be speaking of two aspects, and two aspects constitute plurality. Thus, I would be imputing multiplicity to His exalted Essence, and one whose essence is multiple is a created thing and not God.

[§33] [As for] those who maintain that [both] the one and the multiple come forth from Him, the Exalted, but that the emergence of the one from Him is essential (*bi-dhāt*) while that of the multiple is accidental (*bi-ʿaraḍ*), [one should ask them]: 'In what sense has the one whose emergence is essential issued from Him, the Exalted?' If the one issued forth is not He Himself, then that which is not He must be something which is formless and without attribute, [but] apart from God. Thus, there will be many and not one. The conclusion is that:

> Whoever speaks of Him is ignorant and whoever remains silent is unmindful of Him. Whoever thinks he has reached Him makes a baseless assumption. Whatever you distinguish in your reflective judgements, no matter how precise, will divert from Him and reflect back on yourselves and will be an artefact and a creature like yourselves.[19]

[§34] Since man, insofar as he is a created thing, must necessarily speak on this topic from his own perspective, we can only say that – although His exalted Command, which is the cause of all creation and existence, is one absolute grace (*fayḍ-i muṭlaq*) that shines equally upon the 18,000 worlds[20] with no [special] illumination (*tajallī*) or favour (*ʿināyat*) on one rather than another being – every creature will speak about Him, the Exalted, according to the existential rank that it has received from His exalted Command, and in proportion to the existential traces of Him which he witnesses in his own essence.

[§35] For example, since the First Intellect received its existence from His Command without any mediation and was one by virtue of pure oneness [of the Command], it could know and visualise only one and

oneness; so in relation to the Intellect's own knowledge and vision it said, 'Out of one can only issue one.' And since the Universal Soul received its existence from the Command through the Intellect, and was able, with the assistance of the Intellect, to govern (*taṣarruf*) and organise (*tadbīr*) the realm of body (*jism*), it saw unity and oneness through that aspect which was [turned] towards the Intellect, and plurality and multiplicity through that aspect which was [turned] towards body (*jism*). [Thus], in relation to its own knowledge and vision, it said, 'Out of one can issue only one, and [from another aspect] many.' Since body received its existence from the Command through numerous intermediaries, and from its standpoint there was nothing but variation and multiplicity, it did not see or know anything but multiplicity and variety, and in relation to its own knowledge and vision said, 'Nothing can issue from the one but the many.'

Thus, whatever these intellectual, spiritual and bodily beings say about the emergence of things from Him, the Exalted, they speak from the standpoint of their own knowledge and vision. But in truth He, the Exalted, is independent (*munazzah*) of all this.

[§36] From such considerations, it necessarily follows that if we say the emergence of something from Him, the Exalted, is possible, we speak of such a thing in relation to our relativity and origin (*iḍāfa wa mabda' khūd*); and if we say the emergence of something from Him, the Exalted, is impossible, [we do so] in relation to the (divine) reality and our return to the divine source (*ḥaqīqat wa ma'ād-i khūd*); and if we say it is possible from one aspect and impossible from another, [we do so] from our own dual nature; and if we say it is not at all possible [for anything to come out of God, we do so] from the negation of our dual nature (*dū wajhī-yi khūd*).[21] Godspeed to you.

Taṣawwur 4

Concerning the First Intellect, the Agent Intellect and the Universal Intellect, being three in expression and one in meaning.

[§37] The First Intellect (*'aql-i awwal*) is so called because it is the first created entity which came into existence by the Command of the sublime, exalted Producer (*amr-i bārī ta'ālā*), without any mediation (*tawassuṭ*). It is called the Agent Intellect (*'aql-i fa''al*) because all

things were actualised from potentiality through its assistance; and the Universal Intellect (*'aql-i kull*) because individual intellects which are attached to intelligent people in this world are its effects. One of the attributes of the First Intellect is that it is perpetually immobile due to the illuminations of the lights of the Word (*kalima*) which are shining upon it, and it is continually stimulating stillness and motion in the sacrosanct [Universal] Soul (*al-nafs al-muqaddasa*). Godspeed to you.

Taṣawwur 5

Concerning the Universal Soul.

[§38] From the circumference of the highest sphere (*falak al-a'lā*) to the centre of the depths of the earth, this universe is one organism (*shakhṣ*) which is called the macrocosm (*'ālam-i kabīr*); and the Universal Soul (*nafs-i kull*) is a single spirit (*rawān*) which performs a single action on its body. But the Soul's action and influence varies according to the [degrees of] receptivity of different parts of the universe and their respective innate capacities (*isti'dād*). For example, its action and influence on the heavens is motion (*ḥarakat*) and on the earth is rest (*sukūn*); on elements it is mixture (*imtizāj*) and on minerals it is solidification; on plants it is growth, on animals it is sense perception and motion, and on humans it is speech [or reason, *nuṭq*] and discrimination. For this reason the Universal Soul is called the mover (*muḥarrik*) of heavenly motions, the stabiliser of the earth's quiescence, the solidifier of minerals, the nurturer of plants and the life-giver of animals. Godspeed to you.

Taṣawwur 6

Concerning primordial matter.

[§39] [The term] *hayūlā* (primordial matter) is [formed from] two Arabic words from which a particle has been omitted: *hayū* [and] *ūlā*.[22] *Ha-ya-wa* means 'preparation' and *ūlā* means 'first'; [thus *hayūlā*] means 'the first preparation'. Preparation denotes preparedness (*isti'dād*), meaning that it is possible [for *hayūlā*] to be a suitable recipient for a thing.

[§40] Matter is of four kinds: primordial matter (*hayūlā-yi ūlā*), universal matter (*kull*), the matter of nature (*ṭabī'at*) and matter of production (*ṣinā'at*). The matter of production is any [raw] material

which can be worked upon, such as wood for the carpenter, iron for the blacksmith, indigo for the dyer, and so forth.

[§41] The matter of nature consists of the four universal elements of the universe, [earth, water, air and fire]. In the same manner as that in which the carpenter, the blacksmith and the dyer manipulate wood, iron and indigo, and manufacture different tools, universal nature *(ṭabīʿat-i kull)* manipulates the four elements and brings forth different forms, such as minerals, plants and animals.

[§42] Universal matter is the absolute body (*jism-i muṭlaq*), [which fills the cosmos] from the highest sphere to the depth of the earth, in which the Universal Soul governs and controls all bodies, in the same way as the artisans of the elemental world – that is, the realm of growth and decay (*ʿālam-i kawn wa fasād*) – act on the elements.

[§43] Primordial matter is a simple intelligible substance (*jawhar-i baṣīṭ-i maʿqūl*) which the senses cannot perceive. It is nothing but pure existence, that is to say, the very beingness (*huwiyyat*) of things. For example, each and every existing entity has an existence (*wujūd*) by means of which it exists. That existence which comprises all existing entities is prior to their essence (*dhāt*) and, in relation to all of them, becomes the prime matter of each one of them. It is like woodenness, which precedes the essence of all wooden things and in relation to all of them, becomes the matter for each one of them. Taken in its utmost simplicity, it is pure beingness, and [it functions as] the very being and existence of every quantity (*kammiyyat*) and quality (*kayfiyyat*).

[§44] When it [beingness] becomes receptive to taking on quantity, the absolute body [i.e., universal matter] becomes visible such that the three dimensions of length, breadth and depth cannot be dissociated from it. When quantity becomes receptive to taking on quality, it becomes a particularised and determined body in the form of a triangle, a square, a circle and so forth.

[§45] Primordial matter is called the passive substance (*jawhar-i munfaʿil*) because it is never active by itself and will never become actualised unless something else is added to it. Its function is just this: to be a receptacle of all forms which are conferred upon it. Godspeed to you.

Taṣawwur 7

Concerning universal nature and universal body.

[§46] When the Universal Soul (*nafs-i kull*) moved towards perfection, the source which precipitated that motion was universal nature (*ṭabī'at-i kullī*), and the source capable of receiving that motion was universal body (*jism-i kull*). This is because, just as it was inevitable that the [Universal] Soul should move towards perfection, likewise it was necessary that universal nature should be the source of universal motion, and universal body be the source capable of receiving universal motion.

[§47] Universal nature is one of the faculties (*quwwat*) of the Universal Soul, and all the spiritual entities (*rūḥāniyyāt*) in this world are its parts. Such spiritual entities are also called angels (*firishta*). It is said that among sensible objects there is nothing which does not have an angel accompanying it and preserving the order of its existence. This [operation] is to such an extent that, [as the adage goes], 'With each drop of rain there is an angel.' By this is meant that, for example, a drop of rain descends from a cloud only when it has acquired that quantity which is its complete form (*tamāmī-yi ṣūrat*), so that when it separates from the cloud its parts do not disintegrate in the air and it reaches its centre [i.e., the earth]. Such a spiritual entity which functions to preserve its quiddity (*māhiyyat*) is called an angel. Similarly, in the case of a stone which is thrown up into the air, when the power of the person who has thrown it vanishes from it, it returns by nature to its own place. That power by which it returns to its own place is called an angel.

[§48] Although the movement of all bodies, which comes from the almighty Command [of God], through the intermediary of the Universal Soul, is found up to this point in each body and nature, and it is this nature which precipitates the motion of the body, we observe that corporeal beings from the outermost sphere to the very centre of the earth are stable in their own place, and that these places are their natural abodes according to an order. But since every individual body has an individual nature (*ṭabī'at-i juzwī*) derived from universal body, it follows that universal body [too] has a universal nature; and since universal body is the body of the sphere of spheres, its nature [too] will be that of universal nature. Furthermore, since universal body could not receive the influences of the Universal Soul without an intermediary, it

was necessary that this intermediary could only be a faculty subsidiary to corporeality (*dhāt-i jismiyyat*), and that faculty was universal nature.

[§49] Bodies below the sphere of the Moon are of two kinds, simple (*basīṭ*) and composite (*murakkab*). Examples of simple bodies are fire, air, water and earth, and examples of composite bodies are minerals, plants, animals and humans. The faculty of universal nature permeates all bodies, initially stirring each one into motion and ultimately bringing each to rest. Such is the decree of the August, the Omniscient One.

[§50] Also, in the same manner as the existence of the Soul was necessary so that the Intellect could bestow form upon it, [the existence of] Nature was necessary so that the Soul could give rest and motion to it. Similarly, the existence of [a corporeal human] body became necessary so that Nature could grant it the second perfection (*kamāl-i duwwum*)[23] of acting and reacting (*taḥarruk wa infiʿāl*), and that the harmonious order of being might thus appear, by the Almighty's divine decree and fair succour. Godspeed to you.

Taṣawwur 8

Concerning knowledge of the human soul.

[§51] It is clear that the body, insofar as it is a body, possesses no action and movement [of its own], because if a body possessed motion and action by its own essence, it would be necessary for all bodies which fall under the same definition (*ḥadd*) to have the same kind of movement and action. But we can see that this is not so; we see bodies from which no action or movement comes forth at all, as well as bodies from which actions and movements do come forth, and we know that those actions and movements [issue] from a force which is beyond corporeality.

[§52] We find that some bodies move in one direction. For example, the movement of fire is from the centre towards the circumference, and the movement of water is from the circumference to the centre. We know that water and fire act in that manner by nature, and [therefore] we call it a natural movement (*ḥarakat-i ṭabʿī*).

[§53] We find that the movements of other bodies are in different directions and of different kinds. Movement in some of them is semi-voluntary and yet without consciousness and perception; this we call the

vegetative soul (*nafs-i nabātī*). Movement in others is semi-voluntary and at the same time with consciousness and perception, but without discrimination; this we call the animal soul (*nafs-i ḥayawānī*). Movement in others is voluntary, with consciousness, perception and [with] total discrimination; this we call the human soul (*nafs-i insānī*).

[§54] These two souls, namely the vegetative and the animal, are disintegratable and divisible, becoming annihilated when the body decomposes. But the human soul cannot disintegrate and is indivisible, and it survives separation from the body. This is because, although it is not a pre-eternal (*azalī*) substance, it is a post-eternal (*abadī*) one. The pre-eternal being is that which has neither a beginning nor an end, whereas the post-eternal being manifests a beginning from one side but has no end on the other side.

[§55] The imaginal soul (*nafs-i khayālī*) has an intermediary position between the animal soul and the human soul. It has one face [turned] towards sense perception and perceptibles (*maḥsūsāt*), and another towards the intellect and intelligibles (*ma'qūlāt*). If it unites with the animal soul, it will imagine through a bodily organ, become dependent on that organ, and deteriorate with the deterioration of [that organ]. But if it unites with the human soul, it can retain ideas without a bodily organ and be independent and detached from that bodily organ, becoming co-eternal with the eternity of soul, and sharing in both felicity and misery of the soul.

[§56] When the soul departs from the body, it retains a kind of imaginal body (*hay'atī az khayāl*),[24] [bearing the] forms of whatever the imaginal soul knew or did. Likewise, reward and punishment are determined for the human soul in proportion to that [imaginal body], and the imaginal soul reminds it of this reward and punishment. The identity (*ta'ayyun*) of human souls in the Hereafter (*ākhirat*) is determined by this, because in this world human beings are spiritual beings clothed in corporeal bodies, while in the next they are corporeal beings clothed in spirituality.

[§57] The human soul is neither a body nor a faculty of body (*quwwatī dar jism*), because the body is divisible while the soul is indivisible. The soul's substance (*jawhar*) is from the realm of the intellect. It is a separate, non-material (*mufāriq*) substance whose connection with the body is for the purpose of stimulating motion and alteration (*taḥrīk wa taghyīr*), and the exercise of control and regulation. It is

unlike the connection of the vegetative and animal souls which seek nutrition and growth, incline to the mixture of organic complexions, and which will inevitably deteriorate when the latter deteriorates. [Unlike these souls], the human soul does not depend on any bodily organ to comprehend its own essence, intelligibles and non-material [entities]. It comprehends these things through its own essence, and for that reason the human soul is neither composite nor divisible, because whatever is divisible has a specific amount and quantity, whereas the soul has neither amount nor quantity.

[§58] If the [human] soul were divisible, it would be ignorant of something in one part and aware of the same thing in another part, but the soul is not like this. It is the first among the human faculties which is capable of receiving the effusion of the Intellect (*fayḍ-i ʿaql*). Being a passage-way for spiritual realities (*mawrid-i rūḥāniyyāt*), it becomes a treasury of intellectual forms (*khizāna-yi ṣuwar-i maʿqūlāt*). It discriminates between objects which cannot [themselves] comprehend their own form and meaning.

[§59] To the [human] soul belong understanding and knowledge about the power of solidification [in minerals], which is not aware of its own status or the higher status of the vegetative power; and [it possesses the awareness of] the animal power which is not aware of its own creation or the superiority of the human rank. [Thus, the human soul is able to] recognise the wisdom which exists in each form proper to each species.

[§60] The human soul can also be conceived as a non-composite spiritual substance (*jawhar-i rūḥānī-yi basīṭ*) for the following reason. [Take the case of] someone who knows many things from the different branches of the sciences, such as mathematics, natural science, logic and theology (*ʿilm-i ilāhī*), while also having in his memory a substantial amount of the Qur'ān, Traditions, poetry, proverbs, stories and narratives; yet no part of this knowledge mingles with any other. That person [is able to] give a detailed explanation of each part of [his knowledge], and these will reach the ears of [his] audience part by part.

[§61] We can also take the example of a room here in this world, which has been measured to accommodate fifty persons; yet if it were desired to accommodate a hundred people in the room, that would not be possible and there would be unspeakable overcrowding. However, the soul is never overcrowded by the [different] forms of knowledge or by listening to intelligible things. Indeed, even as they increase, there is

more room to fly and more space to move about, and [the soul's] joy and happiness is thereby increased.

[§62] When you say 'my head', 'my eye', 'my ear', 'my heart', 'my tongue', 'my hand', and so forth, this ['my'] of which you speak, is the individual identity (*huwiyyat*) of the human soul to which all of these things belong. By way of example, it [the soul can be compared to] a king whose subjects are [things such as] troops, guards and servants, or [to] a perfect craftsman who has these [things such as] tools and instruments; and just as the king and the craftsman cannot operate without troops and tools, neither can the soul operate without all these things. The human soul needs a physical body through which to manifest itself; it needs a head and a brain with which to think and to discriminate between things; it needs eyes with which to see and ears with which to hear; it needs a heart with which to know and a tongue with which to speak; it needs hands with which to hold and feet with which to walk, and so forth.

[§63] The human soul is also the first perfection (*kamāl-i awwal*) of the natural organic body (*jism-i ṭabī'ī-yi ālī*) in possession of life in *potentia* (*dhi'l-ḥayāt bi al-quwwa*), by which is meant that it is the prime mover of its parts, the changer of its positions, and the provider of form to the matter of the body. Its initial state is pure potentiality (*quwwat-i hayūlānī*). For, just as the individual body (*shakhṣ*) exists potentially in the sperm, so the ultimate perfection of the human being exists *in potentia* in the soul. The soul's particular activity is to become, gradually and by degrees, an immaterial form (*ṣūrat-i mujarrad*), whose very life is actualised in God Almighty.

[§64] All the substances (*jawāhir*) of [human] souls belong to the same genus. The difference between them is due to the difference in their knowledge, character, habits and behaviour. This is because in the beginning the soul is simple (*sāda*) and takes shape through knowledge (*ma'rifat*), opinion (*ra'y*), analogy (*qiyās*), moral disciplines (*'ādāt*) and manners (*a'māl*). Each of these states assumes a form [that moulds] the substance of each soul which becomes the matter (*hayūlā*) of that form.

[§65] The soul's nobility lies in its knowledge, for we can see that as each soul becomes capable of acquiring a branch of knowledge, it becomes nobler than those souls who do not benefit from that knowledge. It is clear that by absorbing the excellence of knowledge, one soul excels others in strength until it attains the degree of the souls of the great

ḥujjats[25] who, by the purity of their essences, become capable of receiving the emanations of the light of the sublime Word (*anwār kalima-yi aʿlā*) and become distinguished from other souls through divine instruction. By the grace of their teaching and learning, they rescue from darkness the souls of men, who are bound in the ocean of matter and shackled by the ties of nature.

[§66] Since God Almighty so determined that everything created should have the food on which its subsistence depends to be of its own kind, and since the human body is constituted of the four elements, so its food consists of those things which arise from these four elements. But, considering that the human soul is intellect *in potentia* and the human intellect is soul *in actu*, [the soul, therefore], belongs to the realm of intellect and derives its food from knowledge and action. The proof of this is that if someone eats a great deal of healthy, savoury food with relish every day until the end of his life, but does not acquire knowledge, he will never become a sage; but if he eats little food, just enough to stay alive, and acquires knowledge, he will become a sage. Godspeed to you.

Taṣawwur 9

Concerning knowledge of the human intellect.

[§67] Some people believe that the innate intellect (*ʿaql-i gharīzī*) – by which man is distinguished from other animals, and which joins him at the approach of puberty when his childhood ends, and by which he remains intelligent to the end of his life – is equal for all mankind. They assert that there can exist no differences among those who possess the same thing in equal proportion. Although they assert this, they contradict their own words, continuously disputing on intellectual matters and exhibiting disagreement with each other. They do not realise that if all [human] intellects were equal, no man of intelligence would ever [be able] to dispute or oppose another person.

[§68] Their proof is that the equality of intellects can be deduced from the equality in religious obligations (*taklīf*). But they do not know also that if there were no gradation and difference among intellects, it would not be appropriate for one person to impose an obligation [upon another], nor would it be necessary for another to accept that obligation; [nor would it be the case that] one be lender and another borrower, one

ruler and another ruled, one teacher and another student, one master and another pupil. If there were no distinction and difference in intellects, then a common man, who cannot tell head from foot or shoe from hat, would be on equal terms with a great sage who is learned and knows many sorts of things.

[§69] It is also evident that all information is neither absolutely true nor absolutely false; rather, some is true and some false. Therefore, when someone judges that intellects are equal, such an opinion necessarily implies that all information, having the possibility of being either false or true, should be left as it is and its truth or falsity not investigated.

[§70] However, [it should be understood that] there is gradation and difference in intellects. In the initial stage, they are in a state of potentiality, and to reach from potentiality to actuality [the philosophers] affirm that there are four ranks for them. These are the material [potential] intellect (*'aql-i hayūlānī*), the intellect in *habitu* (*'aql-i malakī*), the active (*bi-fi'l*) intellect and the acquired (*mustafād*) intellect.

[§71] The material intellect is a faculty capable of apprehending abstract forms. Even though it has not yet apprehended these forms, it has the capability to apprehend them, like an infant child who cannot teach but has the capability and potentiality of becoming a teacher.

[§72] The intellect in *habitu* is a faculty which can move from necessary [i.e., self-evident] to speculative [knowledge] and vice-versa with ease once it has become fit [to apprehend] the above-mentioned immaterial forms and these forms have been implanted in it.

[§73] The active intellect is a faculty in which the reception of abstract forms and the transition from self-evident to speculative [knowledge] and vice-versa has been actively, not passively, realised, and it can contemplate them whenever it wishes.

[§74] The acquired intellect is a faculty which has acquired all the above-mentioned perfections. Between it and that Intellect which has actualised it,[26] there comes into existence a kind of relationship, such that every intelligible form which exists in that [Intellect] will appear in it without either addition or subtraction, like a mirror which is held in front of someone.

[§75] The fact that the vegetative soul, animal soul, human soul and human intellect spring from one source and origin but appear to be four should be imagined thus: On a dark night someone is standing at a distance of two or three *farsangs* [12–18 km.] from a mountain on

which a fire has been lit. He observes it from that distance and supposes that it is a star and not a fire. Here, the reality of this distance (*'ayn-i īn bu'd*) which lacks the benefit of any proximity should be compared [to the situation] of the vegetative soul.

As this person approaches the mountain, he will reach a point where at one moment he thinks it is a fire and not a star, and at another he thinks it is a star and not a fire. Here, the reality of this remoteness with the beneficial effect of nearness are to be compared with the animal soul.

When he is so close to the mountain that he recognises without any doubt that it is a fire and not a star, the reality of this nearness [and the] effect of [the remaining] remoteness is to be compared with the human soul.

When he reaches the top of the mountain and, by the light of the fire, clearly sees the mountain all around with everybody and everything which is there, the reality of nearness unaffected by remoteness is to be compared with the human intellect. For this reason it has been said, 'The intellect is the light of the human soul.'

[§76] Hence, it is evident that the vegetative soul, [the animal soul, the human soul] and the human intellect, in themselves, do not have different sources, and that all four have one origin, like four branches of one tree, four streams from one brook, four flames on one wick. The difference between them is due to the difference in their functions and movements, and to their proximity to, and remoteness from, the fount of existence.

[§77] However, with regard to sense (*ḥiss*), sensing (*ḥāssa*), objects of sense (*maḥsūs*), estimation (*wahm*) and imagination (*khayāl*): sense is a corporeal faculty, sensing is a psychological faculty (*quwwatī nafsānī*), and by objects of sense are meant things which are apprehended by the senses. The lower aspect of imagination is sense and its higher aspect is estimation. The lower aspect of estimation is imagination and its higher aspect is soul. The lower aspect of soul is estimation and its higher aspect is intellect. The lower aspect of intellect is the soul and its higher aspect is the [Divine] Command (*amr*). Godspeed to you.

Taṣawwur 10

Concerning the purpose of the attachment of individual souls to human bodies and a short account of the composition of the human body.

[§78] One of the reasons for the attachment of individual souls to human bodies is that although, in terms of reality, the agent (*fāʿil*) is the cause of action, in terms of comparative relations, the effect of the action appears in the recipient, which is the object (*munfaʿil*). And although, in terms of the primordially achieved (*ḥukm-i mafrūgh*), the agent is the Divine Command, in terms of the achievable future (*ḥukm-i mustaʾnif*), the trace of the action appears in the creation, which is the object.[27] And although, in terms of [inner] sense (*maʿnā*), the soul is the agent, in terms of appearance (*shakl*), the effect of the agent's action appears in the body, which is the object. That is to say, the cause of action is manifested in the recipient, the Command is manifested in the creatures, and the soul in the body.

[§79] One of the advantages of this attachment [of soul to body] is that the form of goodness (*khayr*) in a good soul and the form of evil in a wicked soul exist [only] *in potentia*. Both souls, considered purely as such and in terms of mental existence (*wujūd-i dhihnī*), are similar to each other and, as long as they do not manifest themselves in concrete existence (*wujūd-i ʿaynī*), they do not become distinct from each other. The distinction between these two souls – the good soul's attainment of the degree of necessity from its potential condition, and the bad soul's forsaking the boundaries of its possible being, falling into the pit of impossibility (*daraka-yi imtināʿ*) – is realised by their attachment to the body. The acquisition of knowledge, the gaining of experience and discipline, the attainment of nobility [and] position, the prudent management of matters of [one's] livelihood, and the cultivation of virtues [during the journey from one's] origin to the return, are only possible through this body which is composed of blood, flesh and other materials.

[§80] Other souls are vouchsafed – due to their nobility, perfection, innate goodness and, out of divine munificence, grace and infinite generosity – such bounty, that for them the receiving and the imparting [of knowledge] (*adā wa qabūl*) has one and the same meaning. They, namely those with divinely [assisted] knowledge (*ʿālimān-i rabbānī*), receive [these perfections] through their very essence, immediately

without any mediation. The advantage of the attachment of [these souls] to the body is that they bring other souls, who are capable and worthy of perfection, to develop and perfect themselves by the light of instruction and guidance. They are like a teacher who brings himself from the level of teacher down to the level of disciple, and teaches [him] first the alphabet and then gradually advances him through [the various] stages [of knowledge], so that at the end [the disciple] becomes learned and attains the rank of the teacher.

[§81] There are other souls which are not innately perfectly good, but which have the capacity to become perfect, namely disciples on the path to salvation. The benefit to these souls in being attached to the body is that, by the actions of perfectly developed adepts (*aṣḥāb-i kamāl*), they themselves become capable of realising perfection, so that whatever degree of perfection is potential in them becomes actualised through these adepts.

[§82] Then there are wicked souls, of such extreme wickedness that they are incapable of absorbing any goodness, nobility or perfection. Such [souls] are rogues and villains (*hamaj al-ra'ā'*) who are not enlightened by the light of knowledge and do not seek refuge in their superiors who would be a pillar of sure support for them. The utility of the attachment of [these souls] to the body is that those hidden influences in them, through which the good is separated from the bad, and the pure from the impure, may become manifest.[28]

[§83] Another benefit gained [by the attachment of soul to body] is that if individual souls were not attached to human bodies, then the construction of the world (*'imārat-i 'ālam*), the harmonious order of living beings (*niẓām-i mawjūdāt*), the confirmation of the divine proof (*ḥujjat-i ilāhī*) and the establishment of the divine path (*sunnat-i rabbānī*) would not be possible.

[§84] Another benefit is that the macrocosm (*'ālam-i kabīr*), from the circumference of the highest sphere to depths of the centre of the earth, is one individual who is called the Universal Man (*insān-i kullī*). Since the sign of a mature person is the ability to procreate, when the macrocosm, which is the Universal Man, reached complete maturity, what he produced as the like of himself was the individual human being (*insān-i juzwī*), who in appearance (*shakl*) is the microcosm (*'ālam-i ṣaghīr*) in the macrocosm, but in reality (*ma'nā*) is the macrocosm in the microcosm.

[§85] It is clear that there is no creature nobler than man, with respect to the likeness that he bears to the entire cosmos, the nobility of his pedigree (*sharaf-i nisbat*) and his complete perfection (*kamāl-i khilqat*). This is because man is a compendium of the refined illuminations of the First Intellect (*ʿaql-i awwal*), the traces of the powers of Universal Soul (*nafs-i kullī*), the wondrous compositions of the celestial spheres (*aflāk*), the various types of constellations, the movements of the stars, the diversities in the variations in mineral substances, the feats of varieties found in various plant forms, the astonishing features of animal bodies (*hayākil-i ḥaywānāt*), the traits and signs of angels, jinn, human beings and devils, the way-marks of land, sea, mountain and desert, the cultivation and destruction of the world, and in him lie spring, summer, autumn and winter, and a myriad gardens.

[§86] Again, the human body – which is [composed] of the four elements, each of which, when separate, maintain their [distinct] structure and repel the others (*mutanāfir*), but which, when they are combined and mixed together and their resistance is broken by each other, conform with one other (*mutawāfiq*) – has been likened to an ideal city (*madīna-yi fāḍila*).[29] It has been said that man is like a city which has been built out of different materials, structurally firm and formally strong. For example, from head to toe his organs, limbs, joints, sinews, veins, bones and nerves are like the houses, streets, districts, shops, stores, markets, workshops, roads and everything else that go to make up a city.

[§87] The intellect and the soul are like the king and [his] minister. The external and internal senses (*ḥawāss*), the faculties of nutrition (*ghādhiya*), attraction (*jādhiba*), retention (*māsika*), digestion (*hāḍima*), repulsion (*dāfiʿa*) and all the other faculties – which are, in their nature and functions, powers to move in ways particular to each, and which are ultimately manifested in the body – are like pillars of the state, such as physicians, scribes, and similarly the other guilds and classes, such as chamberlains, deputies, guards, soldiers, servants, subjects, spies, postmen, messengers, craftsmen, merchants, and everyone else, whoever they may be, through whom the welfare and prosperity of the city is perfected and the regulation of the city becomes possible.

[§88] The physical structure (*bunyat*) of the body and the form of the soul are epitomes of that [divine] world which the pre-eternal Pen (*qalam-i azal*) inscribed on the post-eternal Tablet (*lawḥ-i abad*) by the order of the First Command (*amr-i awwal*).[30] Just as the human soul is

nobler than other souls, so the matter out of which its body is composed must also be more subtle than all other matter.

[§89] Since it was decreed by God's wisdom that all human dispositions, movements and actions should be rational, that in each of them discrimination (*tamyīz*) should be exercised, and that each act of discrimination [should conform with] investigation (*taḥqīq*), therefore the matter from which [the soul's] body is composed had to be more perfect in terms of its equilibrium, and had to be the noblest of all living entities in the form of its creation and shape of its physical structure, size and stature.

[§90] And since it was necessary that the human soul – which was a substance wherein things *in potentia* existed before its attachment to the body – be actualised by the [celestial influences of] the spheres and stars, [it was determined that] when the drop of sperm, in which the individual human body (*shakhṣ*) exists *in potentia*, finds its way and settles in the womb, during the first month [of pregnancy] it is under the influence of Saturn. This is because the first spiritual entity which influences the natural world (*'ālam-i ṭabāyi'*) is that of Saturn, and all ferments (*māya-hā*) are coagulated by it. The second month is under the influence of Jupiter, so that the nature of Jupiter, by means of its heat and humidity, causes that coagulated matter to grow and increase, and unite the parts of the sperm, which is by now transformed into clotted blood (*'alaqa*). The faculties of growth and alimentation start during the period of Jupiter. During the third month it is under the influence of Mars, when the nature of the clotted blood is transformed into a foetus (*muḍqa*). If [during] the course of the influence of Mars the heat is raised, [the foetus] will dry (*yubūsat padhīrad*) a little, the power of growth will increase and the passage for food will open. During the fourth month it is under the influence of the Sun, so that by the nature of the Sun, the contours (*takhṭīṭ*) of the organs which have appeared in the foetus will stand out and the animal spirit (*rūḥ-i ḥayawānī*) will start to function. So the embryo starts to move and its organs become clearly distinguished: the head, the brain, the heart and all the limbs of the body appear. During the fifth month it is under the influence of Venus, so that [by means of] Venusian nature, it manages to gain control over its own spiritual faculties (*quwwathā-yi rūḥānī*),[31] bringing its creation to completion and its physical structure to perfection. The place for the eyes and the nose appears, the mouth opens, and the head emerges between the two ears.

During the sixth month it is under the influence of Mercury, so that by the Mercurial nature it gains a different sense and a different movement. The limbs become differentiated one from the other [and] it acquires a feeling of where it is. It opens its mouth and moves its lips; it licks with its tongue and sniffs with its nose. Sometimes it is asleep and sometimes it is awake. During the seventh month it is under the influence of the Moon, so that by the lunar nature it becomes active (*hā kār āyad*), [its] sense perception is completed, [its] stature straightens out, the organs become powerful and the joints harden. It begins to move continuously, it feels the constriction of [the womb], and conceives the intention of being outside. If it is born in this month, it will survive and be a fully developed being. During the eighth month it is again under the influence of Saturn, and such heaviness and gravity appears [in the embryo] that if it is born in this month it will not survive, because the eighth month is that of the house of Pisces, and Saturn in this position reduces all powers by its coldness and dryness, and [the embryo] will die. During the ninth month, once more the turn [for the influence] of Jupiter arises; the effects [on] the embryo [is activity], movement and independent volition appears. The ninth month features voyage to the [celestial] house of Pisces, when birth is inevitable.

[§91] Those parts of body which have hardness and retention (*ṣalābat wa imsāk*) are called the organs and limbs; those which are liquid are called the four humours; those which are vapour-like (*shakl-i bukhārī*) with extreme fineness, purity and transparency, and which arise from the four humours and permeate all parts of the body [are called the animal or vital spirit].

[§92] The vital spirit (*rūḥ-i ḥayawānī*) first starts from the heart, then fills the passages of the brain, next the orifices of the eyes, then the tubes of the ear, the [gustatory] passages of the tongue, and so on until it reaches all the other organs, from head to toe.

[§93] There are five external senses: touch, taste, smell, hearing and sight. Three of them, that is, touch, taste and smell, develop in the womb, and the [other] two, that is, hearing and sight, only come when [the infant] leaves the womb.

[§94] There are five internal senses also: the *sensus communis* (*ḥiss-i mushtarik*) [i.e., common sense], imagination (*muṣawwira*), cogitation (*mufakkira*), estimation (*wāhima*) and memory (*ḥāfiẓa*), all of which become attached to the child before it arrives in this world at their proper

time, gradually, one after the other, as does the rational, discriminating soul (*nafs-i nāṭiqa-yi mumayyiza*) as well. It [the soul] starts from the brain and from there spreads to the major part of the remaining parts and organs of the body.

[§95] [The *sensus communis*] is located in the anterior ventricle of the brain's first lobe. It is called 'common' (*mushtarik*) because it has access to every sense organ, and every sense [organ] shares something in common with it. For example, all that the eye sees, the ear hears, touch feels, gustation tastes and olfaction smells, first reaches the *sensus communis*. It is [also] called the 'focal point of senses' and the 'treasury of sensory perceptions' (*khizāna-yi ṣuwar-i maḥsūsāt*).

[§96] The active imagination is located in the anterior part of the second lobe of the brain. If this faculty is subservient and helpful to the human intellect, it is called the faculty of cogitation (*mufakkira*), but if it becomes attentive to bodily [desires] and gives way to imaginings and fantasies, it is called the faculty of imaginations (*mukhayyila*).

[§97] The *sensus communis*, to which the [sensible] forms are entrusted, transfers them to the imagination, which is located in the anterior part of the third lobe of the brain. It retains whatever the faculty of active imagination supplies it with, whether [the object] is absent or present.

[§98] The faculty of estimation is located in the fourth lobe of the brain, which is in the middle of the head. The faculty of memory is located in the posterior ventricle of the brain, retaining whatever forms are deposited in it, to use when required by [the faculty of] recollection (*dhākira*).

[§99] The [faculty of] imagination retains [the impressions of] bodily forms. Animals share this [faculty] in common with humans, but only as long as the vital spirit, which is the subtle vapour of the humours, circulates in their bodies. However, because of the perennial and eternal nature of the human soul, a vestige (*hay'atī*) of imagination remains with it, eternally [and] perpetually without end.

[§100] The *sensus communis* is like a postmaster to whom messengers bring letters, mentioning various events and things, which he then assembles. The faculty of active imagination is like a secretary to whom the postmaster hands over the letters for him to keep in his bag. The faculty of cogitation is like the king to whom the secretary brings the bag of letters and to whom he hands them over, so that he can read them and

be informed of the good or bad in them. The faculty of memory is like the treasurer to whom the king entrusts the letters to keep in the treasury. The faculty of recollection [*dhākira*] is like an official who recalls and brings the information to the king's attention again when he wants to hear it.

[§101] When a child is born to its mother, [its] life and death, happiness or misery, affluence or poverty, fame and obscurity, and all manners of contradictory things which it would take too long to mention, follow a horoscope decreed by God for him, and which depend on the aspects of the stars and the influence of the planets. But the ordinance of the Creator who, in His glory and majesty, is the Creator and Ruler of heavenly spheres and stars, far transcend all these [planetary influences] which abide by His command and will. Peace be upon those who follow [God's] Guidance.

Taṣawwur 11

Concerning the essential differentia of each genus and the natural kingdoms: mineral, plant, animal and human.

[§102] Through their solidity (*ḥukm-i inʿiqād*), minerals (*maʿādin*) have commonality with mineral substances (*jawāhir-i maʿdanī*), the essential *differentia* (*faṣl-i dhātī*) of the mineral substance being in its power of solidification. Likewise, mineral substances, through their solidity and properties, have commonality with plants, the essential *differentia* of plants being in the vegetative power of growth and increase. Plants, by means of solidification and the properties of growth and increase, have commonality with animals, whose essential *differentia* is sense-perception and motion. By means of solidification, the properties of growth and increase, sense-perception and motion, the animal shows an affinity to human beings. The essential *differentia* of the human being amounts to the fact that there are three groups among them: ordinary people (*ʿawāmm*), the elect (*khawāṣṣ*) and the supremely elect (*akhaṣṣ-i khawāṣṣ*).[32]

[§103] From the first perspective, when ordinary people discovered that human beings had the ability to speak, they conceived human nobility over other animals in terms of this ordinary, external speech (*nuṭq-i*

'āmm-i ẓāhir); so they treated this external ability to speak as his essential *differentia*.

[§104] From the second perspective, according to what the elect have said, those who have treated this external speech as the essential *differentia* of man are partially correct, but this judgement has been made from the point of view of the observer and not from the point of view of the object observed, and has been uncritically accepted without any examination of the circumstances. In truth, the essential *differentia* of one thing from another lies in that which [is unique to it and] does not share with anything else. It is clear that this ordinary, external speech cannot correctly be treated as the essential *differentia* for man, because speech can be taught to a parrot, which is an animal. Therefore, in addition to this external speech, another excellence is required which is not shared by anything else, and that is discerning thought, which is, in reality, the power of discrimination (*quwwat-i mumayyiza*) and not this external speech. So they have considered discrimination as the essential *differentia* for man.

[§105] From the third perspective, which the supremely elect have adopted, those who look for some other excellence above and beyond this external speech as the essential *differentia* of man and have concluded that discrimination is that characteristic, are partially correct, but they too have not plumbed the depths of the mystery of this problem. They have not been successful in fulfilling the conditions outlined above, namely that the essential *differentia* of any entity is that which is not shared by anything else with it. Thus, we see that there are certain animals which possess [a similar human-like] faculty of discrimination through which they are aware of the inception and consequence of their actions, and of that on which their welfare or destruction depends. For example, a bird knows that the survival of its species depends on its egg, so that what is potential in the egg become actualised through heat, and that heat will be actualised if it takes the egg under its wing. And while a tortoise has no wings, it knows that whatever is potential in the egg [of the bird] will be actualised through heat; so it blows rapidly and continuously upon [the egg] with warm breath, and it even apprehends the proper time of gestation when the chick is to be born from egg, by breaking [the shell of] the egg and letting the chick out.

[§106] It is not hidden from any mind that all such behaviour constitutes a process of thinking similar to human discrimination. So

such thoughtful discrimination cannot be exclusive to man, and since it is not exclusively human, it cannot be the essential *differentia* of man. Therefore, [it may be concluded that] the essential *differentia* of man is his most distinctive virtue, and that pre-eminent virtue lies in his attainment of knowledge (*'ilm*) in terms of receiving and imparting (*adā wa qabūl*) or listening to it (*sam'*). From this point of view, the true human being and his essential *differentia* lies in [his aptitude for] reception of knowledge from his superiors, and dissemination of it through instruction to his inferiors. Godspeed to you.

Taṣawwur 12

Concerning the perfections which the attribute bestows on its subject, and vice-versa, through the permission of God Almighty.

[§107] The perfection which the [human] subject gives to a [moral] attribute (*ṣifat*) consist in the fact that the subject is a soul endowed with innate goodness, and that goodness in him has emerged from potentiality into actuality. That moral attribute is one of the virtues, and hence when that person puts that virtue into practice, it acquires a noble and transcendental form through him.

[§108] On the other hand, the perfection which a moral attribute may give its [human] subject consists in the fact that the attribute is one of the modes of knowledge, intelligence and real conception (*'ilmiyyāt wa 'aqliyyāt wa taṣawwurāt-i ḥaqq*), while the subject is a virtuous soul. However, that virtue or goodness has not yet become actualised from its potential state. Therefore, when it sets out on the course of perfection, increasing itself without diminution, emerging from potentiality to actuality, then every form that it acquires of real knowledge, wisdom and understanding contributes to its perfection.

[§109] Every subject that gives existence to an attribute is a unity (*waḥdat*). Therefore, when God brings into being a unity, the subject has thus bestowed existence upon an attribute. But when [that] unity brings a vain falsehood into existence, it is [as if] an attribute has given existence to a subject. Consequently, since unity belongs to God, [its existence] is real existence, but when falsehood comes from that unity, its existence is an illusory one. Godspeed to you.[33]

Taṣawwur 13

Concerning the categories of knowledge: the necessary, the speculative, the instructional and the inspirational.

[§110] The necessary, a priori, knowledge (*'ilm-i ḍarūrī*), which is also called self-evident (*badīhī*), is that which can be attained through [the faculties of] sense-perception, estimation and imagination. In this [kind of knowledge], there is [no] need for either one's own thought processes (*fikr*) nor for the instruction (*ta'līm*) of others. An example of this is knowledge of the whole and the part, which is known through an axiomatic understanding of the situation that the whole is greater than the part. [Another example] is that the distance from the back wall to the door is the same as [that] from the door to the back wall, which for the intelligent person is the same, but for the ignorant [appears] to be two different things. [Another] example is that oceans do not turn into blood and mountains do not turn into gold; or that one thing cannot be in two places at the same time, though it may be there at different times.

[§111] Speculative or reflective knowledge (*'ilm-i naẓarī*) is that wherein, in addition to intellectual self-evidence, it is necessary to employ one's own thought processes. For example, one first has to reflect to know that [there was a time when] human beings did not exist, and then they came into existence. One may reflect again and then understand that one's own existence does not depend on one's will, because if one's existence were dependent on one's own will, then every perfection, object of desire and degree which is necessary for one would have been created at the same time as oneself. One would have been a free subject which produced these effects, not their receptacle; one would have been the master of one's own circumstances, and whatever one wished for, and every circumstance to which one was subjected, would have been the effect of one's own will. Further reflection leads to the understanding that this is not the case, that one is indeed subject to influences and is not the influencer, and that one cannot be the master of one's own circumstances. Yet further reflection leads to the understanding that the influences one is subject to do not come from oneself; and that if whoever or whatever it came from was, like oneself, subject to influences, and this [in turn] to something else, there would be an infinite regress, and the matter would never come to a final term.

By reflecting yet further, one realises that the ultimate end of those who are subject to influences must necessarily reach back to the absolute originator of influences, who is the influencer not subject to influence. And further reflection leads to the understanding that the absolute influencer is the effector (*mu'aththir*), and that the effector is the artificer and creator of the universe – exalted be His glory. Yet further reflection leads to the understanding that the starting point of both sensible things and transcendent attributes deserves to belong to the Almighty alone. One understands all these things – as well as everything else which is related to the influence of His power and discussions about the wisdom of such circumstances – by successive acts of reflection and without the need of anyone's teaching.

[§112] Knowledge acquired by instruction (*'ilm-i ta'līmī*)[34] concerns the situations when one's knowledge, based on the effects of the Almighty's power, is elevated to the understanding of the effects of the Almighty's knowledge, such that certain issues relating to the cognisance of these effects are raised which requires the instruction of a teacher of comprehensive knowledge (*mu'allim-i kullī*). For instance, it is required that an explanation of Divine Unity be given in such a way that it entails neither anthropomorphism (*tashbīh*) nor agnosticism (*ta'ṭīl*); or to explain how things issue forth from His exalted Command and return to it, in such a way that no multiplicity is attributed to His Essence; and in what sense the Almighty may be said to possess a unity even though He transcends that unity.

[§113] Inspirational knowledge (*'ilm-i ta'yīdī*) also relates to the investigation of similar problems, [but with this difference]: approaching a teacher of comprehensive knowledge – if he teaches one in a systematic manner, relying on exoteric expressions explained and understood sequentially and gradually – it is called instruction (*ta'līm*); but if [the knowledge] given to one by esoteric means and received instantaneously, it is called divine inspiration (*ta'yīd*). Godspeed to you.

Taṣawwur 14

Concerning good and evil, that evil does not exist in initial origination, and [explaining the] existence of the evil that is perceived in this world.

[§114] Since people see good and evil in this world, some of them assume that good and evil have [separate] sources. The Zoroastrians (*gabrān*), for example, believe that Yazdān is one source [of creation] and Ahriman (Satan) is another. Light and goodness are attributed to Yazdān, and darkness and evil to Ahriman.

[§115] The absurdity of this conception can be seen if one asks someone who says that two such sources exist: 'If, in your opinion, there are two creative sources, then tell us, are these two sources equal in existence, power, and comprehension (*iḥāṭat*), with neither augmentation or diminution, or not? Or is one of them more fit for good and the other for evil?' If they are not equal, it necessarily follows that one of them would be greater (*zā'id*) and the other deficient; and the one which is greater would have the power of comprehension, while the one which is deficient would be enveloped by its comprehension. Therefore, the one who exceeds and encompasses the other would be the one who is fit to be the source, not the one who is deficient and encompassed. Thus, from the viewpoint they profess, there cannot be two sources for good and evil. There can only be one source for everything, and that one source is His almighty Command.

[§116] It is clear that goodness is a concomitant of perfection and that perfection is a concomitant of goodness, and that evil is a concomitant of deficiency and deficiency is a concomitant of evil. Thus, absolute goodness (*khayr-i maḥḍ*) lies where one finds absolute perfection, and pure evil lies where one finds absolute deficiency. So, wherever good is intermixed with evil, perfection and deficiency also are intermingled.

[§117] For example, since the First Intellect is in essence superior to all existent things and more perfect in existence and higher in rank, absolute perfection belongs to it. Thus, wherever one finds it, there is absolute goodness. And because the Universal Soul is inferior in essence, existence and rank to the First Intellect, and has one side turned towards perfection and another towards deficiency, in it perfection and deficiency are mingled. And because universal body is deficient in itself, absolute deficiency belongs to it, and in its rank there is pure evil.

[§118] Consequently, three distinct realms can be said to exist: the intellectual realm (*'ālam-i 'aqlānī*), which is absolute goodness; the realm of soul (*'ālam-i nafsānī*), in which good and evil are mixed; and the physical realm (*'ālam-i jismānī*), which is pure evil. Each of these realms has its own denizens. The denizens of the intellectual realm are the people of unity (*ahl-i waḥdat*); the denizens of the realm of soul are the people of gradation (*ahl-i tarattub)*; and the denizens of the physical realm are the people of opposition (*ahl-i taḍādd*).[35] The rule of opposition (*ḥukm taḍādd*) is promoting discordance among the people of the world; the rule of gradation (*tarattub*) is promoting concordance among the followers of religious law (*shar'*); and the rule of unity (*waḥdat*) is promoting oneness (*ittiḥād*) among the followers of the Resurrection (*qiyāmat*).

[§119] For one who turns away from the discord of the people of the world to the concordance found among the followers of religious law, and from there to the unanimity of the followers of the Resurrection, evil does not exist, either in itself or through its effect, because his physical actions have become susceptible to spiritual influences, which in turn are susceptible to intellectual illuminations (*anwār-i 'aqlānī*).

[§120] Moreover, goodness emanates essentially from the Bestower of goodness (*wāhib al-khayr*), whereas evil comes accidentally *(bi-'araḍ*) along the way. For example, goodness is like a grain of wheat thrown into the soil and watered, but evil is like foam which builds up from the particles of dust in the gutter and sits on the surface of water. It is obvious that the foam froths up from the gutter and not from the essence (*aṣl*) and substance of water. It sometimes happens that the [foam] on the surface of water takes such a hold and predominates to such a degree that the water cannot be seen, and one assumes that there is no water at all and that it is all foam. Likewise, it occasionally happens that the power of evil takes such a hold and predominates to such a degree that goodness cannot be seen, and one assumes that there is no goodness at all and all is evil, and that the point has almost been reached where the light of goodness has been extinguished and corruption has revealed itself in the world.

[§121] One of the causes of this is the fact that good is weak at the beginning but powerful in the end, whereas evil is powerful at the beginning but weak in the end. Therefore, when good begins with its initial weakness, evil makes its appearance with its initial strength juxtaposed to it, and since good is weaker, evil appears stronger, until in the end the reality is manifested so that the good, the force of which developed

gradually, reaches its full fruition and evil shrinks away to become naught.

[§122] Predestination (*qadar*) is the primordial decree (*taqdīr-i awwal*) which has proceeded from the First Command to the First Intellect. And Divine Ordination (*qaḍā*), is [the subsequent decree], the first obligation (*taklīf-i awwal*) which was inscribed by the First Command on the First Tablet (*lawḥ-i awwal*).[36] The meaning of the primordial decree is, by way of an example, that when someone wants to build a house he first lays down the foundations for the walls and the rooms. Similarly, the meaning of *qaḍā* may be represented in the same simile as the structure of that house with all its appurtenances.

[§123] Two angels, one called *Sābiq* (Preceding), and the other *Shāhid* (Witness), are appointed as guardians of *qaḍā* and *qadar*, to drive all creatures towards their perfection and the ultimate end which is specific to each one and for the sake of which they were created. Their intention is to stimulate universal good and there is good implicit in all their movements. The evil which rears up here is not due to divine ordination and predestination; rather, it is due to the sensory, imaginative and estimative veils that stand before our faculties of thinking and seeing, and in consequence of which our use of free will amounts to error.

[§124] Since our knowledge and foresight do not encompass the ultimate ends of affairs, and we are unable to choose truth through our own judgement [based on] opinion (*ra'y*) and analogy (*qiyās*), evil comes into existence through the injudicious use of free will (*ikhtiyār*). For example, it is a specific requirement for a student that he should have need [of instruction], wherein lies his good; and of a teacher that he should have no such need, and therein lies his good. Now, if we do not submit to the discipline of instruction and, instead, aspire to be a teacher, we will give up the need which is proper to us and in which our good lies. By conceiving ourselves to be independent [of a teacher] – which is inappropriate, and therein lies evil for us – we forsake that good and fall into evil. We seek refuge in God from this.

[§125] It is also necessary to differentiate total from partial evil. Partial evil is, for example, when the house of a pious person catches fire and his turban and clothes are burnt. Total evil would be if fire ceased to exist in the world. Similarly, partial evil is when a flood enters a house with children in it, causing the death of weak and poor people. Total evil would be if water ceased to exist in the world. Therefore, it is unfitting

to apply the term 'evil' in any real sense to the essence of fire and water and their actions; rather it is applied to them figuratively, relatively and accidentally (*'araḍ*).

[**§126**] Also, in this world, there must be a cause for the existence [of something], while no cause is required for non-existence. For example, [the existence of] wealth needs a cause, whereas no cause is required for poverty; and the existence of day needs a cause, but no cause is required for that of night. Day requires a cause which is the sun that shines from the heights of heaven, but night needs no cause because when the sun disappears night is always there anyway. Consequently, just as the absence of existence is non-existence, the absence of wealth is poverty and the absence of day is night, so the absence of good is evil.

[**§127**] In the same way as individual intellects that belong to intelligent folk are the effects of the First Intellect which has been brought into being by the Almighty's Command, so individual [states of] ignorance attached to ignorant folk are also the effects of the primordial ignorance (*jahl-i awwal*) which came to be juxtaposed to the First Intellect by [the rule of] the opposition of two contradictory things. [As has been said]: 'Such denial, such devilry, which resembles reason but is not reason.'[37] This is because there are both [ranks of] discord (*taḍādd*) and gradation (*tarattub*) amongst souls. On the side of gradation, there may be a soul so disposed towards the course of perfection [by degrees] that it becomes the best of creation when it moves from potentiality to actuality, whereas another soul on the side of discord may tend so towards deficiency that it becomes the worst of creation; and yet another soul, which follows the middle course may have one side turned towards good and another towards evil.

[**§128**] Just as there is discord and gradation in the souls, so there is discord and gradation in the matter out of which bodies are composed. Some matter is [disposed towards] the higher side, some to the lower side and some to the middle, according to the rule that 'everything returns to its origin'. Consequently, there are [combinations of] fine matter and fine souls, where the former is fit for the latter and the latter takes possession of the former; and there are base matter and base souls, where the former is fit for the latter and the latter takes possession of the former; and medium matter, intermediate between good (*khūb*) and bad (*bad*), and souls corresponding [to such types of matter], where the former is fit for the latter and the latter rules the former.

[§129] Suppose someone were to ask: 'Since evil souls bring forth badness from their substance (*gawhar*) out of which they are made, then why do the rightful people (*muḥiqqān*) – may greetings ensue upon mention of them – wage war (*jihād*) against them and impose upon them the obligation to be good?' The answer is that, as was said, [the bodies of] virtuous people are made from a true substance and of bad people from a false substance; but in this world, which is the realm of similitudes (*mushābahat*), where good and bad appear alike and similar to one another, each of them is like the other in appearance and form.

The call and summons (*da'wā-yi da'wat*) of the rightful people is not that they make the wicked good, but that they are carrying out the Divine Command (*amr-i ilāhī*), which is to distinguish (*mubāyinat*) the good from the bad among the creatures of the world, so that good may be separated from evil, according to [the saying]: 'The faithful have been created from the Light of God, and when God gives the order they recognise it.'[38] Likewise, the evildoers are separated from the doers of good by virtue of '*And they rejected those things [Our signs] in iniquity and arrogance, though their souls were convinced*' (27: 14). Once this distinction had been made, there remains no excuse or argument for the wicked [to invoke] against God, by virtue of '*So that after the Messengers, there may not exist any argument for people against God*' (4: 165).

The rightful people – may salutations ensue upon mention of them – first bring the divine proof to the attention of [the wicked] by virtue of '*Invite [all] to the path of your God by means of wisdom and beautiful preaching*' (16: 125), and only after this do they level the sword against them in accordance with, '*And reason with them in the best of ways*'(16: 125), so driving them out of the realm of similitudes (*kawn-i mushābahat*)[39] by means of slaughter [and] battle.

[§130] The summons (*da'wat*) and obligations which the rightful leaders impose [on human kind] are directed at the good. In this world, the good initially fall away from their natural constitution (*fiṭrat*),[40] due to sinful behaviour and iniquity. However, by means of such a call and charge – which, in relation to the souls of good people, is like an elixir which works its effect on the substance of copper and turns it into pure gold – this sinful behaviour is effaced from their memory and they are returned to their original nature. [The summons] is not intended for the wicked so that they might become good. What the wicked derive from the call and obligation is [merely what has been mentioned in the

Qur'ān]: '*There is no summoning for him, neither in this world nor in the Hereafter*' (40: 43).

[§131] Similarly, if someone were to ask why eternal punishment is meted out by God Almighty (*ḥaḍrat-i ṣamadiyyat*), when human actions are temporal and finite – that is, why finite sin is punished with an eternal retribution – the answer is that eternal punishment is not meted out by God Almighty for finite sin. On the contrary, just as the souls of the good by nature deserve a divine reward, and will remain eternally and endlessly in joy, happiness, bliss and felicity, so the souls of the wicked by nature must likewise be punished and remain eternally and endlessly in that great despair and supreme disaster. We seek refuge from this in God.

[§132] From these precursory arguments and premises, it is therefore evident that evil cannot be said to exist in the origination (*ibdā'*) [of creation], and that good and evil do not have two [separate] sources. Whoever affirms the existence of these two contrary sources, claiming Yazdān to be the source of light and good, and Ahriman to be the source of darkness and evil, has juxtaposed Yazdān and Ahriman as two contrary principles. Thus, whenever such a contradiction has been introduced, it will be like two enemies, both of which require a judge to arbitrate between them. Both these views are great errors and manifest denial (*kufr*). Godspeed to you.

Taṣawwur 15

Concerning Paradise and paradises, Hell and hells, purgatories and the paths.

[§133] No one can demonstrate that there is neither truth nor falsehood in this world, because if he says there is no truth, from the negation of truth the affirmation of falsehood necessarily follows, and if he says there is no falsehood, from the denial of falsehood the affirmation of truth necessarily follows. Thus, when the existence of both truth and falsehood are established, the existence of both those who attest to the truth (*muḥiqq*) and those who attest to falsehood (*mubṭil*) are also established. It is clear that the follower of truth and the follower of falsehood each has his [own] sort of thought, word and deed. The thought, word and deed of the follower of truth is truthfulness, veracity and goodness;

the thought, word and deed of the follower of falsehood is falsehood, lying and evil. There is a certain recompense for the thought, word and deed of each one of them, according to the decree, [God] '*punishes those who do evil according to their deeds and rewards those who do good with what is best*' (53: 31). The recompense for the follower of truth is a [divine] reward, and the recompense for the follower of falsehood is [divine] punishment.

[§134] The realm of reward (*thawāb*) is called Paradise and the realm of punishment is called Hell. There is only one real Paradise, and that is eternal reward, everlasting perfection and infinite existence; the meaning of all this is the attainment of God in all His aspects. There is also only one real Hell, and that is eternal punishment, everlasting disappointment and eternal non-existence; the meaning of all this is being outcast from God in every sense of the word.

[§135] If the real Paradise and Hell, as is the belief of the majority of Muslims, were made of physical matter (*mawādd-i jismānī*) and composed of material things – for example, if Paradise were a garden of immense extent adorned with streams, trees, beautiful maidens, palaces, water, milk, honey, wine and other various delicacies of eating and drinking as they count them; and if Hell were, for example, a pit of awesome length, width and depth, eternally and endlessly filled with fire, snakes and countless terrifying scorpions which sting and bite, and, as they have said, [enormous chains] set on fire and red hot with knots in them like mountains, by which the inmates of hell are thrown into the fire and tortured – there would have been no difference at all between this world and the Hereafter. On the contrary, Paradise is situated at the 'uppermost height' (*a'lā 'illīyin*) and Hell at the 'lowermost depths' (*asfal-i sāfilīn*),[41] the magnitude of both realms being of such an extent that no one's estimation (*wahm*) and reflection can possibly comprehend them. The information given by the Prophets in such physical descriptions of Paradise and Hell are all descriptions presented in accordance with the intellectual capacity of ordinary people and expressed in order to either encourage or frighten them, so that they might incline to obedience and abstain from disobedience.

[§136] The elect (*khawāṣṣ*), however, are aware of the secrets and [esoteric] realities [of such descriptions]. They have chosen to manifest their faith in accordance with the exoteric form and appearance adopted by the masses – according to the adages, 'Walk at the pace of the weakest

among you' and 'Put on clothes of the same colour as the prey' – in keeping with the common good, and it is that [exoteric religion] that they practise. Indeed, they are many times more concerned and seriously devout as are ordinary people, because if they, who have no need of these customs, rites, rituals and rules for the attainment of the perfections and nobility of their souls, were to neglect them and not to regard imposing these hardships and yokes upon themselves as their individual duty, the religious law (*sharī'at*) of the Prophet would never have become firmly established, and the consolidation of religion would have in no way been possible.

[§137] Moreover, the realm of similitudes – in which both the followers of truth and falsehood, the veracious and the liars, the good and the wicked, resemble each other, and where the godless devil is occupied in arbitration and disputation – is absolute Hell (*dūzakh-i muṭlaq*). [On the other hand], the realm of distinction, where the followers of truth are distinguished from the followers of falsehood, the veracious from the liar and the good from the wicked, and where the godless devil cannot approach the presence of the Most High – is absolute Paradise (*bihisht-i muṭlaq*).[42]

[§138] The verbal expressions of the scripture (*'ibārāt-i tanzīlī*) pertain to the realm of similitudes and, being endowed [with the particular] characteristics of multiplicity (*kathrat*), have the temperament of Hell. On the other hand, esoteric meanings (*ma'ānī-yi ta'wīlī*) pertain to the realm of distinction and, being endowed [with particular] characteristics of Divine Unity (*waḥdat*), have the temperament of Paradise. Whoever does not attain to the realm of distinction from the realm of similitudes and does not aspire to find esoteric meanings of the expressions of the Revelation is a denizen of Hell. And whoever attains to the realm of distinction from the realm of similitudes, seeking to find and realise the esoteric meaning of the exoteric expressions of the revealed scripture is a denizen of Paradise. Similarly, total freedom of the will (*ikhtiyār-i maḥḍ*) where everything exists [for the soul] as it [ideally] should be, is the true Paradise, just as utter constraint of the will (*jabr-i maḥḍ*), where everything exists as it should not be [for the soul], is the true Hell.

[§139] The soul's delight comes from contemplating intelligibles, which pertain to true thought (*fikr-i ḥaqq*), veracious words (*qawl-i ṣidq*), and good deeds (*'amal-i khayr*). The body's pleasure is derived from perceiving sensory objects pertaining to the faculties of touch,

taste, smell, hearing and sight. If, when the soul leaves the body, it has been inclined in all respects towards the acquisition of advantages which spring from pure intelligible matters (*maʿqūlāt*), and if the shadow of the sensuality has not obscured the light of its free will, it will remain in a state of pleasure without pain, happiness without sorrow and life without death: everything will be as it should be for it.

[§140] However, if [the soul] has been inclined in all aspects towards the acquisition of sensory pleasures, it will inevitably remain in the darkness of perverted fantasy and erroneous supposition when its senses, which are the means of perceiving these sensory pleasures, are taken away from it; so everything that befalls it will be unsuitable. The likeness [of such a soul] is as a man who is half-slain, both of whose eyes have been torn out, whose nose, tongue, hands, legs and all organs have been severed, and who lies there, neither alive nor dead. He is overpowered and overwhelmed by imagining those pleasures which he could have had by means of these limbs and organs, and overtaken by eternal despair because he will never be able to attain them. His situation gives rise to the greatest remorse and repentance. He bears witness to the meaning of [the saying], 'Verily, these are your actions which recoil against you.' However much he wishes to be permitted to return once more to the world to do that which he should do, he will surely not be allowed. All of his supplications and implorations – [as in the Qur'ānic verse, '*Could we return [to earthly life], that we may do differently than we did*' (7: 53) – will be of no avail. That indeed is the real hell. We seek refuge from this in God.

[§141] Both Paradise and Hell are products of man's mental conceptions (*taṣawwur*) and such conceptions are of no more than three categories: sensory (*ḥissī*), psychical (*nafsī*) and intellectual (*ʿaqlī*) conceptions. If his mental conception begins [at the level] of sensory perception and proceeds no further, then such a conception makes of itself a sensible hell for him within his soul, his soul being in its very own hell. If his mental conception begins at the psychical level and proceeds no further, that conception will effect in him a glimpse of his paradise within his soul, his soul sensing the effect of its inner heaven. If his mental conception proceeds from intellectual knowledge and remains at that level, this conception will become a real paradise within the soul for him, his soul being in its very own paradise.

[§142] The real Paradise is also the upright intellect (*ʿaql-i mustaqīm*) – that is to say, [the reason] united with Divine Volition (*amr*), so that,

for example, one ascends from the senses to the estimative imagination (*wahmī*), from imagination to soul (*nafsī*) and from soul to intellect. [In other words], one's sensuality is converted into estimative imagination, then into soul and ultimately into intellect, [until it] comes to rest content with the gnosis of pure intellect, '*returning to his Lord pleased and well-contented*' (89: 28). The real Hell, on the other hand, is that of of the perverted intellect (*'aql-i mankūs*), that is to say, the reason which is separated from Divine Volition, so that, for instance, [it descends from] the intellectual to the spiritual, from the spiritual to the estimative imagination, and from the estimative imagination to the senses. [Hence], his intellect descends [to the level of] soul, then the imagination, then to sense perception, and from there it falls into the Inferno and the most horrid place.

[§143] [As for the doctrine that] beyond each spiritual reward (*thawāb*), there lies a further reward until man attains to God – that is to say, as one traverses [the stages] of perfection, one encounters a paradise beyond each paradise, until one attains to the ultimate perfection – [the Qur'ān says], '*Verily, unto your God is the ultimate return*' (53: 42), and '*Verily unto your God is the return*' (96: 8).

[§144] But these relative paradises are relative perfections, and [we can say this if the following] analogy, taken from [the example of] minerals, plants, animals and humans is extended to the angels and the sacrosanct hierarchies (*ḥudūd-i qudsī*). Thus, precious mineral gems are, on account of the additional force of their purity, colour, transparency and qualities, superior to all other minerals. Now, if one starts at the first stage and arranges them in an orderly [and progressive] manner, one by one, the final stage of [the minerals] will be connected to the first stage of the power of growth [in plants], although the effect of [such development] may seem slight, like the coral tree, which combines in itself both the power of growth and solidification.

[§145] Plants are superior to all mineral substances on account of the greater power of growth added to them. Now, if one starts at the beginning and follows them through, one by one – for example, from a herb that is as thin as a hair and as soft as a drop of water, up to tall trees with roots and branches which can procreate – [one finds that] the final [stage of plant development] is connected to the primitive [stage] of animal development, although the trace of [this progression] may seem slight, as in the case of the palm tree which will not bear fruit unless the

female tree is fertilised with male flowers, and its roots and branches will not grow if its top is cropped off.

[§146] On account of the powers of sense perception and motion superadded to them, animals are superior to all plants. Now, if one starts at the beginning and follows them through, one by one – for example, from gnats, flies and worms, which come into existence by means of putrefaction of air with various sorts of matters, through to birds who come into existence from eggs, up to animals who are perfectly created and have perfect strength, and are begotten through the copulation of male and female, [one finds that] the final [stage of animal development] is conjoined to the first [i.e., primitive stage] of human development. However, the trace of [this connection] is slight, as [can be seen] in the case of the ape whose physiognomy, power of intelligence and comprehension are akin to that of man, such that the ape can even learn by instruction some of the movements and actions of man.

[§147] Man is superior to all animals on account of the powers of discursive reason and discrimination superadded to him. Now, if one starts at the beginning and follows the [various kinds] of human beings through, one by one, for example, from the negro of Zanzibar (*Zangī dar Zangibār*) in the extreme south who, apart from having his hands off the ground, does not differ from animals in any particular way – '*except for that which God wishes*' (6: 128, etc.), and many have observed that an ape is easier to train and more receptive than a negro of Zanzibar[43] – up through persons who have an upright comportment (*rāst ṣūrat*), balanced temperament and physical condition, an even size and stature, and supreme beauty and grace, who have competence and shrewdness in the affairs of life, who are adroit and dextrous, ingenious, skilful, proficient in every art, profession and craft on which the construction, decoration and ornamentation of this world of growth and decay (*'ālam-i kawn wa fasād*) depends, and which are the means of sustenance of people. From such folk, one moves [up] to experienced and accomplished people who have exceptional and remarkable moral qualities, up to dignitaries and nobles, through high officials and people of eminence, up to kings who control and conquer various parts of the world through their wise judgement and government and by the power of the sword, up to those who seek knowledge (*ahl-i 'ilm*), one above the other, to those who have the knowledge of the Divine, until [one finds] their final stage is connected to the first rank of the angelic hierarchy.

[§148] Angels are superior to the entire species of man because of the [ontological] position that they occupy, that is, their greater proximity to the entire source-spring of existence. The final stages of the angelic hierarchy are connected to the initial rank of the Sacrosanct Hierarchy (*ḥudūd-i qudsī*),[44] and beyond this rank 'there lies no rank for the seeker to seek'.

[§149] Hence, [in this system], beginning with minerals to precious gems, to plants, to animals, to man, to angels and up to the sacrosanct hierarchy, it has been so arranged that everything that is superior [in degree] resembles a paradise for the degree below it, and every degree resembles hell in relation to the degree above it.

[§150] Applying now the same analogy exclusively to man, it can be said that when a child is born to its mother, every perfection which becomes attached to its body and its senses, which are the tools for the perfection of its soul, resembles its paradise, and every deficiency through which it has to pass in order to reach [perfection], is comparable to its hell. For example, the condition of the womb in which it was [conceived], was its hell; and the wide expanse of this world into which it has entered is like its paradise. The condition in which it could not open its eyes to sunlight was like its hell; its condition when it reaches that stage is like its paradise. The condition in which it could not talk or walk was like its hell; its condition when it reaches that stage, resembles its paradise. The condition in which it could not read and write was like its hell; its condition when it reaches that stage is like its paradise. The condition in which it had not yet attained puberty – the innate intellect (*'aql-i gharīzī*) having not yet become attached to it, and it did not know the manners and arts of entertainment, war, [modes of] command and decision-making – was like its hell; its condition when it reaches that stage resembles its paradise. The condition in which it is estranged from knowledge of the subtleties of truth and falsehood, good and evil, veracity and lying – not having yet attained knowledge of the conditions of the physical (*jismānī*) and the spiritual (*rūḥānī*) worlds through knowledge of its own body and soul, and the understanding of [the saying of the Prophet] 'He who knows himself, knows his Lord',[45] is veiled from it – is its hell; and the condition when it reaches that stage, is its paradise.

[§151] Regarding the saying that 'paradise is man and hell is man,' it has both a summary and a detailed explanation. As for the summary one, [it can be said that] when the ultimate degree of the thoughts, words

and deeds of mankind – some of whom are followers of truth (*muḥiqq*) and some followers of falsehood (*mubṭil*) – are determined, there appears among the followers of truth a man who is, in himself, a paradise in this world and a world in paradise. Likewise there appears among the followers of falsehood a man who is in himself a hell in this world, and who is a world in hell.

[§152] The detailed explanation is that every act of obedience and worship and [every] meritorious action, such as prayer (*namāz*), fasting (*rūza*), alms-giving (*zakāt*) and so forth, [can be personified] as a concrete individual. Thus, when one wants to make reference to these acts, one must refer to that individual, for it is he, that individual, who actually personifies all this beneficence and these good actions, and is the subject. [Similarly], every hellish desire, disobedience, and [every] wicked action such as theft, lying, fornication and so forth [can be personified] as an individual. Thus, when one wants to refer to these acts, one must refer to that individual, for he is himself that evil and wickedness, and the subject [to which those acts refer].

[§153] Every true thought, veracious word and good deed is also a spiritual entity, that is, an angel, which prepares the soul and facilitates its passage through the degrees of perfection and its arrival at, and union with, the [absolute] source of its existence [i.e, the *'amr*, Divine Command]. Such a soul becomes, therefore, a noble angel, and the spiritual entities (*rūḥāniyyāt*) of thought, word and deed are all parts and expressions of it, and that noble angel is a man, according to [the Qur'ān], '*Had We made him an angel, We would have certainly sent him as a man*' (6:9). Conversely, every erroneous thought, false word and evil deed is a faculty of diabolic inspiration which casts the soul down, stage by stage, into the lowermost depths (*asfal-i sāfilīn*). Such a soul becomes an accursed demon (*dīw-i rajīm*), and all those spiritual powers [of its evil deeds] are parts and expressions of that demon. Now, such a diabolic soul (*nafs-i shayṭānī*) – according to [the Qur'ān], '*devils from among jinn and men*' (114: 6) – is also a man. The former is the person of paradise and the latter is the person of hell.

[§154] Regarding the [reality of] the isthmus (*barzakh*), whenever something moves in the direction of something else and does not immediately reach it, it pauses – that [intermediate state of] pausing is called a *barzakh*. For example, it is necessary that our sense perceptions become [raised to the level of] estimation (*wahm*), that estimation become [raised

to the level] of the soul (*nafs*), and that the soul becomes intellect (*'aql*), and that the intellect becomes united with the Divine Volition (*amr*). So long as the progress of each one of these to the next stage occurs gradually, by degrees and incrementally, there will be one halting place after another. For this reason they speak of [several] isthmuses and stations.

[§155] Similarly, there is an isthmus between the [realm of] creation (*khalq*) and [that of] the Divine Command (*amr*), and between the Divine Command and the spiritual reward (*thawāb*). The isthmus that exists between creation and the Divine Command is greater than that which exists between the Divine Command and the spiritual reward. Since sensory phenomena (*maḥsūsāt*) indicate [the presence of] intelligible realities (*ma'qūlāt*) and we inhabit the realm of the senses, we must necessarily deduce evidence for intelligible matters through [the medium of the] senses. This may be illustrated by the fact that when a child is born from its mother's womb, as long as its creaturely form (*ṣūrat-i khalqī*) does not evolve, that is, as long as its body is incomplete, it cannot become attached to the Divine Command. Correspondingly, in the other world, as long as the form of the Divine Command (*ṣūrat-i amrī*), that is, the [individual] soul, is not perfectly developed, it cannot be united with the spiritual reward (*thawāb*). Thus, the stage when a man has departed from this world but has not yet reached the reward is called purgatory or the isthmus. Departure from this world is not, in fact, natural death; rather, it is reaching from [the realm of] similitudes (*mushābahat*), to [the realm] of clear distinction (*mubāyanat*), and from clear distinction to [the realm of Divine] Unity (*waḥdat*). Godspeed to you.

[§156] There are three paths. The first is the inverted path (*ṣirāt-i mankūs*), like [that of] the plant, whose roots are directed towards the centre [of the earth] and whose branches are directed towards the enveloping atmosphere. By natural power and the effects of the [Universal] Soul, it dominates and controls minerals which lie inferior to it.

[§157] The second is the reversed path (*ṣirāt-i maqlūb*), such as that of animals, which have four legs on the ground. Although in relation to man, the animal does not have its head raised from the earth in any aspect, in relation to the plants it has. By the powers of Nature and the effects of the Soul, it dominates and controls the plants, which lie inferior to it.

[§158] The third is the straight path (*ṣirāt-i mustaqīm*), as exists in the case of man whose head is directed towards the surrounding heavens

and whose feet are directed towards the centre [of the earth]. Although, in relation to the angel, man has not attained the realm of absolute free will (*ikhtiyār-i maḥḍ*), in relation to the animal he has. He governs his inferiors, that is, the animals, plants and minerals by means of natural powers, the effects of soul, the effusions from intellect (*fayḍ-i 'aqlī*), and by the assistance (*ta'yīd*) of the Supreme Word (*kalima-yi a'lā*).

[§159] As for [the saying of the Prophet] that 'The path is finer than a hair and sharper than a sword,'[46] this means that it is possible for the human soul, which at the outset exists in the state of potentiality, to become in actuality either a holy angel or an accursed demon. Whichever side the soul inclines to, the angelic or the diabolic, be it as slight as a grain of dust, this will cause a consequent increase of the angelic or diabolic power [within it].

[§160] Regarding [the saying] that 'the path is a man,' the summary explanation of this is that as long as there is no one to establish these paths, no one can speak of them and it is impossible to know the [differences between] the inverted, the reversed and the straight paths. For this reason the reality of the path is a man. According to the detailed explanation, there is a real person in the realm of individuals, [corresponding] to every idea (*ma'nī-yi dhihnī*) which exists in the world of universals (*'ālam-i kullī*).[47] The person of the inverted path is the one who has changed the direction of his face from the Hereafter to this world. The person of the reversed path is the one who sometimes directs his face towards the Hereafter and sometimes towards this world and its conditions. The person of the straight path is the one for whom this present world is his Hereafter (*ākhirat*). He unites all these relative faces into one, and that is the face which is [turned] towards God Almighty. Godspeed to you.

Taṣawwur 16

Concerning Adam and Iblis.

[§161] The belief of the majority of the people and of the Muslims is that there was a time when God Almighty had not yet created this world, [and] then He created it: '*Verily God is your Lord Who created the heavens and earth in six days*' (7: 54). They add that the first man that God created was Adam. Eve, who was his mate, was created from

his left flank. The progeny of Adam came into existence from his loin in the womb of Eve. At first, Adam and Eve were sent [by God] to Paradise. He permitted them to eat from all provender in Paradise except wheat, which He prohibited, saying, '*Neither of you approach this tree*' (2: 35).

[§162] At first Iblis was an archangel who held the position of instructor to the angels. When God Almighty created Adam, He said, '*I will appoint a vicegerent on earth*' (2: 30), and ordered the angels, '*Prostrate before Adam*' (2: 34). They said, '*Are You appointing [as a vicegerent] someone who will do mischief in the world and shed blood, while we praise, glorify and sanctify You?*' (2: 30). He, exalted be His Glory, said, '*I know that which you do not know.*' (2: 30) They said, '*Praise be to You, we know only what you have taught us*' (2: 32). They prostrated to Adam and kept their angelic status.

[§163] But Iblis refused, arrogantly, and said, '*Am I to prostrate to someone whom You have created from clay?*' (17: 61), adding, '*I am better than he; You created me from fire and created him from clay*' (7: 12). He did not prostrate before Adam and fell from his angelic state into a demonic condition (*dīwī*), in which he will remain cursed by God Almighty until the Resurrection.

After that, [Iblis] went to Paradise where he approached Adam and Eve in the disguise of a well-wishing instructor and deceived them. He said, 'Eat some of this wheat,' and they were deceived by his words and ate the wheat. They were punished by God and fell from Paradise.

Then they repented and said, '*Our Lord, we have wronged our souls. If you do not forgive us and show mercy towards us, we shall be among the losers*' (7: 23). God Almighty accepted their repentance and returned them both to Paradise, and since then they have not fallen from Paradise.

[§164] All of this [contains] symbolic allusions and mysteries (*rumūz*) which are implicit in the exoteric meaning of the Revelation. Those whose insight (*naẓar-i baṣīrat*) does not go beyond the realm of similitudes and cannot reach the realm of clear distinction, are unable to proceed beyond these bare articles of faith (*qawā'id*), and so stop at this point. Those whose insight has passed beyond the realm of similitudes and reached the realm of clear distinction give their assent to all this in terms of the exoteric and [explicit words] of Revelation; but in terms of esoteric and spiritual exegesis (*bāṭin wa ta'wīl*), they understand each of these symbols and allusions as having an inner reality and spiritual sense, with God's permission and goodwill.

[§165] For example, concerning the non-being of the world, that there was a time when it did not exist, then it came into existence, they [the esotericists] say: 'We both affirm that there was a time when the world did not exist and then it came into existence, but we also affirm that it was never the case that man did not exist in this world and also affirm that Adam was the first human in this world.'

[§166] Concerning the world, we say [in reply to the exoteric theologians]: 'Which world are you speaking about, [when you say] that there was a time when it did not exist and then it came into existence? If you mean this universe – with the heaven raised up, ornamented with the Sun, the Moon, constellations, stars, and the Earth spread out, with mountains, seas, plants, animals and human beings flourishing upon it – it cannot be said that there was a time that it did not exist and then came into existence. For if you say that there was a time when this world did not exist, you are saying that the Creator was at that time not a creator, or that his creative power (*khāliqī*) was [merely] potential in Him, and [only] became actualised later.' This is unbelief (*kufr*). We seek refuge from this in God.

One must therefore say that the Almighty was always the Creator and, having said 'Creator', this necessarily implies something created, that is, this world. Thus, there was never a time when this world did not exist.

[§167] If someone were to object, 'In this way, both God and the world are [considered to be] eternal (*qadīm*), and this is polytheism (*shirk*),' we reply, 'We deny neither the eternity of the world nor its createdness.' We say, 'In respect to itself, the world was created, but in respect to the One who completed it and perfected it, it is eternal.' Its created nature (*ḥudūth*) lies in its potentiality and its imperfection; and its eternity is constituted by its coming into a state of necessary existence from potentiality, and from imperfection (*nuqṣān*) to perfection (*kamāl*).

[§168] The reason, therefore, that people imagine and judge there to have been a time when it did not exist and then came into existence, is because not all beings can ascertain the real situation of the world. For example, the world appears differently to a worm that lives among rocks, to a bird that flies in the air, to a child in the womb, to an infant, to an adult, to an ignorant adult, to a learned man; or, among scholars, to someone with speculative (*naẓarī*) knowledge, someone with instructional (*taʿlīmī*) knowledge, or someone with inspired (*taʾyīdī*)

knowledge. And each of them is able to describe the world from their own standpoint.[48]

[§169] However, the world of which it could be possible to say that it was not at first, and then came into existence, is that of which it is said that 'the world consists of 18,000 worlds'.[49] Amongst these [worlds] is the revolution that takes place when one cycle changes to another, when one prophetic tradition (*sunnat*) and custom (*ā'īn*) changes to another, and one religion (*millat*) changes to another. Each one of these is a world, each of these is a separate world, and when each changes, one may say that such and such a cycle, a prophetic tradition and a religion, which did not exist and then came into existence, was a separate world which underwent non-existence and then existence. And the first man in that world was the first founder of that religion, who revolutionised the previous cycle and its traditions.

[§170] As for the creation of this world in six days, these six days refer to the cycles of the founders of [six] religions (*aṣḥāb-i sharāyi'*), [i.e., the Prophets Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus and Muḥammad]. And each day is one thousand years: '*Verily one day of God (rabb) is one thousand years of your reckoning*' (22: 47), that is, from Adam to Muḥammad, peace be upon him. This is the world of which it can be said that there was a time when it did not exist and then it came into existence.

[§171] Regarding the notion that in the first [created] world the first man was not Adam, and [the idea that] there was never a time when mankind did not exist in this world, [the truth of] this matter is that the purpose of the movements of the spheres was the mixing (*imtizāj*) of the [four] elements of the natural kingdoms, and since the purpose of the [natural] kingdoms was the human species, the order of existence necessitated that first minerals, then plants, then animals and then human beings come into being. If there had been no minerals, plants could never have come into being, and had minerals, plants and animals not existed, neither could man have existed. Thus, since there never was a time when the world did not exist, when there were no minerals, plants, animals or human beings, the human species, accordingly, has always been and always will be [in the world].

[§172] As for [the proposition that] Adam was, from one point of view, the first man in the first [created] world and, from another point of view, he was not, they [the esotericists] profess that according to our

understanding of his circumstances, the world and the natural kingdoms – by which it has already been made clear that the human species has always existed in this world and always will – Adam cannot have been the first man in the first world.

[§173] And as for Adam being the first man in the first world, we profess that [it refers to the] cosmic cycles (*adwār-i 'ālamhā*) and to the changes from one cycle to another which occur, that is, changes from one world to another. Thus, when one cycle, which is another world, begins, the founder (*wāḍi'*) of the religion of that cycle is made manifest, and his appearance, form, language, dialect, speech, behaviour, deeds and spiritual path, both in whole and part, are completely different [from the previous cycle]. It is he who is said to be the first human being, who did not exist in the world and then did. And all men who live during his period (*dawr*) are called after him in that period and regarded as his descendants. The founder of the religion which came into existence during [the first cosmic cycle of] 7,000 years was Adam, and therefore [the people of this cycle] refer to Adam and are called Adamites (*Ādamiyān*).

[§174] In the cycle of every Prophet, the [period of the] manifestation of the exoteric dimension of the religious law (*ẓāhir-i sharī'at*) is called the cycle of concealment (*dawr-i satr*), and the cycle of every Resurrector (*qā'im*), when the manifestation of the esoteric realities of the religious laws (*ḥaqāyiq-i sharī'at*) of the Prophets occur, is called the cycle of disclosure (*dawr-i kashf*). The cycles are ordained [in periods of] one millennium, and each cycle lasts one thousand years.

[§175] Once [a series of] millennia has begun, every 7,000 years a Resurrection (*qiyāmat*) occurs. When seven times seven thousand years, that is 49,000 years, have passed and the 50th millennium begins, there occurs the 'Resurrection of Resurrections' (*qiyāmat-i qiyāmāt*). During these millennia, the cycles of concealment and disclosure rotate like night and day.

[§176] The story of Adam and Iblis is this: At the beginning of this [new cycle of] 7,000 years, when [the previous cycle] had reached its termination, and the Resurrector of that cycle, by divine decree and wisdom, closed the door of the summons and preaching of that Resurrection (*da'wat-i qiyāmat*) which was passing, he inaugurated a cycle of concealment and legislative religion (*dawr-i satr wa dawr-i sharī'at*). Thus, a Prophet (*nabī*), possessing Divine Revelation and inspiration (*waḥy-i ilāhī wa ilhām-i subḥānī*), was chosen who established sensory

symbols corresponding to each intellectual reality, laying down the foundation of religious law in the world. The disciples of the Resurrector of the previous cycle, that is, the angels, found it difficult to obey the exoteric prescriptions of the [new] religious law which Adam had established by the order of the Resurrector. They objected, desiring to throw off those chains and yokes according to the measure of knowledge which, by hearsay, they had learned about the Resurrection (*ʿilm-i qiyāmat*). But when the order (*farmān*) of the Resurrector – may salutations ensue upon mention of him – reached them, saying that '*I know something which you do not know*' (2: 30), they became aware of themselves and realised the necessity to repent and implore pardon, and by accepting those legal prescriptions and prohibitions they reached the eminent rank and virtuous position intended for them.

[§177] Ḥārith-i Murra, that is, Iblis, was one of the teachers at the end of the [previous] cycle of disclosure who had survived until the beginning of the period of concealment. Since he held the position of instructor to the angels – that is, he was among the preachers of the [doctrine of] Resurrection (*ahl-i daʿwat-i qiyāmat*) and did not have in him the inclination to be taught by Adam – he said: 'This religious law imposes a fixed path, whereas that Resurrection whose door they have closed is the total purpose [of that law]. I have attained that purpose and have reached that goal; why should I return from that goal and purpose and start passing through the degrees and way-stations again?' He did not accept the religious law and said: 'I am already conversant with the substance of that summons to which Adam invites [us], and do not need to bow my neck beneath the yoke of obedience and obligation to it.'

[§178] As for his saying, '*I am better than Adam, because You created me from fire and him from clay*' (2: 12), by that 'fire' he meant divinely assisted (*ta'yīdī*) knowledge, and by that 'clay' he meant speculative and instructional (*taʿlīmī*) knowledge, meaning that [whereas his knowledge] is divinely assisted, Adam's knowledge is merely speculative and instructional. In its loftiness and comprehensive nature, fire symbolises divine assistance (*ta'yīd*), earth symbolises rational speculation (*naẓar*) and water symbolises instruction (*taʿlīm*).

[§179] Regarding that which Adam was commanded, '*Do not approach this tree*' (7: 19), that is, not to eat wheat, by this [symbolism] is meant the Tree of Eternity (*shajarat al-khuld*) and the Eternal Kingdom (*mulk-i lā yablā*) (20:120), that is, the lore of the Resurrection. 'Do not

eat wheat' means not to start teaching the [doctrine of] Resurrection and not to speak about its appearance, because its time was not yet ripe.

[§180] As for [Adam's] disobedience and deception by the words of Iblis and eating the wheat, the implication [of this story] is that [even though] Iblis was cursed by his disobedience and arrogance, paying no attention to this, he still approached Adam. He revealed to Adam demonstrative proofs of the summons (*da'wat*) of the Resurrection [proclaimed by that] Resurrector. On account of his initial weakness, Adam accepted [those proofs] and, furthermore, repeated [them] before some people who were not entitled to know them, and so he was abased by the chastisement of that Resurrector, may salutations ensue upon mention of him. When Adam realised that he had committed a sin, he acknowledged his error and took refuge in God's all-encompassing Mercy, and his apology and repentance were accepted.

[§181] As for Eve, who is referred to as Adam's spouse, she symbolises the spiritual significations (*ma'ānī*) within that *sharī'at*, as she was aware of the esoteric principles and realities (*bāṭin wa ma'ānī*) [of it]. She knew that the task of executing the religious law of that cycle was to be accomplished by Adam and herself. She also accepted the words of Ḥārith at first, but in the end she confessed her sin, turning in penitence to God.

[§182] But the Paradise from which Adam and Eve were both caused to fall, and the Paradise which they regained and from which they never have fallen, alludes to the fact that truth has a beginning and an end. For, due to the discord (*taḍādd*) that we see at the beginning, we have to say that falsehood exists. However, in the end we perceive that a certain gradation (*tarattub*) exists, so we are forced to confess that [in fact, only] truth exists and falsehood is naught. Truth is weak at the beginning but powerful in the end, whereas falsehood is powerful at the beginning but weak at the end. For this reason, falsehood can be said to resemble truth in the beginning, whereas the resemblance ceases at the end where falsehood does not exist any more.

Thus, the Paradise where Adam was and from which he was caused to fall was the Paradise at the beginning of truth, which is the realm of similitudes where the follower of truth and the follower of falsehood resemble each other. The Paradise at which he arrived and from which he was never caused to fall was the Paradise at the end of truth which is the realm of clear distinction (*kawn-i mubāyanat*) between the follower of

truth and the follower of falsehood. Falsehood certainly does not remain in that realm. Proponents of esoteric exegesis (*aṣḥāb-i ta'wīl*) have given similar interpretations of other allegories and indications which have been revealed about Adam and Iblis. Godspeed to you.

Taṣawwur 17

Concerning the causes for various differences that exist among the world's inhabitants, and between the followers of truth and the followers of error.

[§183] There are so many causes and reasons for these differences [among human beings], whether they relate to universal or particular realities that God alone can comprehend them [all].

Regarding universal realities, these refer to the causes [of events] as governed by astronomical laws relating to the stars' trajectories, oppositions, conjunctions and the impact of astral radiation, which are the celestial forces (*fā'ilān-i samāwī*) underlying whatever good or evil fortune [befalls man] and [are influences] which determine the origins of human birth. This is because, by the wisdom of His decree – praise be to Him, the Exalted, and His divine ordination and pre-determination (*qaḍā wa qadar*) – no action, be it in word or deed, can be undertaken by any creature unless one of the forces of the heavenly powers graces the speech, limbs and organs of that creature.

[§184] Regarding particular realities, these refer to the effects on earth (*munfa'ilāt-i arḍī*), such as the composition of the human body, which is made of four mutually opposed substances. From the time [a child] is conceived in the womb until it comes into the world and to the end of his life, the climate and the influence of the place in which he is born and grows up will have their effect on his temperament, and variations in these [influences] will be manifested in his body, humours, character and habits. The doctrines, religious beliefs, habits and customs which he acquires from childhood to maturity, from his father, mother, instructors, teachers and masters, in the midst of which he grows up and which permeate the flesh of [its body], [all] belong to the same category.

From the goblet of love,
I sipped a kind of wine in my cradle,

the sweetness of which will linger in my throat
'till the [Day of] Resurrection.[50]

[§185] When during its infancy, as the faculty of coagulation is conjoined with the faculty of growth, that infant seeks succour from the natural elements and humours in order to facilitate the conglomeration of its [physical] parts and fulfil the perpetuation of its being. In this state, the infant has neither thought nor deliberation.

[§186] When the faculty of growth (*nāmiyya*) combines with the faculty of the sensation, [the child] seeks succour from the spheres and the stars for the preservation, regulation and strengthening of the limbs, and in that state its senses, which are the tools and instruments for the perfection of its soul, become complete [and] it begins to think and deliberate.

[§187] When the faculty of sensation (*quwwat-i ḥassāsa*) combines with the faculty of rational discrimination (*nāṭiqa-yi mumayyiza*), [the child] receives succour from the Universal Soul (*nafs-i kullī*) with intelligible ideas joining its [power of] learning. In that state its thought and deliberation are strengthened.

[§188] When the faculty of rational discrimination (*nāṭiqa-yi mumayyiza*) combines with the power of mature intellect, [the child] receives assistance from the Universal Intellect (*'aql-i kull*) through intelligible ideas which become infused with its knowledge. [In that state], its thought and deliberation are perfected.

[§189] At every moment of the [process] described, the combinations which occur between the various functions – physical, sensory, estimative and imaginative – are numerous. During all these stages and degrees of perfections, until it reaches the ultimate perfection, [the child's] senses are strong, but its intellect remains weak. Thus, any education that it receives from whatever teacher leaves its trace in his soul, [as said by the Prophet]: 'Every child is born according to the original nature (*fiṭrat*), but its parents make him a Zoroastrian, Jew or Christian.'[51]

[§190] It is for this reason that natural impurities (*shawā'ib-i ṭabī'ī*), temptations of habit (*wasāwis-i 'ādatī*) and conventional laws (*nawāmīs-i amthila*)[52] prevail and domineer over it. Examples of natural impurities are the inclinations towards, and longings for, the physical world and nature (*'ālam-i jism wa ṭabī'at*), immersion of the soul in material things, and domination by lust and greed for the sake of the pleasures of this perishable world.

[§191] By temptations of habit are meant, for example, certain moral traits, habits and rituals which, in the course of time, become so widespread among people and so firmly established in their minds and belief systems that they cannot tolerate any change, great or small, that anyone may make to them. Some will greet such changes with irritation and others by ridicule.

[§192] By conventional laws are meant, for example, practices and customs which a truthful master (*muḥiqq*)[53] has introduced and imposed on people, as for example, the *qibla* [in Makkah, for the direction of prayer], ritual sacrifices, specifically defined rites, and observances of devotional exercises. All of these come to be so firmly established in their imagination and fantasy, so fixed and set [in their minds], that when another truthful master comes along and seeks to revive for them the spirituality of these commands and prohibitions which they have long since forgotten, and in the course of effecting a more progressive and perfect development, he desires to introduce changes in the practices and rituals of the previous master of truth, they rebel and disobey him and would prefer to kill and burn themselves and their children. Hence they refuse to accept that [renewed] summons (*da'wat*).

[§193] The conflicting differences between the followers of truth (*muḥiqqān*) and the followers of falsehood (*mubṭilān*) is due to the fact that 'Truth and falsehood exist and each has its own adherents.'[54] On the side of the followers of truth are the doers of good and right (*muṣliḥān*), and on the side of falsehood are followers of falsehood, the wicked and the depraved (*mufsidān*).

[§194] There is no conflict or dispute among the followers of truth, the doers of good and right, neither between themselves nor with the followers of falsehood, the wicked or the depraved. The reason for this is that the followers of truth have access to both the realm of common creatural resemblances (*mushābahat-i 'āmm-i khalqī*) and the realm of specific distinction of the [Divine] Command (*mubāyanat-i khāṣṣ-i amrī*), and [if] they wished to put the robes of truth, goodness and righteousness upon the followers of falsehood, the wicked and the depraved, [they could]. But the followers of falsehood, the wicked and the depraved dwell only in the realm of common creatural resemblances and have no access to the realm of specific distinction of the Command. Thus, they dispute and quarrel among themselves as well as with the followers of truth, the doers of good and right.

[§195] Since in the realm of similitudes both groups resemble each other, the followers of truth (*muḥiqqān*) enforce the Divine Command upon humankind so that the good can be clearly distinguished from the bad ones. On the other hand, since in the realm of similitudes the power of senses dominate and the devil is at war with God, the pupil assumes for himself the position of teacher and the apprentice elevates himself above his master. Because outer appearances prevail among the inhabitants of this realm [of similitudes], they decline to accept the Divine Command and resort to quarreling and fighting with the followers of truth.

[§196] The followers of truth are thus necessarily forced to take measures not only in accordance with that aspect of the summons (*da'wat*) which proclaims, '*Invite to the path of God with wisdom and beautiful preaching*' (16: 125), but also to apply the rule of the sword according to '*And contend with them in a better way*' (16: 125). It is for this reason that severe rebellions occur.

[§197] Also, concerning God's dealings with mankind, the common people (*'awāmm*) and the elite (*khawāṣṣ*) each speak differently and have different perceptions. For example, one says 'He deals tyrannically with mankind', another says 'no, with justice (*'adl*),' another says 'no, with grace,' and yet another says 'with an all-encompassing mercy'. There is discrepancy between each one of these [statements]: in one respect they all speak the truth, and in another respect they are all wrong. The truthful aspect is when they appropriately observe the rule of each realm, and the false aspect is when they do not. Since the ranks and degrees of mankind are different, it is impossible to apply a general and equal rule to all.

[§198] The [right] answer is that the Almighty's dealings appear as tyranny to one who dwells in the descending stages of plurality (*darakāt-i kathrat*) and from whom all true realities are veiled; they [appear as] justice to one in the darkness of whose soul a light has appeared, so that there is an even distribution between light and darkness; and it [appears] as grace to him the light of whose soul exceeds its darkness; and it is an all-encompassing mercy to that person whose soul is illuminated by the Light of God (*nūr-i khudā'ī*).

[§199] Concerning the discordance (*ikhtilāf*), which is a discordance in form only, whereas in reality it is harmony: it is such that the truthful master desires that the discordances in man's sensory faculties (*mukhtalifāt-i quwāy-i ḥissī*) should become harmonies in his faculty of estimation (*muttafiqāt-i wahmī*), and that those harmonies should

then be converted into a concentrated unity of the intellectual faculty (*muttaḥidāt-i quwāy-i ʿaqlī*), [so that they] become uniform in nature, [and for man] one state of consciousness becomes unified with other states, and vice-versa. [In such a condition], neither time is subject to change, nor places create alteration, nor relationships multiply. A person may only set foot on the path of this total happiness if he has the aptitude to receive such a perfection. However, such aptitude (*istiʿdād)* only actualises itself to the measure that his character is refined and his behaviour manifests harmony.

[**§200**] Such refinement and harmony cannot be attained by kindness and moderation. On the contrary, strictures and prescriptions (*aḥkām wa takālīf*) must very often be enforced [to such a degree] that very few hearts can tolerate them. Because the truthful master does not follow anyone's personal opinion or whim, he says [from the Qur'ān], '*If God was to obey their whims, heaven and earth would have become corrupted*' (23: 71). It is like when a patient wants to eat honey and sugarcandy, but the doctor forbids it and gives him aloe and the juice of colocynth instead.

[**§201**] Since the aim of the truthful master in [making use of] these contrary [forms of remedy] is to perfect human souls, he does not take fright at these contentions. And even if [people] flee from him, become his foes, or resort to riot-making and sword-wielding, he heeds and reckons them not. The dignity and rank that he chooses vis-à-vis men is glory through God's glory, and greatness through His greatness:

> [He is] great through the greatness of God and the greatness of His friends, without boasting of alliances and familial ancestry, or the abundance of his possessions and wealth, or taking pride in his knowledge or [pious] deeds; [He is] great through the august majesty of God and His friends, not by vaunting himself over God's servants or working oppression throughout the land.[55]

[**§202**] The mercy which [the truthful master exercises] through [divine] mercy is that through which [mankind] is enabled to attain proximity to the Divine Presence; and the wrath which he exercises through [divine] wrath is that through which they are denied seeking refuge at the Almighty's Oneness. From this point of view, his anger, hatred and punishment are the same as his mercy, compassion and goodwill. His parsimony, withholding and illiberality are the same as his benevolence,

generosity and liberality. For this reason he says, 'I am the one who plucked out the eye of sedition (*'ayn al-fitna*), and if I were not among you, no one else would pluck it out!'[56] From this, the meaning of [the saying of the Prophet], 'Disagreement within my community (*ummat*) is a blessing,'[57] becomes clear, in so far as the aim of such disagreement is [to attain] unanimity.

[§203] The unanimity which is a purely formal one, being in reality disagreement and opposition, pertains to the people of this world who are ignorant of the inner realities of things. Such people cannot perceive that all [worldly] affairs have two aspects. To them, unanimity and consent is that they should concord with and follow each other's personal whims and opinions, whereas they consider disagreement to be the selection of a certain opinion or policy by one party, while another party adopts the opposite viewpoint. They do not discuss such matters [from a spiritual perspective] so that otherworldly benefit may be preferred over worldly loss; [on the contrary], they pursue a course in which otherworldly losses are preferred for the sake of worldly advantages.

[§204] The ultimate aim and final intention of [worldly] rulers is to deceive and charm their subjects by distributing money and worldly positions, and to obtain dominion and control of their kingdom with their help. Their mercy is a diminution of their power of aggression, as much as their anger is nothing but bloody-mindedness, a rising gall, and a frantic impulse to eradicate the enemy. [Likewise,] the ultimate aim of the subjects in submitting to the order of, and obedience to, the ruler is to obtain for themselves [temporal] benefits and avoid [personal] losses.

[§205] The ultimate aim of the subjects would be to acquire some kind of power and make arrangements through which they can seek elevation and precedence over their own kind. The ultimate goal and purpose of the ruler and the subjects will be reached when the desire and longing for the physical world and nature overpowers their souls, and [the resulting] negligence impels them from matters of the intellect to passions of the soul, and from passions of the soul to estimative things, and from there to affairs of the senses, and from there to the lowest degrees of Hell.

[§206] In this fashion, natural powers, bestial vices, temptations of habit, outdated laws or patterns of social convention, will all become independent forms (*ṣūratī mujarrad*) for every soul [and] will never leave the individual, and consequently in the Hereafter they will be

stripped of the robes of perfection. It is like taking a small fire to a large pile of firewood, then blowing onto it so that the fire blazes up and burns the wood and everything else that it can find; or like a group of people suffering from diabetes or dropsy, the diabetics eating honey and those suffering from dropsy drinking icy water, while there is no doctor to prevent them from doing so, as a result of which they all die. We seek refuge from this in God.

[§207] Since these people are unaware of the secrets of the truthful masters (*muḥiqqān*), because their resolution and ambition go no further than the physical realm of the affairs of this world, they cannot recognise the origin and end of the intentions of the truthful masters. When a particular truthful master (*muḥiqq*) says, 'I am the person who plucked out the eye of sedition,'[58] they do not listen to him. [Instead] they foster disagreement and rebellion, and are not able to distinguish truth from falsehood. They say it is not true that he tore out the eye of sedition; they lay the foundation for such a sedition that it will never diminish or cease. May God Almighty grant [us all] guidance. Godspeed to you.

Taṣawwur 18

Concerning the paucity of the followers of truth and the great number of the followers of error.

[§208] While it is clear that plants are nobler than minerals, yet no tree, however big it may be, can ever be the size of a mountain; and while animals are nobler than plants, yet no animal, however great its size and dimensions, can ever be the size of a large tree. Human beings are nobler than animals, yet no human being, however tall and sturdy he may be [in comparison with] his kind, can ever be the size of an elephant.

[§209] Likewise, it is also evident that the superiority of each of these over the other depends not on their form (*shakl*) and matter (*mādda*), but on their inner reality (*ma'nā*) and form (*ṣūrat*). However, the Almighty's decree was such that every creature which has been given a surplus of power in its exterior form has suffered as a consequence a diminution of powers in its interior spiritual reality. For this reason, the learned are said to resemble the ruby and sapphire, while the ignorant are likened to stone and clay.

[§210] It is said that in the same way as it is necessary to rummage

through many rocks and much clay before one can find a ruby or sapphire big enough to make a jewel out of it, so it is necessary to examine the people of this world, who are in appearance human but are actually non-human, one by one, until one can find a person who is really human.

[§211] There is a text (*naṣṣ*) of the glorious Qur'ān from which the characteristics of both these classes can be verified. In reference to the class of the followers of truth (*ahl-i ḥaqq*), [the Book says], '*And few of My servants are thankful*' (34: 12), and [in reference to] the class of the followers of falsehood (*ahl-i bāṭil*): '*But the majority of people do not know*' (7: 187). There is also a tradition (*khabar*) and a report (*athar*) concerning these two classes: 'People are like a myriad of camels, out of which none serves as a riding camel (*rāḥila*),'[59] and 'They are few in number, but their worth is great and near to God Almighty.'[60]

[§212] The reason for this situation is that existence (*wujūd*) in this world is by constraint (*qasrī*) and non-existence is by nature (*ṭab'ī*). Here, the shadow of senses veils the light of the intellect, and [the influence of] senses upon the intellect (*ḥiss-i 'aqlī*) is stronger than of the intellect upon senses (*'aql-i ḥissī*). For this reason, the followers of falsehood, idiots, ignoramuses, scoundrels and criminals, and other of this ilk abound and have the upper hand. Such folk are described [thus in the Qur'ān]: '*They have hearts but they do not realise [anything] with them; they have eyes but they do not see with them; they have ears but they do not hear with them. They are like cattle; nay, they are even worse*' (7: 178).

[§213] [On the other hand], intelligent, discriminating and well-behaved people, who are among the followers of truth, are few in number and weak. Such folk are described as those who have sound hearts, clear vision, hearing ears, tongues speaking of the Unity of God, and eyes contemplating the divine realm of their Lord.

[§214] The paucity of the followers of truth and the great number and power of the followers of falsehood are both [applicable] to an early stage [of events] where they have just begun to be manifest. The followers of truth are weak at the beginning but strong in the end, like the dawn whose light gradually increases until the Sun rises and the world is illumined. But the followers of falsehood are strong at the beginning and weak in the end. Is it not the case that at the beginning they are completely dominant and overwhelming in their strength, but that in the

end they are annihilated and vanquished into nothingness? [It is] like the shadows and darkness of the night, which at first seem completely dominant and overwhelming, but as the night passes and dawn approaches, they vanish, so that by the end of the night, as dawn appears, nothing is left of the shadows and darkness of the night. Godspeed to you.

Taṣawwur 19

Concerning demons, fairies and angels.

[**§215**] Those who dwell in the realm of similitudes say that demons, fairies and angels have a mental existence (*wujūd-i dhihnī*). They profess that such beings are hidden from the human eye, although their spiritual force (*rūḥāniyyāt*) is capable of taking possession of bodies at will. Those who dwell in the realm of clear distinction say that each of these entities has a real existence (*wujūd-i ʿaynī*) manifest in its own proper realm.

[**§216**] The demon (*dīw*) is one whose preliminary understanding is based on passive sense perceptions (*idrākāt-i ḥissī-yi infiʿālī*) but goes no further. The fairy (*parī*) is one whose preliminary understanding is founded on intellectual perception but goes no further. The angel (*firishta*) is one whose knowledge is founded on instructional (*taʿlīmī*) learning and who then rises up to [wisdom gained through] divine assistance and, in so far as the angel's sensory understanding is by nature intellectual and its intellect identical to divine assistance, it verifies the truth itself. Angels are perfect by themselves and capable of perfecting others.

[**§217**] On the other hand, the demon is one for whom both this world and the Hereafter are [immersed in] this world. The fairy is one who, while inhabiting this base world, yet faces the Hereafter. The angel is one for whom both this world and the next world are as the Hereafter.

[**§218**] If the physical, the spiritual and the intellectual worlds were to be divided between demons, fairies and angels, the physical world would be the portion of the demons, the spiritual the portion of the fairies, and the intellectual realm the portion of the angels.

[**§219**] If discord (*taḍādd*), gradation (*tarattub*) and unity (*waḥdat*) were to be divided between demons, fairies and angels, discord would be the portion of the devils, gradation the portion of the fairies, and unity that of the angels.

[§220] If the perverted reason or intellect (*'aql-i mankūs*), the inverted intellect (*'aql-i maqlūb*) and the rightly-guided intellect (*'aql-i mustaqīm*) were to be divided between demons, fairies and angels, the perverted intellect would be the portion of the demons, the inverted intellect the portion of the fairies, and the rightly-guided intellect would be apportioned to the angels. Godspeed to you.

Taṣawwur 20

Concerning progression from corporeality to spirituality, and from spirituality to rationality.

[§221] In the course of his quest for physical and spiritual perfection (*kamāl-i khalqī wa amrī*), man at the initial stage, when he is not independent of his bodily organs, is obliged to make use of forces pertaining to his animal faculties (*quwā-yi ḥayawānī*) upon which sense perception and movement depend. Thereafter, [he makes use of] the particular soul (*nufūs-i juzwī*), through which the perfection of the human body is achieved; [followed by] the intelligence of worldly life (*'aql-i ma'īshatī-yi dunyā'ī*) which, in one way or another, is possessed by everyone; [followed by] the use of the prophetic law-giving intelligence (*'aql-i shar'ī-yi nabawī*), through which the general well-being of creatures can be maintained in the world; and lastly [by using the] resurrectional intelligence of the Hereafter (*'aql-i qiyāmatī-yi ākhiratī*), which is the terminus of all goals and the supreme end.

[§222] The force pertaining to animal faculties is subservient to and carrier of the particular soul. The particular soul is, in turn, subservient to and carrier of the intelligence of worldly life. The latter, in turn, is subservient to and carrier of the prophetic law-giving intelligence. The latter, in turn, is subservient to and carrier of the resurrectional intelligence of the Hereafter.

[§223] The progression of each of these [powers] to the next commences as follows: the animal soul (*nafs-i ḥaywanī*) is a totality composed of the subtle elements of the vapours of the [four] humours (*akhlāṭ*); the particular soul is a totality composed of the components of the animal soul; the intelligence of worldly life is a totality composed of components of the particular souls. The prophetic law-giving intelligence and the resurrectional intelligence of the Hereafter cannot be

said to consist of components, because they are two respected principles (*aṣl-i muʿtabar*); they are complete in themselves and all these things are nothing without them.

[§224] The animal faculties [in human beings] receive the emanation of the particular souls through pedagogic discipline (*taʿlīmāt-i rīyāḍī*),[61] so that from such training [emanating] from the particular souls they can attain the proper [state of] wholeness, which is the intelligence of worldly life. At this stage, through the human form, [the animal force] receives the emanation of the prophetic law-giving intelligence, and through the latter it receives the resurrectional intelligence of the Hereafter. In this way it progresses from the animal force to the particular soul, from the particular soul to the intelligence of worldly life, [from there] to the prophetic law-giving intelligence, and from the latter to the resurrectional intelligence of the Hereafter. Godspeed to you.

Taṣawwur 21

Concerning the Origin and the Return, this world and the Hereafter, man's coming into this world and his departure from it, illustrating whence he has come, why he has come and whither he is heading, and discussing the resurrection of souls and bodies.

[§225] The exotericists (*ahl-i ẓāhir*), who are alien to discussions concerning the physical and spiritual creation (*āfarīnish-i khalqī wa amrī*), say that the origin (*mabda'*) of man is that he is born from his mother through the coming together of the constituent corporeal parts, and that the return (*maʿād*) consists in his departure from this world through the disintegration of these bodily parts.

[§226] The followers of the rightly-guiding mission (*bandagān-i daʿwat-i hādiya*) – may God confirm its strength – profess that the categories of being in the created world [i.e., of mankind] and their various combinations are numerous. In order that their disciples might form a conception of this, they have divided these into four categories: (i) a purely partial existence; (ii) a partial existence facing towards total existence; (iii) a total existence; (iv) and an existence transcending both the partial and total.

[§227] The purely partial existence (*wujūd-i juzwī wa bas*) is that of the people who dwell in the common realm of similitudes (*kawn-i*

'ummūm-i mushābahat), wherein truth and falsehood are intermingled. The partial existence facing towards total existence (*wujūd-i juzwī ki rūy bi-kullī dārad*) pertains to the inhabitants of an intermediary realm who have turned away from the common realm of similitudes (*'umūm-i mushābahat*) towards the exclusive realm of distinction (*khuṣūṣ-i mubāyanat*).[62] Total existence (*wujūd-i kullī*) belongs to the inhabitants of the exclusive realm of absolute, clear distinction (*khuṣūṣ-i mubāyanat-i muṭlaq*) which, in all respects, is free from any admixture with vain falsehood. As for transcendent existence, beyond both partial and total existence (*wujūd-i bālā-yi juzwī wa kullī*) – supposing one wished to speak of it – all one can say is that it transcends and eschews comparison with both the common realm of similitudes and the exclusive realm of clear distinction.

[§228] Each person's origin is in proportion to the existential degree he has obtained from God's exalted Command, and his return thereto: '*As He brought you forth, so you will return [to Him]*' (7: 28).

[§229] The origin of someone who has [only] attained 'partial existence' is an origin without return. It is like the mirror-image which appears as form but not in reality; or like a false report which, when it is first heard, may be either true or false, but to which one turns a deaf ear when, on further consideration, one tries to verify it and [finds] it has no demonstrable truth. Since it has no [real] outcome, it forfeits [even] what appeared to be, but was not, its source; thus it has neither an origin nor a return, [as is said in the Qur'ān]: '*Falsehood originates not, nor does it restore*' (34: 49).

[§230] The origin of someone who has attained 'partial existence facing towards total existence' is oriented towards return [to God]. It is like a true report that enters both [organs of] hearing and sight. The origin of someone who has attained 'total existence' is an origin which is identical to his [spiritual] return. But we are not competent to speak of the glory and grandeur of that 'existence which transcends the partial and the total'.

[§231] In another sense, 'origin' is the capability of reasoning with one's particular intelligence of worldly life (*'aql-i juzwī-yi ma'īshatī*); and 'return' is to sublimate one's particular intelligence of ordinary life to the prophetic law-giving intelligence (*'aql-i shar'ī-yi nabawī*), and from the latter to the resurrectional intelligence of the Hereafter (*'aql-i qiyāmati-yi ākhiratī*).[63]

[§232] In one sense, 'origin' is to realise that one should be with someone (*bā kasī bāyad būdan*) and 'return' is to be with that person.[64] In still another sense, 'origin' consists of relative self-realisation (*khwīshtan-shināsī-yi iḍāfī*), that is, knowing why one has been created; whereas 'return' lies in true (*ḥaqīqī*) self-realisation, that is, applying in action that which one has been created to do.

[§233] Any origin which does not attain to a return, and any return which does not arise from an origin, is neither an origin nor a return.

[§234] Some people have the idea about the return that there are hierarchical ranks and degrees (*marātib wa darajāt*) in this world but not in the Hereafter. In the Hereafter, [they say], there is either absolute necessity or absolute impossibility. According to them, the ranks of the good (*ahl-i khayr*) are one degree above, and the levels of the wicked (*ahl-i sharr*) are at the bottom (*daraka-yi shīb*). They eliminate [all] degrees [in the Hereafter] and say that when the human soul leaves the body, it can only be in one of two states: either it progresses from possibility to necessity, which is [the realm of] God and Divinity, or else it descends into impossibility (*imtināʿ*), which is eternal non-existence.

[§235] Others deny this and say it is clear that, at the time of the Prophet [Muḥammad], people were summoned (*khwāndand*) to Paradise on condition that they sacrificed their bodies and wealth. Subsequently they were summoned to knowledge (*ʿilm*) on condition that they sacrificed their bodies and wealth, [as well as] their anger and lust. Later on they were summoned to [obey] a person (*kasī*) on condition that they sacrificed their bodies, wealth, anger and lust, [as well as] their knowledge and intellect. Still later they were summoned to the Lord [of the Resurrection] on condition that they spontaneously forsake and abnegate their own selves, drowning all their physical well-being, wealth, lust, anger, knowledge and intelligence.[65]

[§236] It is clear that these four summons are not all formally the same and that there is a great difference between them. The aim of these [different] summons has been, and continued to be, the salvation of mankind, that by accepting them men might progress from potentiality to necessary existence, from relativities to the realities of relativities (*ḥaqāyiq-i iḍāfāt*), and from the realities of relativities to the Absolute Reality (*ḥaqīqat-i muṭlaq*).

[§237] It is also clear that everyone who accepted and submitted to one of these summons, which in his own time was explained to him, was

awarded salvation and perfection. However, they were not all equal in degree in their acceptance and submission (*taslīm*), but were of different degrees. Now, if these intermediary hierarchical degrees were to be eliminated and one were to consider the situation in absolute terms – that whoever progressed at one stroke from possibility to necessity was fine and good, and whoever did not plunged into [the abyss of] impossibility – one can see what the consequences of that would be!

[§238] There are no more than two basic divisions of humankind: the followers of truth (*muḥiqqān*) and the followers of falsehood (*mubṭilān*). Those professing falsehood remain in [the realm of] impossibility and cannot reach [the realm of] necessity. Those professing truth are either weak or strong. The strong are natives of [the realm of] Divine Unity (*waḥdat*) and have not, in reality, ever fallen from [the realm of] necessary existence that they should need to go back there. The weak are natives of [the realm of] gradation (*tarattub*), and those who dwell [in this realm] move from possibility to necessity gradually and not at one stroke. Some people progress from possibility to necessity by dissociating from and execrating (*tabarrā*) the followers of falsehood, and [at the same time] befriending [and expressing] solidarity (*tawallā*) with the community (*jamā'at*) of the true Imam (*imām-i ḥaqq*).[66] They submit to his command – may salutations ensue upon mention of him – patiently heeding his command and being content with his rule. And for some people, 'The intention of the faithful believer is better than his deeds.'[67]

[§239] Since in this world there are both total and partial good, and total and partial evil, people are not engaged all at once in total good, partial good, total evil or partial evil – that is to say, every person possesses a certain relative degree in the practice of good works, and a certain relative degree in the performance of evil works, and when a man departs from this world, his resurrection at the time of his return will be in exactly the same condition and status which his soul was inclined to and loved [at the moment when his soul was] experiencing separation from the body – so how can it then be said that [in the Hereafter] there are no degrees of abasement and elevation? Rather both exist: the ascending ranks of the good, one above the other, up to the supreme degree; and the descending ranks of the followers of falsehood, one below the other, down to the lowermost depths (*asfal-i sāfilīn*).

[§240] [If this were not the case], according to the judgement formed [by the disputant], everyone who committed a partial evil would

be in the same category as those who committed a total evil, and there would be no benefit at all in doing a partial good, either in itself or in its effect. This would mean that the forgiveness and grace of God Almighty would be withdrawn from all the creatures of the world, except for the one who is God's proof (*ḥujjat*), or someone of his calibre. If this were the condition of mankind, can one imagine that there could be any result from the works of those who intend good? Would any possibility exist for the intercession of the righteous on their behalf?

[§241] As for this saying [of the Imam][68] – may he be exalted and sanctified – 'If there is a sinner among the subjects (*ra'iyyat*) who remains inside the community of the Imam of the truth, he will be forgiven; but if there is a subject who performs good deeds, yet is outside the community of the Imam of truth, he will not be pardoned' – such words are to be interpreted as having purely metaphorical import, from which we take refuge in God (*na'ūdhu billāh*).

[§242] However, the notion entertained by some folk that the soul upon separation from the body in that world has no concrete individual identity (*ta'ayyun*) or distinguishing characteristic is incorrect. [It is false] because the soul's activity and comprehension in this world requires the participation of the faculty of imagination (*quwwat-i khayāl*), which acts as an intermediary between the corporeal and the spiritual faculties. After [the soul] leaves the body, an imaginal body (*hay'atī*) [remains] with the soul. Just as in this world when a person dreams, he sees different circumstances through the mediation of the imagination and physical sight, so too in the Hereafter, the spirits see different things and situations through the mediation of the imaginal body (*hay'at-i khayāl*), and they become aware of their own condition and the condition of others as well.

[§243] The state of the spirits of the righteous in the Hereafter can be compared with someone who has a delightful and pleasing dream, so that he abides in joy, delight and rapture. The state of the spirits of evil folk resembles that of a person who has an extremely unpleasant and distressing dream, causing him to abide in great fear and terror, becoming anxious and distracted. The only difference is that dreams last an hour or two, but that condition [in the Hereafter] is of eternal duration.

[§244] Regarding man's neglect of the realm of the Hereafter (*'ālam-i ma'ād*), a simile may be given. Suppose someone suffers a cerebral stroke

and people, thinking he is dead, bury him; but he is not dead and he suddenly revives in the grave and plunged in terror, realises where he is. One can imagine how long he would survive with no air reaching him. Even though he knows that the body is a transient borrowed organ and that, even if he is saved from his predicament, there is still the possibility that he may die either at the moment that he is saved or a few days later and [that] his body will ultimately perish and the soul will necessarily depart from it, yet see how much sorrow, pain, regret, agony, grief, agitation and anxiety will beset him as a result of that one hour of distress that he experiences with that transient borrowed body. How much greater, then, will be his sorrow and regret when he realises that the very essence of his being is afflicted with a complete and utter deficiency itself, accompanying him for eternity without end. We take refuge in God from this supreme chagrin and utter remorse.

[§245] Now, even though at the present time the very essence of his being is inseparably accompanied by this same deficiency in this world he is insensitive to and unconscious of the pain of that ignorance because of his preoccupation with his external and internal senses. However, as soon as the conjunction of soul with body is severed, his awareness returns and he apprehends the pain of his own ignorance. He is like a man who walks in the snow and whose feet are frost-bitten. As long as he moves he does not feel that cold, but once he enters a warm room and rests, that pain will gradually manifest itself, until at length, both his legs fall off. We seek refuge in God from this.

[§246] As for this world (*dunyā*) and the Hereafter (*ākhirat*): *dunyā* is an Arabic word derived from the cognates *dunuww*, *adwān* and *danī*. *Dunuww* means 'closeness', *adwan* means 'deeper', and *danī* means 'worthless'. The purport of this [etymology] is that *dunyā* signifies that which is near to human sense-perception and human sense-perception close to it; 'deeper' alludes to the most profound abyss (*asfal*); whereas 'worthless' refers to the ignoble conditions of nothingness and extinction. These 'heavens' and 'earth', [cosmological] 'fathers' and 'mothers' (*ābā' wa ummahāt*),[69] this above and below, behind and before, right and left, length, breadth and depth, doors and walls, trees, springs and flowers, gold and silver, property and animals, are called 'this world' and 'worldly' because this world appertains to the [realm of] the senses, and our senses are near to it and it is close to our senses; otherwise, this world is not really those things.

[§247] Rather, [what is referred to as] *dunyā* is the realm of similitudes (*kawn-i mushābahat*), where the followers of truth and of falsehood, the truth and the false, correct and incorrect, the veracious person and the liar, good and evil, the wicked and the good, all seem to be the same. [It is] a state in which all contradictory things are similar to each other, in which man is so bewildered and veiled from the truth that he cannot differentiate and distinguish between any of these things.

[§248] The Hereafter is the realm of clear distinction (*kawn-i mubāyanat*), where right and wrong, the followers of truth and of falsehood, the veracious person and the liar, truth and lies, good and evil, the wicked and the good, are distinguished from each other. It is a state in which all things deceptively similar to each other are clearly distinguished, where right from wrong and the righteous from the wrongdoers are made distinct and clearly apparent by the grace of divine gnosis (*ma'rifat-i ilāhī*).

[§249] Thus, the net-result of man's coming into this world is that the [underlying] realities (*ḥaqāyiq*) of things become confused and ambiguous to him, and his original nature (*fiṭrat*)[70] becomes altered by perverse fantasies and false suppositions. The result of his departure from this world and his reaching the Hereafter is that this bewilderment, darkness and deviation are lifted from his soul, so that his pure nature returns completely stripped of perverse imaginations and false suppositions, and that in response to this prayer, 'O God, show us things as they are,'[71] the reality of things is manifest to his spiritual perception enabling him to differentiate between these contrasting conditions correctly.

[§250] Furthermore, the relation between this world and the Hereafter can be compared to that of a child to an adult or a lunatic to a sane person. The child imagines things for which there is absolutely no basis. For example, he may see an image in the mirror and assume that it exists [independently] like himself. He is aware of neither his own infantile state nor of the state of maturity. But the adult knows that whatever the child knows or sees is baseless fantasy. He knows his own state of maturity and the child's infantile state. The lunatic perceives existing things as non-existent and non-existent things as existent, while the sane person sees things as they actually are, whether existent or non-existent.

[§251] Whosoever's original nature at the point of birth has not been altered by perverted fantasy and false suppositions, even if from the standpoint of external appearance and [temporal] relations (*bi-ḥukm-i*

ẓāhir wa iḍāfa) he appeared to have entered into this world, from the standpoint of interior reality and truth, he is, in fact, not in this world. The [sole] indication of his entrance into this world is that he has come into this world *from* the Hereafter, *from* Reality into relative being, *from* the realm of necessity to that of possible being, so that just as he was essentially perfect there, he may bestow perfection on others, imparting wholeness and completeness to those who are deficient here.

> You passed through the realm where God
> established [mere] possibility;
> Now, from [the realm of] necessity
> You may observe the realm of possibility.[72]

[§252] In the same way, there may be a person who appears to exist visibly in this world, although in reality he has never entered it, whilst another may appear to have departed from it, although he has never, nor indeed, ever will, leave the world. Another still, one finds who has directed his attention from this world to next, while another has turned his attention from the Hereafter (*ākhirat*) to this world. Godspeed to you.

[§253] From whence has man come? [He has come] from the realm of the Divine Command to the realm of illusory existence and similitudes which is the common condition of all creation (*wujūd-i majāz wa mushābahat-i 'āmm-i khalqī*). There, the entire creation is a demonstration of God Almighty and Holy: '*And if you ask them who has created them, they will certainly say "God"*' (43: 87); '*Nor is there aught but what glorifies Him in His praise*' (17: 44); '*And to God prostrates, willingly or unwillingly, whatever is in the heavens and in the earth*' (13: 15).

[§254] Why has he come? He has come in order to advance from this realm of similitudes common to all creatures (*mushābahat-i 'āmm-i khalqī*) to [the realm of] clear distinction proper to the elect [who follow] the Divine Command (*mubāyanat-i khāṣṣ-i amrī*): '*Is not His the creation and the Command?*' (7: 54). [In that realm], only one intermediary exists to act as a proof of Him, the Almighty, the Holy, an intermediary who is a unique manifestation of the First Intellect. In this realm man will proceed from the first confession (*iqrār*), '*And if you ask them who has created them, they will certainly say "God"*' (43: 87), to the second confession, '*Verily, God is the Guardian-Lord of those who believe, and for unbelievers there is no Guardian-Lord*' (47: 11).

[§255] Whither is he going? [Man is going] to a realm where neither this common creaturely perception (*naẓar-i ʿamm-i khalqī*), nor the exclusive vision of the [adepts of the] Command (*naẓar-i khaṣṣ-i amrī*), will furnish demonstrative proof of the Almighty; rather, the Almighty Himself will be a proof of Himself.

Is not everything except God in vain,
and must not all pleasures inevitably cease?[73]

[§256] [There are three basic realms.] The first realm is that of the origin (*mabda'*) where, by virtue of the creation of the physical world, the common relative profession of faith (*shahādat-i ʿāmm-i iḍāfī*) is realised. Here, the divine actions which are the vestiges of the Almighty's creative power, serve to guide [the seeker] to Him.

The second realm is intermediary in nature where, by virtue of the creation of the realm of the Command, the elect's true profession of faith (*shahādat-i khāṣṣ-i ḥaqīqī*) is realised. Here, His almighty Word (*qawl*), that is, the vestiges of His knowledge, act as a guide unto him. There, through the mediation of the manifestation of the First Intellect (*maẓhar-i ʿaql-i awwal*) whereby all proofs are unified into one single proof, and all symbols are combined into one single symbol, the common vision of [the inhabitants in the realm of] similitudes (*naẓar-i ʿāmm-i mushābahat*) is converted into one harmonious unity by grace of the special teachings of the inhabitants in the realm of clear distinction (*taʿlīm-i khāṣṣ-i mubāyanat*).

The third realm is that of the return (*maʿād*) [of the soul to its divine abode]: '*Verily, unto Us is their return*' (88: 25). Here is pure Oneness and divine ipseity without any association (*waḥdat-i maḥḍ wa huwiyyat-i bī sharīk*), where both the creaturely professions of the common folk (*shahādat-i ʿamm-i khalqī*) and the specific professions of [those who follow] the Divine Command (*shahādat-i khāṣṣ-i amrī*) are abolished: '*Is not His the creation and the Command?*' (7: 54). And here neither the point of view of the common folk [ensnared in] similitudes nor the teachings of the elect are effective in any way, [as has been said]: 'I have known You through Yourself. You led me to Yourself. If it were not for You, I would not have known who You are.'[74]

[§257] The resurrection (*ḥashr*) of bodies and souls: The resurrection of bodies is of several kinds. One is when the final degree of the

solidifying [mineral] force (*quwwat-i in'iqādī*) reaches the first degree of the vegetative force, which constitutes a mineral resurrection. Another is when the final stage of the vegetative force reaches the first stage of the animal force, constituting a vegetative resurrection. Another is when the final degree of the animal force reaches the first degree of human power, which is the animal resurrection. Finally, when the final stage of the power of humanity attains to the first degree of angelic power, the human resurrection occurs.

[§258] Furthermore, the human rational, discriminating soul (*nafs-i nāṭiqqa-yi mumayyizz-yi insānī*) is like a body in relation to the intellect, the imaginative soul (*nafs-i khayālī*) is like a body in relation to the rational soul, and the animal soul is like a body in relation to the imaginative soul. From this point of view, the union (*ittiḥād*) of the animal soul (*nafs-i ḥayawānī*) with the imaginative soul, the imaginative soul with the human rational soul, and the human rational soul with the intellect – each to what is superior in degree to it – constitutes a bodily resurrection (*ḥashr-i jasadānī*).

[§259] Again, the body is an instrument (*ālat*) of the soul's perfection. In the initial stages of its quest for perfection, when it is weak, the mediation of the body is indispensable to the soul, for it attains virtues and perfections by means of the body, this being the very purpose of the existence of the body. Whenever one's organs are in harmony with and susceptible to spiritual influences – that is to say, whenever the soul imbibes knowledge and receives [spiritual] benefits by mediation of the senses, by reflecting on the compound diversity of sensible objects and [thus] apprehending the intellectual forms of things – a physical resurrection may be said to have occurred, in the true sense and in reality. [In this manner], both – the body having realised perfection through the soul, and the soul having derived benefit from the body – will have attained perfection. Both body and soul will have become one and the same thing, that is to say, a corporeal entity that has turned into a spiritual being (*jismānī rūḥānī shuda*).

[§260] In sum, every mental, verbal or bodily act which originates from a human being effects its own reward or punishment, and [man] will be resurrected [in a form] resulting from [these] bodily and spiritual acts. During [the soul's] return, these very same acts will be placed before him. That [deed] which deserves reward will be shown to him in an attractive and beautiful form like an angel which will accompany him for

all eternity; and that which deserves punishment will be presented to him in a hideous and ugly form like a demon – 'Verily, these are your deeds which return to you'[75] – which will be brought upon the soul to accompany it as befitting its type, down into the lowermost abyss [of Hell].

[§261] The good will delight in the pleasure of 'Act in such a manner as to enjoy what you see,' and the wicked will suffer the pain of '*[O God], could we but return, we would do other than what we did*' (7: 53).

[§262] On whether the [soul's] return is corporeal or spiritual. For those who dwell [in the realm] of discord (*ahl-i taḍādd*), according to, '*Falsehood originates not, nor does it restore*' (34: 49), there is [in truth] neither origin nor return, be it in flesh or in spirit. However, for those who are natives of [the realm of] gradation (*tarattub*), there is both origin and return, in flesh and in spirit. The natives of the [the realm of] Divine Unity, in terms of the ultimate metaphysical reality of things, cannot be said to have either an origin or a return, whether in body or in spirit, for in reality they have never fallen from the realm of Unity that they should need to return there. However, in terms of the relativity of things in this world, they too, in relation to this relative existence, have both an origin and a return, in body and in spirit, for although in reality they have not come to this world, in terms of relative existence, they have.

[§263] Regarding the resurrection of the spirits (*ḥashr-i arwāḥ*), this human body is like a tomb for the soul. Every soul whose inclination and yearning is for body and the physical world (*'ālam-i ṭabī'at*), and which is imprisoned in the hands of the devils of lust and anger, being heedless of Almighty God's Command, has in reality died the death of ignorance. Such a soul has already fallen into the tomb of its tenebrous body and fallen prey to hellish passions and desires.

[§264] The resurrection of such folk will be the resurrection of their souls which have died the death of ignorance, [as has been said]: 'They lie fast asleep, entombed in their bodies, darkened by infernal passions and desires.'[76] Then, when the Trumpet of the [Day of] Resurrection (*ṣūr-i qiyāmat*) is blown, that is, when the call of the summons of the Resurrector (*da'wat-i qā'im*) is given – may salutations ensue upon mention of him – they will be resurrected from the tomb of the flesh, that is, they will be roused and revived by the spirit of faith: '*Answer God and His Prophet when He summons you to that which gives you life*' (8:24). Godspeed to you, and praise be to God, the Lord of all the worlds.

Taṣawwur 22

On the refinement of character.

[§265] When man sets out to acquire perfection of the soul, the first step he takes, by which he becomes prepared for the reception of intellectual matters and gradually reaches the rank of recognition of the Imam and thereby the recognition of God, is the refinement of character (*tahdhīb-i akhlāq*). The reason for this is that, to start with, when the human body becomes fit [to receive] the individual soul, and [when] the individual soul assumes the governance of the human body, the soul is extremely weak, and domination falls into the hands of the sensory, imaginative and estimative faculties. As the body becomes stronger, the senses become more dominant, and the onslaught and domination of these faculties increase. Consequently, the soul becomes increasingly veiled from its original function, which is the comprehension of objects of knowledge and roaming freely throughout the wide expanse of intelligible matters. Thus, as long as one's character has not been refined and the substance of the soul emancipated from enslavement to the powers of nature (*quwā-yi ṭabī'ī*), bestial impurities (*shawā'ib-i bahīmī*), the temptations of habit (*wasāwis-i 'ādatī*) and conventional laws (*nawāmīs-i amthila*),[77] neither well-being in this world will be achieved nor can salvation in the Hereafter be expected.

[§266] Since in every epoch, all the [sciences of] ethics (*kull-i akhlāq*) and social conduct (*mu'āmalāt*) have been kept in order by the grace of their harmony with the command of the truthful master of that epoch (*amr-i muḥiqq-i waqt*) – may salutations ensue upon mention of him – and have suffered ill by relinquishing his command, thus the basis of the refinement of character lies in obedience and utter submission to the command of the truthful master. For one cannot know, in effect, what type of morality every truthful master in each particular epoch prescribes, ordains and considers as appropriate for the people [of his time]. For this reason, if one persists in observing ethical codes and manners permitted and sanctioned by a truthful master, but when another truthful master [of a later epoch] perceives that moral prosperity lies in following a different course which he indicates to be licit, and if one hesitates to follow that [second] command and is troubled with confusion, thus generating objections and scruples within one, such objections will result in the impossibility [of all faith] – may God protect us from that!

[§267] Just as man acquired an erect posture in the world of creation (*'ālam-i khalqī*) and thereby became distinguished from other animals, so must he acquire uprightness of the soul in the world of the Command (*'ālam-i amrī*) by accepting the true religion, so that by that uprightness he will become distinguished from those human beings who appear to be human but are in reality not. So such uprightness consists of true thoughts (*fikr-i ḥaqq*), truthful words (*qawl-i ṣidq*) and good deeds (*'amal-i khayr*). All three must be linked to the command of the Imam of the time – may salutations ensue upon mention of him.

[§268] No one by himself can acquire uprightness in himself, or think truthfully, speak truthfully, or do good deeds except through his command – may salutations ensue upon mention of him – and unless that command (*farmān*) reaches a person through his spiritual assistance (*ta'yīd*), or through the instructions (*ta'līm*) of a teacher who has a special grace through his assistance.

[§269] One of the sayings of the universal teacher (*mu'allim-i kullī*)[78] is that the basis and substance of all good character is love for the Imam of the time (*dūsti-yi imām-i waqt*). The sign of this is to love him and not oneself, because if one manifests an atom's worth of self-love, he does not love [the Imam] – may salutations ensue upon mention of him. Whoever mixes his love of the Imam with self-love makes his love impure and adulterated, and being impure, such love will not be accepted.

[§270] Thus, the most solid foundation that may be laid down for the refinement of character is not to love oneself, and [to consider it] necessary [to obey] the commands and orders of the true Imams – may salutations accompany mention of them – who are the cause and reason for the existence of all creation and of all existing things, and who, while being beyond [the duality of] body and soul, yet encompass both. [This saying] befits the dignity of the Imams: 'If the earth were devoid of an Imam even for a moment, it would perish with all its inhabitants.'[79]

[§271] The devotees, devoid of all scruples or doubt, but with total confidence and sincere trust, must believe that a single merciful glance or sign of acceptance given by the Imam to the supplication and imploration of the creatures from first to last can remit their sins and pardon their faults, transmuting their iniquities into deeds of merit.

[§272] In order that devotees may learn how they may avoid falling into error, how they should fear their Lord, how they should submit to

Him, how they should know themselves, and what they should ask for themselves, [the Imams] have given expression to sacred utterances. And out of extreme mercy towards [their] followers and for the sake of admonishing them, they have taken it upon themselves [to issue such expressions, which] act as carefully weighed comparisons in thought, word or deed, so that the obedient servants will understand that the Imams are themselves free [of such expressions] and exalted above such [matters], and that all these [words] are for the sake of their followers, to frighten and awaken them from the sleep of negligence, to save them from the death of ignorance, and to revive in them the spirit of faith.

[§273] Accordingly, they should lay such indications on one scale-pan of the balance, and their own thoughts, words and deeds on the other pan, so that even if there is no proper correspondence between themselves and the Imam's mandate – may salutations accompany his mention – [at least] in relation to themselves a sense of awe and godly fear may appear in their souls. By force of this fear then, all of Iblis's overlords and satanic powers, whose domination had resulted in conceit and rebellion, revolt and sinful error, pride, disdain and heedlessness, will be overcome and their parties routed. At this point, angelic consciousness (*khirad-i firishtagī*) will prevail and triumph, the soul will be able to inwardly participate and relate to the truth of the sacred verse: '*Verily, towards Us is their return. Then upon Us will be their reckoning*' (88: 25,26).

[§274] For example, with respect to the fact that conceit makes people delight in hearing themselves falsely praised, yet become sorely offended by just reproach, one must meditate upon the following sacred words which [the Imam] has uttered:[80]

> My God, were I to weep to Thee until my eyelids drop off, wail until my voice wears out, stand before Thee until my feet swell up, bow to Thee until my backbone is thrown out of joint, prostrate to Thee until my eyeballs fall out, eat the dirt of the earth for my whole life, drink the water of ashes till the end of my days, mention Thee through all of that until my tongue fails, and not lift my glance to the sky's horizon in shame before Thee – yet would I not merit through all that the erasing of a single one of my evil deeds![81]

[§275] Similarly, with regard to prestige and wealth, and for what one may petition God, [he has said]:

> O God, bless Muḥammad and his Household. O God, spare me the concerns which distract me, employ me in that about which Thou wilt ask me

> tomorrow, and let me pass my days in that for which Thou has created me. Free me from need and tempt me not with ingratitude. Exalt me and afflict me not with pride. Make me worship Thee and corrupt not my worship with self-admiration. Let good flow out of my hands upon the people and efface it not by my making them feel obliged. Give me the highest moral traits and preserve me from vainglory. Raise me not a single degree before people without lowering me by its like before myself, and bring about no outward exaltation for me without an inward abasement in myself to the same measure.[82]

[§276] Similarly, regarding man's social conduct with others:

> O God, bless Muḥammad and his Household, and point me straight to confront him who is dishonest toward me with good counsel, repay him who separates from me with gentleness, reward him who deprives me with free giving, recompense him who cuts me off with joining, repay him who slanders me with excellent mention, give thanks for good, and shut my eyes to evil.[83]

[§277] Also, regarding affection for friends and hostility towards enemies:

> O God, bless Muḥammad and his Household, and provide me in this world and the next with caution against offences, and wariness against slips in the states of satisfaction and wrath, such that I may remain indifferent toward that which enters upon me from these two states, work toward Thy obedience, and prefer it and Thy good pleasure over all else to both friends and enemies. Then my enemy may stay secure from my wrongdoing and injustice, and my friend may despair of my inclination and the bent of my affection.[84]

[§278] These are but a few of the holy words which [the Imam Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn] uttered in the *Ṣaḥīfa-yi kāmila*. They are but a small selection of the hundred million oceans of light, the waves of which surge up from his holy sayings in that magnificent book, and which are here quoted for the purpose of strengthening the foundations of the refinement of characters. As for the remainder, if the seeker after truth looks for himself, God willing, he will find them.

[§279] Another of the sayings of the universal teacher (*muʿallim-i kullī*) is that if the disciple fulfils the requisites of 'fear God' (*ittaqū Allāh*) a maxim which can be written on one fingernail, he will acquire

all the noble virtues along with all the modes of moral conduct – initially between himself and God, and ultimately between himself and God's creatures – which he need practise, the explanation and analysis of which could otherwise not be contained in a great number of volumes.

[**§280**] For example, if the disciple integrates the fear of God (*Khudā-tarsī*) into his discipline of reflection (*fikr*), that reflection – being an expression of intellectual irradiation arising from the human rational soul – will put him in harmony with the truth (*ḥaqq*), a harmony which will effect the union of his soul with the true summons (*da'wat-i ḥaqq*). By the power of its spirituality (*rūḥāniyyat*), an angel will be appointed to guard over his reflection so that it is ever beautified with truth.

[**§281**] And if the disciple integrates the fear of God into his speech (*qawl*), his speech – which is the manifestation of the meanings of what he thinks – will become an exemplar embodying intellectual knowledge (*mathal-i ma'lūmāt*), an exemplar which becomes the source-spring [of] '*Speak straightforward speech*' (33: 70), and from its spiritual power an angel will be appointed to guard over his speech and always keep it adorned with truthfulness.

[**§282**] And if the disciple integrates the fear of God into his actions (*'amal*), the application of what he thinks and his reflection (*fikr*) will become manifest from his words, and by means of this process become actualised in his behaviour and conduct. [In this manner], he becomes a model [of] '*He will rectify your conduct*' (33: 70), and from its spiritual power an angel will be appointed to guard over his deeds and always keep them adorned with righteousness.

[**§283**] Once he has attained this, he will have obtained truthful thought (*fikr-i ḥaqq*), righteous speech (*qawl-i ṣidq*) and good actions (*'amal-i khayr*), which are the rungs of the ladder (*mi'rāj*) by which he may ascend to the world of the Hereafter. His thoughts will have become an intelligence made up of the Divine Command, his speech will be a spirit made up of that intelligence, and his works will be a body composed of that spirit.

[**§284**] Likewise, in the case of a miserly person: the missionary (*mard-i da'wat*) will say to him, 'Give so much of the wealth you possess,' but his heart will not be in accordance with this. If they impose it on him and he is not afraid of God, he will resist and will thus forfeit [both] this world and the Hereafter. But if he fears God and considers the matter with pious Godfearing, he will give, even though in the beginning only

under duress and with reluctance, but after doing so a few times he will become generous.

[§285] Similarly, if envy is dominant, and he considers the matter with pious Godfearing, he will realise that in the whole world no one can attain wealth or honour [merely] by wishing – except by the grace of God Almighty – vouchsafed particularly to him. He should consider that, 'If I envy someone for those blessings and favours that God Almighty has granted him, God will not thereby reduce what He has destined for him just because of my envy. However, since that envy has arisen from my soul and desires to influence the course of his affairs which, of course, it cannot, it will recoil back on my own soul, in accordance with the adage that "Fire devours itself if it finds nothing else to devour."[85] Thus, that fire [of envy] will consume my own soul, so that I will forfeit [felicity in] both this life and the next, and be overtaken by the wrath of God.' So, in this fashion, he will gradually restrain himself, and abandon reliance on his own might and power, coming to rely instead on the might and power of the Most High. He will put into practice the good thoughts harboured in his conscience and will ultimately reach such a point that if he sees anyone endowed with wealth and prosperity, he will invoke, 'O God, bless him that he may enjoy what he has, and let me likewise have as much as that and much more.' The same applies to the other base characteristics, which would take too long to enumerate.

[§286] Likewise, the philosophers state that the reformation of character is similar to the treatment of a patient by a physician. For every human body in which the four humours, namely yellow bile, black bile, blood and phlegm, are in equilibrium will enjoy perfect health and a sound constitution. However, if there be too much or too little of one of these humours in his body, it will be affected with disease and illness in accordance with the increase and decrease in the amount [of that humour]. A physician is therefore needed so that, after acquainting himself with the symptoms and learning the facts, he can undertake – albeit trusting in God and seeking His satisfaction – to treat the body competently and skilfully. He should balance excess [in one humour] by decrease and shortage by increase, and thus bring the body's balance back into a state of healthy equilibrium.

[§287] The doctor of the spirit, who is in charge of the refinement of character, is therefore required to examine the state of the moral character, and [as with the physician's practice] to find out which of the four

faculties [of the soul], that are comparable to the four natural temperaments, suffers from imbalance. Thus, he conjoins wilfulness (*'azm*) to dryness, gentleness (*narmī*) to humidity, restlessness (*tīzī*) to heat, and calmness (*sākinī*) to coldness. Once he knows this, he should balance each with its opposite. For example, severity with toleration, frivolity with dignity, sexual desire with abstinence, anger with contentment, facetiousness with seriousness, miserliness with generosity, haste with deliberation, and avarice with liberality.

[§288] This being so, since all base characteristics arise from sexual desire and anger (*shahwat wa ghaḍab*), some ascetics in Islam have maintained that these two passions should be completely nullified. To this end they try hard to starve themselves of sensual stimuli, retiring into dark hermitages and depriving themselves of all but a small quantity of food. Then people begin to relate with astonishment how a certain ascetic has reached such perfection in asceticism with respect to food that for so many days and nights he has reduced his nourishment to such-and-such a degree, even though [he only eats] such disagreeable food as barley, millet and acorns; and that he constantly and with great passion repeats 'Allāh, Allāh', and in between collapses and falls into unconsciousness, hinting that at such moments a door to the unveilings from [the realm of the] unseen is opened to him, as if to signify by this conduct that he has been vouchsafed a physical encounter with the presence of the Absolute (*ḥaḍrat-i ṣamadiyyat*). Such a person may generate a huge crowd of followers who attribute to him many marvels and miracles (*mu'jizāt*).

[§289] The argument that the adepts of truth (*ahl-i ḥaqq*) have with them on this subject is this: 'Divine wisdom requires that a man's senses be the instrument whereby he acquires perfection of soul – yet you [ascetics] would destroy the soul's instrument of perfection before it reaches that perfection, so that before the eye of reason is opened by the senses, you destroy the eye! You are like someone who mounts a horse and sets out for somewhere, but before reaching that destination, he cuts the horse's heels; since he cannot continue the way on foot, he stops his journey bewildered, so that predators and wild beasts kill him, or he perishes through some other cause. This is because you deprive yourself of the sound nutriment which produces pure and glittering blood. The fine vapour (*bukhār*) generated from this pure blood produces the substance of animal spirit (*rūḥ-i ḥayawānī*), which is the mount upon which the human soul rides, thus

keeping the humours in equilibrium. You eat disagreeable food which produces dense and thick blood, and from that dense, thick blood a dark vapour is generated which constitutes the substance of the vital spirit, so that thereby the humours become indisposed, and madness, dejection (*sawdā*) and melancholy (*mālikhūliyā*) overtake you.'

[**§290**] In regard to the attempt to completely eradicate these two forces of anger and sexual desire, it should be understood that one who lacks anger also lacks in moral courage (*ḥamiyyat*), and lacking moral courage, he can be counted neither among the divisions of mankind nor among the divisions of womankind. Should anger ever accidentally overpower his soul, there will be no difference between him and a beast of prey.

[**§291**] [Likewise], one who has no sexual desire or lust must turn his back on generation and reproduction, on which the preservation of the human race and the maintenance of the inhabited world depends. A person who suppresses the power of lust can be counted neither among the divisions of mankind nor among the divisions of womankind. Should lust ever accidentally overpower him, there will be no difference between him and a brute.

[**§292**] However, neither of these attitudes relating to anger and sexual desire mentioned above can be said to be sound or good. Both these methods are objectionable in regard to their approach to [the reality of] this affair, which is to say that there should be neither excess on the one side nor deficiency on the other. Overcoming both of these forces should be accomplished by bringing them to perfection – namely, by bringing both of them under the rule of reason (*ḥukm-i ʿaql*), so that, where they were despotic (*ammāra*) and obstructive, they will now become obedient (*ma'mūr*) and co-operative; where they governed the affairs of reason, now reason should govern their affairs. Thus, the angels will yoke them together – that is, anger in the role of 'male' and lust in the role of 'female' – in a contract of matrimonial union, so that from their marriage will issue forth offspring suitable to their [original] state of being (*ḥāl-i wujūd*):[86] knowledge, wisdom, remembrance (*tadhakkur*), chastity, generosity, courage, truth, veracity, righteousness, meritorious deeds, rectitude, good conduct, love, friendship, concordance, brotherhood, trustworthiness, modesty, patience, tranquillity, dignity, pudency (*ḥayā*), contentment, humility, trust [in God], satisfaction, sincerity, and all else that ensues from such qualities.

[§293] If, however – God forbid – the intellect is overpowered by these two forces [of anger and sexual desire], the soul's light and purity will be veiled by their perverse darkness and moral deviation. The devil (*shayṭān*) will bind the marriage contract between them, and that marriage will give birth to offspring which are in contrast to their [original] state of being: ignorance, folly, forgetfulness, hypocrisy, debauchery, miserliness, suspicion, falsity, lying, evil, corruption, error, fault, enmity, hatred, spite, treason, impatience, impudence, shamelessness, malevolence, greed, tyranny, obstinacy, haughtiness, anger, the sowing of dissension, slandering, vanity, conceit, quarrelsomeness, fanaticism, love of wealth, prestige, offspring, flattery and authority, and all that follows from these.

Deny these base characteristics,
so as to uproot them all.
Yes, in a manner befitting each of them,
Let them be controlled by reason and wisdom,
So that what is a hindrance becomes a help,
and finds repose in the pacifier.[87]

[§294] The truth is that as long as man does not recognise his own errors, sins and shortcomings, his soul will never be able to recollect its own proper realm; [it will] fail to pass through the degrees of meritorious deeds and mount up the steps of perfection. Because of his self-love, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for him to recognise his own faults and shortcomings, and so these will remain concealed from him. Consequently, conceit will manifest itself, and there is nothing so [morally] detrimental and dangerous as this.

[§295] Although the liar is as far as can be from the truth, yet the hypocrite (*murāʾī*) is far worse than the liar, while the conceited (*muʿjib*) person is even worse than the hypocrite. For the liar only tells a lie, while the hypocrite both tells a lie and dissembles in his actions. Because the liar and the hypocrite praise the conceited person, and because the latter, due to his extreme love of flattery and his arrogant conceit (*ʿujb*), finds their words and deeds laudable and pleasing, he neither abstains from this [vanity] nor orders his flatterer to desist [from their praise]. Consequently, every instance of conceited self-admiration which occurs in him inevitably increases his distance from the light of divine guidance,

bringing him even closer to the darkness of error and necessarily leads him to the state of '*Verily, they are veiled from their God on that day*' (83: 15). We seek refuge from this in God.

[**§296**] Thus, when one praises, compliments and commends someone for his good deeds, one must first think about what that good actually is, so that one may know who the good man is. Since goodness (*nīkī*) is a concomitant of moral perfection (*kamāl*), it should be understood that one who is in the absolute sense good is [only] one who is perfect and complete in being good [that is, in practising virtue]. And it is obvious unto which of the devotees of the mission (*banda-yi da'wat*) such a degree can be said to be applied. So when one realises that one lacks such perfection, and that even [that little of] good which others attribute to one is all a falsehood, one should not be pleased with such falsehood and become confused about one's situation. Rather, one should ask himself: 'With all these defects of character and shortcomings that engulf me, should I consider myself worthy of such epithets and abase myself by assuming the rank [given by such flattery]. If so, I would be claiming to be that perfect person. If this idea becomes rooted in my heart, my conceit and stupidity will increase, and each time I regard myself with admiration and self-love, I will descend one more degree into the abyss (*hāwiya*). Therefore, such a man who flatters me and relates so many tales of my supposed goodness is a false worldly friend and, in reality, my [spiritual] enemy regarding the life to come.

[**§297**] Likewise, if one is to call someone evil and reproach him for his wickedness, one should first reflect on what badness is, so as to recognise who the evil-doer is. Since badness is a concomitant of moral deficiency, one who is bad is he whose soul is deficient in every respect. If I am deficient in all respects and have not reached perfection in any respect, and am bad in proportion to that deficiency which belongs to my essence, the wickedness they ascribe to me is thus true and not false, and therefore I should not be offended by the truth and deny it. I should rather be offended by my own deficiency, not by its being pointed out to me. I must oppose this wickedness in myself and not attempt to repudiate his words. Even if he is an enemy and what he says is out of enmity, I must choose from what my enemy and my friend say that which is conducive to the betterment and benefit of my soul in the Hereafter.

[**§298**] Since I am awakened by the words of my enemy but am lulled into the sleep of negligence, nay, the death of ignorance, by the words of

my friend, I should be entirely grateful to this enemy of mine. If I were, in effect, to behave in this manner, such a conception would become a cause of my soul's perfection, and with each step that I take in the path of the acquisition of virtuous accomplishments I will gain a further, higher rank. Therefore, the man who reproaches me so much and talks so much about my wickedness is, in the figurative, false and worldly sense of the word, my enemy, but in truth, with regard to the life to come, he is my friend. I should not remain hostile towards this enemy, nor friendly to that friend, but [on the contrary] consider this friend an enemy and that enemy a friend.

[§299] In such matters, the firmly established principle on which one can absolutely rely is the fact that, being devotees of the true divine mission (*da'wat-i ḥaqq*), we know that on the day when '*Their excuse will not profit those who did injustice*' (30: 57), we shall be asked: 'If your profession of love for the lord of the age (*imām-i zamān*) be true and sincere, tell us, which one of your friends have you hated for the Imam's sake, and which one of your enemies have you loved for his sake?' We shall have to give acceptable answers. There, when all veils are lifted and [the reality of all] affairs divulged, only veracity will be accepted, and no one will be able to resort to sophistry. The acceptable answer will not be that 'So-and-so was the Imam's enemy, but since he was my friend I still loved him.' Rather, the acceptable answer will be to say, 'Although so-and-so was my friend, yet since he was the enemy of the Imam I hated him, and since so-an-so was the friend of my lord, I loved him, although he hated me.'

> [In his devotion to You, he attained to such a high degree that] he banished away from himself his intimate associates because they conceived enmity to You. He brought close to himself those who were far because they responded to Your summons. For Your sake he befriended those who were strangers to him, and for Your sake he held those who were intimate with him as enemies.[88]

Such is the meaning and reality of this [saying]: 'Religion is love for the sake of God and hatred for the sake of God.'[89] Godspeed to you.

Taṣawwur 23

Concerning various kinds of submission.

[§300] The ontological need (*iḥtīyāj*) of possible beings for the Necessary Being – may its majesty be exalted – far transcends the scope of man's finite imagination. From the very centre of the earth (*markaz-i taḥt al-tharā*) unto the outermost extreme of the farthest firmament (*falak al-aʿlā*), even unto the Universal Soul (*nafs-i kullī*) and the First Intellect (*ʿaql-i awwal*), all beings according to their essences and ontological requirements, have been stirred into motion, turning their faces towards their [divine] whole and original principle (*kull wa mabdaʾī khwud*). Each being, according to the aptitude it possesses, progresses from inferior to superior degrees, eventually realising its own perfection through submission (*taslīm*) to that which transcends it.

[§301] For example, when the earth submits itself to the domination of plants so that they can spread their roots therein, extracting their sustenance from, and making use of, the earth's best and most precious substances to nurture themselves, thereby growing tall and manifesting their properties, it effects the transition from the earthly to the vegetative state. [Similarly], when plants submit themselves over to the dominion of animals, so that animals convert them into food and thereby perfect their bodily organism, shape and senses, there ensues a progress from the vegetative to the animal condition. When animals give themselves over to the control of man that he may make use of some of them to nurture himself, gaining physical sustenance and stimulating his animal spirit which provides [or guarantees] sense perception and motion – and [he] may accrue from some [animals] various other benefits and accomplishments – the transformation from the animal to the human condition is thereby effected.

[§302] [The same is the case] when an ignorant and imperfect human being submits himself to the control of a wise and perfect man (*insān-i ʿāqil wa kāmil*) and surrenders to him both his senses and intellect, that is, puts his own will (*ikhtiyār*) completely in the hands of the other, so that he might, in the manner [his master] considers to be most beneficial, transform him from one condition to another and take him from one place to another, until he reaches the point where he will not wish to die as long as the other wishes to live, nor wish to live as long as the other wishes for death; or if he tells him that bright daylight is

the dark of night or that the dark of night is bright daylight, he will not object to this in his heart, nor ask the reason why and wherefore. Once this point has been reached, so that the free will and personal desire of the imperfect and ignorant person have become merged with, and annihilated in, the will and desire of the wise and perfect person, he the [disciple] will have emerged from the pit of ignorance and reached the degree of knowledge.

[§303] That man of perfect intelligence (*ʿāqil-i kāmil*) to whom the ignorant imperfect person should submit himself exemplifies the teaching given by the teacher of the rightly-guided mission (*daʿwat-i hādiya*) – may God ensure its stability – whose understanding and judgement are linked to the truth and the truthful master (*ḥaqq wa muḥiqq*). He [the man of perfect intelligence] is not just any wise or learned savant who does not acknowledge the truthful master of the time (*muḥiqq-i waqt*) and is incapable of transcending the boundaries of his own reason and knowledge which he assumes to be [inspired] wisdom and knowledge. Such an attitude would be total unbelief (*kufr-i maḥḍ*) from which we seek refuge in God. This is because his reason bears but a semblance of reason, being itself unreason and his knowledge [merely of the type of which] it is said, 'Verily, some kinds of knowledge are mere ignorance.'[90]

[§304] According to the same ontological order, the elements (*arkān*) mix and mingle with one another by virtue of their submission to the rotation of the spheres and the irradiation of the stars. The celestial spheres remain in their natural orbit by virtue of their submission to the Universal Soul. The Universal Soul, in turn, attains perfection by virtue of submission to the First Intellect. The pre-eminence of the First Intellect over all other living beings lies in the fact that its submission to the sublime Word (*kalima-yi aʿlā*) is of superior purity and sincerity [than theirs]; its will, knowledge and power is better than that of other creatures due to its avoidance of associating others with the supreme Divine Word.

[§305] Since the purpose of the emanative effusion (*ifāḍat*) of the supreme Word upon the First Intellect was to grant it eternal repose (*sukūm*), absolute perfection and true wisdom, the emanative effusion of the Intellect upon the Soul consisted in the fact that the perfection which was in the Soul's power to receive was granted to it. Similarly, the activity of the Soul in Nature consisted in the fact that the forms of things which

the Soul had received from the Intellect would be bestowed on Nature. [Likewise], the action of Nature upon matter lay in bringing into the reality of concrete existence the forms bestowed upon it by the Soul. The final purpose of all such emanations was that [the natural kingdoms], beginning with minerals, would combine with the vegetative [realm], and [the vegetative realm combine] with the animal realm, and [the animal realm] be terminated by humankind. Thus, the chain of being completes its circle in man. Therefore, it is in this fashion that submission (*taslīm*), which is the supreme perfection belonging to the [First] Intellect, came to be the singular property of man.

[§306] As men are different and varied in their aptitudes, their ways [of self-surrender] may be different. Thus, some have said that when a man submits to the lord of the Divine Command (*ṣāḥib-i amr*), he should be asked: 'Have you done this with full conscious understanding of your submission or blindly?' One may measure his perfection according to the character of his submission (*taslīm*).

[§307] Some have said that insight (*baṣīrat*) should precede submission, because any submission without insight is merely imitation (*taqlīd*) and not submission. Others have said that the foundation of the creation of the physical world is set on [the principles of] opposition and gradation (*taḍādd wa tarattub*).[91] [When man lives in the realm of] opposition, there is neither insight nor submission. Therein no benefit can be derived either from knowledge or action, and no result is produced by either personal endeavour (*jahd*) or trust on God (*tawakkul*); everyone who strives to gain religious knowledge (*hama-yi mujtahidān*) falls into error. The reason for this is that [in the realm of opposition], submission is not based on insight, action is not based on knowledge, and religious endeavour is not based on trust in God. In that realm the soul is as if turned upside down (*intikās*) and is '*in layer upon layer of darkness*' (24: 40). Its every activity, whether in thought, word, or deed becomes a descent into the pit of Hell until it reaches the most infernal degree. Therefore, whatever the insight or submission one exercises while in the realm of opposition is, in reality, neither insight nor submission, but rather the semblance of insight and submission.

[§308] In [the realm of] gradation, both insight and submission truly exist. Therein, benefit can be derived from both knowledge and action; results are produced by both righteous endeavour and trust in God, and all those who strive to gain religious knowledge find the truth.

The reason is that in this realm submission is based on actual insight, action is based on knowledge, and religious endeavour is based on trust in God. In this realm, the soul stands upright amid the lights of good things and meritorious acts (*anwār-i khayrāt wa ḥasanāt*) in such a way that it faces increase without decrease. Its every activity, whether in thought, word and action, elevates it to an ever more superior degree, on up to the supreme and highest degree.

[§309] Now, what is signified by insight (*baṣīrat*) is simply that a man becomes conscious of, and awakens to, the need (*iḥtiyāj*) which lies within his imperfect self, and hence [his need for] a master (*mutammim wa mukammil*) who can bring him to perfection. Once he becomes conscious of this, his insight is perfected and he realises to whom he should submit himself.[92] So when he is given certain prescriptions or prohibitions by such a perfect being who grants perfection, he becomes inwardly enlightened (*mustabṣir*) as far as his aptitude permits him, and he will submit to that which he is unable [to understand].[93]

[§310] If one delves into and begins [to study] some scientific problem as a novice and pupil, one's intention and belief should be that, through the intellectual pleasures one derives from this study, one's faith in submitting to a truthful teacher (*mu'allim-i ṣādiq*) will become stronger and purer – not that he should reach a position in knowledge where he knows all that which the true teacher knows. Such [an attitude] would be transgressing the limits of discipleship. We seek refuge from this in God.

[§311] To each of these realms of relative existence corresponds a different type of submission. [For instance], in the realm of physical senses (*kawn-i maḥsūs-i jismānī*), which is the first [or lowest] rung or degree of existence, the subject sees all the clearly distinguished realities (*mutabāyanāt*) in the shape of obscure illusions or similitudes (*mutashābahāt*), and he is obedient to the lusts of the body, subservient to the dictates of nature, and blindly follows the passions of the soul. Then, on the second rung or degree of existence, which is that of spiritual imagination (*kawn-i mawhūm-i rūḥānī*), the subject has one face turned towards the clearly distinguished realities and another face towards illusions. Here, he sometimes inclines towards worldliness and sometimes attends to the affairs of the Hereafter. [Lastly], in the realm of [purely] intelligible existence (*kawn-i mawjūd-i 'aqlānī*), which is the third degree of existence where degrees extend into infinity, the subject

beholds all indistinct semblances as clearly distinguished realities. Here, he sees both the master of truth (*muḥiqq*) and the truth (*ḥaqq*) itself resplendent in the aura of divine wisdom, free from vain speculation and satanic fantasies.

[§312] The submission of people of the realm of the physical senses is an artificial submission (*taslīm-i taṣannuʿī*) under legal constraints, the submission of the denizens of the realm of the spiritual imagination is voluntary (*ikhtiyārī*), and the submission of people of the realm of intelligible existence is an entirely natural one (*ṭabīʿī*).

[§313] Artificial submission made under legal constraints is when someone says something out of financial need, or [out of fear for his] life, or for some other reason, specifically for his own benefit to satisfy his own desire and purpose, but in his heart nothing in fact corresponds to his exterior utterances [i.e., he is not sincere in his submission].

[§314] Voluntary submission is, for example, someone who is busy in this world with something, in perfect happiness and serenity, and with no ulterior motive. Suddenly, the command of the truthful teacher (*amr-i muʿallim-i ṣādiq*) reaches him, saying that he should abandon all this and throw himself into the most unbearable hardship and difficulty. At first he resents this and is offended. Eventually however, he overcomes the effects of that resentment and offence, turns back to his faith and the divine mission (*daʿwat-i ḥaqq*), realising that if he does not do what he says wholeheartedly and with no reluctance or compulsion, he will be existentially lower than the base mineral, that both his religious and worldly life will dissolve away '*like scattered motes*' (25: 23), and he will miss the purpose of both this life and the next. Therefore he will at once wholeheartedly, with the purest of intentions and the utmost sincerity, renounce all that was the source of his [worldly] comfort, choosing to abide by his teacher's will rather than follow his own preference.

[§315] Natural submission is not within the reach of every pupil. It is reserved specifically for the *ḥujjat*s and the truthful Imams (*imāmān-i ḥaqq*) – may salutations ensue upon mention of them – because their visions are enlightened by the light of primordial conscience (*fiṭrat*) which shines especially upon them from the horizon of divine assistance (*taʾyīd*). Things are to be seen there that few hearts can withstand.

[§316] As our lord Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn – may salutations ensue upon mention of him – said:

O God, You created us from frailty, built us up from feebleness, and began us from '*mean water*' (77:20). We have no strength except through Your power and no power except through Your help. Help us to succeed, guide us the right way, blind the eye of our hearts towards everything opposed to Your love, and set not in any of our limbs passage to disobeying You.[94]

Taṣawwur 24

On prophethood and imamate, where with respect to prophethood are discussed miracles, pseudo-prophets and the possessed, and with respect to the imamate are discussed pupils, teachers and the *ḥujjats*.

[§317] Since the creation of this world is based on opposition and gradation (*taḍādd wa tarattub*), and human beings are also [acting on the basis] of opposition and gradation; and since there exists [in the realm of] opposition a privation of spiritual aptitude; and in the realm of gradation the perfection of aptitude: human souls are therefore varied and differ with respect to their receptivity to the resplendent lights of the Divine Command (*anwār-i ishrāq-i amr-i ilāhī*), just as material objects are variously and differently receptive to the physical light of the sun. [Consider] stones, for example: one [kind] is pitch black, while others are progressively less dark, and their essences are more receptive to illumination, up to translucent glass which receives light from one side and emits it from the other.

[§318] In so far as human beings are unable to be receptive to His Almighty Command without mediation, it was necessary that there should be intermediaries vis-à-vis the Divine Command. Those people whose consciousness (*khāṭir*) behaved as does a [translucent] glass held up to the sun were the Prophets.

[§319] The Prophets were necessary (*bāyistand*), in the first instance, because men initially acquire [knowledge through] names (*asmā'*) before they can attain to their meanings; they first need to set foot on the road in order to reach the destination. Consequently, two rules (*ḥukm*) have been laid down: one is that of the religious law and this [lower] world (*sharī'at wa dunyā*), which concerns man in relation to other men and whose rulers are the Prophets – peace be upon all of them; the other rule is that of the Resurrection and the Hereafter (*qiyāmat wa ākhirat*), which concerns God in relation to God, and whose rulers are the truthful

Imams (*imāmān-i ḥaqq*) – may salutations ensue upon mention of them – those who 'raise up' the Resurrection (*qā'imān-i qiyāmat*).

[§320] Now, the age of religious law (*zamān-i sharī'at*) is a time in which worship (*'ibādat*) is ordained at specific times, when the practice of external, physical behaviour is dictated (*da'wat bā ẓāhir-i a'māl-i jismānī*), and when all acts of worship are completely absorbed in their specific temporal moments. [This age] is called the cycle of concealment (*dawr-i satr*), being particularly characteristic of the Prophets – peace be upon them.

[§321] [On the other hand], the age of Resurrection (*zamān-i qiyāmat*) [is] when specific times of worship are abrogated, when people are summoned unto God for His own sake, and when all the moments [of life] are completely absorbed in the practice of devotion. [This age] is called the cycle of manifestation (*dawr-i kashf*), which is specifically characteristic of the Imam – may salutations ensue upon mention of him.

[§322] The Prophet – peace be upon him – appears at the beginning of the cycle of origin (*dawr-i mabda'*). He encompasses it so that through him the lights of the Almighty's Command (*anwār-i amr-i ū ta'ālā*), in the form of acts of obedience and worship, collectively prescribed to the generality of humankind, may reach them. As the majority of people in this world are, in the first instance, veiled from accepting and responding to the Divine Command in good faith, and can only perceive what is connected with the senses, fanciful estimation and imagination, the divine providence has decreed that these divine lights – which are absolute intelligible realities (*ma'qūlāt-i muṭlaq*) and pure divine graces (*ta'yīdāt-i maḥḍ*) – should become apprehended through the Prophets, their family and offspring, and by the senses, estimation and imagination, according to the principle that revelation is [given in proportion to] the degree corresponding to that stage (*al-tanzīl manzilatun mim-tilka al-daraja*). Human beings accepted these things as a result of [their] affinity to the senses, estimation and imagination, and applied themselves to them. These precepts and rules were ordained to control particular realities with the implication of their being consistent with universal realities. For example, the well-being of ordinary people in this world was achieved by [their] adherence to these prescriptions and prohibitions, while the souls of the elect within the community (*millat*) became capable of acquiring [spiritual] perfection by such ways and means, thus [enabling them to]

progress from religious practices (*'amaliyyāt*) to religious knowledges (*'ilmiyyāt*), and from that on to purely intelligible realities (*'aqliyyāt*).

[§323] The Imam – may salutations ensue upon mention of him – is situated at the commencement of the cycle of perfection (*dawr-i kamāl*),[95] encompassing both the origin and the perfect fulfilment. The lights of the divine creative volition (*anwār-i amr-i ibdā'ī*), by his command, shine upon those souls who harbour an aptitude to apprehend the perfection of the Divine Command, taking the form of distinctive and true gnosis (*ma'rifat*), love (*maḥabbat*), obedience and devotion. And by the grace of the Imam – may salutations ensue upon mention of him and his family and offspring – in accordance with [the saying], 'Spiritual exegesis (*ta'wīl*) is the restoration of things to their origin (*al-ta'wīl radd al-shay' ilā awwalihi*)'[96] – these sensible, estimative and imaginal realities become one and the same with the absolute intelligible realities and sheer divine supports (*ta'yīdāt-i maḥḍ*). Say, 'Praise be to God for this, the praise of the thankful.'

[§324] However, regarding prophethood, should anyone deny it and claim it to be unnecessary, it may be said to him that man's actions can only be of three types: either all actions are permissible, or all actions are impermissible, or some actions are permissible and some are not. If he says all actions are permissible, he can be killed at once in accordance with his own pronouncement. If he says none are permissible, he should die immediately in accordance with his own pronouncement. However, if he wants neither to be killed nor to die, he must accept that some of these actions are permissible and others not. Now, when the question of legally permissible and legally forbidden acts is raised, there arises the need for laws and regulations (*ḥudūd wa aḥkām*), which are called the religious law (*sharī'at*), and such a law requires a founder (*wāḍi'*).

[§325] Here, he should be asked whether just anyone, whoever he may be, can be the founder [of that law], or nobody can, or some can and others cannot. If he responds to the first two of these questions, the same [rules] as above will apply. Therefore, it will be necessary for him to admit that some can become the founder [of religious law] and some cannot.

[§326] Again, he should be asked whether the founder must be appointed by God, [and] assisted and invested with this mission by divine decree, or whether he can be elected by mutual consensus of the community (*ijmā'*). If he says that he can be elected by consensus, then if one

group obeys him, another group will oppose him, and so the controversy will never be resolved. It follows, therefore, that the founder must be appointed by Almighty God, and must be unique in his claim and mission (*da'wat*). This is one method of proving the necessity of prophethood.

[§327] Another method is as follows: For the sake of their own welfare, the human species in its social life needs the good (*ṣalāḥ*), which is called religion and law (*millat wa sharī'at*). Here there are two things in view: prevention (*tamānu'*) and mutual co-operation (*ta'āwun*). By 'prevention' is meant that a man should be able to retain possession of his property, and by 'co-operation' is meant that individuals cannot procure the welfare of their own interests in isolation [of others]. In all his crafts and business transactions, without which he cannot survive, man cannot do without the assistance of other members of his species in order to acquire what he does not have. Prevention and mutual co-operation must have their prescribed limits and regulations, but nobody can arbitrarily by himself lay down such limits and regulations, because if he did the same conflict as was mentioned above would arise. Therefore, the founder [of these regulations] must be that person whom God has appointed as the executor of His Command (*walī-yi amr*), obedience to whom He has [directly] linked to obedience to Himself: '*Whoever obeys the Prophet obeys God*' (4: 80). This has been another method of establishing the validity of Prophecy.

[§328] Further, one may be asked whether the human intellects are all merely potential (*bi-quwwat*) or actual (*bi-fi'l*). If one responds that all human intellects are all merely potential, it would follow that none of the world's inhabitants are knowing, and that all are deficient and ignorant; and if one were to say that all [human intellects] are actual, it would follow that none of the world's inhabitants are ignorant, and that all are perfect and knowing. The inevitable conclusion is that some intellects are potential and some are actual, and that persons with potential intellects need those whose intellects are actual in order that the latter may actualise the potential intellects of the former.

[§329] Moreover, God Almighty has given excellence to certain creatures over others, giving each thing within its own kind a specific limit (*nihāyat*). For example, he made the plant the limit of minerals, the animal the limit of plants, and man the limit of the animal condition. [Similarly], He made the prophetic faculty (*quwwat-i nabawī*) the limit of mankind. In the same way as the creation of these natural kingdoms

reached their fulfilment in man who is capable of speech, the creation of man reached its limit or fulfilment in the law-giving (*ṣāḥib-i shar'*) Prophet.

[§330] The sublime Word (*kalima-yi a'lā*), the First Intellect (*'aql-i awwal*), and the Universal Soul (*nafs-i kullī*), each have a manifestation (*maẓhar*) in this world.[97] The manifestation of the sublime Word is the Imam – may salutations ensue upon mention of him – [whose reality] is beyond all human thought and imagination, and above all description, whether it be positive or negative. The manifestation of the First Intellect is the supreme *ḥujjat* (proof) of the Imam, who gives perfection its form. The manifestation of the Universal Soul is the Prophet who vouchsafes the souls of men the aptitude to receive, during the initial period (*dawr-i mabda'*) [of religious law], that form which constitutes their ultimate perfection.

[§331] When, by the decree of God Almighty, the date and the time arrives that a [new] law-giver should arise and the affairs of the material world should change, and that the religion (*millat*), government, temperaments, languages, ethics, customs and mutual relations of people are on the verge of changing from one kind to another, the celestial figures (*ashkāl-i falakī*) are configured in such a way that a person of prophetic nature (*shakhṣ-i nabawī*) – who is a manifestation (*maẓhar*) of the Universal Soul, both capable of receiving divine inspiration and the bearer of the trust of divine revelation – appears. Due to the harmonious relation and the sensible connection which is formed between him and the community, and reciprocally between the community and him, a sense of exchange in performance and exercise of duties is established between them. He is both a student and a teacher: a student, because he receives his knowledge through revelation (*waḥy*) and inspiration (*ilhām*) from spiritual beings (*rūḥāniyyāt*) and angels; a teacher, because he transmits that knowledge to his community in proportion to that which their minds are capable of understanding.

[§332] The reception of revelation and inspiration [by a Prophet] from the transcendental realm (*mala'-i a'lā*) and the supreme angelic dominion (*malakūt-i a'ẓam*) is analogous to the visions we receive in dreams, except that he sees these while he is awake by the swift projection of one thing upon another (*ilqā' al-shay' ilā al-shay' bi-al-sur'a*), meaning that [these things] flash from the Universal Soul, which is the Preserved Tablet (*lawḥ-i maḥfūẓ*),[98] upon his holy soul. It is in this sense that he

[the Prophet] says, '*I am a man like you*' (41: 6), since he cannot be free from attachment to, and consubstantiality and participation with, others, nor from anything connected with their physical affairs. His special distinction is '*It is revealed to me*' (41:6), and since '*It is revealed to me*' cannot be disengaged from '*I am a man like you*,' the descent of revelation and divine inspiration cannot take place in isolation from, and without interference of the imagination (*mu'āriḍa-yi khayāl*). Such interference should be imagined as a fine, transparently clear veil which becomes coarser as it develops, till it reaches the pinnacle of coarseness.

[§333] Everyone whose soul has been illuminated by the light of spiritual truths (*nūr-i ḥaqāyiq*) and who has become acquainted with the explanations of the people of spiritual exegesis (*ahl-i ta'wīl*) will see all these things clearly when he reads the Qur'ān. For example, he may find verses in which the exoteric revelation (*tanzīl*) and the esoteric exegesis (*ta'wīl*) are identical, as for example this verse: '*The earth will shine with the Light of its Lord*' (39: 69). [On the other hand], he will also find verses like '*By the [steeds] that run with panting breath*' (100: 1), in which there is an immense distance between the [exoteric] revelation and its esoteric exegesis.

[§334] Now, the revelation and its spiritual exegesis are analogous to a dream and its interpretation (*ta'bīr*) which a man apprehends when he wakes up. For instance, when he is sound asleep within the walls of his room, his senses at rest, his soul is so entirely absorbed [in the dream] that past, future and present all merge into one in what he dreams. He sees things at that time in his dream which happened a thousand or ten thousand years ago. Clearly he sees this with the sight of the soul (*naẓar-i nafs*) and not with the sight of the eyes. The interpretation of his [dream] depends on how great or small the interference of imagination has been and is according to the strength or weakness of his soul. If the imagination has not interfered, the dream will be true and there will be no need for an interpreter to explain it. But if the imagination has interfered and the dream has become altered by similitudes and mixed with confused reveries and unreal fantasies, an interpreter will be required to explain it. However, if the power of the soul has been strong enough to resist and overcome the imagination and its prattling interference, the interpreter will not need to exert much effort and will be able to penetrate its mystery easily and quickly. In the contrary situation, however, it will be hard and difficult to such a degree that he will be unable to deal effectively with

the imagination and uncover the secret [meaning] of the dream. The Prophet's reception of inspiration and the descent of the literal revelation, accompanied by its spiritual exegesis [in the form of] glad tidings (*bishārāt*) or stern admonitions (*indhārāt*), is exactly of this type [of imaginal activity].

[§335] The position of the founder of a religious law vis-à-vis his community is like a king who looks about and sees a great many people [before him], some of whom are mad and some of whom are sane, but he puts all of them alike in chains and fetters. Alternatively, he may be compared to a physician who looks about himself and sees innumerable invalids with different diseases as well as a great number of healthy people, yet he prescribes the same drink and the same kind of food and diet for each one of them. Albeit, the king's intention is that madness should depart from the lunatics, and the physician's intention is only just to cure the sick, which is something the healthy do not need. However, if he did not enforce uniform rules on everyone, the principle of his preaching (*da'wat*) and his religion would never become properly arranged, firmly established and securely rooted. You may call the person [who does this] a Prophet (*payambar*), the founder of a religion (*wāḍi'-i millat*), the giver of a religious law (*ṣāḥib-i sharī'at*), the Trusted Spirit (*rūḥ al-amīn*), or a manifestation (*maẓhar*) of the Universal Soul, for all these terms have the same meaning.

[§336] Let us now discuss the miracle (*mu'jizāt*). Common people have said a lot of things concerning the miracles of Prophets, most of which is related [to the realm of] the supernatural (*kharq-i 'ādāt*, lit. 'the breaking of habits'). When someone wants to have rational proofs for their existence, they say that thinking about them is wrong, and that it is useless to try to find the meaning and reality of them. What the adepts of truth (*ahl-i ḥaqq*) say regarding the significance of miracles is that since the Prophets – may the peace of God be upon all of them – act as the intermediary link (*wāsiṭa*) between the Divine Command (*amr*) and creation (*khalq*), due to that position (*mathābat*) each manifests a trace of the Divine Light (*anwār-i rubūbiyyat*) according to his innate aptitude and capacity. Thus, it is nothing extraordinary if they are graced by the emanation of divine matter (*mawādd-i ilāhī*) and assisted by spiritual forces (*rūḥāniyyāt*) in order to govern the affairs of the physical realm. Thus, each one of them is specially vouchsafed miracles or marvels as has been narrated regarding the miracles of each Prophet. However, they add,

one should not rest with only this outer appearance (*ẓāhir*) but should seek out the spiritual realities (*ḥaqāyiq*) of each [miracle], for appearances correspond to flesh and realities to the spirit.

[§337] Concerning miracles and the thaumaturgic powers (*karāmāt*) of the Prophets, they [the adepts of truth] also state that, from the point of view of the domain of genus (*ḥayyiz-i jins*), the Prophets share with other men – in accordance with '*I am a man like you*' (41: 6) – everything that belongs to the physical creation and bodily composition, appearance and form, food, drink, apparel and marriage. However, from the point of view of the domain of differentia (*ḥayyiz-i faṣl*) – in accordance with '*Nor does he speak of his own desire; it is just a revelation sent down to him*' (53: 3–4) – the Prophets differ from others.

[§338] The true miracle is the miracle of knowledge and rational proof (*'ilm wa ḥujjat*), not the one of action and power. When someone dominates the whole world through power [and brute force], it is possible for a wolf or a lion to overpower him, yet one cannot say that the wolf or lion is superior to him. But in so far as knowledge is concerned, it is possible for someone to furnish an intellectual proof whereby the lips of all rational people in the world are sealed, being rendered incapable of defeating him through argument, unable to utter a single word by way of rebuttal.

[§339] In this world, there are both miracles and pseudo-miracles (*shibh-i mu'jiz*), that is to say, sorcery and talismans. Both look alike in the realm of similitudes, yet it is improper to confound the two. One must clearly distinguish between them and the distinction must be made by means of knowledge and intellectual proof, rather than by power and brute force, since the medium of resemblance (*mā bihi al-mushābaha*) must be different from the medium of differentiation (*mā bihi al-mubāyana*). In other words, the medium by which two things resemble each other cannot be the medium of their distinction. Thus, for example, if a resemblance is made [between two things] by means of audition, then the distinction should be made by means of vision; or if a resemblance is made by sensory means, then the distinction should be made by intellectual means. By the same measure, if resemblance pertains to action and force, then the distinction should be by means of knowledge and intellectual proof (*'ilm wa ḥujjat*).

[§340] Therefore, such types of miraculous power evaporate here. Undoubtedly, one has to accept that [the sort of prophetic] miracles

[discussed here] are a kind of ability or power of which others are incapable. But as long as one does not comprehend the furthest limit of humankind's powers and abilities, how can one know what powers and forces exceed it? Therefore, if someone seeks to know a Prophet through the miracles he performs, he should first truly ascertain the limits of each human individual's abilities and powers, and apprehend what constitutes pseudo-miracles, such as sorcery, talismans and similar things. Once his knowledge encompasses this, he will be able to apprehend which force and power is superhuman, and which can thus be understood to be a miracle. And it is obvious that this [understanding] is beyond the power of any man, and if it be within someone's power, what need would he have for a Prophet? Thus, it is only a Prophet who can distinguish [the real] miracle from the pseudo-miracle, and that person who demands a miracle from a person who makes a claim to prophethood is setting up his own reason (*'aql*) as the measure, thus weighing himself against the divinity of God and the prophethood of the Prophet. Hence, when he comes to have faith in the Prophet through a miracle, he is putting his faith in his own intellect and not him. Godspeed to you.

[§341] On pseudo-prophets (*mutanabbiyān*). The situation of pseudo-prophets is as follows: When the time is right for a Prophet endowed with revelation (*ṣāḥib-i waḥy*) to come into existence, certain heavenly constellations which favour his appearance are configured in harmonious combinations. Although their initial purpose was just to bestow existence on that one individual [Prophet], yet at the same moment certain illuminations and effects produced by the movements, constellations and irradiation of stars may come to bear an astrological influence on the horoscope (*ṭāliʿ*) of another person with a horoscope similar to that of the Prophet. This astrological influence accordingly affects the natural constitution, physical nature, personality and soul of that other person. However, the [astrological] influence is weak, because, were it strong, all of them would be Prophets, or close to the rank of a Prophet, and in that case none of the Prophets would have succeeded in his prophetic mission. Thus, in proportion to the amount of astrological influence which affects their horoscope, they claim prophethood. But, ultimately their imposture is revealed and recognised by the grace of the will and power of God, which is connected to the prophetic mission of the [true] Prophet, so that they are overpowered and humiliated, by the divine favour and bounty of the Almighty's assistance.

[§342] The existence of that pseudo-prophet, his initial power and success, and his humiliation and defeat in the end, is also but a gift and a mercy from the Almighty in order that the [fake] adversary and charlatan, in so far as such can appear in opposition to the [true] Prophet and prophecy, should be revealed for all the world's inhabitants to see and hear. Henceforth, that charlatan's existence will be recognised as the source-spring of impious doubt and cast aside, so that the faith of the believers and their readiness to obey the proscriptions and prescriptions of the true Prophet may become stable and strong – for guidance comes from God and favour from Him.

[§343] On the possessed (*mamrūr*). Common folk call them 'those possessed by a spirit (*parī dār*)'. Their condition is such that excessive dryness predominates in their brains and melancholy overcomes their temperament. They are incapable of putting their mental affairs in order by [the power of] thought, and their imagination – which represents the perfect power of the vital or animal spirit (*rūḥ-i ḥayawānī*) – keeps up a continual babble of mimicking in their minds combined with lightning-like images which flash up and then suddenly die down. At the same time a window opens up between the soul of such possessed folk and the Universal Soul, so that some of the mysteries inscribed on the Preserved Tablet (*lawḥ-i maḥfūẓ*) flash upon their souls, so that they give voice to these sayings. However, if the possessed is not beaten or does not become extremely tired and exhausted, what he says does not turn out to be true. Some sages wished to bring someone to a state in which he could inform them about the mysteries of the spiritual world (*malakūt*). They caused excessive dryness to dominate the brain and melancholy to overcome his humours; they made him run hard and severely beat him and abused him, so that in that state, he answered all the questions which they asked, and the [answers] turned out to be true.

[§344] Such is the condition of the possessed according to the understanding which I, a humble creature, have formed on the basis of my own conceptions. However, were all the scholars of the world to try, even once in the lifetime of such a possessed person, to get him to utter one reasonable word, they could not, for he cannot understand such things; and judgement in these matters belongs to God Almighty.[99]

[§345] On the Imamate. The time during which these deliberations (*taṣawwurāt*) are being recorded is an epoch of concealment (*satr*) and prudence (*taqiyya*), and it is his eminence [i.e., the Imam] – exalted be

his power – who ordains *taqiyya*, his command being – may salutations ensue upon mention of him: '*Taqiyya* is my religion and the religion of my forefathers.'[100] Therefore, considering that in the entire heaven, earth, world and the realm hereafter, no form of [religious] truth can exist outside of him, nor can it be permitted, the devotees of the rightly-guided mission (*da'wat-i hādiyya*), consider him to be the truthful master (*muḥiqq*). Truth without him is infidelity (*kufr*), and [to recognise truth] besides him is to ascribe partners to God (*shirk*).[101] They follow his command – may salutations ensue upon mention of him – and in the spirit of true prudence (*taqiyya-yi haqīqī*), in so far as their humble understanding allows, they guard and protect the truth in the heart. They neither speak [of this] nor write it down on paper, observing thus the propriety of the [Imam's] command so far as their wretched and frail condition permits. [In this manner], they avoid becoming subject to his wrath.

[§346] From the above, one can apprehend just how much [that is, how little] this most wretched of all wretches can write down of his philosophical conceptions that have been granted him by grace of [the Imam's] infinite mercy. However, I am obliged to write down a few words concerning [those matters] that he has permitted [to be communicated]. And success is from God, upon Him we rely.

[§347] It has been said that 'The worth of the faithful believer cannot be measured [as it truly deserves].'[102] One meaning of this adage is that the believer is one whose true worth is beyond all estimation. Now, if this is the situation regarding the believer, one can deduce what the situation is vis-à-vis the lord to whom the believer surrenders with full faith. One of [the Imam's] majestic attributes is that he is [the manifestation of the Divine Command], that supreme being through whose Will the non-existent comes into being, and through whose Word the impossible becomes necessary being.

[§348] There are two aspects to this question: If they say that the Imam does not resemble man in any way, they have denied his belonging to the realm of the senses and the sense-perceptible; and if they say that he resembles man in all aspects, this is denying [his belonging to the realm of] the Intellect and the intelligible. If it is said that no one has access to knowledge of the Imam, they will have claimed that [the tradition which says], 'The knowledge of God means that all the people of an epoch recognise their Imam, obedience to whom is obligatory upon them,'[103] is

to be understood in a purely metaphorical sense – 'from which we take refuge in God'. And if they say that everybody has access to knowledge of the Imam, this implies that the Imam can be apprehended by the sense and reason of everyone, regardless of who they may be.

[§349] Of these two points of view, the first results in infidelity (*kufr*) and the second in associationism (*shirk*).[104] Thus, it has to be concluded that recognition of the Imam from the point of view of the Imam is one thing, [and] from the point of view of human creatures another. It is impossible for human beings to recognise the Imam from the point of view of his being the Imam as the Imam, because no one's senses or reason can comprehend his essence or the reality of his attributes. However, it is possible for him to be recognised from the point of view of his being human, as a human creature, and it is permitted that everyone should, according to his existential rank, know and say something about their recognition of him. For the greatest expression of divine mercy to mankind is the appearance of the Imam of the age (*imām-i zamān*), as a man among others, so that through him man may know God in the true sense (*bi-ḥaqīqat*) of recognising Him, and obey God in the true sense of obeying Him.

[§350] The sacrosanct Divine Essence (*dhāt-i muqaddas*) has made the Imam – may salutations ensue upon mention of him – the manifestation of the sublime Word (*maẓhar-i kalima-yi a'lā*), the source of illumination (*manba'-i nūr*), the lamp of divine guidance (*mishkāt-i hidāyat*), the lantern of divine glory (*qandīl-i 'izzat-i ṣamadiyyat*), the scales of obedience and worship (*mīzān-i ṭā'at wa 'ibādat*), and the person who embodies this knowledge and love of Himself (*shakhṣ-i ma'rifat wa maḥabbat-i khūd*). God has made him the centre of the heavens and the pole (*quṭb*) of the earth so that everything which rotates and is stable thereupon might persist as it is by his grace. [In this fashion], the continuity of the world's 'person' and 'spirit' (*shakhṣ wa rūḥ*) is indissolubly linked to the perpetuation of the Imam's person and spirit. [As has been said], 'If the earth were devoid of an Imam even for a moment, it would perish with all its inhabitants.'[105]

[§351] In truth, God has made the Imam independent of both the material and the spiritual realms, and has made both of these dependent upon and in need of him. God has brought mankind, jinn and angels under his command, and has made him their master (*mālik al-riqāb*). As has been said, 'Through [God's] power, every creature submits to us

[Imams], and through His might, comes to our obedience.'[106] God has clothed him in the garment of His own oneness and has granted him His own eternity and perpetuity. God has bestowed on him something of His own Names (*asmā'*) and Attributes (*ṣifāt*) by which He manifests himself, and the lights of that Name and the traces of those Attributes appear in him. [Accordingly], his speech is the speech of God, his act is the act of God, his command is the command of God, his word is the word of God, his decree is the decree of God, his will is the will of God, his knowledge is the knowledge of God, his power is the power of God, his face is the face of God, his hand is the hand of God, his hearing is the hearing of God, and his sight is the sight of God.

[§352] Thus, it is quite just for him to say, 'We are the most beautiful names of God (*asmā' al-Allāh al-ḥusna*) and His supreme attributes,' which is to say, 'I am the supreme Name and the superlative attribute of God, hypostatised and individualised (*mu'ayyan wa mushakhaṣ*).' [He can also say]: 'I have known God before the creation of the heavens and the earth,' and 'We stand in such a relation to God that when we are near unto Him, we are Him,' or 'I am the one who raised high the heavens and outspread the earth. I am the First and the Last, the Manifest and the Hidden, and I am omniscient over all things.' There is always a community (*jamā'at*) following the Imam in this world. Through them he is known, and through him they are known. He is known by his community because they regard him as their lord (*khudāwand*), and the community is known by him, being famed as his community.

[§353] He [i.e., the Imam in essence] has neither any beginning at the inception, nor any transformation and change in the middle, nor a termination at the end. Despite the fact that he is the divinely everlasting and eternal substance (*jawhar-i qā'im wa bāqī*), the cause and reason behind all living things, the lord who bestows existence on all creation, and by the truth of his creative realities, he transcends all sorts of species and individuals, yet he appears to be endowed, in relation to this physical world, with both [a kind of] species (*naw'*) and individuality (*shakhṣ*). However, his individuality is his species, and his species is his individuality, and his person is perpetuated through his species to the end of all time.

[§354] The formula of the profession of Divine Unity (*kalima-yi tawḥīd*) is the [exclusive] heritage to be transmitted and inherited through his sacred progeny and holy descendants, in one line of descent

and essence – '*offspring, one after the other*' (3: 34) – [a lineage] which will never be ruptured, even unto the end of time.

[§355] On the Imam and his offspring, quoted from the holy words of [Imam Ḥasan] *'alā dhikrihi al-salām:*[107]

> Know that this Imamate is a reality [which] will never cease, change or be altered. It will continue forever to be transmitted through the progeny of our lords (*mawālīnā*). It will never leave them, whether in form, meaning or reality. With regard to the situation of others [from the Imam's family], each of them enjoys a connection to our lord in a different fashion. One of them, like Salmān, is related [to the Imam] in his interior reality (*ma'nā*) rather then his external appearance (*shakl*), [i.e., their kinship is purely spiritual, not physical]. [Thus, the Prophet said of him], 'Salmān is one of us [our family].'[108] Another, such as Musta'lī,[109] is connected to him merely in his external appearance without any relation to his interior reality. Another is connected to him both in external appearance and interior reality, like our lord Ḥasan. Still another takes after him in external appearance [and] in interior reality, while being in his proper reality actually him, like our lords Ḥusayn and 'Alī.
>
> This is because human beings are necessarily divided into three groups: the followers of the exoteric (*ahl-i ẓāhir*), the followers of the esoteric (*ahl-i bāṭin*), and the followers of truth (*ahl-i ḥaqīqat*).[110] For the followers of the exoteric, the Imam must be, in external reality, the son of the Imam, in order that visible formal appearance of the external physical world remain as it is. [For the followers of the esoteric], it is also necessary that the Imam be the son of the Imam in the esoteric sense (*bi ḥukm-i ma'nā wa bāṭin*) and in terms of the existence proper to the spiritual world (*'ālam-i rūḥānī*), so that the existence of the esoteric realm may be perpetuated, and the realm of the spiritual world be continued. [But for the followers of truth], truth dictates (*bi ḥukm-i ḥaqīqat*) that the Imam must exist as himself in person, so that, effectively, real existence (*wujūd-i ḥaqīqī*) may continue. This is because, in the same manner that absolute Reality requires that there be real existence, so spiritual existence is required by the inward esoteric dimension. Similarly, just as the existence of the interior and ideal realm (*kawn-i bāṭin*) is necessitated by the inward esoteric dimension, so the existence of the exoteric realm (*kawn-i ẓāhir*) is required by the dictates of the outward exoteric dimension.

[§356] Another extract from the holy words of [the Imam Ḥasan] *'alā dhikrihi al-salām*:

If mankind knew what the Imamate is, no one would have entertained doubts such as these. If only they had realised that mutability cannot exist without some immutable [central] point, just as the circumference [cannot exist] without the centre point. For everything that rotates or moves requires a cause for its rotation and movement, and the moving force in relation to the object which rotates or moves must be stable and perfect, in order to be able to spin or move it. This is why it has been said [in the Gospels]: 'Heaven and earth will change, but the commandment of the Sabbath will never be altered.'[111] This means that while the Prophets and the *ḥujjats* may change – at one time this one, at another time that one, at one time in this community, at another time in that – the Imam will never change: 'We are the people of eternity.'[112] [The essential nature of the Imam will never change], even when he is a drop of sperm in the loins of his father, or [a foetus] in the womb of his mother. It is a total impossibility to suppose that the true Imam could cease to exist, and the case of the acting (*mustawdaʿ*) Imam such as our lord Ḥasan [b. ʿAlī], could be any different.[113] In reality, it is impossible for any past or future Imam to be better or more powerful than another, or to be better at one time than at another time. For example, it is wrong to suppose that he should be better when he reaches maturity than when he was a drop of sperm, or better when the designation (*naṣṣ*) was made than before it was made. The designation which is made is not in order *to make* him an Imam; it is only made so that people should recognise him as such – otherwise, from his standpoint and perspective, all such different states are one and the same. Such is the case because a perfect man (*kāmilī*) must always exist amongst God's creatures in order to raise those who are incomplete and deficient to a state of perfection. Even if you assume that he is not that person [the perfect man], there would still have to be someone else. For, if each imperfect soul needs a more perfect soul [to perfect it], and the more perfect soul, [in its turn], needs an even more perfect one, and in the final case, [the chain] must terminate with the perfect man who does not need anybody else, and through whose instruction [all others] may reach perfection. Such a perfect man is a logical necessity and the matter must ultimately finish there [with him].

[§357] It is just as is narrated in the story of Abraham (Qur'ān, 6:76–79): '*And when the night came down on him*,' that is, when he reached the degree (*ḥadd*) of the esoteric dimension. Then '*he saw the star*,' that is, he saw the *dāʿī*. So he said, '*This is my Lord*,' meaning that he imagined that [the *dāʿī*] was the perfect man. '*But when it set*,' that is to say, when he saw the star come down, he turned to the Moon. When he saw the Moon, that is to say, when he saw the *ḥujjat*, he said, '*This is my Lord*', meaning that he imagined that [the *ḥujjat*] was the perfect man. '*But when it set*,' that is to say, when he saw the Moon came down, he turned to the Sun and he

interprated [that light] to be the Imam. Hence he said '*This is my Lord, it is greater*,' that is to say, he realised that [the Imam] was the perfect man. With respect to those other luminaries [the star and the Moon], he said '*I do not love things that set*.' The meaning of this is that 'When I attained to the highest level, I resolved not to associate [anything of] the lower level with the highest level' – except for the Sun, of course, regarding which he did not say '*I do not love things that set*,' rather he states, '*I have turned my face to Him who originated the heavens and the earth. A man of pure faith, I am not one of the idolaters*' (6: 79). The meaning of this verse is that once I recognised the Malik al-Salām ('Lord of Peace')[114] and turned towards him, I realised that he is the creator of 'the heavens and the earth' – namely I learned that the exoteric [teaching] of the Prophets which is called 'the heavens', and the esoteric [teaching] of the *ḥujjats* which is called 'the earth', all come from him. The reason for this is that the esoteric sense (*bāṭin*) of 'the heavens and the earth' is the realm of religion (*'ālam-i dīn*), whereas the exoteric sense (*ẓāhir)* of 'the heavens and the earth' is the realm of the world (*'ālam-i dunyā)*. One designates the earth as symbolising the hidden esoteric sense (*bāṭin*) because the earth is the centre and the heavens are the circumference. Although in appearance the circumference envelopes the centre, in reality and meaning the centre is the cause of the existence of the circumference, while the circumference is not the cause of the existence of the centre. '*I am not one of the idolaters*,' means that 'I do not associate anyone with Him.'

[§358] '*Truly, my prayers, my devotions, my life and death, belong to God, the Lord of the worlds*' (6: 163). [In this verse], 'my prayers' mean 'I will summon [the people] to Him'; 'my devotions' mean 'I will believe only in Him,' for worship (*'ibādat*) is to confess to the divinity of God. [In other words], 'I shall devote "*my life*", both in this world and in the Hereafter, to Him who is the Lord of these worlds, the Lord of both this world and the Hereafter, the Lord of the origin and the return, the Lord of bodies and souls, the First and the Last, the Manifest and the Hidden.

[§359] In brief, it is quite inappropriate to set everything down in writing, especially in times like this, [when one must work] in haste, hidden and in a dark place.[115] However, an overall picture of what has been said is as follows.

If the Imamate is perfect, it will never change or disappear, such that there can never be an Imam without the Imamate or the Imamate without an Imam. And if the Imamate is not perfect, [the existence of] a perfect man is still required in every circumstance. Who then is he? The Prophets do not

meet these conditions and answer such descriptions, neither do the *ḥujjats*, nor do the philosophers (*ḥakīmān*) nor kings. This then is the question. If such a perfect person were not to exist, those who are imperfect would not be able to attain perfection. What remedy then is there except to submit oneself to the command of these Imams of ours, who are [true Imams], neither [as] sons of the Prophets nor [as] sons of anyone else?

The Imams, both outwardly and inwardly, both exoterically and esoterically, issue from the pure line and loins of the Imam, one after another. The Imam is perfect when still in the form of sperm in the loins of his father and the pure womb of his mother. An Imam is always an Imam and always perfect. Otherwise, why should he say, 'The Imam knows from which drop of sperm the Imam after him will come?'[116] If his being in the form of a drop of sperm or adult were not the same, he would not have said: 'His sperm was kneaded along with his intellect.'[117] Their status looks different according to the way that our eyes perceive them. For example, sometimes [we see that the Imam is] a child, sometimes an old person, and sometimes a youth, and so forth, because although he does not change, it can be that we see him with our eyes as changing, or see him as two distinct persons, as a father and son. This is akin to the man with double sight who sees all things as two instead of one, or the person who turns round and round on one spot, and when he sits down sees the room spinning around him although it is fixed, but since the man's mind is spinning round and round, he thinks the room is turning too; one may also consider the case of someone suffering from bile to whom sugar has a bitter taste. But once you come to the realisation that that drop of sperm in the loins of his father is but one and the same light, 'a light that transmigrates from loins to loins,'[118] and even though the mother's womb into which this light enters [may be perceived by you] as imperfect, you may still affirm these words: 'And we come from the Light of God (*nūr Allāh*).'[119] For can the Light of God be affected by anything? Can the Light of God be dimmed by any cause or circumstance? It is nonsensical [to maintain otherwise], my friend. Or can this intellectual sperm (*nuṭfa-yi 'aqlānī*) be more perfect when it becomes a mature person? Or can anything be hidden from the Light of God, [so that it can be supposed] that at some time he [the Imam] is cognisant [of a truth] and another time incognisant, or that some of them know and others do not? This matter [of the perfection of Imamate] is not what some people have supposed.

Up to this point, [we have reported] the words of [the Imam Ḥasan] *'alā dhikrihi al-salām*.

[§360] Now, concerning the physical designation of succession (*naṣṣhā-yi jismānī*) that the Imams – may salutations ensue upon

mention of them – may have accorded their physical sons who were from [them] in appearance, but not in reality, the same judgement [delivered above] applies, if viewed from the perspective that it was done in accordance with the [divine] mandate of Truth (*ḥukm-i ḥaqīqat*), and that it was the course of action that they saw to be most expedient. [As has been said]: 'When the speech of God arrives, then fall silent.'[120]

[§361] However, from a relative point of view (*ḥukm-i iḍāfa*), as described by their *dā'īs* and *ḥujjats*, these edicts [of designation] were established during the time when they [the Imams] – may salutations ensue upon mention of them – exercised [political] authority over the external physical world. During such times, [some of] their followers turned away from the *ḥujjat* and the caliph, and even from the gnostic reality of the person of the Imam (*shakhṣ-i ma'rifat*) because of the sins they had committed and the ingratitude which they had expressed. Thus, they [the Imams] confined them in the [phenomenal] realm of justice and punishment.

[§362] At other times, when they [the Imams] desired that a break, an interval and a trial [of faith] take place, deeming that concealment and strict protective dissimulation (*tasattur wa taqiyya*) were necessary, they gave preference to the physical son over the son who was physically, spiritually as well as in reality like themselves. Thus, they concealed [the true successor], disallowing themselves in the guise of making such a formal appointment (*naṣṣ-i shaklī*).

[§363] [However], sometimes the followers [of the hidden Imams] were foolishly indiscreet, and began to substantiate, verify and venerate the real (*mustaqarr*) Imam, without his consent and permission.[121]

[§364] As was mentioned in the introduction, knowledge (*ma'rifat*) of the Imam, from the point of view of his real being as Imam, is impossible for mankind, but in terms of [his] relation with mankind, knowledge of him has been arranged into four categories so that no one may be deprived of recognising him according to the degree he has in the scale of being.

[§365] The first is the knowledge of the person of the Imam in his physical (*jismānī*) form. Animals share this [kind of] recognition [with humans], as do [his] enemies. If this recognition did not exist, when [his followers] want to prostrate before him, how can they know before whom they should prostrate and towards whom they should place their faces on the ground?

[§366] The second is the knowledge of his common name (*ism-i ʿāmm*) and physical genealogy. This recognition is shared alike by the followers of truth and the followers of falsehood (*muḥiqqān wa mubṭilān*), by hypocrites and faithful believers. If this kind of knowledge did not exist, when they want to perform their prayers, they would not know who is to be named in their prayers (*duʿā*) and to whom they should address their prayers for forgiveness and repentance.

[§367] The third is the knowledge of his Imamate, and faith in and submission (*taslīm*) to him. In this [kind of] recognition there is a radical distinction made between the follower of truth and the follower of falsehood. The good become distinguished from the bad through dissociation (*tabarrā*) [from them] and, by expressing their love (*tawallā*) [for the Imam], are admitted into his congregation.[122]

[§368] The fourth is the knowledge of his essence (*dhāt*) through [recognition of] the reality of his attributes. This [type of] knowledge is obtained by one's affirmation of the divine transcendence (*tanzīh*) and holiness (*taqdīs*), and is utterly unlike all other forms of knowledge [so far mentioned]. [Here], even the holy souls and enlightened minds lack the power to gaze directly upon the sun of this knowledge, [such that] 'Minds are perplexed without reaching him, eyesight is blinded, speculation is nullified, knowledge is defeated, holy souls have perished and illuminated minds are brought to nought.'[123]

[§369] With respect to the Imam's recurrences (*karrāt*) and repeated returns (*rajaʿāt*), they – may salutations ensue upon mention of them – have pronounced that the principle of relative and real existence (*ḥukm-i iḍāfat wa ḥaqīqat*) must be kept in mind. Insofar as there are diverse degrees of truth and each Imam manifests a different degree [of truth], a different mystery, a different benefit (*maṣlaḥat*) which they detail and elucidate [for people], one cannot say that they do *not* have a return. But insofar as the Divine Truth has a unity wherein all these stages are one, and the Imams are all one in reality (*ḥaqīqat*), so that their bodies (*shakhṣ*) are not separate from each other nor their spirits, neither can one say that they *do* have a return.

[§370] The meaning of the terms '*imām*' and '*qāʾim*' (Resurrector) are the same, but people use the name Qāʾim to refer to that Imam who introduces some great change in the religious law (*sharīʿat*). When the Qāʾim manifests himself in physical form, that is, when he propagates his mission by way of deeds but not [yet] in words, he is called the 'lord

of the necks' (*mālik al-riqāb*); and when he manifests himself spiritually, that is, when he spreads his mission through both word and deed, he is called the 'lord of hearts and necks' (*mālik al-qulūb wa al-riqāb*).

[§371] Since in all periods and at all times the welfare of mankind depends on what he – may salutations ensue upon mention of him – orders, he sometimes finds it advisable to occupy a throne, or possess dominion, wealth, an army and a great treasury. [At such times] he opens the door of his summons, which is the greatest mercy to all mankind, to all the world's inhabitants. He treats everyone with forbearance, kindness and tolerance, and under his great reign everyone prospers and is happy.

[§372] At other times, however, he avoids the outer paraphernalia and luxuries of royalty and power, leaving people to suffer the afflictions and perplexities of [divine] tribulation, thus subjecting them to severe torments and sparing no one. His conduct with respect to religion and [temporal] rulership is such that only a few brave hearts can tolerate it, in so far as he would annul all rights (*ḥaqqī*) granted [to those entitled to them], leaving no trace of the reality (*ḥaqq*) of truth by which one can recognise him. He would say and do such things as to make one block one's ears with cotton and close one's eyes, so as not to hear or see anything he says or does.[124]

[§373] The following is one of the sayings [of the Imams]: 'Our affair is one of intense hardship, our secret a dreadful mystery. No one can bear it except an angel close [to God], a Prophet sent as a messenger, or a believer whose heart God has tested with faith.'[125] And the following is [another] saying – may salutations ensue upon mention of him: 'You will be sifted like grain in a sieve, boiled like water in a pot, mixed up, until you are turned completely upside-down.'[126] Those who had held the rank of the 'tongue of knowledge', (*zabān-i 'ilm*) have said that this means you will be subjected to afflictions and perplexities of trials and tribulations; you will be turned upside-down, so that your essence (*khulāṣa*) will [be purified and] remain on top, leaving whatever is left on the bottom.

[§374] Concerning the dictum that the Imam has never descended [into the human form], nor will he ever descend into the realm of relativity (*akwān-i iḍāfī*): the purpose of such descent [for ordinary mortals] is to acquire a perfection in each of the realms of relative being, which otherwise they would not be able to obtain. The Imam, however, does not need any perfection outside his essence, not only in these realms but in

the whole universe. Does he not, in reality, bestow existence and perfection upon these relative realms and upon all creation? Consequently, from this point of view, according to the absolute reality (*ḥaqīqat al-ḥaqā'iq*) underlying all things, the Imam has never descended nor ever will descend into these realms of relative being.

[§375] But, relatively speaking and [according to the saying], 'Through an appearance [of the Imam] which is relative to the people [in the realms], not a real manifestation in his essence,'[127] he has a kind of appearance in each of these realms [of relative being] for the sake of [sustaining] their existence. For if he did not make an appearance and cast a glance upon each of these realms, and if each of these realms did not have some relation and connection with him, they would have no existence at all. Thus, in this respect, in terms of relativity, he has been and always will be manifest in this world. It is from this perspective that [the Imam appears as] both father and son, sometimes a child and sometimes an old man, and so forth.

[§376] Anyone who reasons to himself that the Imam – may salutations ensue upon mention of him – should act according to the prescriptions of the founder of the religious law in order to be Imam, and in order to be impeccable (*ma'ṣūm*), that he should adhere to the canons of ascetic piety and holy chastity which ordinary people consider to be piety and chastity, [such a person] can be numbered among those who are described, when discussions about human intelligence are broached, as [possessing] 'such denial, such devilry, which resembles reason, but is not reason.'[128] Such a person does not have even an iota of understanding regarding the condition of the Imamate.

[§377] When such people witness the behaviour and actions of the Imam – may salutations ensue upon mention of him – they become delirious, thinking these to be terrible transgressions, uttering things '*whereby the heavens are almost torn asunder*' (19: 90). For the Imam – may salutations ensue upon mention of him – exercises his judgement in a manner that is beyond the comprehension of mankind. Therefore, only that person of whom it can be said that, 'The believer has been created from [the Light of] God, and when God orders him something, he will recognise it,'[129] will be able to disclose this mystery by the light of his primordial conscience (*nūr-i fiṭrat*). Such a person knows, beyond any shadow of doubt or suspicion, that it is the truth which follows the Imam, not the Imam who has to follow the truth. This is because the Imam is the

lord of truth (*khudāwand-i ḥaqq*), and his will and desire have no need to be justified or motivated by any secondary cause, because from his perspective, the cause, the caused and the causation are all the same.

[§378] Similarly, such a person will understand that [the Imam] is truthful in essence (*muḥiqq-i bi-dhāt*), such that all those who become adepts in truth have been vouchsafed their truthfulness through his influence and grace. All that the worldly folk deem to be truth, when he declares it false, they also apprehend it to be false; and all that the world regards as false, when he declares it to be truth, they consider it to be true. Thus, it is the Imam who is the index of truth (*nishān-i ḥaqq*) in every situation and time, not his [transient] words and deeds. They consider truth without him as infidelity (*kufr*), and to set it [i.e., truth] besides him as polytheism (*shirk*).[130] By this means, such a person can attain to the supreme height [of understanding] which is the abode of the most advanced adepts (*sābiqān*). However, as for the one of whom it is said that 'the infidel is created from the sins committed by the believer,' he will fall into everlasting nothingness and eternal humiliation due to his own obstinacy, denial and opposition to the Imam. We seek refuge from this in God.

[§379] About these two positions – that is, that of the truthful master (*muḥiqq*) and that of the follower of falsehood (*mubṭil*) – the real situation is indicated here, in what is also [one of] their sayings: 'One who recognises me has recognised me in eternity (*fī al-dharr*), and one who rejects me does not belong among the folk of the right hand [of God on the Day of Judgement].'[131] God willing, this will be clear to the people of vision and insight (*ahl-i baṣar wa baṣīrat*).

[§380] Regarding the asceticism and chaste purity of the Imam, if one were to measure this on the scale proper to ordinary mortals, it would appear as if he had neither asceticism nor chastity. This is because the relation of ordinary people to the Imam is like that of a wretched ant to a perfect man. Nay, they are more than a thousand degrees inferior to that. Now, just as no man bothers to avoid or be wary of an ant or any other animal in his actions, why should the Imam, who sees nothing [of substance] outside himself, bother to be wary and take precautions for anything or anyone? How many learned persons there have been who considered themselves to be supreme justices (*qāḍī-al quḍāt*) or leading missionaries (*dā'ī al-du'āt*), yet were unable to comprehend the secret of this matter? They saw the Imam, heard his words and observed his

actions, but adopted a perverse and hostile attitude [towards him], and by doing so have been humiliated and confused. We seek refuge from this in God.

[§381] The Imams – may greetings ensue upon mention of them – have various notable dignitaries: some are pupils (*muta'allim*), some are teachers (*mu'allim*), some are missionaries (*dā'īs*), some are 'gates to esoteric meaning' (*bāb-i bāṭin*), some are 'tongues of knowledge' (*zabān-i 'ilm*), some are 'supreme proofs' (*ḥujjats*), and some are 'hands of might' (*dast-i qudrat*). The *dā'ī* and the *bāb-i bāṭin* are, in one sense, the same, as are the *zabān-i 'ilm* and the supreme *ḥujjat*. As for the pupil, the teacher, the *ḥujjat* and the Imam: one who is not learned and needs instruction (*ta'līm*), but, while being instructed, is not permitted to instruct others, such a person is a pupil. However, one who is not learned and needs instruction, but when instructed is allowed to instruct others, is a teacher. There is another type of person, however, who learns without instruction from anyone, that is, he knows everything without recourse to any physical teacher, acquisition of science or dictation of knowledge, and needs no one's teaching. His knowledge, coming from the outpouring of the Imam's illumination (*fayḍ-i anwār-i ta'yīd*) that has become united with his thoughts, obliges him to teach others. Such a person is the *ḥujjat*.

[§382] [Lastly], there is one who is beyond both learning and unlearning, who is the lord of all these (*khudāwand-i īn hama*) and the bestower of that knowledge (*ma'rifat*) through which the perfection of reason is obtained. Such a one is the manifestation of the sublime Word (*maẓhar-i kalima-yi a'lā*), who bestows that knowledge which is the perfection of the intellect. The whole purpose of his work is that people should come to know and love him and so become members of his party, company and community (*jamā'at*). He is the Imam – may salutations ensue upon mention of him.

[§383] His supreme *ḥujjat* is the manifestation of the First Intellect, that is to say, the visibility and power of the illumination of the First Intellect is made manifest through him. His position has been likened to the Moon. For just as the body of the Moon is in itself dark but illuminated by the Sun, taking the Sun's place in its absence (*khalīfat-i ū bāshad*), and lighting up the Earth in proportion to the amount of light that it has been capable of obtaining from the Sun, so the soul of the supreme *ḥujjat*, which by itself knows nothing and is nothing, is illumined by the effulgent radiation of the divine assistance (*ta'yīd*) from the Imam. In the

absence of the Imam, he acts as his vicegerent. By virtue of his capacity to receive the grace of the lights of knowledge (*fayḍ-i anwār-i ʿilm*) and according to the measure of his aptitude, he enlightens people about the Imam, showing the way to him – may salutations ensue upon mention of him. He establishes the truth of the Imamate and the community of the Imam with arguments and proofs which no impartial and intelligent man can deny. He makes the souls of the pupils, who are potentially capable of receiving the form of perfection and becoming intelligent, to become learned in actuality, by means of the perfect [ideal] forms he inculcates and the effective actions he undertakes.

[§384] The function of the supreme *ḥujjat* is to lay down genuine foundations for the religious mission (*daʿwat-i ḥaqīqī*) of the Imam. The [Imam's] *ḥujjat*s are in reality and essence all one, and it cannot be said that one is greater then the others, although people consider that the *ḥujjat* through whom more truths are disclosed, and whose summons to the Imam is more comprehensive and significant, to possess the higher degree.

[§385] Now, the function of the *dast-i qudrat* (hand of might) is that, when the gate of repentance becomes closed, that is, when the Imam desists from spreading his mission through [his own] words (*daʿwat-i qawlī*), he is put in charge and appointed as commander so that he may organise the affairs of the community in a concrete manner (*siyāsat-i shaklī*).

[§386] The *zabān-i ʿilm* (tongue of knowledge) has been likened to water, the gentle drops of which penetrate the earth and cause the various plants and different kinds of flowers and herbs to sprout forth. He thus engages in teaching the souls of men, enabling them by his instruction to pass from merely potential to actual knowledge, so that the marvellous qualities and extraordinary virtues within each person may become actualised – according, of course, to the will of the Almighty.

[§387] The *dast-i qudrat* has been likened to fire which, just as it incinerates itself, also consumes, scatters and destroys everything else in its path, that is, it strikes and kills, and so on. Now, whenever the *dast-i qudrat* rules and dominates a kingdom, if the *zabān-i ʿilm* does not obey his commandment like the rest of the citizens of the kingdom, he may lose his life (*wujūd-i shaklī-yi jismānī*). And, if the *dast-i qudrat* does not seek the guidance of the *zabān-i ʿilm*, he is deprived of the blessings of perfection and nobility of the soul in the Hereafter (*ʿālam-i maʿād*).

[§388] And at certain times it will be necessary for the Imam – may salutations ensue upon mention of him – owing to the completeness of power and splendour of the might and authority of the blessed summons (*da'wat-i mubārak*), to entrust the duties of both the *dast-i qudrat* and the *zabān-i 'ilm* to the *zabān-i 'ilm* [alone], thus uniting the exoteric with the esoteric summons.

[§389] Now, you may call the Imam – may salutations ensue upon mention of him – either 'Imam', or the 'eternal Face of God' (*wajh Allāh al-bāqī*), or the 'Supreme Attribute' (*ṣifat-i a'ẓam*), or the 'Great Name of God' (*nām-i buzurg-i khudāy*), or the 'Manifestation of the Supreme Logos' (*maẓhar-i kalima-yi a'lā*), or the 'Truthful Master of the Age' (*muḥiqq-i waqt*). For he is all things even without creation, whereas all creation devoid of him is but nothing. All these titles have one and the same meaning. Godspeed to you.

Taṣawwur 25

On the essence of language, the faculties of speech and hearing, and silence.

[§390] Since everything in this world has both matter and form, language also possesses both matter and form. For example, man's breathing is equivalent to matter and the individually separate letters [of pronunciation] are equivalent to form. [Likewise], the separate letters are equivalent to matter while the joined letters are equivalent to form. Then, in as much as the joined letters are equivalent to matter, the words are equivalent to form, and in as much as the words are equivalent to matter, so a well-composed discourse in comprehensible speech is like form.

[§391] The origin of language consists in the separation of sounds, which are emitted from their source of vocal articulation [in the throat], taking the form of discrete letters. These form into compound letters; first they are joined, then they become words, then several words, then an entire, intelligible discourse. In this way, [people] come to understand each other.

[§392] The production of sound, pure and simple, is common both to man and animals. The distinguishing characteristic of man [from animals] is in his power to vocalise distinct letters through sound. For,

the purpose of each thing lies in its ultimate perfection, and the ultimate perfection of sound is guidance (*hidāyat*). Now, the ultimate perfection of such guidance consists in bringing the soul from its state of potentiality into a condition of actuality through the removal of obstacles and veils. In so far as animals are not obliged to submit to [the discipline of] guidance, their mutual understanding of each other is achieved by the sounds they emit, sounds which they obtained from the Bestower of forms (*wāhib al-ṣuwar*),[132] without being privileged with the distinction of letters.

[§393] However, man, being in himself a microcosm (*'ālam-i ṣaghīr*), is a model (*namūdār*) of the macrocosm (*'ālam-i kabīr*) and a compendium synthesising the influences of both worlds [within himself]. The requirements [of his human nature] and the perfections [he acquires] transport him to ever higher [degrees of] perfection towards '*Thy Lord, He is the ultimate goal*' (53: 42). Since man needs to become perfect in his essential nature and capable of bringing others to perfection, he necessarily has to have recourse to the use of sounds vocalised as distinct letters. [This faculty] God gave him.

[§394] Thus, the sound of his voice becomes a speech (*qawl*), made up of spiritual matters (*mawādd-i rūḥānī*); in other words, his speech is a manifestation of the ideas which he ponders. Such discourse then takes the form of symbols and signs of intelligible ideas, which are the spiritual matter (*mādda*) from which the acts of speech and hearing are composed; for discursive speech, in its most perfect form, acts as a mould for [the expression of] such ideas.

[§395] And, in a certain manner, that person alone can be said to be speaking in the real sense of the word, whose speech is a complete expression (*adā-yi kullī*) which, when received by his listeners' deficient souls, causes them to pass from their imperfect domain to the limit of perfection. Likewise, only that person can be said in reality to be hearing who instantaneously has the capacity to receive [that discourse] without any inflation or distortion [of meaning].

[§396] However, the aptitude (*isti'dād*) of people varies in degree, and all these 'speaking', 'silent' and 'listening' people are situated at different hierarchical degrees, one above another, up until the *ḥujjat* of the Imam, who is the one capable in the absolute sense of bringing others to perfection, so that his discourse, hearing and silence all carry the same significance.

[§397] As for the Imam – may salutations ensue upon mention of him – he is far exalted and utterly beyond all these operations, for he has been, and still is, the giver of the discourse of all orators, of the hearing of all who listen, and of the silence of all who keep silent.

[§398] [In this connection], one of the Imams – may salutations ensue upon mention of them – once told his congregation: 'From the time that I became your spiritual master (*walītukum*), I have not spoken to you.'[133] Now the meaning of this declaration may become intelligible to devotees from the following extract from the holy words of [the Imam Ḥasan] *'alā dhikrihi al-salām*:

> All these expressions I use and these stories I tell you relate purely to your non-existence, which I manifest to you unto your non-existence (*bi-'adam-i shumā bā shumā mīnumāyam*). That which I said prior to our time, [concerning] the call and summons to the knowledge and worship of God, was a relative kind of discourse (*sukhan-i iḍāfī*), but now both the knowledge and worship of God are one immediate word (*sukhan-i bi yak bār*). [And if], like the Arab who barks at his dog so that it may respond, it is objected that I also make use of arcane words in my discourse, I reply that I use and have used words which point to intelligible realities, highlighting the absurdity of vain speculations [and] advancing the annihilation of pseudo-realities (*ma'dūmāt*). Godspeed to you.[134]

[§399] Thus, in relation to his own sacred essence, he [the Imam] has neither uttered nor spoken anything, but in relation to the perfections that he manifested, with a view to bringing the world to perfection and making human beings more complete, there has never been, nor will there ever be, any orator or speaker (*nāṭiq*) in all the 18,000 worlds other than him.

[§400] The supreme *ḥujjat* of the Imam is, from one point of view, the absolute speaker (*gūyā-yi muṭlaq*), and from another point of view, he is the absolute maintainer of silence (*khāmūsh-i muṭlaq*). This is because, in relation to what is above, transcendent and independent of speech and silence, he has come to the realisation of his essential utter nothingness, surrendering himself by virtue of his union (*ittiḥād*) with that which transcends him. In this respect, he is the absolute maintainer of silence. However, in relation to that which lies below him – and in this respect, by grace of the succour (*ta'yīd*) vouchsafed from what is above him, he grips in his hands the string of relative phenomena and their

esoteric truths – he guides the seekers on the way of truth along the path to perfection and abets their return [to the divine source]. In this sense, he is the absolute speaker.

[§401] Consequently, from one point of view, there is a person who speaks and whose discourse involves a relation that he entertains with his inferiors who are below him. Yet, at the same time, that person is silent, and his silence involves a relation of devotion which he entertains towards his superior above him who is, in reality, his very own essence. All other people [besides the *ḥujjat*] are, from one point of view, silent orators, and from another point of view, maintainers of silence who speak. In one sense they both speak and maintain silence, and in another sense they neither speak nor maintain silence; in one respect their faces are turned from speech to silence, and in another respect their faces are turned from silence to speech. Godspeed to you.

Taṣawwur 26

Concerning the cycles of the six Prophets with authority, from Adam to Muḥammad – peace be upon them – and the truthful Imams – may their mention be sanctified – and the appearance of the mission of the Resurrector, and the proclamation of the mission of Resurrection.

[§402] Every Prophet – peace be upon all of them – has had a legatee (*waṣī*)[135] in whom the light of the Imamate has been firmly set and established with surety, and to whom the knowledge of prophecy has been temporarily entrusted through trusteeship (*istīdā*ʿ). The reason for this legacy is that during the period of each Prophet, the truthful Imams – may salutations ensue upon mention of them – perceived it to be in the best interests of the people to manifest themselves as legatees of that Prophet. Adam's *waṣī* was Seth (*Shīth*), who has been called the son of Adam. The vestiges of knowledge in which Adam was instructed by God and the illumination of those words, by means of which Adam's repentance was accepted [by God], were exclusively his. From the time of Adam that legacy has continued in the progeny of Seth, '*offspring, one of another*' (3: 34), and will continue to the end of the life of the world.

[§403] The *waṣī* of Noah (Nūḥ) was Sām (Sem), who has been called the son of Noah.

[§404] The *waṣī* of Abraham (Ibrāhīm) was Malik al-Salām – hallowed be his remembrance – who has been called the son of Abraham.[136]

[§405] The *waṣī* of Moses (Mūsā) was Dhū al-Qarnayn,[137] who was called Aaron (Hārūn), being more celebrated by that name. Since Aaron was destined to be the *waṣī* of Moses, but he died during Moses' lifetime, and since Moses had to entrust the legacy to the sons of Aaron, and Aaron's two boys were infants, [Moses] charged Joshua (Yūsha' bin Nūn) with that legacy and appointed him temporarily with keeping the mysteries of the guardianship (*sirr-i walāyat bī mustawda'ī hā dāsht*),[138] so he might hand that legacy over to Aaron's sons. The wisdom in that was to make clear the benefit of making such an appointment (*naṣṣ*), which is necessary for the succession to continue.

[§406] The *waṣī* of Jesus was Ma'add[139] – may salutations ensue upon mention of him – who is also called Simon of the Rock (Sham'ūn-i Ṣafā', i.e., Simon Pietreus), being more celebrated by that name.

[§407] The *waṣī* of Muḥammad the Chosen (*muṣṭafā*) was our lord 'Alī – may salutations ensue upon mention of him.[140]

[§408] It is said that after Abraham – peace be upon him – [the functions of] royalty, prophethood (*mulk wa nubuwwat*), and religion and the Imamate (*dīn wa imāmat*) continued in two lineages (*baṭn*). One was the exoteric lineage [through] the progeny of Isaac (Isḥāq), and the other was the esoteric lineage [through] the progeny of Ishmael (Ismā'īl). While the signs of royalty and prophethood continued to be passed down in the lineage of Isaac, the lights of religion and the Imamate continued in the lineage of our lord Ishmael. Jesus – peace be upon him – represented the last of those signs which had passed down the lineage of Isaac, and he also attained to the commencement of the divine illuminations which had graced the progeny of our lord Ishmael. Muḥammad the Chosen was a grand spiritual compendium, unifying in himself both the terminus of those signs and the commencement of those illuminations. He was thus unique, without peer in authority, prophethood, majesty and statesmanship, pre-eminent both in the spirituality of his words and his physical conduct.

[§409] Now, every one of the prophets – peace be upon them – was each pitted against various adversaries and pharaohs, some visible and others hidden. It is well-known among the common folk that Adam's adversary was Iblis, Noah's adversary was Nasr,[141] Abraham's adversary

was Nimrūd, Moses's adversary was Pharaoh (Fir'awn), Jesus's adversary was Judas (Yahūdā), and Muḥammad's adversary was Abū Lahab.

[§410] The conservation of religious prescriptions of the Prophets was committed into the hands of the real Imams (*imāmān-i mustaqarr*) – may salutations ensue upon mention of them. However, because of the benefits they saw therein, and the divine wisdom they understood therein, they have sometimes effected this conservation through their own sacred selves, and have at other times entrusted it to their vicegerents and other people. Had they always effected this conservation themselves, the spirituality of these religious laws would have always remained firm and all the disagreements [there have been] would never have occurred. But since God has made these disagreements a cause for concord, as Muḥammad – peace be upon him and his progeny – has said, 'Differences amongst my community are a mercy,'[142] they have done whatever they deemed advisable for mankind at that time, and in like manner they have made the continuance of these rules an obligation.

[§411] The true Imams – may salutations ensue upon mention of them – have sometimes been called the 'son of Adam' or the 'son of Noah' or the 'son of Abraham'. They have maintained this on account of the benefits and relations they have seen to be proper. But in reality, they were neither of the lineage of these Prophets, nor of the progeny of philosophers, nor of the offspring of kings, nor of any other lineage except their own blessed and sacred one.

[§412] Since Muḥammad – peace be upon him and his progeny – was the Seal of [all the previous] cycles of legislative religions (*khātim-i adwār-i sharāyi'*), and the one who began the cycle of the Resurrection (*fātiḥ-i dawr-i qiyāmat*), and all religious laws and religions reached their perfection in his religious law and religion, he is likened to the day Friday (*jum'a*), which subsumes the five previous days and joins them to Saturday (*shanba*), namely to the Resurrector (*qā'im*) – may salutations ensue upon mention of him. In this respect, Saturday or Sabbath serves to symbolise that Resurrector, who is that which is symbolised.

[§413] He [the Prophet] has been called the 'Seal of the Prophets' because [as has been said], 'God, the Blessed, the Exalted, has based His religion on the likeness of His creation, so that they might find His creation a sign indicating His religion, and His religion a sign indicating His unicity (*waḥdāniyyat*).'[143]

[§414] By the same measure, the pattern of the creation of the

divine religious prescriptions (*āfarīnish-i amrī-yi shar'ī*) corresponds to the pattern of the physical creation (*āfarīnish-i khalqī*). For example, the physical creation of human beings is in six stages: semen, sperm, coagulated blood, the embryo, bone and the whole human form. The creation of the prescriptions of religion likewise was accomplished by six Prophets endowed with revelations (*ṣāḥib-i waḥy*): Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus and Muḥammad – peace be upon all of them. From this perspective, the mission of Adam is like the semen, the mission of Noah like the sperm, the mission of Abraham like clotted blood, the mission of Moses like the embryo, the mission of Jesus like flesh and bones, and the mission of Muḥammad like the perfect human form.

[§415] Since the creation of legislative religion was thus perfected with Muḥammad – peace be upon him – and no further perfection was required, he is called the 'Seal of the Prophets'. There is a full explanation of why he is the 'Seal of the Prophets', and that is that every Prophet who preceded him indicated that another Prophet would come after him, declaring that his religious law would reach perfection in that of the next Prophet, but Muḥammad – peace be upon him – said: 'After me will come the Resurrector' – may salutations ensue upon mention of him – 'and my religious law will reach perfection in his resurrection.'[144]

[§416] He [Muḥammad] warned mankind and conveyed the glad tidings about the Resurrector who would bring about the Resurrection, and since he was the last herald and conveyor of the glad tidings of the Resurrection, he said: 'The Hour and I were sent together, like these two forefingers,'[145] meaning that 'Both the Resurrector and I have come together like two forefingers that are stretched out beside each other, but I came a little in advance.' Since it was intended that there be no further religious law after Muḥammad, and since the mission and religious laws of all previous Prophets were to be terminated by means of his own mission [in summoning people to] the Resurrection, he was thus the Seal of all the Prophets and their various legal codes (*sharāyi'*).

[§417] The legal statutes of each Prophet who succeeded the Prophet who preceded him were all aimed at perfecting those previous laws, not their abrogation. But that perfection has, from the exoteric and formal point of view, appeared like abrogation not perfection, because until something is changed from one state to another it cannot be given the form which is the aim of the perfection of that thing. For example, until the sperm changes its state through alteration and modifications, it will

not move on from the form in which it is and pass through the stages of coagulated blood, embryo, flesh and bone – in attaining to each of which it moves closer to the soul – and so it will not attain the completeness of the human form.

[§418] One must understand the process of perfecting and abrogating (*iṭṭāl*) religious laws in the same manner. If, [for instance], a religious statute instituted by one Prophet remains unchanged and is not followed by another edict instituted by the Prophet who succeeds him, then in the end, the lord of the Resurrection (*qā'im-i qiyāmat*) will be unable to exercise his [proper] spiritual authority, and consequently, those who are subject to this [outdated] religious edict will never be able to progress from the way to the aim, from the letter to the spirit, from deceptive similitudes (*mushābahat*) to what is distinctly clear (*mubāyanat*), from relativity to reality, and from legalistic religion (*sharī'at*) to the Resurrection (*qiyāmat*).

[§419] The exponents of spiritual exegesis (*aṣḥāb-i ta'wīl)* have said that [the meaning of] those six days mentioned in the Qur'ān (7: 54) during which the heavens and the earth were created, refer to the six cycles of the six Prophets with their respective revelations, each cycle (*dawr*) corresponding to one day, and every day to one thousand years: '*A day of your Lord is as a thousand years of your reckoning*' (22: 47).

[§420] By 'heaven' they allude symbolically to exoteric religious commandments pertaining to the body, and by 'earth' they allude to esoteric spiritual rules. In other words, the exoteric physical commandments and the esoteric spiritual commandments achieved their completion during the six cycles of the six apostolic Prophets.[146] They also declare that Adam was distinguished by [being taught] the Names, Noah was distinguished by [knowing] their hidden meanings, and Abraham was distinguished by integrating both of these. [Likewise, they say] that Moses was distinguished by [preaching] the exoteric revelation (*tanzīl*), Jesus was distinguished by [his knowledge of] spiritual exegesis (*ta'wīl*), and Muḥammad by his integration of both within himself.[147]

[§421] Now, the cycle of Muḥammad – peace be upon him – was the beginning of the cycle of the Resurrection, and the resurrection is particular to the Imam who is the lord of the Resurrection. Despite the fact that all the Prophets have, from the time of Adam [to Muḥammad], made direct or indirect allusions to the Imam of their time, no Prophet ever announced the sublimity and majesty of the Imam more openly

than the Seal of the Prophets. [Among the things he has said is]: 'If the earth were devoid of an Imam even for a moment, it would perish with all its inhabitants.'[148] In another place, he has said: 'He who dies without knowing the Imam of his time, dies the death of an ignoramus.'[149]

[§422] Throughout the course of the religious mission (*da'wat*) of the Prophet – peace be upon him – there are three clear and evident mandates. One pertains to the initial period, during which the truthful master (*muḥiqq*) is recognised by means of the divine truth (*ḥaqq*). Another kind of mandate applies to the intermediary period, during which one recognises the divine truth through the truthful master, and the truthful master through the divine truth. Finally, there is the mandate proper to the final period in which one recognises the divine truth through the truthful master.[150] [As the Prophet has said], 'Recognise the truth and you shall recognise the one who possesses it. 'Alī is with the truth and truth is with him. May the truth follow him wheresoever he turns.'[151] [Thus is summed up] the origin, the intermediate and the final periods.

[§423] He [the Prophet also] said, 'I was a Prophet when Adam was still between water and clay.'[152] This statement has the same meaning alluded by the maxim, 'First comes thought, then action,' that whatever is initially intended to happen, it being the ultimate purpose and perfection, will in the end become manifest. By the same token, although Muḥammad was chronologically later than all the previous Prophets from Adam to Jesus – peace be upon them – yet he was the ultimate perfection of all their religious laws, being pre-eminent and superior in the ranks of nobility over all of them.

[§424] It is for this reason that he said, 'I have been sent with the comprehensive revelation (*jawāmi' al-kilam*),'[153] that is to say, 'All words are comprehended in what I have brought'; and, 'I have been sent for your welfare in this world and your salvation in the Hereafter';[154] and, '*I know not what will be done with me or you*' (46: 9), meaning, 'I know not what will be done with me and you until the Resurrection.'

[§425] When the divine designation and indication of the investiture (*waṣāyat*) of our lord 'Alī was revealed in the verse, '*O Prophet, convey the message which has been sent down to thee from your Lord, and if you do not, you will not have delivered the message*' (5: 70), meaning, 'Convey that message for which We sent you and if you do not do, you will not be a Prophet,' he – peace be upon him – immediately entrusted

his prophethood to ['Alī's] Imamate, thus uniting the religion of law (*sharī'at*) with the [religion of] Resurrection (*qiyāmat*). He announced: 'Alī is the lord (*mawlā*) of all those for whom I am their lord. O God, love him who loves 'Alī and hate him who hates 'Alī, support him who supports 'Alī, and abandon him who abandons 'Alī, and may the truth follow him wheresoever he turns.'[155]

[§426] The Prophet established the foundation of his community on seven pillars of religious law (*haft arkān-i sharī'at*).[156] As was explained earlier, since his religious mission was the beginning of the [religion of] Resurrection, it was all [expressed in the form of] creaturely realities (*khalqiyyāt*) consisting of divine mandates (*amriyyāt*), physical substances (*jismāniyyāt*) made from spiritual substances (*rūḥāniyyāt*), practical activities (*'amaliyyāt*) based on intellectual realities (*'ilmiyyāt*) and relative affairs (*iḍāfāt*) referring to divine realities (*ḥaqāyiq*). Exponents of spiritual exegesis (*ta'wīl*) have assigned a spiritual meaning and truth to each of these pillars [of religion], providing both an abbreviated and detailed explanation of them.

[§427] The summary explanation [of these pillars] is that ritual ablutions (*ṭahārat*) means to dissociate oneself from previous religious customs and traditions; the confession of faith (*shahādat*)[157] is to know God through Himself; ritual prayer (*namāz*) means to be always speaking with the knowledge of God [in mind]; fasting (*rūza*) means to speak with the followers of falsehood with precautionary prudence (*taqiyya*), and to maintain such fasting continually; alms-giving (*zakāt*) is to render unto your other brothers in religion that which God Almighty has given you; pilgrimage (*ḥajj*) means to abandon this temporal world and seek the eternal abode; holy war (*jihād*) means to annihilate oneself in the Essence of God Almighty.[158]

[§428] As for the detailed explanation, *ṭahārat* means that in the same way as the outer surface of body is cleansed from physical impurities with water, the inner spirit should also be cleansed from its innate impurities and perverse forms of imagination with knowledge (*'ilmiyyāt*), which is here symbolised by water. In this manner, devilish fantasies and speculations which have veiled one's primordial conscience (*fiṭrat-i ūlā*) can be dispelled from the mind.

[§429] Likewise, the expression 'God is greater' (*Allāhu akbar*) implies that He is both too great to be described and too great *not* to be described. The word 'greater', if taken literally, could imply that there

exists another great one of the same genus as Him – may He be exalted above that – and that He is simply more exalted than that [other] 'great one'. But this would be utter impiety and blasphemy – may God preserve us from that.

[§430] The gist of the matter is that one must observe two points of view here, [arising from the fact] that all people are obliged to acknowledge and confess to God's existence regarding [their] origin (*mabda'*) and return (*ma'ād*), to [the Supreme Being who is] both the First and the Last. From the first point of view pertaining to the origin, such a confession (*iqrār*) consists of a [mental] form in the act of believing (*dar i'tiqād ṣūratī*) and of an attribute [it takes] in its verbal expression (*dar lafẓ-i ṣifatī*), [that is, 'God is greater']. If such attestation regarding their origin and beginning is not given [by people], the result would be agnosticism (*ta'ṭīl*).

[§431] However, from the second point of view pertaining to the return, it should lead to the recognition of the fact that this form [of belief] and verbal [attestation] of an attribute has relevance solely from the human, creaturely point of view, and not from the divine standpoint. This is because none other than God Almighty can apprehend the reality of the Divine Essence (*ḥaqīqat-i dhāt*). Therefore, from the second point of view, it is necessary to proceed by negating and denying all predications of attributes to Him.

[§432] Now, if one considers both points of view, one of them concerns that which relates to our origin, being the viewpoint of the beholding subject (*al-nāẓir*), while the other concerns that which relates to our point of return, being the viewpoint of the object beheld (*al-manẓūr fīhi*). The first aspect, which is that of the [attestation of] the attribute, relates to our origin, and the second, which is the negation of the attribute, relates to our return. But He, the Almighty, is not conditioned by either of these two [aspects], and He also transcends this very transcendence (*tanzīh*). Only in this manner may the meaning of 'God is greater' be correctly realised by God's permission and His just will, while maintaining both the status of the human, creaturely realm (*ḥukm-i 'ālam-i khalqī*), which is where verbal description (*waṣf*) is applicable, and the status of the world of Divine Command (*'ālam-i amr*), that is, divine transcendence (*tanzīh*), both in their proper place: '*Is not His the creation and the command?*' (7: 54). [It is so], by divine will and His just providence.

[§433] Similarly, the profession of faith (*shahādat*) implies two confessions: 'I testify that there is no deity except God,' and 'I testify that Muḥammad is His Prophet.' From the first profession of faith ensues the common relative confession (*iqrār-i 'āmm-i iḍāfī*) [as the verse states] '*If you ask them who created them, they will surely say "God"*' (43: 87), whereas from the second profession ensues the specific confession of the elect who follow the Divine Command (*iqrār-i khāṣṣ-i amrī*), for '*Allah is the Master of those who believe, and the infidels have no Master*' (47: 11). Self-realisation, in the relative sense of the word (*khwīshtan shināsī-yi iḍāfī*) which pertains to our origin, accompanies the first profession of faith, but true self-realisation (*khwīshtan shināsī-yi ḥaqīqī*) which pertains to our return, necessarily ensues from the second profession and leads to the conclusion that 'He who knows himself knows his Lord' [that is, the Imam].[159]

[§434] [As for] the performance of ritual prayer (*namāz*), just as uprightness in bodily stature occurs naturally in creation, so righteousness of the soul is to be achieved by being receptive to the Divine Command. Intention (*niyyat*) in prayer means that one should eschew in one's thoughts, words and deeds everything which is apart from Him, the Almighty, everything which is not for His sake and may lead to polytheism. One should abandon reliance on one's own strength and might, and rely instead on the strength and might of the Almighty.

[§435] Similarly, [the meaning of the invocation], 'In the name of God (*Bismillāh*),' refers to the fact that the name of a thing is something through which that thing is understood. But God Almighty is not invoked by a single name but rather a plurality of names. Thus the Persians call Him '*Khudā*', the Arabs '*Allāh*', the Turks '*Tengrī*',[160] the Europeans '*Dieu*' (*Dāwū*), the Indians '*Harī Nāran*' (Narayan), the philosophers '*wājib al-wujūd*' (Necessary Being), and so forth.[161] In fact, throughout the whole world, whether amongst the Islamic communities or amongst pagan infidels and polytheists, not a single group can be found which does not call Him, the Almighty, by some name or another. Now, if these names all conformed to the reality (*ḥaqīqat*) of God, then, all these people in the various religious communities would have attained salvation and become cognisant of God – which obviously is not the case. It is also obvious that He, the Almighty, has a real name (*nām-i ḥaqīqī*) through which He can be known.

[§436] Now, the debate that occurs here is that one must say either

the name is eternal and the object named created; or the object named is eternal and the name created; or the name and the object named are either the same or each a separate reality unto itself. If the first case is affirmed, what is this other than blasphemy and polytheism? If the second is affirmed, that the object named is eternal and the name created, [and if it is maintained] at the same time that both are one and the same reality, what meaning [is to be given] to the name and the object named? If, [on the other hand], it is affirmed that these two are different realities, what else is this but [the affirmation of Divine] multiplicity?[162] The net result of all these viewpoints is that the door of discourse about this topic is closed. The thesis to which one may resort is that, in so far as people dwell in the temporal realm of similitudes (*kawn-i mushābahat-i khalqī*), they must all inevitably have recourse to making symbolic references (*ishāratī*) to Him, the Almighty, designating Him by some name. Since all human beings in the world can be classified into the ordinary (*'āmm*), the elect (*khāṣṣ*) and the supreme elect (*akhaṣṣ-i khāṣṣ*), and since everyone speaks of Him, the Almighty, from a viewpoint proper to his own self, His names have been expressed by these [classes] from the perspective of their [relative] intellectual positions, not from the standpoint of where He actually is.

[§437] For example, ordinary people use '*Allāh*', '*al-Raḥmān*', '*al-Raḥīm*' and other names as synonyms, without raising questions as to whether these terms are relative (*iḍāfī*) or real (*ḥaqīqī*). The elect speak of these names as being synonymous from a relative point of view; but above and beyond this, they mention that Name which He, the Almighty, has reserved especially for Himself, applying it to Him in the real sense of the word. The supreme elect (*akhaṣṣ-i khāṣṣ*) speak of the synonymous names, as well as of that Name which the Almighty has reserved especially for Himself, in both a relative and a real sense; but above and beyond this – there where the name and the object named are one and the same, that is, absolutely beyond the distinction between attribution and that which causes it – they use another pointing to divine incomparability (*tanzīh*). This then is referred to as the Supreme Name (*ism-i a'ẓam*), personified and hypostatised, as they [the Imams] declare: 'We are the most beautiful names of God and His supreme attributes,'[163] and 'God is known through us, adored through us, disobeyed through us.'

[§438] Thus, whoever wishes to pronounce the real Name of God Almighty and to apprehend God Almighty by means of His real Name,

should in effect become informed of that person whose entire preaching and mission (*da'wat*) lies in this [knowledge], and who is unique in [enacting] this preaching and mission. And Godspeed to you.

[§439] Similarly, the Persian translation of [the Arabic] '*al-ḥamdu li'llāh*' (Praise be to God) is '*sipās khudāy rā*,'[164] which consists of three praises (*si-pās*): thought, word and deed. Each praise has to be performed with truthful sincerity and should conform to the needs of intelligence, with exclusive devotion to God Almighty. And that will only take place when one, while concentrating on the aim of his quest and the ultimate goal that he seeks, places his trust in God in all sincerity.

[§440] Now, [the expression of] such praise (*al-ḥamd*) of God constitutes the path towards the ultimate goal (*maqṣad-i kullī*) [for the knowledge of God]. This universal aim lies at that point where gratitude (*shukr*) and patience (*ṣabr*) have one and the same reality and significance. In this respect, therefore, praise combines both patience and gratitude, and only one who can pronounce this praise with the total sincerity it demands will be able to set foot on this path and so reach this aim. This can only take place when one identifies his ultimate likes and dislikes in this world, likes that which brings him closer to God Almighty and is thankful for it, and dislikes that which takes him away from God Almighty, and exhibits patience in face of that.

[§441] This may be elucidated as follows: A person must first comprehend [what is meant by] 'the gain that is in essence a loss, and the loss that is in essence a gain.' Albeit, he will only comprehend this when his soul passes from its potential state into actuality, so that he sees things as they really are. For as long as it is in a state of potentiality, he will see things the other way round. He will consider the possession and accumulation of worldly things as a gain, liking them and being grateful for them; [conversely], he will consider the loss of worldly things as a loss, disliking it, and exercise patience in face of it. But when he moves from potentiality to actuality, he will come to realise that his real gain lies in the decrease of worldly things, while his real loss lies in the increase of worldly things.

[§442] Take the example of a person who has sufficient food and clothing with which to survive and to gain his livelihood in the world, and who does not need anything else in the way of livelihood, yet he still desires to become king of the world, and exerts himself to this end. Every gain which occurs to him in his path towards the attainment of this

end – from conquest of a small district to victory over an entire region, from rule over one person to rule over several hundred thousand men, and so forth – only increases his need to secure further resources and to carefully inspect the treasury, revenue, supplies, the army, and so on, until, when he reaches his ultimate goal and becomes king of the world, there is nothing left for him but absolute deprivation.

[§443] Therefore, when the dust of false appearance dissolves and the reality of the situation is exposed, the [real] form of this discourse appears reflected from the mirror of certitude into his rational soul (*nafs-i nāṭiqa*). At this point, he realises that the gain which he considered to be profitable was in essence all loss both in its appearance and reality. Now, [due to his recognition of] both the appearance of things as described, and its hidden reality – since the man knows well that he must, of necessity, separate himself from this world, being unable to take with him any of the luxuries of his kingdom or opulence of royalty, and all of these he must forsake here – what he is left with will be heaviness, pain, punishment and oppression, all of which pertain to the domain of eternal hell and its infinite chastisement and torture. Hence, he discerns, by the light of reason and interior vision, that in proportion to his experiencing a gain in his worldly career, he sustained a loss [in his prospects for] the life Hereafter, and inversely, he obtained a gain in his life Hereafter in proportion to having suffered a loss in [his] life in this world.

[§444] A wise man once propounded this parable regarding the world and its temporal duration: 'It is,' he said, 'as if there was a person who wished to travel from one part of the world to another. His journey entailed passing through various stages and waystations. At the first waystation an obstacle appears in the road and he has to stay there until the obstacle is removed. As long as he stays there he will require only as much as an ill person takes medicine, and he would be satisfied with this, since he knows that if he is not satisfied and desires more than his minimum daily needs and accumulates in excess of what he needs, he will be like a person who takes medicine in excess of what he needs, and so endangers his life. When the obstacle is removed, he [the traveller] will be able to depart from that station without any bother as long as he has not acquired in excess of his needs, something that may bind his heart at the time of departure.'

[§445] When he comprehends these circumstances in their entirety,

he will realise that whatever he loses in the affairs of this world, he gains in the affairs of the Hereafter. He acquires a sense of the pains which have the appearance of pleasures in this world, [and] the flavours of the pleasures of the world Hereafter which are enjoyed by the elect and conveyed, undiluted and unblemished by suffering, to his intellectual taste-buds. Thus, according to these premises, he re-directs the attention that he [previously devoted] to this world towards the Hereafter. What he formerly abhorred, he comes to love and cherish and even give thanks for it, since he perceives it to be closer to the Almighty's benign will; and what he previously loved, he now abhors, exercising it with self-restraint, since he perceives it to be far from God's approbation and pleasure. Thus, he comes to declare, 'Praise be to God', on his tongue truthfully and correctly, encompassing both these aspects, [gratitude and patience]. And Godspeed to you.

[§446] The [performance of] ritual prayer (*namāz*) is exactly the same. Its intention is to curb the power of anger (*quwwat-i ghaḍabī*). The case is like this: At the beginning of life, the human soul is in the state of potentiality, veiled by the shadow cast by the senses to perform that function which is proper to it. Hence, the soul becomes dominated by arrogance, sinful disobedience, pride and rebellious passions. By assiduous practice of ritual prayer and constancy in *namāz*, spending one's time five times a day in prostration and genuflection, bowing oneself with the utmost humility, abasing oneself in the dust of lowliness, the soul will develop a form of modesty and humility, virtues which are the beginning of a [genuine] aptitude for the fear and awe of God, which will in turn lead to what is meant by [the verse], '*Be wary of your duty to God, and be with the truthful*' (9: 119).

[§447] Genuflection (*rukū'*) is equal to half a prostration (*sujūd*), and it corresponds to voluntary submission (*taslīm-i ikhtiyārī*) to His almighty Command. Regarding the two prostrations, one is conventional, signifying submission to the signs of His creative (*khalqī*) and active artisanship, this being the effect of His almighty acts; and the other is obligatory (*taklīfī*), signifying submission to the signs of His verbal and imperative (*amrī*) [power of] production, this being the effect of His knowledge.

[§448] [Likewise], sitting for the [two] salutations (*taḥiyyāt*) [of 'Peace be with you'] means that once these religious duties have been facilitated in this way, the devotee's heart will calm down after mov-

ing in various directions, and his soul will naturally come to rest in its obedience to God, being '*firmly established in the favours of a mighty King*' (54: 55). Two greetings (*salām*) are offered, one to the right side and the other to the left. These [greetings] signify that [at the ultimate point those] two possibilities, that of the common folk (*'āmm-i khalqī*) and that of the elite [aware] of the Divine Command (*khāṣṣ-i amrī*), are transcended and realised in the world of Divine Unity (*'ālam-i waḥdat-i ilāhī*), wherein '*The foremost, the foremost, they are those who will be brought nigh*' (56: 10–11). At this point then, one offers one's greeting to the companions of the right hand [who are the people of clear distinction] – '*And peace be upon you from those on the right hand*' (56: 91) – and another greeting is given to the people of the left hand, who are the people of gradation (*tarattub*). And Godspeed to you.

[§449] Similarly, the aim of fasting (*rūza*) is to break the power of the carnal appetite. For the human soul, in the initial stages of its corporeal existence, inclines towards the pleasures, the sensual passions and the manners of this world, and consequently is cast downwards, head over foot, into the chasm of abasement, plunging into a lower degree of existence. Nothing can cure this except restraining the soul from its [base] inclinations. [Therefore], fasting, which similarly restrains the soul from its inclinations, was introduced so that for thirty days a year, and every day [from dawn] until night[fall], one closes one's mouth to food and drink, and avoids and denies oneself appetising things to which one's taste is accustomed and which are agreeable to one's nature. One should be steadfast in this self-control and self-denial in this so that gradually and by degrees, a form will become imprinted in the soul, unto such a point that all one's limbs and faculties, whether internal or external, become restrained from [pursuit of] improper things. In face of all worldly pleasures and lusts, one then chooses to exercise self-restraint, considering it necessary to refrain from every thought, word and deed which does not conform to reason and is not permitted by the intellect, that is to say, not bound to the command of the truthful master (*muḥiqq*).

[§450] It is the same with alms-giving (*zakāt*). When a person's wealth reaches a prescribed amount (*niṣāb*), so that someone else can benefit from receiving a share of it, he should give something to those in need in proportion to his wealth and financial capacity. In this manner, by means of one's material wealth, the ongoing relationship (*silk*) [be-

tween] benefaction, benefactor and beneficiary can continue to operate in the material world.

[§451] [Likewise], in the spiritual realm, one receives from one's superiors knowledge benefiting the form of one's return [to the divine source] (*ṣūrat-i maʿād*). Having attained essential perfection [through such knowledge], one imparts it to one's inferiors in proportion to their ability and aptitude to receive it, thus bringing others to perfection. In this way, just as in the material world one tries to make the poor man rich by means of material wealth, so one should endeavour to make this same man rich in the spiritual world through spiritual wealth, so that the ongoing relationship [between] benefaction, benefactor and beneficiary can continue to operate by means of spiritual wealth in the spiritual world.

[§452] The same [analogy] applies to pilgrimage (*ḥajj*). The pilgrim sets out, for example, from his home for Iraq,[165] and from Iraq travels to Baghdad, from Baghdad to the [Arabian] desert, and from there to the house of Kaʿba. [In this journey], his soul undergoes a transformation and acquires a disposition to perfection until it obtains its ultimate perfection. Such transmutations and transformations constitute [the soul's] ascension from immediate (*ḍarūrī*) knowledge to theoretical (*naẓarī*) knowledge to instructional (*taʿlīmī*) knowledge, unto knowledge received through divine grace (*taʾyīdī*). Thus, he will realise what is implied in '*Today is the great pilgrimage to the ancient house, the pure*' (9: 3; 22: 33), and he will have replied to the summons '*And God calls to the abode of peace*' (10: 25), with the answer, 'Here I am (*labbayka*), O God, here I am.' Furthermore, the journey to the house of Kaʿba, according to the literal statute of revelation (*tanzīl*), signifies the quest for the Imam, and reaching the house of the Kaʿba, according to the esoteric exegesis (*taʾwīl*), is the recognition of the Imam.[166]

[§453] It is the same with holy war [or struggle] (*jihād*), concerning which it should be understood that it has various senses, and these have been divided into four types [of struggle]: physical (*jismānī*), spiritual (*rūḥānī*), intellectual (*ʿaqlānī*) and real (*ḥaqīqī*). The physical struggle is to wage war against one's exterior enemies, where one fights one's physical enemies with bravery of the heart and with arms. The other types of struggle are waged against internal enemies. The spiritual, for example, consists in fighting the reality of one's own [inner] darkness (*ʿayn-i ẓulmat*) by the trace of one's own light (*athar-i nūr*). The intel-

lectual struggle is to fight against the trace of one's own inner darkness by the reality of one's own light (*'ayn-i nūr*). The real struggle is to combat one's self, afflicted with all that is potentially ungodly, apart or disassociated from God, by the aid of God's Selfhood (*huwiyyat*), the Almighty Necessary Being.

[§454] It is the same with Paradise (*jannāt*), which consists of perfections, ranged one above another, unto the final perfection, as has been explained in the chapter [15] pertaining to Paradise and paradises. According to the literal revelation (*tanzīl*), the four streams of Paradise (*chahār jūy-i bihisht*) consist of water, milk, honey and wine. According to spiritual exegesis (*ta'wīl*), they stand for four kinds of knowledge as befitting the varying capacities of human intellects. Thus, water symbolises immediate and self-evident knowledge (*'ilm-i badīhī*) common to all men which can be communicated and is accessible to everyone. Milk symbolises reflective knowledge (*'ilm-i naẓarī*) which is reserved for 'children', that is, those of weak intelligence. Honey symbolises instructional knowledge (*'ilm-i ta'līmī*) which can only be imparted to one kind of people, namely those who have progressed beyond the realm of personal opinion (*kawn-i naẓar*) and turned from degeneracy to rectitude. Wine symbolises divinely inspired knowledge (*'ilm-i ta'yīdī*) which results from the disclosure of spiritual realities. This type of knowledge is suitable only for persons of a sound temperament who, having turned away from a degenerate state to a condition of rectitude, moved from rectitude to Divine Unity. With the latter type of persons there is no need for one to engage in dissimulation (*taqiyya*) and it is improper to do so. Do you not see that wine is not given and ought not be given to anyone whose temperament has been slightly or seriously upset, or who is affected by illness? When such a person regains his former good health, he is not forbidden wine, nor should be.[167]

[§455] The same [analogy] is applicable to [the Qur'ānic verse], '*And their Lord will give them to drink of a wine pure and holy*' (76: 21). This verse confirms the fact that for the soul of such persons, the grace of divine illumination is vouchsafed, without any mediation, or any corporeal or spiritual intermediary, so that between him and his absolute origin, there is neither veil nor intermediary.

[§456] It is the same with the fair and lovely, wide-eyed virgins of Paradise (*ḥūr-i 'īn*) [in the verse, '*And companions with beautiful big and lustrous eyes*' (56: 22)]. These are a form presented as one feels desire

(*ma'a al-ishtihā'*) all of sudden within oneself. The meaning of this is that the subtle realities of the intelligible realm, [which] a man has the desire to perceive, take a form presenting itself to his essence, that is, to his rational discriminating soul, and from that he enjoys perceptual happiness and beatitude. [In other words], a marriage is celebrated between the first and last principles of his gnostic knowledge, the offspring of which are angelic forms and holy spirits.[168]

[§457] It is the same regarding [the verse that speaks of angels] '*having wings – two, three or four*' (35: 1). These signify that the likeness of the human soul, at the time when it has fallen under the shadow produced by [the darkness of] the senses and become veiled from having any conception of intelligible realities, is as a bird whose feathers have been shackled. For this reason, it is said, 'Let the flying bird alight and the landed bird fly.' The meaning of this saying is that the flight of the senses, that is, their domination, should be brought down, meaning brought under, the command of reason; in this manner, their domination will turn into subjugation. [But] reason, which has been brought down and landed, that is, become subjugated, should fly, that is, the mind should be roused and stimulated to move so that its subjugation may turn into domination [over the senses].

[§458] Since the first degree of the soul in this flight consists of passive sensory perceptions, God speaks of its 'having wings', that is to say, its vision is quite weak, so that it seems as if only a single wing has fledged. Now, when sensory perceptions are combined with mental reflections, God speaks of two [wings], that is, the soul switches its attention from perception of particulars by the imagination to universal conceptions, so that its faculty of intellectual comprehension (*quwwat-i naẓar*) is beginning to manifest itself, making it seem as if it has fledged two wings.

[§459] When mental conceptions are united with intellectual knowledge (*'ilm-i 'aqlī*), God speaks of three wings, because at this stage the soul's faculty of intellectual comprehension reaches its perfection, and it seems as if it has fledged three wings. When perfect realisation of intellectual knowledge becomes necessary in a person's individual essence, then God speaks of four wings, because at this stage the soul's faculty of intellectual apprehension of spiritual realities becomes infinite, making it seem as if four wings had been fledged. Here the soul reaches the supreme degree, the ultimate and final point, which is this very fourth degree.

[§460] In similar manner, [the verse] '*The hour has drawn nigh and the moon is split asunder*' (54: 1) signifies that when the reign of the Resurrection, which is the world of the Hereafter, draws near, the affairs of this [sublunary] realm of growth and decay, which are subject to the moon's influence, will disintegrate.

[§461] In the Qur'ān, there are also found several expressions conveying one and the same meaning, but which – if their commands were imposed according to the literal sense of the revelation (*ẓāhir-i tanzīl*) – would arouse diverse and contradictory meanings, resulting in utter confusion. But if one were to resort to their spiritual exegesis and truth (*ta'wīl wa ḥaqīqat*), the ruling of such verses would appear harmonious and as if perfectly in accord with the hierarchical structure of being.

[§462] One such example is this verse: '*Anyone who has done an atom's weight of good will see it, and anyone who has done an atom's weight of evil will see it*' (99: 7–8). The [literal] meaning of this is that in the life Hereafter, recompense for good and evil will be by the weight of an atom. Another verse is: '*Whoso brings a good deed shall have tenfold the like thereof, and whoso brings an evil deed shall be recompensed but the like thereof*' (6: 160). The meaning of this is that in the Hereafter, every good action (*ḥasana*) receives a tenfold reward and every evil action has but an equal [punishment]. Another verse is, '*God will transform their evil deeds into good deeds*' (25: 70), the meaning of which is that all evil deeds will be transformed into good deeds. Another verse is, '*Verily, God forgives all the sins, because He is the Forgiving, the Merciful*' (39: 53). This signifies that there [in the Hereafter], all sins will be pardoned since He is forgiving and compassionate.

[§463] The explanations given by the followers of spiritual exegesis and truth (*ahl-i ta'wīl wa ḥaqīqat*) concerning these expressions [are as follows]. When it is described [in the Book] that the retribution [given to the soul] for good and evil deeds will be according to an atom's weight, this refers to the condition [reached by] the human soul as it develops from a potential to an actual state. Such a soul enjoys an equilibrium of light and darkness comparable to the condition of a sick man in whom the power of his illness and the power of his natural constitution are equal. For example, when the aroma of food reaches his sense of smell, or when he consumes a greater or smaller portion of that food, his strength or weakness will increase accordingly. By the same measure, the man's

rise or fall in the hierarchical levels of goodness or infernal degrees of evil, in his perfection or deficiency, all will be determined [by his deeds down to the least] weight of an atom.

[§464] With regard to the fact that each good deed will receive a tenfold reward whereas the retribution for each bad deed will be meted out in exact proportion, the situation is as follows. As the human soul becomes capable of spiritual enlightenment, in proportion to each degree it ascends from the realm of the senses to that of pure intelligibles, it becomes much closer, in fact [tenfold nearer], to apprehending the ultimate purpose [of its existence]. Such a soul is like a man whose temperament is affected by illness, but is able by the strength of his constitution to overcome the strength of illness. His condition improves so much that, by administering just a small quantity of medicine, he acquires considerable strength. It is by the same measure that [even a minor act of] goodness may be amplified [tenfold].

[§465] With regard to the evil deed which is counteracted by a punishment equal to itself, the meaning of this relates to a situation in which one has attained the degree of complete perfection, [but also has a certain] deficiency which is a necessary concomitant of the soul, and produces an effect proportionate to itself. The situation in which evils are transmuted into good deeds is merely this: the appearance of deficiency becomes merged with the appearance of perfection in the soul, so that deficiency fades away and vanishes, and perfection become consolidated and established.

[§466] With regard to the fact that all sins will be forgiven, this refers to the state where all subsidiary and relative things [of the material world] are transformed into corresponding spiritual realities (*ḥaqāyiq*). These realities are then absorbed in union with the Absolute Reality (*ḥaqīqat-i muṭlaq*), so that possibility dissolves in necessity, and a complete union with the primordial aim [of creation] which is pure light (*nūr-i maḥḍ*), is achieved.

[§467] All the verses of the Qur'ān, from the opening *sura* of the Book to its end, each and every one of them, has a spiritual exegesis (*ta'wīl*). The present words are [a few] examples of what has been said [by the adepts], so that the followers of truth and men of wisdom may realise that, apart from the exoteric dimension of the revelation of the Qur'ān, there is another meaning and aim which should be sought therein. It is in relation to such esoteric exegesis that the Qur'ān is indeed a miracle,

not merely by the fact of the literal text (*tanzīl*). Hence, no one knows the interpretation (*ta'wīl*) of the Qur'ān except God and those well-versed in knowledge: '*But no one knows its ta'wīl except God and those who are firmly grounded in knowledge*' (3: 7).

[**§468**] The Prophet – peace be upon him – speaking about our lord 'Alī – may prostration and glorification grace his mention – gave good news about this in his saying: 'There is amongst you one who will fight you for the *ta'wīl* [of the Qur'ān] in the same manner as I fought for its *tanzīl* (revelation).'[169]

[**§469**] 'Alī's mission as legatee (*waṣāyat*) of the Prophet's will, was left so hidden and ambiguous for the community and majority of the followers of Islam (*ahl-i millat*) that after the death of the Prophet – peace be upon him and his progeny – both the elite and common folk found occasion to designate Abū Bakr to the caliphate by common consensus (*ijmā'*).[170] Following him, the business [of leadership] fell to 'Umar and this [appointment] was not devoid of divine providence and wisdom which our lord 'Ali brought to bear [upon his leadership]. For it was necessary that the literal sense of the religious obligations (*ẓāhir-i aḥkām-i sharī'at*), which is measured to the common domain of similitudes (*'umūm-i mushābahat*) among the Prophet's followers, be established first, so that subsequently the inner meaning and reality (*ma'nā wa ḥaqīqat*) of those injunctions, which pertain exclusively to the special domain of spiritual discrimination (*khuṣūṣ-i mubāyanat*), could be introduced [by the Imams]. And it was necessary that certain persons exist to incarnate and personally embody that realm [of exoteric religion], and they [the caliphs Abū Bakr, 'Umar and 'Uthman] were just such people.

[**§470**] To strike a simile of the situation: night must first exist so that from it the dawn may break and the sun arise. In this regard, they [Abū Bakr, 'Umar and 'Uthman] were like the night, whereas the likeness of Salmān[171] – peace be upon him – was the dawn. [Thus, the Prophet said]: 'Salmān is one of us, a member of the family (*ahl al-bayt*). Whoever recognises him is a believer and whoever denies him is an infidel.'[172] The likeness of our lord 'Alī – may salutations ensue upon mention of him – was as the sun. The authority [of Abū Bakr, 'Umar and 'Uthman] was the very essence of illusory similitudes (*'ayn-i mushābahat*), whereas the authority of Salmān was a product of spiritual discrimination (*athar-i mubāyanat*), and of 'Ali the quintessence of spiritual discrimination

– nay, it was the authority of the very world of Divine Unity (*ḥukm-i ʿālam-i waḥdat-i ilāhī*).

[§471] However, the adherents of Islam (*ahl-i islām)*, aside from that elect company who followed ʿAlī, had become so swollen with pride and conceit about the caliphate of those individuals [the first three caliphs] that they could not appreciate the ideal standpoint (*ghāyat*) from which he administered the affairs of state, so that they – except those whom God so wished – did not support ʿAlī's leadership (*imāmat*) with full sincerity and faith. And when ʿAlī introduced [the light of spiritual] discrimination (*mubāyanat*) in the ambiguities of religious law (*mushābahat-i sharīʿat*), the opinions and the sympathies of the greater number of the Muslim community had solidified so much in favour of the plain exoteric [and] literal sense of religious law, and in support of Abū Bakr, ʿUmar and ʿUthman – the personification of those prescriptions – that all those great disasters, which are recorded in history books and have not yet ceased, occurred.

[§472] This is one of the holy sayings [of Imam ʿAlī] which he – may salutations ensue upon mention of him – uttered by way of supplication:

> O God, You made me one of the people of recognition (*ahl-i maʿrifat*) of You, who have held fast to the Rope of Your Oneness before the passing of the centuries and time, before the disappearance of eras, before the creation of male and female, before the procreation of generations and the legacy of their posterity.[173]

ʿAbd Allāh [b.] ʿAbbās says [about Imam ʿAlī]:

> All womankind is as though impotent to bear the likes of ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib. Indeed, I saw him on the day of the Battle of the Camel,[174] without armour, riding between the arranged ranks of warriors, proclaiming: 'I am the Face of God and none can approach Him except through me. I am that side of God that you have abandoned. Who will repent? I pardon him. Who will implore pardon? I forgive Him.

[§473] Among the many prophesies and promises that he [Imam ʿAlī] has uttered is the following:

> I will set up a pulpit in Egypt. I will take Damascus. From there I will go to Daylam and raze its mountains and trees. I will then reach out to those

people who dwell beyond the mountains in Mazandaran, Gilan and Mūqān. Then I will wage war in India, China and Byzantium.

[§474] Someone asked him, 'O our lord, tell us whether you will live again after death, so as to accomplish all these things yourself, or will someone from among your progeny and family do them?' He said, 'Alas, you have slipped from the path [of truth]. This will be done by a man of my progeny.' The meaning of this is that, 'A man from my progeny will do this when the day arrives for the mission of the Resurrection (*da'wat-i qiyāmat*),' which is the perfect culmination of all previous religions and denominations, to surpass all religious laws.[175]

[§475] [In this context], it has been said that the religious laws (*sharāyi'*) of the Prophets are like the days of fasting [in the month of Ramaḍān], and the mission of the *ḥujjat* is like the *'urfa*,[176] and the mission of the Resurrector (*qā'im*) – may salutations ensue upon mention of him – is like the feast-day [at the end of the fast]. The meaning of this is that in the same way as a day of fasting reaches the *'urfa*, and thereby the [month of] fasting reaches [the day of] the festival, so will the Prophets' religious law culminate in the summons (*da'wat*) of the *ḥujjat* of the Resurrector, and thereby be connected with the summons of the Resurrector.

[§476] With respect to the proximity of the advent of the Resurrection, the Prophet – peace be upon him and his family – said, 'I hope that God Almighty, will not leave me in my grave more than half a day.'[177] When they asked him how long this half day would be, he replied, 'Five hundred years [as the Qur'ān says], '*Verily, one year of your Lord is like one thousand years of your reckoning*' (22: 46), which means that the mission of the Resurrection will be proclaimed five hundred years after his time.

[§477] Sayyidnā, our master[178] [Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ] – may God sanctify his soul – who was the supreme *ḥujjat* of our lord the Resurrector of the Resurrection (*qā'im-i qiyāmat*), the messiah of the Cycle of Resurrection, the one who blew the first blast of the trumpet of Resurrection (*nāfikh-i ṣūr-i awwal*), made his appearance in the year 500 after *Hijra*. He set out in search of this pure and unique religion, betaking himself to the sacred presence of our lord Mustanṣir – may salutations ensue upon mention of him – and was specially favoured with a vision of the lights of divine assistance (*anwār-i ta'yīd*). By the command of the latter, he came forth

and proclaimed openly the rightly-guided mission (*daʿwat-i hādiyya*) – may God so confirm it! Upon the first blast of the trumpet of the holy mission, he announced the call, asking if knowledge of God is to be attained with or without the guidance of a person. He asked 'Does reason suffice [as a guide to God] or not?' Thus, he who replied that 'reason is sufficient' assumed that with such a reply he would claim victory, because he saw that the whole world had made the intellect their ruler; however, if he replied that 'no, reason is not sufficient,' he would himself have testified that there is a need for a ruler.

[§478] Now, [Sayyidnā] based the holy mission on the principle that the truth in each era is what the truthful master of the time (*muḥiqq-i waqt*) – may salutations ensue upon mention of him – proclaims, and not that which has been heard from a truthful master in the past. Any truth which mankind has heard from a truthful master in the past, and which has been twisted and turned [by people over time], is but a fragment. Detached from the bearers of the truth of the time, it is taken out of its whole and original source. Re-uniting that truth with the truthful master [of the time] effectively reconnects it with its whole and original source. [Further], in the whole universe it is impossible to constitute a truth hypothetically to be truth by itself, so that people might become followers of truth when they implement it. [Likewise], no falsehood can be constituted hypothetically to be false by itself, so that when people follow it they become followers of falsehood. On the other hand, truth is that which is connected with the truthful master [of the time] and falsehood is that which is detached from the truthful master [of the time]. This is because truth and falsity as such are two abstract, mental ideas (*maʿnā-yi mujarrad-i dhihnī*), and until they become concretely manifested in a person, they have no external existence. Once they become concretely manifested in a person, then the very person of falsity (*ʿayn wa shakhṣ-i bāṭil*) will be [found in] a man who is an unbeliever and is in error.[179]

[§479] The intellect (*ʿaql*), too, is an abstract, mental concept, and as such it has no external existence, and when they wish to speak about it concretely, they can only do so [by pointing] to an intelligent person. Knowledge (*ʿilm*) is also an abstract, mental concept, without any external existence, and when they want to speak about it concretely, they can only do so [by pointing] to a knowledgeable person. This is because, just as the truthful master (*muḥiqq*) is the soul and form (*jān wa ṣūrat*) of truth, so the man of intelligence (*ʿāqil*) is the soul and form of intellect,

and the man of knowledge (*'ālim*) is the soul and form of knowledge. Thus, truth (*ḥaqq*) is like the body and the truthful master like the soul.

[§480] Take the example of various parts of the human body which are made up of elements in mutual opposition. As long as the soul, which harmonises, controls and co-ordinates the body, acts as its governor and manager, all the different parts of the body will be maintained in good order and all its disruptive tendencies will be kept in check. But once the soul forgets its control and management of the body, all the body's harmonious elements will undergo discord and all its united parts will be ruptured apart in mutual opposition.

[§481] Now, it is the same regarding the truth and the truthful master. As long as the truth is connected and affiliated to the truthful master, all disruptive elements will be united in harmony and all its disconcordent parts will be agreeably co-ordinated. However, when the truth becomes detached from the truthful master, all its harmonious parts will become disconcordant and its unity will be ruptured into scattered diversity.

[§482] When the time arrives for the final period of legislative religion (*dawr-i sharī'at*) to connect with the beginning of the epoch of the Resurrection (*zamān-i qiyāmat*), a trembling will fill all earth and heaven. All the arcane mysteries, signs, testimonies and allusions shall be exposed, and the veil of the invisible realm be rent asunder. From the orient of hope (*mashriq-i intiẓār*), the sun of Divine Reality (*āftāb-i ḥaqīqat*) dawned with the good news that 'Between the first and the second blasts of the trumpet, there will be a period of forty years.'[180] The first blast on the trumpet was the mission of Sayyidnā [Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ] – may God sanctify his soul – and the second blast on the trumpet was the mission of the Resurrector [Imam Ḥasan *'alā dhikrihi al-salām*] – may salutations ensue upon mention of him. [At this juncture], the Resurrector announced his spiritual manifestation (*ẓuhūr-i ma'nawī*), graciously diffusing the lights of his mercy throughout the world and its inhabitants. In this manner he announces: 'I have rent asunder the veil of dissimulation (*taqiyya*) by the authority and wisdom of the Resurrector.'[181] Praise be to Him [God] for this, the everlasting praise of the thankful. And Godspeed to you.

Taṣawwur 27

On the idol worshippers and refutation of their doctrines.

[§483] Although the people of the world imagine that idol-worshippers fashion an idol with their own hands and worship it, prostrating themselves before it, and regarding it as their creator and an object of veneration, the followers of truth (*ahl-i ḥaqq*) have affirmed that idol-worshippers do not consider the idol to be their creator, but rather an intermediary between themselves and their creator or deity. As the Qur'ān says [about them]: '*They are our intercessors with our God*' (10: 18), '*we do not worship them save that they may bring us nearer to God*' (39: 3). Nevertheless, even in this respect, they commit a great error and speak in clearly heretical terms, relying on idle fancy, bare supposition and imagination.

[§484] There are three classes of idolaters. The first group confesses that 'There is a creator and demiurge of the cosmos, who is the originator of all things created, the producer of all objects of production (*mukhtari'-i mukhtara'āt*), the creator and provider of our daily bread. He is the creator, the profound depth of whose majestic attributes and unicity are beyond the scope of human reason and imagination, and who cannot be approached except through intermediaries.' However, they believe the best intermediaries are heavenly spiritual beings, not human individuals. The first group believe in pure spiritual beings (*rūḥāniyyāt*). The second group stay with the stars, which [they believe] are the temples (*hayākil*) of spiritual beings. The third group passes from [the worship of] spiritual beings to stars, and from stars to idols which they have fashioned with their own hands.

[§485] Elucidating this in detail, those [of the first group], who profess their faith in pure spiritual beings, maintain that: 'The life and movement of all moving bodies, from the highest, encompassing, heavenly sphere down to the very centre of the earth, depends on spiritual beings who exercise their control over all the parts of the universe. These pure spiritual beings are separate from all matter composed of prime matter, independent of corporeal faculties and organs, and are subject neither to alteration in time nor to changes in place. They are always engaged in glorifying and sanctifying God Almighty, and do not desist from this task even for a twinkling of an eye. This is their work from pre-eternity to post-eternity. They are forever privileged with immutable

permanence of their substance, being exempt from all transformation and annihilation.'

[§486] On the Prophets and those endowed with the power to transmit revelation and divine inspiration (*aṣḥāb-i waḥy wa ilhām*), [these idolaters say]: 'They are the same as us in physical build, appearance and form; we share with them in all the same organs and limbs, in eating and drinking, in being clothed, in getting married, in suffering and happiness, poverty and wealth, weakness and strength, sickness and health, life and death, and so forth. Why, therefore, should we obey their orders and evaluate the probity of our affairs in both worlds according to their commandments and prohibitions? In order to attain nearness to God we prefer the mediation of spiritual beings; we appeal to them for intercession, and take refuge in them, before the Eternal (*ḥaḍrat-i ṣamadiyyat*).'

[§487] [They add]: 'We know that unless there is manifestly some correspondence and affinity between our souls and the spiritual beings, we can neither appeal to, nor take refuge in, them. And such similarity and affinity can only be achieved when we have purified our souls from all base characteristics and furnished them with laudable moral qualities. We also know that this refinement of character and morals cannot be achieved except through the assistance and help of such spiritual beings, and that this assistance and help cannot be acquired unless we assume a position of pious supplication and humble entreaty, and observe the necessary requirements involving ritual prayers, fasting, giving sacrifices, burning incense and recitation of incantations.'

[§488] 'When these conditions are fulfilled in this way,' [they say], 'we shall be endowed with the aptitude to achieve perfection, and our souls will achieve a correspondence and affinity with the spiritual beings. We can then betake ourselves to them, petitioning them for the sake of our needs, so that they, being our intercessors, mediators and lords before Him, the Eternal, the supreme Lord and Creator who provides both for us and them, may intercede for us, in order that through their intercession, our needs may be granted by the Eternal. Thus, our proximity to those spiritual beings will become nearness to their intellects; and from their intellects we advance to the First Intellect (*'aql-i awwal*), and from the First Intellect unto God Almighty.'

[§489] Those [of the second group] who come down from the [worship] of spiritual beings, to the [worship] of stars declare that:

'Although power and might belong solely to spiritual beings such that, by gaining proximity to them, we may approach the presence of the Eternal, each of the spiritual beings has a separate temple as a star, and each star has its own separate sphere. In this respect, the spiritual beings are like souls and stars are like their bodies. These stars, which are like bodies for those beings, are luminous, transparent temples, placed in a most exalted position. Their realm is that of being without corruption, fulfilment without desire, life without death, light without darkness, perfection without deficiency, existence without non-existence, stability without mutability, subsistence without annihilation, youth without age, health without sickness, power without weakness, and so forth. They undergo neither birth nor death, neither feel illness nor fatigue. Their existence stems from the primordial origination (*ibdāʿ*) of His Divine Command (*amr*). Their species is their very own individuality, and their individual being is their own species, for an eternity without end.'

[§490] 'It is these stars,' they say, 'which take precedence in intercession, not the Prophets, who are only human individuals (*ashkhāṣ-i basharī*) composed of four material elements like all other corporeal beings. Furthermore, the Prophets undergo birth and death, and are subject to illness and fatigue. Their realm is that of growth and decay, desire and fulfilment, life and death, light and darkness, perfection and deficiency, existence and non-existence, stability and mutability, subsistence and annihilation, youth and ageing, health and sickness, power and weakness, and so forth. No movement, whether in thought, word or deed, may proceed from them except by the power and grace of the almighty Divine Command, which comes to them through the mediation of [these] spiritual beings. Whatever the Prophets and other people say or do in this world has all been providentially predetermined by influences of the stars and movements of the celestial spheres, just as the horoscope of each person, whoever he may be, dictates.'

[§491] [The idolaters continue]: 'Now, if someone in this world reaches such a degree that he is recognised as a superior personality by the whole world, such that his perfection of eloquence and excellence in art seems utterly marvellous, and if you investigate the matter closely, [you will see] that this is the result of the auspicious influence of Mercury, which is the smallest planet in the whole sky. Nevertheless, with all his achievements, such a man may become incapacitated by a serious illness simply because of a slight vapour that touches his brain,

and he may even sometimes go insane. From the time that he is born of his mother until his death, he is always in a state of transformation and change. He is never safe, even for a twinkling of an eye, from dangers, misfortunes, calamities and tribulations. Therefore, for these reasons, we give preference to the intercession of heavenly bodies rather than of human individuals. Through these heavenly bodies we seek to approach their souls, and through their souls their intellect, and through their intellect the First Intellect, and through the First Intellect God Almighty.'

[§492] Those [of the third group] who come down from [the worship of] spiritual beings to their temples [the stars], and from these temples to idols, declare that: 'These temples that we approach in order to gain proximity to the spiritual beings are subject to rise and decline. Sometimes they are above and sometimes below the Earth. When they are above the Earth they are invisible during the day and visible at night, but when they are beneath the Earth they are hidden at night and visible during the day. At night when they are visible, sometimes a cloud or some other object such as an atmospheric change intervenes, and they become hidden from our eyes and we are veiled from them. That is the reason why we construct here, on Earth, an image made up of a substance which corresponds to each of these seven celestial temples respectively at an auspicious time when the will of heaven seems favourable.'

[§493] 'Accordingly,' [they maintain], 'one should make, for example, the image of Saturn out of lead, iron and hard stone; the image of Jupiter out of tin, white bronze and diamond; the image of Mars out of red stone and copper; the image of the Sun out of gold, ruby and amber; the image of Venus out of pearl, topaz and onyx; the image of Mercury out of turquoise, brass and manganese; and the image of the Moon out of silver, crystal and white stone.'

[§494] 'Furthermore,' [they add], we are well aware of what type of clothes [one should wear], which sort of ring with what sort of seal set in it [one should put on], what sort of perfume and incense, incantation and sacrifice is proper for each temple. While observing these conditions we seek to approach these idols whose characteristics we have described, then approaching their celestial temples, and from there approaching their souls, and from their souls to their intellects, and from their intellects to the First Intellect, and through the First Intellect to God Almighty.'

[§495] In order to repudiate the false vanity of such folk and to establish the truth of the matter, the followers of truth (*ahl-i ḥaqq*) have responded as follows: 'You have affirmed the nobility of the spiritual beings and we are in concord with you on this point, but you are not correct in accepting the direct mediation of spiritual beings and refusing human mediation. Apart from this, you are the victim of an extraordinarily amazing contradiction which you do not notice or feel. You believe that between creation and God Almighty, there must be an intermediary by means of which you can come near to Him, the Exalted One. So ponder well upon what you say regarding the intermediaries and that these are not human but rather pure spiritual beings, because as you will see, that which you negate results precisely in its affirmation, and that which you reject implies an acceptance.'

[§496] [The followers of truth say]: 'If there were nothing else but this – that is, if you suppose that this world, with the appearance it has of comprising celestial spiritual beings, spheres, planets, stars, the elements, minerals, plants, animals and so forth, each in its proper place, but without the existence of man – how then would it be possible for you to conceive the very order, splendour and edifice of the world, or make assertions regarding truth and falsehood, good and evil, body and spirit, origin and return, this world and the Hereafter? Can you [even] pronounce their names or not? Now, it is obvious that you cannot. Know then, that if this had been the case, if creation had been perfected like that without the coming of man into the world, then the creation of all living beings would have been in vain. We take refuge in God from this.'

[§497] 'Therefore,' [say the followers of truth], 'you must ponder the marvels of the power and wonder of His transcendent wisdom, so that you may realise that in the affairs of all created beings, be these of inferior or superior rank, there are so many hidden and astonishing states and subtle perfections that sublime intellects (*'uqūl-i mufāriq*) cannot comprehend beginning and end, and even the angels falter here in their meditations, being unable to explain and describe such things.'

[§498] 'It is quite right what you say, that human individuals, from their birth to the drawing of their final breath, are not safe or free from misfortunes, calamities, accidents, hardships, change and transformation, and that those spiritual beings and [their celestial] temples are independent and exalted beyond all such eventualities. However, you should realise that just as the creation of those spiritual beings and their

celestial temples – which are active agents (*fāʿilān*) and primordially originated beings (*āfarīnish-i ibdāʿī*) – [are eternal], so the human species incarnated in the individual human being – which is a passive sort of creation (*munfaʿil*) through various human individuals who are created temporally and corporeally – will endure eternally, from pre-eternity to post-eternity.'

[§499] 'However, these heavenly bodies, being luminous, immune from all impurities and change, are by virtue of their exterior appearance a means of illumination for [other] physical bodies and for the light of optical vision. On the other hand, each of the Prophets, although endowed with a body, a physical organism composed of base matter, [and subject to] misfortunes and calamities, they are, in the interior spirit, the cause of enlightenment of hearts and formal harmony of spirit. So one who is in spirit a cause of the enlightenment of hearts and the formal harmony of the spirit, is more noble and perfect than one who is merely the means of illumination of physical bodies and the light of optical vision.'

[§500] Divine wisdom has decreed that the things of this world that are precious and dear are derived from shabby things far removed from them in likeness. For example, gold and silver come from earth and stone, musk from the navel of the wild deer, amber from the excrement of aquatic beasts, honey from bees, sugar from cane, pearls from shells, silk from worms, linen from plants, and human beings from sperm.

[§501] All spiritual and physical beings, from the First Intellect down to the Universal Soul, from all the spheres down to the elements, are means and intermediaries, for man to come into existence from non-existence. And all these calamities, misfortunes, changes and transformations which necessarily affect man's situation are caused by heavenly influences and inauspicious stars that influence his horoscope. Saturn and Mars are respectively called the 'major maleficient star' and the 'minor maleficient star' because Saturn acts with extreme and severe coldness, while Mars acts with extreme and severe heat. But if it were not for the coldness of Saturn acting in combination with the coldness of the Moon and the activity of Venus, nothing would have solidified in this realm of growth and decay (*kawn wa fasād*); and if it were not for the heat of Mars acting in combination with the heat of the sun and [the activity] of Jupiter, nothing would have solidified, germinated and grown.

[§502] Jupiter and Venus are respectively called the 'major beneficent star' and the 'minor beneficent star' because if one were to imagine their action and influence on the creation of a child without the participation of the two inauspicious stars [Saturn and Mars] as well as other stars, it would be necessary to imagine [a child] without bones, nerves, sinews, ligaments, blood, colour, skin, hair, and in fact without any organs at all. Thus, divine wisdom has decreed that each one of these things should be associated with one of these stars, and were it not necessary as a result of this that every drop of sperm which travels from the loins to the womb be a complete creation, God Almighty would have negated His own wisdom. The celestial influence of the planets' operations, which are regulators of the divine order [in the world] and by mediation of which the creatures of the physical world are caused, would have been rendered null and void. It is thus that God Almighty – according to the [Qur'ān], '*He shall not be questioned as to what He does, but they will be questioned*' (21: 23) – preserves the celestial portion and fate [of each being] according to His will and predetermination.

[§503] That which comes into existence and that which disappears into non-existence, he who lives a long and happy life blessed with good fortune, and he who lives a short life afflicted with adversity – in each of these situations lies a marvellous mystery concealed and a wonderful directive hidden, as is well-known to those of discerning intelligence (*ahl-i khirad*) and understanding.

[§504] Now, each person, from the most humble to the most noble, is characterised by a different constitution, nature, profession, speciality, external and internal form, deficiency and perfection, vice and virtue, malady and well-being, strength and weakness. The existence of some people is a cause of order, creative inspiration, glory and splendour to this world, while that of others is a cause of careful reckoning [of their folly and grief], and of awakening from the sleep of heedlessness and the slumber of ignorance.

[§505] All these calamities, misfortunes, disasters and mishaps, if seen from the angle of reality, are but forms of God's all-embracing mercy, so that people in this world will not be overtaken with hubris, nor become afflicted with pride by the ridiculous vanities and garish ornaments of the deceitful devil in this perishable abode. It is by such [calamities] that arrogance, the spirit of rebellion, pride, sin and self-forgetfulness do not gain mastery over them, and it is through the descent

[of such misfortunes] that they do not turn away from God Almighty, thus falling into the infernal abyss of satanic passions and desires.

[§506] If people in this world were not seized by poverty and destitution, they would never conceive the idea of adopting a profession or a craft in order to obtain their livelihood; they would not subject bodies and souls to pains, and no worldly intelligence (*ʿaql-i maʿīshatī*) would ever be perfected. And if life's vicissitudes were not there to polish the soul – according to the saying, 'God be praised who has made misfortune to be the polisher of the free-born'[182] – no intelligence of the Resurrection and the Hereafter (*ʿaql-i qiyāmatī-yi ākhiratī*) would ever evolve from potentiality to actuality.

[§507] God Almighty bestows good health upon his creatures so that, by possessing physical well-being, they may apprehend and contemplate His bounties and blessings and take their daily bread and allotted sustenance from the good provision that He has granted them, and so that they can occupy themselves with His works, performing their duty in the path of God Almighty, rendering praise and giving thanks unto Him – may His Name be magnified!

[§508] He sends illness upon them so that their sins may be expiated, and that through the entreaties and supplications that they make to His august sublime presence (*janāb-i ʿizzat-i ṣamadiyyat*), the burden of their errors and iniquities might be made lighter, and so that the inclination of their souls towards repentance and contrition, and their offering of thanks and praise to Him – Exalted be His name – might increase, and also that the extent of their reliance upon God and certitude in God might be amplified.

[§509] [The Prophet has said], 'My God has commanded me to make my speech a commemoration, my silence a meditation and my vision an indication.'[183] The meaning of this saying is that my Lord has commanded me to make my speech a commemoration of the perfection of the knoweldge of the hereafter (*kamāl-i ʿilm-i ākhirat*), my silence a meditation upon the origin and the return (*mabdaʾ wa maʿād*) of this world and the hereafter, and my vision an indication of the marvels of creation and the Command (*khalq wa amr*).'

[§510] As for the enduring of misfortunes, calamities, hardships and adversity, there is a great difference between someone who has no choice in the face of these troubles and someone who does. For it is not so surprising that when someone who has no choice whatsoever between

two activities, one of which is extremely easy and the other extremely difficult, he demonstrates endurance in the face of hardship. It is otherwise for someone who is able to exercise his free will (*ikhtiyār*) regarding these two conditions [by choosing the difficult task].

[§511] One of the extraordinary aspects of man's patience before adversity and his endurance of misfortune is that the greater his misfortune and the more hurtful the calamity which afflict him, the stronger becomes his faith in God Almighty and his certainty that therein lies his salvation in both worlds. The substance of his soul melts in the crucible of tribulation, so that all its impurities and deficiencies disappear, all his dross is consumed away in the fire, and he is left like refined and purified gold.

[§512] Here, one may adduce the example of an impotent man who is neither capable of performing sexual intercourse nor feels any pleasure from it. For the impotent man does not freely renounce the pleasure of intercourse; on the contrary, it is a condition by which he is constrained against his will. [In contrast], there is the situation of a young man who abstains from sex due to his moral rectitude, uprightness and the refined character of his ethics, of which one quality is breaking the power of passion, fearing God and being scrupulous to observe His will.

[§513] The full extent of the various states which confront man during the passage of time and the rapid sequence of days and nights, each of which is ever new – such that their novelty manifests so many marvels of God's power and wondrous displays of His wisdom, each better than the last – is beyond number and measure – except to Him who is aware of all the mysteries and secret realities [of creation] (*'ālim al-sirr wa al-khafiyyāt*) and comprehends all these many perspectives.

[§514] One proof of man's being the final cause and ultimate purpose of all existence in this world is the fact that the adage, 'At first there is the thought, at last the action,'[184] pertains exclusively to man. Take the example of one who desires to have a bench to sit upon. He first prepares the wood, which is the material cause (*'illat-i hayūlānī*), then he finds a skilled person [a carpenter] who is the efficient cause (*'illat-i fā'ilī*). The carpenter will then determine the shape of the chair, which is the formal cause (*'illat-i ṣūrī*), with the final cause (*'illat-i ghāyī*) being the sitting of the man on that chair. This shows that although the bench only came into existence after the wood and the carpenter and the man could sit on the bench only when it was made, the intention to make the bench and

to sit on it was the first thing. Man's situation, his precedence in the rank of nobility and his posteriority in time over other creatures, is exactly the same, because although he comes into existence after several physical and spiritual intermediaries, he was, from the very beginning, the ultimate aim and purpose of all creation.

[§515] One obvious proof that this is the reality of the situation is the fact that when the effusive grace of the Divine Command (*fayḍ-i amr*) fell upon the First Intellect, it did not halt there, but provoked the existence of another type of being, that is, the Universal Soul. Likewise, when it [the Command] fell from the First Intellect upon the Universal Soul, it did not halt there either, but provoked another type of existence, that is, the spheres. And when it fell from the Universal Soul upon the spheres, it did not halt there either, but provoked another type of existence, that is, the elements. And when it fell from the spheres upon the elements, it did not halt there either but provoked another type of existence, that is, the natural kingdoms. And [similarly], when it fell from the natural kingdoms upon the minerals, it did not halt there, but provoked another type of existence, that is, the plant kingdom. When it fell upon the plant kingdom, it did not stop there either, but provoked another type of existence, that is, the animal kingdom. And when it fell upon the animal kingdom, it did not stop there, but provoked another type of existence, that is, humanity. But when it fell upon man, it stopped there, for the furthest reach and terminus of creation was sealed with him. Thus, man is a compendium (*majmū'ī*) of all these stages and perfections, bearing within himself a likeness of the entire cosmos, which is expressed by the marvels of his physical constitution and the amazing composition of his soul. On the other hand, pure spiritual beings [such as angels], are left in possession of only one single perfection.

[§516] And so, since man is in the position of a manifestation (*maẓhar*) of the mysteries of the heaven and earth and a compendium of the effects of both worlds, he is ennobled and adorned with all these physical and spiritual perfections. Through the influence of his spiritual soul (*nafs-i rūḥānī*), the concomitants of his physical organism acquire an even greater excellence through the benefits that his bodily and physical affairs afford him.

[§517] So, it is clear that every quiddity (*māhiyyat*) which proceeds from a source (*maṣdar*) in the transcendent realm (*mala' al-a'lā*) possesses a manifestation in this world. Since the intellect originates in man

and reaches its perfection in him, the manifestation of the First Intellect is situated where man is. Thus, we see that intelligent people are different and distinguished by various degrees of intelligence, one intellect being necessarily superior to another, until the point is reached where one may find an intelligent person who knows everything without recourse to instruction. He deduces the realities of things by reference to his own soul and needs nobody and nothing apart from, and outside of, his self, aside from the divine assistance (*ta'yīd*) of the theophanic manifestation of the sublime Word (*maẓhar-i kalima-yi a'lā*), which lies above him. He is perfect in his own essence and a cause of perfection in others. Thus, we can apprehend that he is a manifestation of the First Intellect.

[**§518**] All these created beings have a point of origin and a final perfection. We can also comprehend that God Almighty has granted them existence for the sake of realising perfection, that their origination (*mabda'*) was for the sake of their return [to the divine source]. Hence, it must be that the chain of being (*silsila-yi wujūd*) will attain its return [to the divine source] where its termination lies, just as it commenced there where its source lies. Now, we know that this chain of being does not attain its end in either spiritual beings nor in heavenly temples and celestial spheres, nor in the natural elements, nor in minerals, plants or animals, but rather in the intellect of the person of man, and thus it returns to where it started from. And Godspeed to you.

Colophon

These words were written at the end of the book *Rawḍa-yi taslīm* in the noble handwriting of the king of the world's *dā'ī*s and master of created beings, Naṣīr al-Dawla wa al-Dīn (Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī), chosen by the lord of the worlds (*ikhtiyār mawlā al-'ālamīn*) – may our lord exalt him:

> 'On Tuesday in the middle of the month of Shawwāl in the year 640 [7th April 1243]; and in the presence of the great master, chief of the *dā'ī*s, Ṣalāḥ al-Dawla wa al-Dīn, master compiler of both poetry and prose (*munshī-yi jahān mubdi' al-naẓm wa al-nathr*), Ḥasan-i Maḥmūd – may his eminence continue – who is the compiler *jāmi'* of these highly useful, original, precious and incomparable themes of the mission (*da'wat*), an occasion occurred to read the whole of this book and, in accordance with our aptitude, certain benefits were obtained. We beseech our lord (*mawlānā*), to bestow upon

him and other devotees of the rightly-guiding mission (*da'wat-i hādiya*), success in the accomplishment of meritorious deeds and acts of kindness. May God accept this prayer for all: O Lord, cause us to benefit from what You have taught us, and [teach us] what is to our benefit by the grace of the Chosen One [Muḥammad] from among His servants.'

This is the handwriting of the most needful creature in God's creation,
Muḥammad al-Ṭūsī.[185] This copy was finished [in the year] 968.
12 Rabī' II, 968 [31st December 1560].

Annex[1]

[1] On the nature of spiritual union

Khwāja Muḥammad Bāsaʿīd was saying:[2] 'There are people who say, "We have abandoned ourselves; we have completely surrendered ourselves to our lord (*mawlānā*); we do not possess an identity apart from him; he is everything. Thus, whatever we say or do, all our speech and action are his," and many more strange things, which they say with their tongues but do not put into action.' When this question was submitted to the judgement of His Holiness (*ra'y-i jahān-ārā-yi muqaddas*) – may his name be glorified – he responded as follows:

Tell Khwāja Muḥammad [Bāsaʿīd] that if those who have used our name in this way – who claim 'so-and-so is all and everything', and [who say] in their own words, 'all our being is [our] lord (*khudāwand*) Muḥammad,[3] our very self is him, we have no separate existence in between, he is everything' – even though they take our name, yet say and do this kind of thing, the Ismailis not only will not listen to them, but they may think it lawful to stone them to death because of this behaviour and these words that issue from their tongues. They make of our name a snare whereby they waylay weak believers and induce them to turn their face away from our Lord and His summons. But since you have said that you asked this question for your own [spiritual] benefit, a few words shall be said for your sake, so that you may attain peace of mind, and so that you may realise the nature of real union (*ittiḥād-i ḥaqīqī*).

First, you should know that there are two worlds: the world of creation (*ʿālam-i khalqī*) and the divine world (*ʿālam-i khudā'ī*), and there are two rules (*ḥukm*), one corresponding to relative being (*ʿālam-i iḍāfī*) which is that of religious law (*sharīʿat*), and the other corresponding to the world hereafter, which is the world of Divine Reality (*ʿālam-i ḥaqīqī-yi khudā'ī*) and called the Resurrection (*qiyāmat*). Now there are two rulers: one who addresses the needs [of] the world of relativity, legalistic religion and creation (*sharʿī-yi khalqī*), who deals with conduct appropriate to the world of creatures and creation, [and] he is called a Prophet; the other ruler deals with the world of true spiritual sovereignty, and he is called the Resurrector (*qā'im*).

For one [ruler], religion consists in the saying, 'Discourse to the

people about religion,' [for example, about] '*the Merciful, the Compassionate, the Master of the Day of Judgement*' (1: 3–4), while for another the ultimate goal [is concerned with] the aim of religion which is the Resurrection. Now, one must in the first place set out on the way in order to reach the destination; one must begin with religious law to reach the Resurrection; begin with the exoteric (*ẓāhir*) to reach the esoteric (*bāṭin*); begin with prophetic revelation (*tanzīl*) to reach spiritual exegesis (*ta'wīl*), begin with the literal word (*lafẓ*) to reach the meaning (*ma'nā*), and start from the beginning to reach the end:

How can men arrive at the meaning,
Without passing through the names?[4]

Now, the created world is called [the realm of] religious law, multiplicity and relativity, and the divine world is called the realm of truth, unity and resurrection. These two worlds are indispensable for human beings. In any case, as long as human beings are not manifested in this world of creation, where '*From man and woman has been scattered abroad a multitude of men and women*' (4: 1), they cannot attain to the divine world, since man is the offspring of both these worlds.

We may, in this context, take an example which is quite near to the conditions of both these realms of being and worlds, both in respect to the body (*jism*) and the spirit (*rūḥ*). Being in his body, man is the child of the corporeal world, while in his spirit, he is the child of the spiritual world. Just as nurture of the body depends upon things appropriate to the body, so care of the soul depends upon things appropriate to the soul. Just as the body cannot grow without physical nourishment, so the soul will disintegrate and will not survive without suitable nourishment. Inevitably, if the soul cannot obtain suitable nourishment, it will not nurture itself properly, and so abominable and satanic behaviour will become manifest from it.

In the same context, it can be said that human beings possess two faculties: one enabling them, by means of the physical sun, to distinguish shapes and colours; and the other enabling them, by means of the spiritual sun, to differentiate between truth and falsehood, the true and the false claimants. The faculty that perceives physical shapes and colours of sensory objects is called 'physical sight' (*bāṣira-yi jismānī*), and the faculty that comprehends the praiseworthy and the blameworthy, truth and

falsehood, good and evil, is called 'intellectual sight' (*bāṣira-yi 'aqlānī*).

The outward, material sun illuminates one's physical vision so that one may see things by means of it, and the world may unfold itself before one's vision. The sun of the spiritual realm (*āftāb-i 'ālam-i rūḥānī*) illuminates one's spiritual vision, which is called 'the soul's rational faculty' (*quwwat-i nāṭiqa-yi nafsānī*), through which can be differentiated good from evil, the truthful master (*muḥiqq*) from the false pretender, and truth from falsehood.

If the physical sight is not united with the light of the physical sun, it will not perceive at all, but when it is united this does not mean that this eye is identical with the sun. If it is maintained that when the eye has united with the sun, it is identical with it, the eye should be able to see the things without the sun – but that is not the case. The power of the beholder's eye in itself, in relation to the strength that it may possess, depends on light. But the sun, which illuminates the world and its inhabitants, has no need of the sight of this or any other person. If you were to assemble together an infinite power of vision from all the people of all the worlds, all these eyes would not be [equal to] the sun, for all these eyes without the sun have no sight at all.

Now, when a person's power of vision becomes united with the light of the sun of the real world (*āftāb-i 'ālam-i ḥaqīqī*),[5] such that by his light and through him, he can distinguish between truth and falsehood, the truthful master from the false pretender, this is not to say that he has attached himself [independently] to the light of gnosis (*nūr-i ma'rifat*).

Just as the corporeal eye without physical sunlight is not the sun, but rather possesses its vision through the sunlight, thereby being joined to its light, and is blind if its vision is veiled from sunlight, so also it is the same with the [spiritual vision], which if it is not attached to that [spiritual sun], cannot distinguish truth from falsehood.

The indication that one's vision is conjoined to the physical sun is that nothing veils one's sight. In this sense, the earth's shadow is the veil of the physical sun, or else a dark house or a shadow cast by clouds can become a veil. Likewise, the veil that separates one from the sun of the world of faith (*āftāb-i 'ālam-i dīn*) is that of our passions which separates us from that light of the sun of faith. Just as the sign that one is effectively conjoined, that is, united, with the sunlight is that clouds do not occlude themselves before him, such that his eyesight is conjoined with the limpidity of its light, so the sign of conjunction (*paywastan*) and

union (*ittiḥād*) with the real light of the world of religion (*āftāb-i 'ālam-i ḥaqīqī-yi dīnī*) consists in the total elimination of passions and complete submission (*taslīm*) to [the spiritual light].

The speech and action of such a person should be in harmony with his [i.e. the spiritual sun's] command and will, so that the person's speech is his discourse and his action is his action, to the degree that all his actions are determined by his command and will. And when this occurs, it is exactly as if his physical eyesight has been all at once united with the pure light of the sun, no longer curtained by any veil. Thus, all the veils of the world and its infernal passions having been rent aside, he has been united with [or illumined by] the pure sunlight of the world of faith.

As long as a person has not completely subordinated his self and his desires to the command and will of the sunlight of the spiritual world, and as long as both he and his worldly nature, that is, his passions, have not been annihilated, he will not be able to reach the purity of the light of love and gnosis (*nūr-i ma'rifat wa maḥabbat*). That is what [spiritual] union is like: 'I have chosen the will of 'Alī over my own desire.'[6] Such a person never says, 'I have united myself with 'Alī and his unity in both personality and appearance.'

You see your own eye, you see the sun, and you know that the power of your sight proceeds from the sun. So how can you say, 'I myself am the sun'? As long as you see yourself as a person endowed with a bodily shape and form, coming and going, talking, performing some action; as long as there is love within you, drawing its strength and sustenance from the light of gnosis cast by the divine sun (*āftāb-i rabbānī*), then in the same way that he who beholds with the physical eye cannot confess himself to be the sun, so he who beholds with the sunlight of the spiritual world cannot claim, 'I am the sun of the spiritual world.'

Indeed, you are non-existent in yourself and existent through Him. Likewise, the physical eye is blind in itself but only endowed with vision through His light. But the eye is not itself 'Him', but rather constantly in union with 'Him' – [it is] not itself 'Him'. Without Him, the eye can neither see nor know.

It is in this context that some 'discerning *ghulāts*' (*ghulāt-i muḥaqqiq*)[7] have declared that the basic foundation and aim [of religion] is the light of gnosis and love for the Imam of the time (*imām-i zamān*) which has been vouchsafed to us through the divine mercy. 'So, let us,' [they say], 'burn up the body that acts like a veil before that light of gnosis

and love, so that the veil may be cast aside, leaving only the light of love and gnosis, by means of which we may unite ourselves with him. When the veil of the self is removed, the light of love and gnosis will remain, which is he himself.'

They spoke like this, but they did not [go as far as] saying that each of us is him [i.e. the Imam], nor [did they] assert, gesturing with their bare hands, that 'he himself does this deed'. People [who say such things] are called 'literalist *ghulāts*' (*ghulāt-i hashawī*). The difference between discerning and literalist *ghulāts* is that while the former drown themselves in the light of gnosis, the latter [seek to] submerge the Divine in themselves. And so it is that some of them assert that, 'We are ourselves him; whatever we say, do or think is his doing.' A more obvious sort of impiety and more ignominious form of ungodly associationism (*shirk*) than this does not exist! We seek refuge from this in God. May God protect us and grant us all a goodly retribution in the end. For God is the provider of the reward of those who do good.

[2] On the hierarchy of spiritual knowledge

O God, our Lord!

It has been said: 'Just as the gnosis of God in reality depends on the man of God (*mard-i khudā*), so the recognition of the Imam in reality depends on the man of the Imam (*mard-i imām*),' and so on. This statement is not true in an absolute sense; otherwise it would imply that the man of the Imam can only be recognised through another man and so forth, until it ends up in infinite regress.

What should be known, to put it briefly, is that everyone possesses a different degree in gnosis, as is stated in the Qur'ān: '*And none of us is there, but has a known station*' (37: 164). The highest station [of gnosis] is that one knows God through God (*khudā rā bi-khudā shināsand*):[8] '*God bears witness that there is no God but He*' (3: 18). This station can only be that of the man of God, who is the manifestation (*maẓhar*) of the Divine Command (*amr*) and the Word (*kalima*) of God and the mediator (*mutawwasiṭ*) between God and creation – such that, with the face that he has towards God, he can recognise God, and with the face that he has towards people, he can cause people to reach God, so that through his gnosis they become cognisant of God.

Since the Divine Command and the Word are from the realm of

Unity – '*And Our command is but one*' (54: 50) – the man of God will always be that unique truthful master who does not and cannot have any partner or like in the world: '*He is one without a partner*' (6: 163).

After this, the next station is to know God through the man of God. This may be the rank and degree of the *bāb*s (gates) and the supreme *ḥujjat*s (proofs), who are manifestations of the First Intellect and First Effect (*ma'lūl-i awwal*).[9] They are also the first receivers, so that whatever they accept from the first man (*mard-i awwal*), they cause to reach other human beings. Since there is only one mediator between them and God, they know God through that mediator. And because multiplicity (*kathrat*) is potentially embedded in the First Effect, the number of people who hold this class in every age can be more than one. However, during the time when the Imam of the Age (*imām-i waqt*) – may salutations ensue upon mention of him – manifests himself, this community of adepts [i.e., *bāb*s and *ḥujjat*s] are concealed like stars at the moment of sunrise; they only reveal themselves during a period of concealment (*rūzgār-i satr*).[10]

Beneath this station, there are stations of multiple degrees which pertain to the ranks within the community (*maqāmhā-yi jamā'atī*). Between them and God there are several mediators. The spiritual knowledge (*ma'rifat*) of this community lies in the fact that each person, according to the station he possesses, is cognisant of the spiritual knowledge of his own teacher in such a manner that the form of his soul is identical with that which is in his teacher's soul.[11] So, ultimately all acts of cognition are united by the cognition of the one who is truly cognisant (*'ārif-i bi-ḥaqīqat*), that is, the man of God: '*And to Him are returned all affairs*' (11: 123).

The worship of each group is in proportion to their gnosis of God because, as has been mentioned in the *Fuṣūl-i muqaddasa*,[12] just as there exists a kind of gnosis which is total (*kullī*) and real (*ḥaqīqī*), and one which is relative (*iḍāfī*) and partial (*juzwī*), so worship (*ṭā'at*) is correspondingly either total and real or partial and relative. And Godspeed to you.

Appendix

A Philosophical Commentary

Christian Jambet
(translated by Hafiz Karmali)

The title of this treatise, *Rawḍat al-taslīm*, literally means 'The Garden of Submission'. One must not be misled by the literal meaning of the word *taslīm* as 'submission' or 'obedience'. If there is total obedience, it is not based on the acceptance of religious legislation and on blind respect for its prescriptions. Submission is recognition of the Imam, the Resurrector (*qā'im*), and by this minor adjustment from legislation to the bearer of effective-reality (*ḥaqīqat*), the enunciator of the Resurrection (*qiyāmat*), the very meaning of the act of obedience and its significance is radically altered.

This is not to say that obedience is less strict, less rigorous; on the contrary, *taslīm* demands total abandonment of oneself, self-effacement, a fierce battle against one's ego, a battle which is at the heart of moral duties which seek to enable the faithful to welcome, as if his very own, the will of the Imam. Unconditional obedience is not based on the revelation of a clear law before which man would have to renounce the freedom of his wishes, but on that of freedom, infinite freedom of the Resurrector, a freedom which the Resurrector transmits to the faithful by his summons or convocation (*da'wat*), which demands total obedience of he whom it enjoins to transcend legalitarian religion.

In the Imam of the Resurrection, the loyal-faithful (*mu'min*) does not encounter the otherness of law but the identity of a freedom by which he alienates the very principle of his own alienation, his egoism

and concern with self. The interchangeability of complete freedom and of obedience, as a consequence, dissuades us from translating *taslīm* as submission. It is the original disposition of man, whose nature (*fiṭrat*) is the purely spiritual link to his primordial Originator or Existentiator (*Mubdiʿ*), a link that predisposes to free will (*ikhtīyār*). Free will is never more itself than in absolute obedience to the Imam, never further from itself than the apparent liberty to do what free will dictates.

The Ismaili notion of *taslīm* differs profoundly from *ʿubūda*, a notion for which Michael Chodkiewicz so eminently provided an exegesis in one of his interpretations of Ibn ʿArabi: '*ʿUbūda*, servitude, is the indelible status of the created.'[2] The servant of the Imam exercises an obedience as all-encompassing as possible, to the extent that the very indelible status of his being, at the origin of his own existentiation into the world, is freedom.

The ultimate basis of *taslīm* is *ḥaqīqat*, the Real itself, and not *sharīʿat*, the prophetic law which is considered a veil. De-emphasising *sharīʿat*, the Ismailism of Alamūt envisions a personal realisation of the Resurrection, which awakens in the loyal-faithful an effective reality. The faithful moves from the creaturely and relative condition to substantive being and absolute condition. It is indeed a process of human divinisation, of returning to the One (origin and principle of the Perfect Man), in such a manner that, by testifying to the Word (*kalima*) of God manifested in human form, man enables redemption of the Divine Imperative (*amr*) itself.

Such is the grand providential plan that Ismaili gnosis designates by the expression *ḥaqīqat-i dīn* (true meaning of religion), a term which *taslīm* encompasses. *Taslīm* is true faith, which is why one may also translate the title as 'The Garden of True Faith'.

1. The paradoxical One

Tawḥīd

The sum total of the types of knowledge presented by Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī in this treatise, such as the metaphysical deductions, has only one objective: to profess the authentic Oneness of God (*tawḥīd*). This presupposes a spiritual interpretation of the exoteric *tawḥīd* [§3, 429–33]. Ismaili exegesis sees in the declaration of faith, *Lā ilāha illa'l-Lāh*, 'There

is no deity except God', a double negation. The first negation refers to the word 'divinity' (*lā ilāha*). The great Ismaili *dā'i* Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-Kirmānī (d. after 411/1020) explains that this negation corresponds to one of the two paths that one may follow to attain the truth of *tawḥīd*: the negative path which consists of denying all the attributes of the ipseity, the essential reality, of the One.[3] To say 'There is no deity' is, therefore, to deny that the divine ipseity should be the subject of attribution. *Lā ilāha* is synonymous with *lā mawṣūf*: God is not a subject of inherence; He does not receive a predicate.

One must be wary of believing that negation refers to the divine ipseity itself and that it entails dispossessing God of all essence – this would be the act we designate by the term *ta'ṭīl*, the act of dispossessing God of all functions. To avoid such radical agnosticism, a distinction is made between ipseity and attributes, subject and predicates. By the first negation, *lā ilāha*, the Divine Reality frees itself from all predication, from all affirmation. He is above all His Names. The second negation, *illa'l-Lāh*, entails denying that He be subject of non-attribution. It would therefore read: *la huwa lā mawṣūf*, 'not He subject of non-attribution'. The pre-eminent exalted ipseity, above names and attributes, is in turn subject to negation in such a manner that the negative theology is reversed: it is the One attested to by the second negation that bears the Divine Names (*asmā al-ḥusnā*) and all of the revealed attributes. Whereas the first negation maintains the inaccessibility of the divine ipseity, the second negation permits the epiphany of the One in the names and attributes. Thus, the role of the epiphanies of the One is to typify the inaccessibility of what they manifest.

We propose to designate the ipseity of the Divine Principle under the rubric of *L'Un paradoxal* (the paradoxical One). By this term we mean to recall that the One is not an existent, nor is He the being of the existent. In short, the One is not, absolutely speaking, anything that might present itself in the guise of being. Moreover, He is not even one, since the name of 'the One' will be appropriate only for the epiphany of the ipseity, only to the real Name of the Real. But if we attest that 'the One' is the appropriate name for the manifestation of the Real, we ought to bear in mind what part of this manifestation is the revelation of the un-revealable, that there is no synthesis between what is manifested and what manifests it.

In fact, we learn that there are two kinds of *tawḥīd*. What Naṣīr

al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī calls the exoteric *tawḥīd* corresponds to an affirmative theology, that is, naming God and recognising in Him the creative Principle. This is the general consensus of the common people, the *ahl-i mushābahat* (people of similitude). They lack the second *tawḥīd*, the esoteric *tawḥīd*, that which is conceived by the *ahl-i mubāyanat* (people of distinction), who know that those who believe have a *walī*, a Guardian-Lord. That is to say, without their acknowledgement of the Resurrector – the human manifestation of the Word (*kalima*), the locus of the Divine Imperative (*amr*) – their first attestation of the One, dark in illusion, is incapable of proceeding to the double negation. The exotericists assign the name of 'Creator' to the divine ipseity itself and consequently divest Him of His status of first theophany. For the esotericists, this name is appropriate only for the One who is *not* the paradoxical One; or rather, it is apt for what makes the paradoxical link – link without link, pure imperative liaison – between the One who *is-not* and the One who *is*, what the Ismailis name *ibdā'*, 'primordial origination', or 'eternal existentiation' [to use Henry Corbin's term]. And that is why the obvious sense of what the Qur'an says of God, that '*He is the Guardian-Lord (mawlā) of those who believe*' (47:11) does not apply really to the paradoxical One, but to His manifestation in the Resurrector.

This fusion between the attestation of the name of God and that of the Resurrector is accompanied by another essential thesis, without which it would be pure *tashbīh*, associating the created with the Divine Essence: it is impossible to name the paradoxical One. This impossibility immediately implies the necessity to name: that which we can say, we must say. That is why the Resurrector's name offers itself to the naming of what is above and beyond the names [§435–38]. As the Real is indescribable and not demonstrable, it is necessary to grasp it, not in itself as such, but in the manifestation of the primordial origination in the human locus of the Divine Imperative, the Resurrector. There is a merging of radical apophatism [negative theology] and the doctrine of epiphany here.

True *tawḥīd* consists, therefore, of first attesting to the pure ineffability of the Divine Principle and, at the same time, attesting to its manifestation in the man of God. There is an intimate solidarity between these two degrees of *tawḥīd*, in such a manner that it becomes impossible to escape from *ta'ṭīl* (agnosticism), if one does not recognise the Resurrector – just as it is impossible to escape *tashbīh* (associationism) if one does not accompany recognition of the Resurrector, with attestation of

the indescribable One. The Resurrector manifests that which withdraws itself from all manifestation; he is the affirmation of radical negation itself. That is why the apophatic approach, corresponding to the first negation, which enables the spirit to apprehend the Real negatively, is in proportion to the powerlessness of the spirit to rise to the Real itself, to its infinity. This powerlessness is redeemed by the second approach which redirects it to the supra-rational essence of the Imam of the Resurrection, whom it is necessary to recognise and whose recognition is the *da'wat*, the 'summons', the 'convocation' itself. It is only due to our powerlessness that we distinguish between these two approaches. In truth, they are but one expression of the real unity of *tawḥīd*, and it is in this sense that it is possible to say (with the tradition) that 'Knowledge of God is knowledge of the Imam of the time.'

Dualism

We observe that dualism, which postulates the existence of two principles, one of good and the other of evil, is the object itself of a complex two-fold process [§2–8, 114–16]. First of all, dualism is denounced as a false doctrine, by virtue of arguments drawn from the classical arsenal of Muslim authors. This has a precise aim: to revive from the dualist hypothesis, though false in itself, two categories which will play an eminent role in the ontology of Alamūt Ismailism: the concepts of *tarratub* (gradation) and *taḍādd* (opposition).

Let us reconstitute Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī's intellectual approach and reasoning. The adherents of dualism must either affirm equality of the two principles and thus institute an original opposition, or subordinate one to the other, which would institute their gradation. Thus, the rational result of the dualist hypothesis is to establish either opposition or a graded order. However, one must declare that as the only necessary Principle, the indescribable and ineffable One transcends both categories that emanate from it. If dualism is false, dualitude is very real and true; it opposes darkness and light, where the opposition will be the category of all that which is incompatible with the attestation of the Real, and refuses to accept gradation or hierarchies of emanation.

Dualitude is secondary; it derives from the primordial origination issued from the Real, and it assumes this origination prior to itself. As for opposition, the dual conflict can only express the indescribability of

the paradoxical Real which grants it the real existence of the origination, and it can only be overcome by the final triumph of the Resurrector. After the refutation follows, therefore, the re-establishment of dualitude, re-established in its own right, not instead or in place of the attestation of the One, but as one of the major consequences of this attestation.

Let us measure the scale of what is at work in this deduction. The Real only reveals itself to the extent that it at first veils itself; it unveils the essential reality of the One. From there, as Ṭūsī's treatise tells us, 'He is He and not He, thus He is He' [§7], an enigmatic statement whose mystery may be solved only on the condition of reading that the identity of 'He' – name without name, pure pronoun by which the divine ipseity designates itself – attests itself on the basis of the radical non-identity of He from He. The difference, better still the contradiction, establishes the identity when it is a question of He. 'He' is the name of the undifferentiated, of the above and beyond the principle of Reason. 'Nothing' prevents the attainment, by the path of naming, of the pure unity, since this does not have the figure of 'nothing' which conceives it like the whole, like the whole existent, like the whole of the existents, like the unifying One. The Real is paradoxical unity, above and beyond distinction and similitude, above and beyond synonymy and homonymy, the radical undifferentiating of all that derives from the manifestation, from origination. The Real is also radical distinction, the principle of division in two, of absolute separation. Distinction and similitude, light and darkness, imperative and creation, law and resurrection, oppressors and men at liberty – all these pairs of opposites originate in the supra-essential power of the Real, which is called 'One' only on the condition of barring from this One a negation which situates it, simultaneously, in the difference with oneself.

It appears, therefore, that the original difference – the Real opening itself, which constitutes its only unity, its sole identity – allows dualitude to re-institute itself. The error of the dualists is to situate dualitude at the level of the first Principle. The two terms, connected in two contrary principles located at the sources of good and evil, when submitted to logical analysis, do not avoid cancelling each other out. If, however, we place them as consequences of the Principle, they rediscover their force. Gradation and opposition are the main categories, no less essential than the completed and the inchoate, which will suffice to deploy the entire regime of ontological manifestation.

The order of gradation refers first to the origination and emanation of the superior existents of Intellect, Soul and Nature. This requires a doctrine, that of the Imperative.

The Word or Imperative

Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī distinguishes two 'points of view' drawn from the reality of the first Principle: the point of view of *mabdaʾ* (origin) and that of *maʿād* (return). 'Origin' or beginning designates the created condition of man, when he is yet incapable of intellective distinction. 'Return' signifies perfection, completion, the accomplishment of distinction and unification of man, his return to the Unique [§225–33].

According to the 'origin', the point of view of the created world, we apprehend the first Principle by the affirmative path, whereas according to the point of view of the 'return', the completed in the form of eternity, we proceed according to the negative path, divesting Him of all that would not be able to belong to His effective-reality (*ḥaqīqat*). It is really what spiritual exegesis (*taʾwīl*) reveals by the expression *Allāhu-akbar*, 'God is Greater' [§429–32]. The utterance and purely exoteric comprehension of these words entails that the Principle be attached to the level of the Supreme, the 'greater' Being whose name is Allāh. However, this is to confuse the paradoxical unity of the Principle with positive nomination which must, by the merciless negation of all positive nominations, be relegated to the level of the First Intellect.

According to the point of view of the 'return', which is the hidden meaning, the expression means that He is such that He will always be greater than what would herein be attested. His greatness is pure eminence, such that it will be more infinite than the infinite Being itself. The infinity of the Principle is always growing, an infinite such that it will be above and beyond the most powerful infinity that one might ever conceive. Thus, the primordial One is above and beyond His very own infinity, an infinite above and beyond all unity that might assign a name to His infinity.

The notion of 'points of view' is critical. It is inseparable from contemplation of the Real and it establishes the pervasive docetism of Nasīr al-Dīn Tūsī. It appears for the first time, in plain clarity, in *Taṣawwur* 3 [§30–36], where it enables one to avoid the difficulties created by the law of emanation: 'From the One can proceed only one.'

(i) There is a 'point of view' of the First Intellect on the Principle, which expresses the very essence of the Intellect and consequently its true place in the process of emanation. The point of view taken on the One expresses the procession of the Intellect from the Imperative, the Divine Command (*amr*). To the extent that the Intellect is the absolute One, the infinite-in-activity of all essences and effective-realities proceeding from the primordial origination, its point of view taken on the One which *is-not* consists of attesting to the unity; to say, by its own being as the Universal Intellect in the immanence of the unity of the Principle in its essence, that the One is one. This point of view taken on the One which *is-not* engenders the Intellect, and by the same movement, the naming of the Real in the guise of the One: from the One can only proceed the one [§30–35].

(ii) There is a 'point of view' of the Universal Soul on the paradoxical One. To the extent that the essence of the Soul expresses intelligible unity and multiplicity, by the fact of its double point of view, taken respectively on the Intellect which precedes it and on Nature of which it is the demiurge and which follows it in the gradation of the existent, the manifest Soul, the multiple One, and its point of view taken on the Real announces itself: from the One can only proceed one and from multiple nothing but the multiple.

(iii) There is a 'point of view' of the Universal Body of Nature, which is an entirely passive point of view, of the created depending on the act of the demiurge of the Soul. It is the point of view that expresses the One only in so far as it unifies and multiplies. The body of Nature manifests the One and the multiple, and it is from there that its point of view is enunciated: from the One can only proceed the multiple.

We will have no doubt recognised in this a procession that is traditionally Neoplatonic. The Ismaili thinker's interest in its reappraisal lies in the formulation of each level of the procession as a 'point of view', of a perception of the Real. The Real itself is above and beyond the procession, which would suppose, therefore, the indescribable origination of the Imperative. As soon as there is procession, beginning with that of the absolute originated First, there is perception, nomination, conversion of the indescribable One into a veritable whole: in the Intellect, in the Soul as the One-multiple, and in the Body as the One and the multiple.

Docetism is therefore a doctrine of knowledge which holds that everything enunciated be a 'point of view' taken by the subject, which

enunciates itself, expressing its fundamental reality and not the fundamental reality of what is enunciated. Or rather, it is indeed the Real enunciated which is enunciated, but according to the reality of that which, while enunciating it manifests it, and while manifesting it situates it, below its own reality. The Real is the thing itself, unconstituted, situating itself above and beyond its constitution by the naming of it, which makes it pass into the effectuation of successive constituents, of successive subjects where it expresses itself.[4]

That is why all the discourse of Ṭūsī's treatise is in essence 'docetic', and all search will consist in the distinction between the manifestation and what is above and beyond the manifestation. It will always suppose a *dehiscence*, an opening, between the Real and its manifestation, even within manifestation itself. Thus, the One which *is-not*, is from the point of view of Intellect the One which *is*; from the point of view of Soul, the One which is one and the multiple which is multiple; and from the point of view of Body, the One which is multiple.

This original non-reconciliation of the real One and of the One that is, this fundamental opening between the Real and of the Intellect, determines the whole of the doctrine of Resurrection, the Resurrector situating himself, as we will see, at the point itself of this opening, expressing in his person, manifesting the manifestation itself, the process of the Divine Imperative (*amr*).

Of the Real, it is possible however, to say something which, while being a 'point of view' taken on Him, will be the nearest to His effective-reality. He is pure spontaneity of Himself. To conceive him, Naṣīr al-Din Ṭūsī borrows from the Aristotelian doctrine of modality.

According to Aristotle, there are four modalities: the necessary, the contingent, the possible and the impossible. Let us note right away – and the statement is critical for the ontology with which we are concerned here – Ṭūṣī's exclusion of the contingent [§22–23]. The procession is such that there is nothing of the contingent, nothing which might not be necessity by others or not necessity by self. This process of exclusion of the contingent had been realised by Avicennian logic. The Real is necessary by self. In effect, it is pure existence, or rather pure existentiation, pure act. The Aristotelian definition of the Real is indeed taken up here by Ṭūsī but on the condition of conceiving it above and beyond being, such that pure existentiation or pure act becomes a simple call into being: the imperative Word: *Kun*! Be!

The Imperative is the necessity of the Real. It is pure necessity; there is no other enunciable necessity of the Real apart from the summons (*da'wat*), addressed to non-being to convert itself into being. Before even designating the entire process of the Resurrector, the word '*da'wat*' designates the Imperative itself which calls existence into being, beginning with the eternal totality of essences, the primordial Intellect. The Real is the summons of the One which *is* at the indescribable point of the One which *is not*. The summons is manifestation, bearing in itself the double attestation of the One which *is not* and of the One which *is*. At the same time it is the birth of the 'point of view' of Being on the Real which surmounts it, the Real conceived as One, in the guise of the One. There is no real being but in the Imperative, and yet every being deploys its Imperative, in the negation of being in the Imperative, in the guise of existence manifesting existentiation.

There is, therefore, no necessity but of liberty, of the indescribable spontaneity of the Principle. The manifestation of this spontaneity will always be a 'point of view' on indescribable freedom.

The impossible, therefore, will be the modality of increasing privation. The more a manifestation participates in the multiple, the more it is deprived, let us dare to say, from proximity to the Real, the more it receives participation in impossibility, in the opposite of spontaneity. There are, therefore, only 'possible' existents, if the possibility of being is the modality of what manifests itself in the guise of privation, of at least one privation, that which transforms the status of what emanates from the Imperative.

Between the supreme Principle, the Imperative and the First Intellect, there is no difference comparable to that which we find later in the gradation of existents. Here we are at the level of unity itself in three steps: the ineffable One, such that it is above and beyond all determination, be it positive infinity and unity; the originating One, the Imperative, whose ipseity is constituted by the act of primordial origination; and the One originated, the First Intellect, the infinite totality of effective-realities.

The procession of emanation, strictly speaking, begins at the moment the sequence of Intellects is engendered from the first among them, like the parallel engendering of Souls from the Universal Soul, and celestial bodies from the Universal Body. Here, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī takes up the Avicennian scheme [§10–29]. The First Intellect expresses its 'point of view' in three representations: that of (i) its Principle, the Word

or Imperative; (ii) its own essence, necessitated by the Principle; and (iii) its own essence of being simply possible. These three representations produce three existents, whose nature expresses, respectively, absolute necessity, derived necessity and the possibility-to-be, that is, the Second Intellect, the Universal Soul and the sphere of the spheres. This triple-fold process reproduces itself until the lowest degree, the sub-lunar world, where the particular bodies, the vegetative, animal and human souls, as well as the intellects, express the ultimate procession of being.

Each existent possesses an effective-reality (*ḥaqīqat*). Tūsī regularly opposes the *ḥaqīqat* of a thing to its relative state (*iḍāfī*). Envisaged under the aspect of eternity, such as it is configured in the First Intellect, the thing is effective-reality. Considered in the network necessitating causes and effects in the inferior world of created Nature, the thing is relation, relativity, relative being. The two categories, that of substance and that of relation, distribute themselves as a function of the division into the realm of the Imperative and the world of creation.

The realm of the Imperative (*'ālam-i amr*) is the infinite universe of substances originated in their eternity. Each sensible reality thus possesses for its esoteric dimension an effective substance that makes it participate in the world of primordial origination. Its *ḥaqīqat* is its unity. Like the unity of the Principle that it reflects, the unity of the substance expresses itself in three phases: it is the ineffable One, the Imperative and the Intellect expressed in a concrete being. At the centre of the substance, the fine point of its reality is the expression of the ineffable Real, of the pure spontaneity of the Real. This spontaneity determines being 'in the Imperative' of the substance, its freedom which is its superior necessity. This freedom originates the intelligible reality which is the *ḥaqīqat* at the level of the realm of the Intellect.

The world of creation (*'ālam-i khalq*) begins where multiplicities express imperative unity. It is the world of Nature, and very often this world is seen as equivalent or comparable to the sensory world of the Body. From the point of view of creation, what is intelligible substance becomes relative being; it expresses itself in the multiple liaisons which unite it to various bodies, and loses or converts its spontaneous freedom in constraint. It is the world of the originated, of natural passiveness .

The hierarchy of the realm of the Imperative and the world of creation, of substance and relation, are duplicated into the hierarchy of the completed and the inchoate, the realm of distinction (*kawn-i mubāyanat*)

and the realm of similitude (*kawn-i mushābahat*). The completed is not strictly speaking a 'world', but has the status of effective-realities. That which is of the order of the intelligible bears the trace of the Imperative originator, of the fundamental liberty of the Principle. It is 'completed' in its absolute reality, in its *ḥaqīqat*, and by the same token, the completion of its essence designates the infinite that constitutes its real being. Each existent, conceived from the point of view of the completed, in its effective-reality, is infinite because it participates in the infinite dimension of primordial origination. Infinity, spontaneity and effective-reality are all one, and their unity will be named the Resurrection (*qiyāmat*). The inchoate is the rank of realities in becoming, whether they are considered in the network of relations or in movement, even of conversion, towards the One. The completed, by contrast, is the rank of realities in the state of Resurrection. It is the realm of unity (*waḥdat*), the rank of final perfection, the return of all things to the One.

The Resurrection is this conversion from the inchoate to the completed, which absolves the lights of the Real from the mingled, sensory world where they once stagnated. As superior being, man reverses his point of view, henceforth contemplates plurality from the point of fundamental reality, and conceives himself and all things with a bias for the Real. Dissipation of the imaginary, liberating distinction from evil, liberty necessitating, are one and the same distinction, whose end or perfection is the realm of the *ahl al-waḥdat* , the 'people of unity', of those who live in the state of Resurrection.

2. Man and his destiny

The nature of Man

Man is the ultimate aim of the creation and he ensures the participation of natural kingdoms in the Resurrection, which is the return to a superior and intelligible rank and condition. Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī takes up, in a fashion, Avicenna's hierarchy from mineral to human, in such a manner that man encapsulates in himself the active properties of kingdoms inferior to him [§84–89, 514–18]. In the chain of beings, the highest grade of human species reaches the lowest grade of angels. The Perfect Man (*insān kāmil*) – that is, the Prophet or the Imam – is superior to angels in themselves if by angel we mean 'spiritual being' or the soul of each perceptible reality,

celestial soul or royal soul of the majestic sub-lunar sphere.

Indeed, man encompasses in himself the entire series of effusions from the Imperative-Word, those which 'fall' upon Intellect, Soul, Nature and its elements. Man's body and his intellect are thus respectively perfections of the corporeal world and of the intelligible world; man envelops the entire macrocosm. Man's nature symbolises with Nature as microcosm of the seasons and its pleasures, of animals and of angels or devils, a universal mirror. His body and soul surmounted by the intellect are a living *politic*: man is a city. To each member or organ of the body corresponds a function and a social organ: to intellect and soul, king and *wazīr*. There is no real surprise in this parallel that reproduces a vision of the world quite traditional since the days of Plato. It no less expresses a set of conditions. As man is an abrogated being called into this world 'when the pre-eternal Pen inscribed on the post-eternal Tablet by the order of the First Command' [§88], he owes it to himself to ensure that the rights of the Imperative prevail, by filtering through his being the whole world of creation at the heightened level of the realm of the Imperative as originally structured. Thus, the life of man, geared towards the event of the Resurrection, is an intensely moral life.

Man is not in the realm of appearances what he ought to be in the realm of distinction. Two principles struggle within him; truth and falsehood have among men their supporters and their detractors: 'There are no more than two basic divisions of humankind: the followers of truth and the followers of falsehood' [§238]. In turn, the followers of truth see themselves submitted to a distinction: there are the people of unity (*ahl-i waḥdat*), those 'who have not, in reality, fallen from [the realm of] necessary existence that they should need to go back there,' and there are the people of gradation (*ahl-i tarattub*), those who gradually tear themselves away from the apparent and tend towards the mode of being '*in the Imperative*'.

One need not assume that those in the order of gradation are of another nature and receive spiritual obligations less intense than the people of unity. Between the 'elite' and the 'elite of the elite', there is only a difference in degree, and the order of gradation does not designate a third kind of man as an intermediary between the followers of falsehood and those of the truth. It is not useful, therefore, to represent the order of gradation as the community of faithful apt to recognise the Imam only under the veil of a doctrine reconciled with the *sharīʿat*,[5] leaving only a

very small number of faithful especially chosen to know the Imam 'in shining light'.

Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī's text is perfectly clear: there are only two kinds of men, determined by their choice, either in favour of the Resurrector or hostile to the reality of the Imam. As there are degrees of elevation in good and abasement in evil [§239], it is impossible to confuse partial evil and absolute malice. Distributive justice requires that acts of partial goodness be rewarded in their capacity in proportion to the good they contain. Gradation is thus a consequence of the hierarchy of rewards. It is no less also the means by which to constitute a community of believers (*jamā'at*). If there were only those in the position of *ḥujjat* who have received the wholehearted illumination of divine assistance (*ta'yyīd*) transmitted by the Imam, there would be no means to unite a greater mass of servants, and the ladder of true knowledge descending from the peak of illumination reaching down to the humble teaching of the most recent loyal-faithful would be useless [§240].

The order of gradation (*tarattub*) is this communal link which unites the followers of the Resurrection, a link without obligation except internal, without authority except spiritual. It is an authority and obligation much more forceful than prophetic law, because it makes of each person a disciple of his own master, who is for him the adept who has attained a higher level of understanding. The order of gradation is a universal pedagogical link, a discipline of dissemination of knowledge based on an obligation of evidence and of truth as taught: an effusion of knowledge cascading from the Imam to his *ḥujjat*; teaching which goes from master to disciple, weaving between them the reciprocity of gift and obedience; omni-communication of gnosis (*ma'rifat*).

The more knowledge there is, the greater is the obedience, the more strict the discipline. The order of gradation is a monastery of light, an enclosure whose walls have the transparency of truth, where the internal rule forbids to forbid, forecloses the law and systematises the exercise of freedom by virtue of a severe ethic of surpassing oneself. The disciple is immersed in the world of similitude and appearances, wherein the deprivation of the light of gnosis arouses in him the desire for a *gradus*, a gradual movement towards the oriented Resurrector.

The conditions of existence

The gradual order of disciplines is a function of the hierarchy of conditions of existence, subject to relative categories that must be transmuted into distinct existences. The three degrees are sensory, imaginative and intellective. By traversing these three modes of existence in one gradual movement, the disciple progresses to a conversion analogous to that which is accomplished in the macrocosm: Nature to Soul, Soul to Intellect.

At the lowest level of perceptions, the disciple is subject to 'nature's beckoning and to passions of the soul,' a mixture of substances, of effective-realities. In the median position, the imaginative condition, the disciple is not unlike the Universal Soul which revolves both around the world of distinction situated above it as well as the world of appearances situated below. The imagination is a feature of the soul formed with the apparent and the distinct, a mixture that aspires to its own differentiation by virtue of the intellect. The third condition of existence is precisely that of the intellect, strictly speaking the order of gradation, of enlightened spirits perfecting themselves in the ultimate status of unity.

Borrowing from Aristotle's medical doctrine of natural states, constrained and natural movements [§286], Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī demonstrates that progress leading from the apparent to the distinct is accompanied by a gradation in forms of obedience (*taslīm*) [§306–15]. The natural place for man is proximity to the Real, union with the tenant of the Real.

In metaphysical space, the order is just the same as in the physical universe. Weighty, heavy spirits fall, their natural place being lower, whereas subtle spirits rise, their natural place being higher. The natural (*ṭabʿī*) movement of elevation is the voluntary (*ikhtiyārī*) obedience of the people of unity, and it is this that tends to convert the voluntary movement of those in the order of gradation, people who are still in the condition of imaginative existence. There is less freedom in voluntary movement than in natural movement, since voluntary freedom is the effort of detachment from the apparent, an expression of the battle against one's self, as if in a tragedy, a dramatic conflict between falsehood and truth. Natural obedience, which triumphs due to effort against one's self, against tendencies to abase the soul, and which resists them in total abandon to the Real, is the spontaneity of a nature at last redeemed and not the effort of a soul divided; obedience is the intelligible act itself.

This topography of obedience(s) and nature(s) should be placed in relation with the gradation of existences. According to a Neoplatonic model, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī distinguishes partial existence; partial existence directed towards total existence; total existence; and existence above that of partial and total [§225–40]. The first degree is that of people of the realm of similitude, the world of appearances. Bearing in mind its symbolic relation with Nature or Universal Body, if primary matter is pure evil, pure nothingness, secondary matter is composed of forms, of a *mixture* whose spiritual equivalent is similitude. Partial existence is therefore not pure falsehood, but mixture, similitude made distinction (form), indistinctly mixed from privation and matter. The 'triplicity' of elements and principles of substance which, according to Aristotle, would be form, matter and privation, characterise well the compound substance, that of existents of the sub-lunar world. In the spiritual hierarchy, therefore, the realm of similitude is homologous to the sub-lunar world.

Partial existence directed towards total existence corresponds to the realm of Universal Soul. It is the condition of form which separates itself from matter, all the while remaining just as well directed towards secondary matter constituting substances of the sub-lunar realm. It is the existence of spiritual beings (*rūḥāniyyāt*) that ensure the regency of these bodies. The spiritual correlate of these souls is the lowest degree of the realm of distinction, the median and mediating, analogous to the regal light conceived by Suhrawardī.

Total existence is that of Intellects or Intelligences; that is 'existence of the realm of the elect of absolute distinction,' for the Intellects are absolutely immaterial. In an Aristotelian perspective, it is existence of act without potential, without privation. We leave Aristotle to situate the ultimate degree above and beyond actuality and potentiality, of Intellect, Soul and Nature. It is the degree of the Imperative, of the necessitating One. It is the ontological correlate of the Resurrector situated above and beyond distinction itself, by whose side reside the people of unity.

To partial existence corresponds an 'origin without return,' which is rather an absence of origin, since it is only the authentic origin (*mabda'*) which is directed toward return (*ma'ād*). Authentic origin is that of the souls or substantial spiritual forms, the only ones to be both act and perfection, such that act is unlinked to potentiality and not *mingled without return* to this potentiality. The summons (*da'wat*) tears souls away from the people of similitude and animates spiritual energy that leads them to

the degree of return, enabling these souls 'to rise to the particular Intellect'. Effectively, within the intelligible world there is a new gradation. The Intellect engraves the degrees of gradation, from practical intellect until the intellect which is able to receive prophethood, and from there, at last, until the intellect of Resurrection made for the other world. The degree of ultimate return reaches that which is immediately superior to it, the existence above and beyond the partial and the total, existence above and beyond the absolute, that of the Resurrector, who is above and beyond Intellect itself, who needs neither origin nor return, he for whom origin is *ipso facto* return, for whom existence is neither emanated nor converted but the principle of all emanation and of all conversion.

This series of four successive summons form the whole, the entire convocation, just as the conversion of each degree of existence to a superior degree perfects itself in the fundamental unity of the Imperative. The *daʿwat* of the Resurrector is, therefore, indeed a hierarchically ordered return of souls to the Intellects, and of Intellects to the Imperative, whose equivalent in the human community is the return of partial existences directed towards total existence, to total existence, then to utmost proximity towards the supra-total existence. The ultimate destiny of man is not the absolute but above and beyond the absolute, that is, existence in the Imperative, the Divine Command (*amr*) itself.

Towards elucidation of *taʿlīm* and *taʾyīd*

Gradation and the effort of elevation depend essentially on one variable factor – knowledge – which is susceptible to intensification or weakening. It is by every means correct to say that the Ismaili concept of salvation is gnosis (*maʿrifat*), since the principal characteristics of the moral life depend upon it. The purpose of the theory of knowledge, presented succinctly in *Taṣawwur* 13 [§110–13], is to tell us not only what it means to know with certitude (*yaqīn*), but also according to which hierarchy of knowledge one attains salutary gnosis.

The first degree of knowledge is necessary (*badīhī*) knowledge. The necessity with which we are concerned here is the necessity of *logic*, which derives from some minimal principles, such as the principle of non-contradiction. Indeed, it is also what natural light reveals to us in all clarity: the whole is greater than the part. As we see, it is not a question of sense-perceptible knowledge, but of all reasonable knowledge,

constrained by the solitary light of the intellect, this in turn conceived at its lowest degree of effectiveness. It is the elementary realm of intellective intuition.

The second degree, theoretical (*naẓarī*) knowledge, may also be called knowledge by inquiry. By examining created existents, this knowledge teaches that beings are not free causes, that they are not causes of their own existence, that they do not govern with free will what they do and the manner in which they behave. This knowledge conceives all things under the aspect of necessity, and the effort it requires is similar to the intellectual clarity of the effort required by Spinoza in his famous 'Appendix' to the first part of the *Ethics*. The term for this theoretical knowledge is 'the Divine Artisan'; it therefore deploys wholly the cosmology ordained to the necessity of efficient causes until the level of the first cause, the principle of universal effectuation. Such is the first point of view taken on the Principle conceived as the cause of necessity.

The third degree is knowledge as taught (*ta'līmī*), that which is procured from the highest teachings among dignitaries of the Ismaili hierarchy, as received by the intervention of the Imam, from the Imperative-Word. In effect, one needs a Master to move beyond the stage of theoretical knowledge. Here, it is not a question of conceiving the Principle or Creator according to the affirmation of a first cause, the necessity of all necessities. The teaching (*ta'līm*) leads above and beyond this point of view, above and beyond the necessity of efficient causality. It reveals the liberty or spontaneity of the Principle, the emanation of all things outside of the Imperative, and their conversion (or 'return') to the Imperative. Ultimately, the theological content, the core of *ta'līm*, is the indescribable, inexpressible Unity of the Principle. Between theoretical knowledge and knowledge which is taught, there is all the difference of a rational theology culminating in existence necessary in itself, and of a negative theology culminating in the paradoxical One. The rational theology of philosophers is a *gradus*, a step towards negative theology, which is the core of *ta'līm*.

Divinely enabled knowledge (*ta'yīdī*) is instantaneous communication, the eternal dimension of what *ta'līm* teaches in a progressive, gradual manner. Between *ta'yīd* and *ta'līm*, there is the same effervescent relationship as exists between Word and Intellect, between Imam and *ḥujjat*. We are at the culminating point of gnosis where the One conceives itself in absolute vacuum, free of all being and of all being-ness. It is the

point of view taken on the freedom of the One, on the Principle as cause of freedom.

Let us return briefly to *ta'līm*. It is an act by which the Master communicates to the disciple a remedy for his pain, for what he lacks, for an emptiness which overwhelms him; a knowledge whose entire value lies in the fact that it heals from doubt whoever receives its wisdom. *Ta'līm* expresses the authority of the Master, which is that of a spiritual physician. At the beginning of his *Haft bāb*, Abū Isḥāq Quhistānī provides an account of his conversion, the encounter with the Master.[6] Having acquired in his youth all the scientific knowledge or exoteric theologies, our hero finds himself in the end overwhelmed with sadness. We find this regularly in narrative accounts of initiation: sadness, intolerable anguish, melancholy engendered by vain sciences. In an assembly, where debates are held and informed opinions are plenty (a sign of incertitude), here is this sorrowful man, who at last comes to name the object of his desire: the truth, that is to say, 'the truthful master' (*mu'allim-i ṣādiq*).

Indeed, here is the crux of the question: the truth does not exist without man, the Master who manifests it; and to search for the truth is to search for a master, *the* Master of truth. Ismailism, by other paths than Sufism, presents in Islam a very pure expression of this general structure of knowledge that we might call 'esotericism'. If it is true that esotericism is all knowledge, all relationship to the truth, all volition of truth, which requires at its centre the figure of the Master, nothing is true if it is not from the Master [§481].[7]

Ta'līm will respond, therefore, to the request of the disciple who seeks to unveil the nature of the Master. It is a desire for healing: 'O angel-man, who is your Adam? What is your method? I am ill and weak at heart and I need medicine.' And the Master responds: 'We are divine physicians, we are pure souls.' As for what he teaches, the content holds, in total, to these simple words: 'The Imam of the Real, the religion of the Real, and the *ḥujjat* are all one.' The Master, who teaches according to the order of gradation, is one with the source of *ta'yīd*, with the manifestation of the Word, the divine Logos, and the subject taught is wholly in the figure of the Imam himself. The ultimate aim of *ta'līm* is knowledge and recognition of the Imam of the time.

That is why Abū Isḥāq Quhistānī warns us to beware the judgement that each person believes himself capable of exercising by his own understanding: 'Whoever exercises judgement by analogy (*qiyās*) wears

out his own intellect.' This implies that one will take a different path from the other, whereby one god here attained by this person, by his own intellect, will differ from another god over there that another person will have attained by a different path, and thus many gods will appear. The requirement to attest to the Unity of God results in unity of discourse of the Real, and this implies, therefore, the discourse of the Master. It is *tawḥīd* which establishes *ta'līm*.

The intellect put into action by adherence to *ta'līm* is not any particular intellect but intellect guided by he who is the most perfect (*akmal*) in gnosis of the Real-Truth. The mediation of *ta'līm*, the link between Master and disciple, is the guided Universal Intellect (*'aql-i kull*), the Proof of God (*ḥujjat-i khudā'ī*),[8] under whose governance particular intellects unite.

This conception of *ta'līm* was more comprehensively presented by Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ in the text of *al-Fuṣūl al-arba'a* (*Four Chapters*), preserved for us by Shahrastānī.[9] In the first movement of his argumentation, Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ demonstrates that particular intellect and reasoning are fundamentally *doxa*, that is to say, the domain of particular opinion. Ḥasan does not, however, focus on the uncertainty of *doxa*, but instead on the fact that it already bears the silent presence of the figure of the Master, in the enunciation that challenges it. Effectively, all discussion is teaching, or yet again, all assertion which claims to be true is a knowledge which teaches itself to another subject. Hence, all opinion, all reasoning, has for a guide to the truth the subject it enunciates, or rather another subject from which the first receives it. Thus, truth eminently questions the masterly command that legitimises it.

The second movement of the demonstration plays upon the reverseability of the guide of *truth* and the *true* guide. Ḥasan poses the question of knowing what the conditions are for what Michel Foucault would name *veridiction*, the articulated verity. If, indeed, there exists a true discourse, there would not exist an equivalence between discourses. We rediscover here a major thesis of Platonism: either no discourse is superior to another, or the masterly command that restricts true discourse is submitted to truth, and he who speaks the truth is made to speak *in the truth*.

The third movement draws the practical consequence of necessary existence of a true master of the articulated verity: it is the Master who determines the path of access to the truth and not the inverse. A principle

of choice is a must here. Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ revisits, in his manner, a classical problem of ancient philosophy: in what would one recognise the master of truth? From this moment, in his fourth point, is advanced a dual division of spirits and men. Their division does not occur so much between people who recognise the truth and those who ignore it – for example, people who acknowledge revelation and those who deny it – as between those who determine who the subject of truth is and those who do not worry themselves about the nature of he who guides them.

Now, the sign by which we recognise the guide, the Imam, is what makes known the need. The critical term here is 'need' (*iḥtiyāj*). Just as the possible redirects to the necessary, the need redirects to the Master who amply satisfies; need and desire here are but one. Desire is the signifier for the Master, the call of the Master who, self-effacing, offers the pleasure of truth. Consequently, he who has already found (due to his need) the Master, is the one who has received the summons (*da'wat*) and recognised who must be the master of truth. Thus, what we have here is a circularity of points of view taken on the Master: circularity of he who speaks the truth, and of he who claims a subject who speaks the truth.

We see the teaching of truth convert itself into a teaching of knowledge which, in turn, converts into manifestation of the subject of truth. The content of truth articulated is the Master who speaks the truth, whatever he might say; in order for a discourse to be real, it has to be spoken by the subject of truth. 'I, the truth, I speak,' implies 'I, the truth, I enunciate myself.' The material condition for this truth to appear, so that the Master awakens those who support him, is the emergence of a desire (innate in the disciple) for a certain subject. But this is desire for the Other. The summons of the disciple by the Master arouses desire to which he will respond. Desire for the Master is desire for the Other such that, in his turn, the Master behaves as a subject who is supposed to know, offering a discursive configuration to this Other that constitutes the subject of truth, which constitutes just as well the truth to which his discourse responds. The Imam, the subject who is supposed to know, is the paradoxical Master of the truth of the One *above and beyond being and discourse*; his knowledge is knowledge of what is not known.

Ta'yīd, inspirational assistance accorded by the Imam, establishes *ta'līm*. When Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ produced his doctrine of *ta'līm*, the Imam of the Resurrection had not operated his manifestation 'in the full light of day,' and had not yet proclaimed the Great Resurrection (*qiyāmat-i*

qiyāmāt). Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī wrote his work at a time after this proclamation. *Ta'yīd* is affirmed as a fourth kind of knowledge and corresponds to the manifestation itself of the presence of the truthful subject. In the instantaneous moment of this presence, the vision above and beyond the intellect effuses and overwhelms those who have so been favoured: the *ḥujjats*, but also the population of the loyal-faithful assembled at Alamūt. This is a fleeting moment which history shrouds in darkness. A fugitive instant cannot enter history. That is why *satr*, the concealment of instantaneous truth, is rendered necessary. Different from Christian theology, where Incarnation establishes a history that eternalises the revelation of the true subject Christ, docetist theology maintains open the abyss between *ta'yīd* and *ta'līm*, between instantaneous assistance from the Resurrector and teaching from the Master of truth. It is thus that the truth must deny itself in knowledge, that the master of truth must express himself in a master of knowledge, who is identical to him but also differs from him.

Ta'yīd is masterly control which submits itself to the Real, the Truth; *ta'līm* is masterly control submitted to the Universal Intellect, presenting itself in the guise of the subject who is supposed to know, manifesting at the second degree, as subject, the imperative freedom of the Real.

The Sunni criticism of *ta'līm*

The construction of the doctrine of *ta'līm* by Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ provoked a riposte, which is also a heroic attempt at refutation in the Sunni world. Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, the great theologian and mystic, is the most profound representative of this tendency and it may be useful to recall here the terms of his argumentation.[10] In turn, it too provoked a detailed Ismaili response.[11] We will thus better understand the reasons for incompatibility between the Sunni and Ismaili conceptions of Islam.

According to al-Ghazālī, the premises of the Ismaili argument are the following: (i) All that can be said affirmatively or negatively carries in it truth or falsehood. Truth is one thing and falsehood is what is opposed to the truth. (ii) Therefore, truth must be distinguished from falsehood and that is the matter of an obligation that no one can avoid. (iii) Man can thus attain truth, either by himself, by his intellect and reasoning, or indeed he will learn from another by a process of teaching. (iv) If wisdom cannot come from independent reasoning, it is necessary to acquire it

from another. However, due to the multiplicity of those who speak and of their mutual contradictions, one cannot learn from any master or other. The teaching must come from a person who, among all men, is the unique possessor of infallibility. The Master must be free from all error.

To establish the falsehood of the first of these premises, al-Ghazālī invokes the model of knowledge in mathematics. If a mathematical question is to us so unfamiliar that if a man commits an error therein because his reasoning is inadequate or his intelligence weak, this does not in the least lead us to doubt the validity of mathematics. To the second premise, al-Ghazālī objects that truth is admittedly one, but we have in us no need to know it. If we conceive clearly what knowledge is in its true necessity, it appears that those who receive the teaching of religious law and adhere to it by pure and simple *taqlīd*, by 'blind faith', have no need for an infallible Imam, whereas for those who doubt this revelation, they would not know what to make of it either. As in the case of mathematics, it would remain for them only to use their intelligence. If man reflects on his own and thus comes to perceive where the truth resides, what need will he have for an infallible master? In religious revelation, what one must know amounts to two basic theses: the existence of the Creator and the truth of His Messenger. In the matter of revealed truth there are, on the one hand, pillars of faith for which the revealed Book suffices; on the other hand, there are matters of conjecture for which reason is required. If we now examine the position itself of an Imam, infallible in truth, from where shall he derive his veracity? Only four sources may be envisaged: Revelation, hearsay, an explicit text, or a rational proof. None of the above can prove to establish the veracity of the Imam.

For al-Ghazālī, the necessity of such an Imam does not withstand analysis. Matters that relate to legalistic religion are positive and vary as a function of the Prophet who teaches these matters. They are conventions, revealed according to the variations of periods and nations. How would it be possible then to trace intelligible decisive proofs and values universally, such as are condensed in the speech of one solitary master of truth?

Finally, he says, we must admit two principles, of which the first is to exercise one's personal judgement. Whoever exercises it is within his rights, because he accomplishes correctly the commandment of God. The second is to make sure that religious law supports knowledge. Universal compassion drawn from this law is such that each person is obliged to

follow one of its precepts with regard to all his speech, all his deeds, and all his beliefs, so that that he will not live like an animal that does nothing except what pleases it. Laws revealed by Prophets during different eras have differed in terms of detail, but they have not differed regarding the fundamental principle of obligation.

Al-Ghazālī maintains that personal reasoning does not entail perdition and accuses the Ismailis of making an error in neglecting the law, attributing the origin of the error to the particular intellect, culminating in the fact of considering oneself 'pure' and 'free' from all need with regard to legal acts of worship.

The critique of the third premise refers back to the first. Against the fourth, al-Ghazālī recalls that if the need for a master was a sure thing, it would then be necessary that this master be infallible. Now, being a master does not at all imply infallibility; for example, the master in mathematics can be truthful without being infallible.

As a whole, al-Ghazālī questions the need, the necessity to conceive the need of an infallible Master. Infallibility has to be demonstrated by reasoning, which thus confirms the priority of human reasoning. It is not at all impossible that the world be exempt from an infallible Imam; conversely, it is possible that the world be forever more exempt from the Prophet: this would not contradict the definition of the world as such. As infallible as he might be, the Imam is never the only one, but there is a crowd of claimants. How to distinguish among them, and from them Christ and the Christians? There cannot have been incontestable transmission of knowledge of an Imam, since different missionaries are necessary, and with them the teaching of the Imam loses its immediacy.

The necessary guidance for men is, therefore, only knowledge of revealed laws, of the assembly on the Day of Judgement, and of the Resurrection. It requires no spiritual exegesis and, in particular, there is no need to know the Day of Resurrection. Certitude of true gnosticism belongs to one who tastes divine truths. Al-Ghazālī thus opposes the development of mysticism to those loyal towards the Imam, among whom the Ismailis prevail. For them, he says, gnosis is vain curiosity and negligence of the only things which should concern men: knowledge of God and His Messenger.

The discourses of Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ and al-Ghazālī differ on every point. If they are incompatible, it is first due to the fact that the same words receive different meanings, meanings that exclude each other. For

al-Ghazālī, truth, for example, is meant in two ways: it is the provenance of literal and prophetic revelation on the one hand, and that of rational discourse, such as mathematics, on the other hand. For Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ, these degrees of truth are actually lies for the intellect, as they do not meet the higher need of absolute certainty, the need which al-Ghazālī denies being as imperious and universal as Ḥasan describes it to be. Then the question of the Master: al-Ghazālī has very well noticed that this is the essential question. Rejecting all masters as unnecessary after the Seal of Prophethood, he is compelled to separate the existence of the world from the requirement of the presence in it of the bearer of truth: the world can live without revealed truth (even if Prophethood had fortunately presented it the gift of religious law).

The forcefulness of Ḥasan's demonstration is based entirely on the exhibition of a need, a desire in man: no man is he who does not desire an absolute certainty. The disciplines that one would call of 'understanding' mathematics, logic or grammar cannot satisfy such a desire. The purpose of such a desire differs radically. If 'the world cannot exist without an Imam,' this is not meant in the sense that he will require prophetic revelation, but by virtue of a superior requirement for communal cohesion. The Muslim City which finds jurisprudence and a political power enlightened by the Holy Book to be sufficient is a City 'apparent' and fleeting. The major link of authentic politics – we encounter Plato here again – is the esoteric link, an intelligible link. If there did not exist a human manifestation (*maẓhar*) of the Divine Word, the Imam of the Resurrection, the only link possible between men would be one of submission by the weak to the powerful.

This is the argument at which al-Ghazālī stops, persuaded that one cannot demand of the City more than it is capable of giving, more than an application, more-or-less reasonable, of obedience to the law. In radical Platonic style, Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ envisions a community that is a perfect City, penetrated from the highest to the lowest degree by a necessary hierarchy, with the same ray of truth as from the enlightenment of the Word or Imperative. The 'link' is not a matter of understanding, just as 'truth' is not a matter for demonstration, but both link and truth suppose the instantaneous intuitive evidence which leads the intellect back to the Unity that is above and beyond itself. For this locus of human Unity from which radiates the teaching, the only real link between true men is not at all legalistic constraint but *infinite freedom of the Imperative.*

The ultimate reason for politics is in this movement of pure spontaneity where is rent asunder all finitude, and the will of the Imam is unveiled in him and in each one of his servants.

Essentially, *ta'līm* teaches nothing other than what in al-Ghazālī's eyes it would not know how to teach: return to the source of existentiation itself, of pure substantiality. For the Nizārī Ismailis, however, *ta'līm* is the only politics that can prevail, since to redirect each person to his substantiality, to go above and beyond the relative world of legal relationships (and of politics woven from these alienating 'relations'), is also to form an otherwise powerful link, a link between the substances themselves. This link is the expression of the paradoxical One in each human unity, in each intellect. *Ta'līm* is the omni-expressivity of the community with regard to a supra-essential unity, of the truth of the Philosopher-King of whom the Ismaili Imam is, assuredly, the most clear vision that Islam has proposed.

3. Ethics and moralia

In his voluminous work dedicated to moralia,[12] Charles-Henri de Fouchécour teaches us to distinguish 'systematic morality' from traditional treatises, whether they consist of aphorisms or exemplary narratives. The ethic of Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī is incontestably to be placed at the heart of this systematic ethics whose elaboration was a constant concern of Iranian Islamic philosophy.[13]

It nonetheless remains that moral reflection is not uniformly organised, as it is presented in his most famous work, the *Akhlāq-i Nāṣirī*,[14] or in the rest of his works, especially here, in the radical theology of Alamūt Ismailism. It is current practice to claim that the *Akhlāq-i Nāṣirī* flows from the influential pen of Aristotle, that its merit lies in establishing a direct link between the peripatetic edifice and the culture of self, economics and politics meeting the needs of Islam, and that, among other things, it introduced the Mongol conquerors from Central Asia to the highly refined culture of the Iranian world.[15] But in making Ṭūsī, like Miskawayh, a simple transmitter of Greek wisdom, we risk effacing profound modifications, interpretations and intellectual developments that he owes to no one but himself. The *Akhlāq-i Nāṣirī*, dedicated to the Ismaili *muhtashim* (governor) of Quhistān, Nāṣir al-Dīn, was modified by its author after the political ruin of the Ismailism of Alamūt, but it

remains marked by a deep concern for divinising man by presenting him as an imitation of the Divine.[16] The work contemplates the demands and limits of such divinisation. It is clear that during this period Ṭūsī sought to reconcile the truly Ismaili theme of divinisation of self with the most delicate themes of the Hellenic version, whose last word was nothing less than divinisation of self in contemplation.[17]

Morality, in effect, does not appease itself in the exercise of virtues that follow the median path, since the search for the golden mean is instead a quest for the extreme good, of the fine point of intelligible existence. According to Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī and indeed, to what Aristotle intended, virtue leads to a sort of surpassing of one's self that virtuous man knows how to accomplish. Nevertheless, there is a difference with Aristotle: Ṭūsī demands that this surpassing be oriented not towards the Intellect, its ultimate goal, but towards the One, the indescribable and inexpressible that the radical Neoplatonism of the Ismailis never ceased to value and promote.

A fact of literary history should, from now on, invite us to render our reading more attentive. Ṭūsī is the author of another work also dedicated to the *muḥtashim* Nāṣir al-Dīn.[18] Consequently, one thing is certain: the essentially Ismaili oeuvre of Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī is mainly dedicated to ethics; a reflection on morality occupies a central place as a generating point of entry. This is so for a number of reasons, of which the following seems to bear upon the others: in the considerable weakness that legalistic religion endured in the eyes of the Ismaili loyal-faithful, morality must substitute its own mode of purification to the rigour of legal obedience. The ethical lifestyle is a life 'in the state of Resurrection,' valid for the whole period of concealment which follows the event of its proclamation. Concealment creates a situation where union with the Divine Unity as manifested in the Resurrector is no longer an immediate spiritual fact, but where the *apparent* return to the exoteric cult must remain *apparent*. Therefore, the ethic becomes an ensemble of practices and discourses, conveyed through a hierarchy of teaching appropriate to govern the *ḥaqīqat*, the effective-reality, of each person, in basic agreement with the teaching of the Resurrector.

Ethical purification

We discover the heart of Ismaili morality in Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī's view presented in *Taṣawwur* 22, where his guiding principle is indeed that of refinement of behaviour and customs, of ethical purification (*tahdhīb-i akhlāq*) as in classical ethics in the world of Islam [§265–99].[19] We see, however, that this concept, inherited from peripatetic thought and Stoicism, underwent a number of modifications that ultimately changed its intention and meaning. Admittedly, the purification is first ordered, in typical Avicennian style, to the aims of the Intellect; it is a first step on the path of acquisition of perfection pertaining to the soul (*kamālāt-i nafsānī*); it is what prepares the soul to receive intelligible ideas.[20] But where the philosophers situate the finality of ethical purification in the contemplation of primary Intellects, Ṭūsī identifies another object desirable at the highest level: moral effort, with an inclination for happiness, in knowing the inner nature of the Imam, of a knowledge which leads to the knowledge itself of God; it is adherence to knowledge in the Imam of the appearance of the Word of God.[21] Morality is a battlefield from which emerges victorious he who contemplates Divinity in the mirror of the spiritual figure of the Imam; and moral combat has no other justification than this vision.

Morality is based on a procession from the First Intellect, Universal Soul and Universal Body. Good and pure evil, which dualism is mistaken in identifying as two antagonistic principles, are absolute perfection of the intelligible and absolute deficiency of matter. Since the Universal Body, or the Body of Universal Nature, bears sense-perceptible matter composed of the four elements, it is where good and evil reside. Ṭūsī reconsiders this conception of matter as it was developed from Aristotle to Plotinus, by radicalising it. Potentiality, of which matter is the substratum in substances composed of matter and form, is a sign of privation, of the absence of ultimate perfection (which, on the contrary, manifests fully actualised). Matter is that substance of which all being is the in-determination, the limit of intelligible knowledge of forms; it is, with evil, on the side of privation. Evil *is not* – which is to say that it is a *privation* of formal existence in act, and matter typifies privation linked to potentiality.

It remains now only to identify the realm where matter and the multiple corrupt the substances, or rather compose themselves in their

unity and form – be it the Universal Body (instead of pure evil, pure privation), which has a Manichaean or Gnostic savour, and would not as such be admitted by a Neoplatonist. In effect, it is not matter, limit of the emanating procession, which sees itself assigned pure evil but Nature and its Body, i.e., a positive degree of gradation of the existent. That Nature in its body exemplifies and expresses pure evil, 'the corporeal realm of pure evil', necessitates a compelling argument to save metaphysical dualism from the ruins of theological dualism.

Ethical purification has as its aim the avoidance of the realm of pure evil corresponding to a type of man, the people of opposition (*ahl-i taḍādd*). It consists of liberating oneself from the falsehood of the people of opposition, from their customs and behaviour which are subject to the powers of the animal soul. The intermediate degree has as its correlate in rank, where good and evil intermingle, the people of gradation (*ahl-i tarratub*) who are loyal to religious law. The final degree of perfection, the realm of pure good, is that of the people of unity (*ahl-i waḥdat*), who liberate themselves from the limitations of legalistic religion for freedom in the state of Resurrection.

The difficulty of this scheme lies in the intermediary status of the people of gradation (*ahl-i tarattub*). Here, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī does not identify them with those who purify themselves in order to attain the status of the people of unity and the Resurrection, but to those who hold on to the letter of the religious law. This proves to my mind that there are two schemes that rival each other in Ṭūsī's treatise.

According to the first scheme, adherents of religious law do not form an intermediary degree between the realms of evil and good, of falsehood and effective-reality, but identify themselves with the tenants of falsehood itself. The people of the order of gradation are those servants of the Resurrector who do not belong to an elite of perfect ones, but by ethical purification seek to progress towards this elite.

According to the second scheme, however, as attested to in *Taṣawwur* 14 [§118, 127], adherents of falsehood are those humans deprived of both the *sharī'at* as well as recognition of the Resurrection. The intermediary degree is not occupied by purification operating within an admixture of good and evil, but by attestation of religious law, thus assuring the maintenance of unity in multiplicity, of good in the face of dangers of disorder and rebellion. The final degree alone represents that of the people of unity (*ahl-i waḥadat*), those of the Resurrection. The location of ethical

purification is, therefore, at the junction of gradation and unity, whereas the *sharī'at* occupies the place of order of gradation as a whole.

This important discrepancy leads us to believe that the doctrine of concealment (*satr*), presupposing the restoration of the exoteric cult, provoked a serious upheaval of theory as witnessed by Ṭūsī. For him it is a matter of reconciling two schemes of thought, hardly compatible in themselves, by rejecting, on the one hand, the exotericists in the darkness of pure evil (which is what the doctrine of Resurrection did when it was proclaimed at Alamūt in 559/1164), but also by 'rescuing' them, on the other hand, in a scheme which situates exotericists at the level of the realm of the Soul. Our treatise is thus itself torn by the conflict experienced by the Nizārī Ismaili community (*jamā'at*) during Ṭūsī's time.

The status of moral purification is, therefore, a problematic one. If, in the hypothesis, the median world of those in the order of gradation is that of the adherents of *sharī'at*, moral purification becomes an adjunct of spiritual effort concomitant with religious law – superior no doubt, but not fundamentally hostile to a *sharī'at* which it prolongs and surpasses. In the hypothesis which seems to us to have been maintained throughout Ṭūsī's work, seeking the existence of all people of gradation to be absorbed in one ethical purification, the *sharī'at* is no other than this purification of the soul which takes place entirely oriented towards the Imam of the Resurrection.

Purification is a battle, it is even *the* battle *par excellence*. By intensifying the contradiction which rules between unity, that is, the First Intellect, and multiplicity which affects the Universal Body; between the people of unity and the people of opposition who correspond respectively to these two realms, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī introduces an idea with a very Manichaean flavour, that of First Ignorance (*jahl-i awwal*).

Admittedly, First Ignorance is not a principle of evil symmetrical to the First Intellect, in the sense of being another existent principle, effectively real. In effect, on its own, it has no existent principle due to the fact that ignorance is pure deprivation. But in First Ignorance manifests a major denial constituted from ignorance and error, a denial claiming to be effective in itself but which is, nevertheless, an effect within the pleroma of Intellects and the hierarchy of Souls. It is this denial, this refusal to attest to the unity of the paradoxical One, of the One above and beyond being, that was the cause for the 'drama in heaven'. As Fatimid theologians have described it, the third Archangel, afflicted by vertigo,

by stupor, 'forgets' to profess *tawḥīd* and falls to the tenth rank. First Ignorance is the cause of the sacred history of humanity just as it is of the cosmic drama. It will be necessary, in fact, for humanity to go through seven great cycles, each achieving perfection in a Great Resurrection, so that the Archangel might 'ascend', degree by degree, from the tenth to the third rank, and re-establish the universal order of the Pleroma.[22]

The moral battle of the human soul, engaged against the opposition and ignorance which threaten it, witnesses in favour of this redemption of the Archangel. It is the instrument for the historic salvation of humanity (of progress from cycle to cycle) as of the transcendent salvation of the Intellects themselves, or more precisely of the third among them. Ethical purification serves the Archangel of humanity in its salutary ascent. Moral combat is not possible if we are one of those human beings plunged entirely in the darkness of the corporeal realm. It begins at the level of the realm of the Soul, of the mixture between good and evil, and it has as its adversaries, evil in the soul and evil outside the soul, as manifested in the adherents of falsehood: 'The summons and the obligations, which the rightful leaders impose, are directed at the good...[they] are not intended for the wicked so that they might become good' [§130].

From this point, the moral battle presents itself in the form of the major *jihād*, of a *jihād* led against oneself, against the soul dark and imperative. In the pen of ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Walīd, who led the community of Ismailis remaining loyal to the Fatimid branch in Yemen at the end of the 6th/12th century, we read the following words:

> It is necessary to sacrifice one's life in an approach to God, according to the obligations mentioned, by which the Imam is commissioned in the book of the perceptible *jihād*. As for the *jihād* led by the path of the intellect, it is a battle of the soul against one's passions and compulsions, of preventing desire to deviate from religious prescription. It is to establish justice among brute savages in a certain necessary realisation, that is, a battle against the faculty of anger; it is to guard against the satanic faculty. This battle is more intense than the battle against the sons of Adam. The proof has been given to us in the words of our Prophet, saying upon the return of a battle: 'We have all moved from the minor *jihād* towards the major *jihād*.' This refers to the battle of the soul against its [baser]inclinations, where the soul tears itself towards the obedience of God; it then behaves according to the norms dear to God.[23]

The universe of the spiritual battle is suffused with light from

Platonism. It is a question of tearing oneself away from the darkness of injustice and to raise oneself towards the rule of divine law, *nāmūs*, a *nomos* which the Ismailism of Alamūt would identify as a status superior to the *sharī'at*, a status of unity, experienced by the people of the Resurrection. If the minor *jihād*, inevitable against the people of opposition, is directed towards literal legislation, the major *jihād* is a battle to institute a superior law, the divine *nomos* [§453]. It is an action internal to the soul, where it delivers itself from the domination of two dangerous faculties, concupiscence and wrath, by the grace of the exercise of intellect. To the couple of exoteric and esoteric correspond well the couple of sense-perceptible and intelligible.

In the view of Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, *jihād* is reinterpreted and conceieved at the level of the soul submitted to the categories of opposition and gradation. Ṭūsī distinguishes souls that progress upon the path of perfection from souls that belong to the category of opposition. The first, when they move from potential to act, become the best of creatures, whereas the second, also moving from potential to act, become the worst of creatures. It is, therefore, not the actualisation of neutral potentialities of the soul that produces the perfection of its substance, but rather the actualisation of particular potentialities and of these alone. A division, a spiritual war, splits souls into two antagonistic powers, which one is enabled to identify by the simple criteria of faithfulness and loyalty to the Imam. That is why it seems to us that the guiding principle of the spiritual battle supposes, in spite of the *satr* – which reinvests the *sharī'at* with a certain positive quality noted above in the median degree of gradation – a progressive substitution of religious law with the rigours of ethical purification. The truly 'good souls' are in the form of those who have renounced legalistic religion and all its imperfections linked to the state of an admixture of good and evil, to faults that maintain solidarity with the rule of sin and the letter of the law. The 'bad souls' are of the infidels, those of the order of opposition, but also of those who persevere in denial, the exoteric Muslims, who are attached solely to the literal meaning of revelation, and chained to the precepts and commandments of legalistic religion.

This scheme has a very dualistic flavour. It would not be complete if pure good and pure evil were not separated by the co-mingled, that is, the world of similitude or appearances. This domain is where history unfolds. There is pure matter, receptacle of pure souls; and there

is evil matter, pertaining to impure souls; and between the two, or like a transitory mixture of two matters, there is median matter, intermediary between pure and impure [§128]. Our period, the era of *satr* within the historic cycle, is a favourable time for this mixture, this confusion, which gives birth to appearance and similitude, where the internal sense and appearance of things and words exchange places, and one travesties the other. The eschatological mission of the adherents of the Real is to subject evil souls to practise a very particular form of *jihād*. It is not a question of making evil good, which is impossible by nature, but to break away from similitude, to conquer appearances, to impose distinction, something like a discernment of spirits. It is also a question of leading a battle against oneself, in such a manner as to rediscover the original angelic constitution that we have had to let go. *Jihād* is compared to an elixir that produces its effects upon bronze and transforms it into gold: *jihād* is alchemy of the soul.

It is appropriate to apply to the legal obligations of Islam a principle of universal hermeneutics. Here it is, as formulated by Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī in one of his shorter treatises: 'Each existent reality possesses an exoteric, apparent aspect (*ẓāhir*) and an esoteric, hidden (*bāṭin*) aspect. For example, the apparent is this inferior world, whereas the hidden is a superior world; and all that is in this inferior world, which is apparent, will also exist in the world of the esoteric.'[24] These correspondences do not obliterate the opposition between inferior and superior, but they make it so that one can pass from one to the other, in a transformation that would also be a conversion, a liberating detachment. *Ta'wīl*, spiritual exegesis, is also an exodus from the apparent, and in this sense *ta'wīl* is a *jihād*; it is even the soul of the real *jihād*.

It is then that the good souls discover that they are placed in a hierarchy according to a certain gradation. The hierarchy of various inner meanings of *jihād* will correspond to this gradation of souls. Let us leave, at the lowest degree, *jihād* in its apparent sense, corporeal *jihād*, which is an external battle, requiring only physical force. As we see, this *jihād* or military action is sometimes necessary, but it is physical, inferior.

Ismailism will renounce armed struggle after the fall of Alamūt, due to material weakness no doubt, but especially as a function of this weakness constitutive of a corporeal war that proves to be the lowest degree of *jihād*. The superior forms of *jihād* are directed towards 'internal enemies': first there is spiritual *jihād*, which is 'fighting the reality of

one's own [inner] darkness by the effect of one's own light'; above that, intellectual *jihād* is 'to fight against the effect of one's own inner darkness by the reality of one's own light'; and finally, the true-real *jihād* is 'to combat one's own self, afflicted with all that is potentially ungodly, apart or dissociated from God, by the aid of God's Selfhood (*huwiyyat*), the Almighty Necessary Being' [§453]. The four degrees of *jihād* correspond to four modes of perception and knowledge of the Imam: corporeal, spiritual, intellectual and finally, real knowledge, that of the unity of the Divine and the human, that of the One.

The growing internalisation of the struggle directs one from the light that we intensify to fight the source of obscurity, to the source of this light itself. The last, ultimate degree of *jihād* is said to be 'real' because it corresponds to the revelation of effective-reality (*ḥaqīqat*), above and beyond the apparent and the hidden; to freedom in the soul, effusions of the Divine Imperative; to the trajectory of the soul from the status of a being simply possible, not necessary, to the status of necessary existent, in imitation of the Necessary Being *par excellence*, the indescribable, inexpressible unique Principle of all things. In other words, *jihād* becomes divinisation of self.

For tactical details of the spiritual battle, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī remains loyal to the philosophers. At the beginning of their lives, men endure domination of the sensory, imaginative and estimative forces; their souls are overwhelmed by weakness [§185–89]. The intensification of sensory forces leads the soul to its own occultation. As long as the soul is not freed from animalistic desires, 'seductions of habit', and natural forces, neither terrestrial nor celestial salvation is possible. We see that it is indeed a question of cleansing the soul of the soul itself, such as it is when it has the form of a physical-sensory body. If salvation did not lie in the beatific vision of the Imam, we would not leave the terrain of peripatetic thought; but it suffices that finality be what it is here, so that the meaning of the whole changes.

In effect, ethics presuppose norms and commandments. For, one of the doctrines most dear to Ismailism is that of the meta-history of cycles.[25] Since Adam, humanity moves thus from cycles of concealment into cycles of revelation, and these come to completion in the apocalyptic appearance of the man of God, of the Resurrector, corresponding to the seventh Prophet-Enunciator (*nāṭiq*). He manifests effective-reality of all things; he personifies the original creative Imperative, the Divine Word.

The Imperative expresses the Divine Real in that it exceeds being as well as non-being. It does not, therefore, originate being-ness in the being, but it dispossesses being of its finitude in being. That is why purification is proof of the excess with regard to being, by which the creature unites paradoxically in the infinite that originates it.

Ṭūsī's Ismaili morality is incomprehensible if we do not relate it to the ontology of the paradoxical One as the foundation of ethical purification. Its locus is the bearer of truth (*muḥiqq*), the upholder of the Real, who appears in each period and renders excellence to moral actions. More generally, one's respect of the commandments of truth lead to good, disrespect to evil. Ethical purification consists, therefore, of submitting oneself to the indescribable, inexpressible God, not as He manifests in the Law but as He manifests in the figure of the upholder of the Real, the truthful one of his period (*muḥiqq-i waqt*), whose most perfect expression is obedience and submission (*taslīm*). Internal freedom of the soul and its total submission to the Resurrector are one and the same.

An objection immediately comes to mind: are the commandments not as variable as the will of the Imam? If that is the case, how do we reconcile this with moral rectitude which presupposes the eternity and universality of these principles. Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī rejects this objection by exalting the cyclical variations of the Imperative: it is not necessary to maintain the customs and conduct that one tenant of the Real had rendered licit, to the point when another tenant of the Real sees the moral prosperity and indicates the conduct to follow in a different way [§266].

The Resurrector is one, but Ṭūsī wrote after the messianic experience of the Great Resurrection came to an end, when a period of *satr* had begun. Once again, the Imams conceal themselves under the appearance of words, of the Word whose immediate presence recedes. At times, Ṭūsī alludes to the Resurrector whose advice he reports, and sometimes he evokes the problem posed by the historic variation of Imams. Overall, the Master of Truth is much closer to the Nocturnal Council instituted by Plato's Laws than the Aristotelian Sage.[26] His reflections are not capricious but the expression of unimaginable freedom for one who contemplates the True. The seemingly arbitrary judgements of the Imam, like the secrets of the Nocturnal Council, are justified by the infinite potential of divine truth which they have the responsibility to assume.

Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī demonstrates in this regard that variability in

moralia conforms to the authentic righteous behaviour of man. There are two realms in correspondence: the created (*'ālam-i khalq*) and the Imperative-Word (*'ālam-i 'amr*). In the first, man distinguishes himself from animal by his rightful station. In the second, he must attain the righteous behaviour of the soul (*istiqāmat-i nafs*). Receiving the teachings of the Imam, he ought to obtain it. And just as in the realm of creation man distinguishes himself from animal, so in the realm of the Imperative, true men, those whose conduct is proper, distinguish themselves 'from those who only seem to be men, but in reality are not.'

The whole of Ṭūsī's moral philosophy is governed by the opposition between the True-Real and the world of similitude. In so doing, he develops a system necessary for all radical ethics: the truthful person distinguishes himself from the dissembling one, and the subject of action presents itself in the characteristics of True Man. We can easily find, in our times, similar expressions of such a concept.

Moral rectitude demonstrates itself in one's thoughts regarding the True-Real, in proper speech and in good deeds, all three according to the imperative of the Imam of the time. Thus, to attain the correct authentic moral permanence, man must submit himself to the commands of the Imam. Commandment can only come from two sources: direct spiritual assistance from the Imam (*ta'yīd*), or teaching (*ta'līm*) received from a master who has been a recipient of special assistance from the Imam.

What is the purpose of this moral combat? We can convey it in a concentrated formula: one must fight against egoism. In effect, the substance and premise of all good behaviour is love and friendship of the Imam of the time (*dūstī-i imām-i waqt*) [§269]. Now one cannot at the same time engage in this love and the love of self. Thus, the proper order would be to love the Imam and not to love oneself (*ū-rā dūst-dāshtan wa khūd-rā dūst-nadāshtan*). A love which is not pure, but tainted with love of self, as little as it might be, the Imam will not accept. The most solid foundation of ethical purification consists in not loving one's self because this self is fictional, illusory. The true reality of the subject is to be found in his cause, and this cause is the freedom of the Imperative, which resides above and beyond all existents, above and beyond body and spirit, and which appears only by the orders and commandments of the Imam.[27]

The moral paradox is here at its climax: whosoever loves himself does not love truly, and he who loves the Imam with a love purified of

all egoism engages all being, with true existentiating freedom. It is this freedom which is evoked by Ṭūsī in the famous tradition of the Prophet: 'If the earth was deprived of the Imam for one single moment, it would perish with all its inhabitants.'

The ethics of *taslīm*

The obedience of a Muslim sincerely devoted to the Word of God is expressed in precise actions, in the performance of regular duties which, by interrupting the course of the day, provide scansion to it. It is essentially a form of worship that is not satisfied by intentions alone, but requires a direct link between good intention and good action. The prophetic and legalitarian religion of *sharī'at* imposes nothing more, nothing less.[28]

Ismaili morality, in the view of Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, differs from this. According to the *sharī'at*, obedience is not at first an ethical motive but religious behaviour itself. However, by elevating ethics above legal obligations, the reformed Ismailism of Alamūt freed a vast area for reflection dedicated to moral attitudes. A purely spiritual religion cannot surpass norms, and if for its requirements it does not turn to religious law, it can only construct a philosophy of existence, a theory of human behaviour and conduct. It hardly matters that, in appearance, the exoteric cult was re-established by *satr*, the new period of concealment, since an open breach had left the adept facing himself in an essential relationship with his Imam.[29] A new formulation of the problematic of moral concern was thus born.

Ṭūsī insists upon a permanent concern for the fear of God, so that each action, where obedience transpired of its own becoming, would materialise in the presence of an angel [§279–85].[30] If in his thought the loyal-faithful honours God, this thought is certainly not the simple accomplishment of religious law. As it proceeds from the soul, or rather from the intellect which culminates at the summit of the thoughtful human soul, the 'good thought' is a luminous, intelligible effusion. It configures the angel of the soul, the very soul which is henceforth an actualised, concrete spiritual being. Conversely, the 'bad thought' works to configure the Satan of the soul, its demonic face. The development of this doctrine of the human soul makes it one of the members of the Universal Soul, which in turn, seeks to be the unified totality of the *rūḥāniyyāt* or spiritual beings, vouchsafed to all the living.

The angel of the soul is conceived in the manner in which Suhrawardī conceived the Lights in their relation with regent souls, a relationship of triumphant domination and invigorating love.[31] 'Good thought' emanates from Divine Reality and, according to this emanation, it renders itself appropriate to rise in the core of the human soul; it is both free action of the soul and an action of the angel upon the soul, at the confluence of the procession of lights and conversion of soul.

This 'affinity with the Real' becomes the cause of marriage between the human soul and the light of summons (*da'wat*) to the Real. One must understand this last sentence as two aspects of the same reality. On the one hand, the soul renders itself by obedience to the Divine Light that summons it; on the other hand, the word *da'wat* has a technical meaning organically linked to Ismaili political vocabulary. It is the hierarchy of ranks inside the vast network of teaching and the link that unites servant with Imam. By his 'good thought' the loyal-faithful receives light from the organisation of perfect beings culminating in the supreme *ḥujjat*. This spiritual obedience/submission (*taslīm*) provokes the appearance of an angel of guidance which will accompany the faithful in such a manner as to ensure that the believer does not err on the path of rectitude in his rapport with the Real.

What applies to thought is also true for speech: he who expresses the fear of God becomes the symbol of intelligibles (*mathal-i ma'lūmāt*). Fear is good; in fact it is the most important category of *taslīm* and obtains from the oft-repeated commandments of the Imam. It is, therefore, not a case of simple reference to philosophical ideals of the contemplative life. It is fear, source of the proper word, which engenders spiritual power (*quwwat-i ruḥāniyyāt*). This, in turn, gives rise to an angel participating in the speech pronounced by man. The same goes for deeds: from good deeds emerge powers that give rise to an angel corresponding to the soul.

The good thought, the good word, the good deed, together form a gradation, a procession of three angelic lights. The gradual process is spiritual incorporation, a formation of the spiritual body of the Elect, of a 'body made from spirit', encompassing the behaviour of man guided by a salutary fear, the spirit constituting his speech and the intellect his thought. The Imperative becomes a generating centre for an individual, and circles of intelligence, of spirit, of body, organise themselves around this perfect centre. The Elect henceforth live *in the Imperative*. The

individual's principle is no longer his belonging to the world of creation, but his true principle in the realm of the Imperative, the source free from existence, where silent liberty of the universal existentiating Principle is expressed. The envelope is the body, the corporealisation of all spiritual emanation. The body becomes manifestation (not incarnation) of the Imperative. The doctrine of morality is faithful to the docetic scheme.

The ethic of *taslīm* is thus a paradoxical translation of freedom from the Imperative in man. When the loyal-faithful reaches the heights of obedience, it is then that he thinks, speaks and moves in the Imperative; conversely, obedient action, speech and thought are the utmost expressions of spiritual liberty. We witness in Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī's Ismaili moral philosophy an operation that renders possible the transformation of a Neoplatonic scheme into a *politic of the supra-sensory*. Let us not be misunderstood. We do not mean to say that mysticism transformed by Neoplatonic thought 'degrades itself' in politics, but that although schemes of thought have not exactly undergone political transformation in the universe of Hellenic thought, in late antiquity (one ought to set aside the Emperor Julian) they undergo a metamorphosis into a morality converted for important requirements of the *da'wat*, in the temporal organisation of the Imam. But the latter is, *ipso facto*, the organisation of spiritual bodies, of those who live in the Imperative, who manifest the supra-sensory.

This is why it seems to us necessary to introduce the concept of a politic of the supra-sensory, distanced as far from politics conceived as an art of governing bodies and souls in the horizon of finitude, as it is from a vision of salvation bereft of all summons, to a plural link in the unity of a superior Imperative. It seems to us, therefore, that there is a scintillating example here of what might have been in Islam the transformation of Neoplatonism (reticent regarding all political agendas) into a spiritual weapon. An organisation which makes this spiritual weapon its own seeks to assemble the loyal-faithful, drawn towards a messianic event: an actuality where manifests (not incarnates) in the man of existentiation, the Imam, the Imperative, the primordial Word.

Spiritual medicine

Man does not submit to such obedience except by medicine for the soul. This is a dominant theme in classical and Islamic philosophy, which

may be traced back to the famous texts by Plato (not to mention Pythagoreanism). In his case, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī speaks of medicine for the soul by opposing the dietetics of the sage to the excesses of Sufi ascetics [§286–9].[32] Briefly, the Ismailis, 'the people of the True-Real' (*ahl-i ḥaqq*) are friendly towards the body in order to become better critics of their souls. We rediscover here the Avicennian thesis which sees the senses becoming a means of perfecting the soul. Pious ascetics destroy 'the eye of sense-perception'. They behave like he who mounts a horse with a precise destination in mind but abandons the ride when it is not possible for him to go by foot. They perish due to wild beasts before whom they remain stupid, taken aback.

Ṭūsī contrasts a diet suitable for love of truth to the excessively strict and poor diet of ascetics. The first, thanks to healthy nourishment, reinforces the vital spirit; the second renders the blood thick and dense. From black bile arise the two most distressful afflictions: anxiety and melancholy.[33] It seems to us that this thesis is one of the most important. In fact, Ismailism itself is not without its own encounters with melancholy, in the impossible mourning that its adepts endure for the Day of Resurrection, which dawns with intense clarity only to fade away that very moment. It appears to us also that the cyclical return of messianic hope bears witness to this highly melancholic atmosphere.

The term 'melancholy' designates in our analysis of spiritual time an ontological configuration, a certain general sentiment of being, a coloration of the soul, a phenomenology of time which is experienced, lived, and no longer a nosologic [disease-related] category. This melancholy is inseparable from the structure of Ismaili supra-sensory history and cosmos: the awaited Resurrector returns, after having already appeared, only to disappear and reappear without end; eternal return of oneself, without the final act of Resurrection sealing the fate of history by a stable event, by a real triumph. Nostalgia, along with expectation without hope, is the consequence of this structure.

Ṭūsī deals with the question of melancholy in *Taṣawwur* 24 after the issue of the false prophet has been clarified [§343–44]. The melancholic (*mamrūr*), 'possessed by a spirit (*parī dār*)', is to the Imam of the Real what the false prophet is to the Prophet. There is, indeed, revelation of the lights of *malakūt*, but so blurred and confused that the truth of what he sees cannot be interpreted unless the melancholic is submitted to violent treatments that might cleanse his speech of its volcanic madness. (None-

theless, by attending to the *positivity* of what he reveals, like the place he occupies, the dark side corresponding to the luminous side, Ṭūsī tells us how much the question of melancholy does not cease to haunt a thought which is itself always threatened by melancholy, as a consequence of its messianic nostalgia.)

Ascetism, by annihilating the force of two important faculties, concupiscence and anger, deprives man of his virtues such as love of self, ardour and courage [§290–93]. Deprived of desire, the ascetic is deprived of government of self, and he has only the choice between two destinies, of becoming either a woman or a beast, when without his own doing, in spite of himself, dormant powers arise: 'A person who suppresses the power of lust can be counted neither among the divisions of mankind nor among the divisions of womankind. Should lust ever accidentally overpower him, there will be no difference between him and a beast' [§291]. Such conditions are effects of an absence. They do not arise from a conflict between animalistic faculties and their control, but the fading away of conflict for lack of adversaries. By suppressing desire and anger, one ceases to govern oneself and is placed in danger of having too much desire mingled with too much anger (the state of an animal) or of losing all desire: woman is man without concupiscence.

To the practices of ascetics, Ṭūsī opposes the traditional rules of moral philosophy. It is on this point, no doubt, that the current treatise provides a teaching similar to that of the *Akhlāq-i Nāṣirī* and to the Aristotelian tradition. He proposes in effect that, with regard to desire and anger, one needs neither excess nor deficiency. He knows that the 'golden mean' is not the mean average obtained by the division in two of defective behaviour added to excessive behaviour, but it is instead the perfection of one faculty, the intellect. The intellect controls animalistic faculties until they are pacified and subjugated to a determined task. The vocabulary of Aristotle is combined with Qur'anic lexicon. The sexual metaphor continues to be spun. Whereas the excessive ascetic becomes effeminate, the well-guided faithful sees joining in himself the male and the female, respectively anger and desire, such that the yoke imposed by the intellect is as natural as matrimonial union.

It is correct to speak of the state of nature in this case, since the union of masculine and feminine engender an abundantÂ moral progeny, which is the normal condition of existence (*ḥal-i wujūd*). We will notice also that the feminine in this state is desire, whereas the ascetic becoming

a female was the consequence of the absence of sexual desire. There is no contradiction, for desire is accompanied by fantastic imagination, and it seeks life which, like the female, is driven by the principle of pleasure. Anger is near to man, for it protects life from a salutary violence, when it is well-guided. But the ascetic, having neither desire nor anger, becomes effeminate in another sense: he places himself outside the universe where free initiative and struggle are necessary.

Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī announces a series of virtues which also stem from the tradition of Hellenic philosophy, all the while belonging to a register of traditional morality in Shi'ism [§293]. The list is disordered, without beginning or systematic end, not ordered according to any hierarchy. It hardly corresponds as such to the efforts of classification in the *Akhlāq-i Nāṣirī*, still less to those of Aristotle. What is common between these virtues and the vices opposed to it? Both virtues and vices create: the one forges a sustainable link between servants of the ideal community; the other leads to dissension and an unfortunate formulation of plurality comparable to the basic maliciousness of matter. Virtues are strength for unity; vices are powers for multiplicity. The reason why the list provided is in a certain disorder is simple. Ṭūsī is here concerned by virtues only to the extent of preparing a work explaining the most important form of morality.

'To be above one's self'

This is expressed in the language of Platonism of the purest kind. Just as, according to Plato, virtues are necessary but insufficient, moral salvation, according to Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, requires more [§294–9]. The moral act *par excellence* is recollection. We have seen that each person has to lead a permanent battle against his self. The fight against egoism allows a return to self without the illusions and favours one unfairly accords oneself. To perceive his imperfection, his weakness of being, man must engage in recollection. Without this, his soul would never be able to remind itself of its own nature (*fiṭrat*), it would not attain its own perfection. Egoism is the most false relation with self. The 'I' that it exalts veils the soul from itself and obfuscates the true subject: 'For the reason that man loves himself, the knowledge of his imperfection and weaknesses are hidden from him, painful, almost impossible.' The greatest danger is the admiration of self, which hides, damages and endangers.

The battle against egoism is thus the first step of true return to self, which is the return of the soul to what resides outside of self, this true part from where it was exiled. The Platonic notion here echoes one of the most common themes in spiritual literature. It supposes a division of the soul into a subject which it must rejoin and an 'I' which hinders it, an 'I' which veils its own darkness and the requirements of return.

What path shall the soul take? At the instant when it glorifies itself, it will ask itself: what does it mean to be good (*nīkī chīst*)? The response cannot be other than this: there is no pure goodness except in perfection (*kamāl*). Who therefore is perfectly good? Who possesses good absolutely complete, and what of perfection? This cannot be said of all members of the summons, the *da'wat*. The moral subject will know very well that he has not reached the highest rank, that he has not at all attained the level of 'the perfect' as yearned for. Thus, there are two degrees in self-criticism. According to the first degree, the soul ceases to derive pleasure in the lie that he once lived. The first condition of this conversion is recollection, the ascension of the soul, degree by degree, in the spiritual universe. And just as Plato wished that the prisoner of the cave had his face turned by force towards true realities, so Ṭūsī demands as a first step in the path of enlightening progress, conversion to the *da'wat*, to the sodality of the Imam. In the second degree, the follower in the order of gradation compares himself to the Imam, the point of absolute perfection, and will readily conclude that he would not know how to measure his moral strengths with those of the Imam. Indeed, the Imam is this point of the Real that renders possible the critique of oneself.

Just as it is necessary to recognise where the true-good resides, it is necessary to engage in an examination of conscience. Admittedly, there is a radical maliciousness about it in Ṭūsī's words, but perhaps I shall not be party to it.

> If I am deficient in all respects and have not reached perfection in any respect, and am bad in proportion to that deficiency which belongs to my essence, the wickedness they ascribe to me is thus true and not false, and therefore I should not be offended by the truth and deny it. I should rather be offended by my own deficiency, not by its being pointed out to me. I must oppose this wickedness in myself and not attempt to repudiate his words [§297].

How not to read these lines about the examination of conscience as a

singular expression, in the milieu of radical Ismailism, of what modern scholars have called *auto-critique* (self-criticism)?

The analysis of self can certainly take on very different forms. There is the case of Seneca who examines his day as it passes and detects there the neglect that does not depend on him. The daily examination is for him a nocturnal dialogue of self with self. The examination, conducted by Marcus Aurelius, consists of rehearsing examples, a recollection, of admirable lives.[34] The Stoic sage is free in his solitude, and the one who questions him is no other but himself; the other who dictates the precepts which he writes down to better remember is himself.

In the precise form of self-criticism proposed by Ṭūsī, however, we are far from this relationship of self with self. There is no such dialogue for the simple reason that there is no dialogue at all. On the one side is the loyal-faithful, neither too good nor too bad; on the other side, the plethora of criticisms which can come from no matter whom, which respect nothing of the dignity of the 'I' to whom they address themselves. This aspect is probably that of other members of the *da'wat*. It is not a matter for the loyal-faithful to examine his conduct or to remind himself of principles, but to accept the criticism and public confession of his faults. This examination is conducted by another, and it has as its aim a moral conversion, a lesson in humility. The battle against egoism is, indeed, at the end of a moral process, as it is also its beginning (since there is self-criticism when the subject prefers the offence he endures) in so far as it frees the truth to arguments that his troubled reason dictate to him, against his detractors.

No doubt this model of self-criticism is linked to one of the practices of spiritual medicine: to speak freely; but with this important difference: the free speech of companions of the *da'wat* express the freedom, superior to it, of the Imam, who represents a freedom much greater than their own reason. Unrestrained criticism has as its aim obedience/submission to the Imam and, in the interim, the recognition by the 'I' of one's own fundamental, basic imperfection.

The source of this type of examination is found probably in the Galenic medicine of passions. Galen proposes, in effect, to 'address himself to someone who designates, for each one us, those of our acts which have not been accomplished correctly.' It is necessary to 'consider as a saviour and one's greatest friend he who denounces each one of our faults.' To be accused of being wrong is a good thing, for 'this compels you to examine

more precisely what you do.' The man who wishes to be saved 'must allow everyone to blame him.' The watchword would be: 'Before all else, be ashamed of yourself.'[35]

Self-criticism is a form. It is quite remarkable that the morality of Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī gives us such a good example of it, for this proves that modern self-criticism has its precedents, that these precedents constitute the genealogy of a practice of truth, and that it can be situated, when it engenders the most radical modalities of this practice, in the horizon of a messianic religion. The moral effort, in voluntary humiliation, consists of receiving criticism favourably, that is to say, the analysis conducted by others in the name of a superior moment, *in the name of the Other*. For that matter, we are not all together in the logic of spontaneous confession. And there is a major difference between self-criticism as practised in the messianic horizon and the source of the Galenic medicine. Certainly others, as in this form of medicine, express themselves freely, without reserve, in a sort of frank speech which is part of the history of *parrhesia* [freedom of speech]. Moral progress consists in the acceptance of this critical speech.

The key word of self-criticism is shame of self as in the debasement of oneself. But there is not here the shade of 'perfecting oneself' by self or other. Self-criticism has not for its aim, by way of speech of the other, to perfect oneself for oneself, but *for the Other*, here for the Imam. The debasement of self consists of no longer being oneself; to be such that one serves the *da'wat* without reserve. The Other and not the same is the category of self-criticism. That is why we believe that the examination proposed by Ṭūsī breaks away from the classical world, and this is made possible by an important departure in messianic belief – a split which rejects self-criticism from the point of view of modernity – according to which self-criticism has three terms: the 'I', the 'others' and the 'Other'.

Moral precepts are summarised in this imperative: 'It is necessary for me to want to be above myself.' How many of us are far from the calm exercise of these virtues? The soul has before it an open field of qualitative knowledge, all built upon the successive negations of the 'I'. Much later in Twelver Shī'ī philosophy, Mullā Ṣadrā was to conceive ethical destiny as a growing intensification of his act of being, leading to 'subsistence', by the mediation of various annihilations, in the proximity of the Other, the Face of the Imam.[36] Indeed, it seems that Shī'ism, in the margins with respect to religious law, has valued this requirement of indefinite debase-

ment, whose tension has in its horizon the mode of angelic being. The soul never ceases to be an ascending movement towards a purity whose axis is the Imam. The importance of what Ṭūsī says here, however, relates to the intensification of the soul as a direct function of its capacity for self-criticism. The best warrior of the *da'wat* is he who progresses, not by personal enrichment, but under the harsh eye of others, returning him to the point of view taken by the Imam of him – he who always goes beyond his present state, under repeated fire of criticism, so that he interiorises. Need one add that this is a form of life that one can find in many radical systems of ethics?

The serious work of unveiling oneself leads to the foundation of moral conduct: the figure of the Resurrector. More precisely, the discernment given to the loyal-faithful to exercise precedes the ideal of imitation, and since it is in advance, its archetypal power guarantees the truth of the day, which is discernment on the Day of the Resurrection. Ṭūsī presents the *ta'wīl* of Qur'ān, 30:57 (*'On that Day, their excuse will not profit those who did injustice, nor will they be invited to seek grace'*) as follows: 'If your profession of love for the Lord of the Age be true and sincere, tell us, which one of your friends have you hated for the Imam's sake, and which one of your enemies have you loved for his sake?' [§299]. The Day when the effective-reality of the created world and of the realm of the Imperative will step out of the shadow, when there is no longer the exoteric or the esoteric, is also the Day when the masks of feigned friendship and of play-acted enmity will fall. The consequence depends on the choice of friends: 'We could say that if such and such, who was the friend of our Lord, even if he was our enemy, we will regard him as a friend.' To the question, 'Who are our friends? Who are our enemies?', the response is given from the point of view of the Imam, who renders the Real present, and his figure determines the divisions of community and the choice of desires.

The categories of *taslīm*

Taṣawwur 23 is dedicated entirely to the concept of *taslīm*, to its forms and meaning. This evokes, first of all, a division of being: there is being which is possible (*mumkin*) and there is the Necessary (*wājib*). This is a classic distinction made ever since the *falāsifa*. But by insisting on the intrinsic property of the Necessary, Suhrawardī has given it a new

orientation: it is sufficient in itself (*ghanī*); it has the freedom of He who depends on no one. Thus, in the Avicennian tradition, Suhrawardī has validated the theme of ontological need with regard to the Necessary. Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī joins this *ishrāqī* tradition by recalling which ontological need sets possible beings into motion – the movement of which Aristotle spoke, and which tended to imitate divine perfection until the moment of final repose becomes an ontological deficiency.

This movement takes place 'from the very centre of the earth unto the outermost extreme of the farthest firmament, even unto the Universal Soul and the First Intellect' [§300]. The aptitude of each being predisposes it to rise from degree to degree. Such is its perfection. It realises its potential whilst ascending, and the movement is nothing other than the being's act of obedience. Obedience is the universal law of movement towards perfection in that it alone transforms into the Principle, free and independent. Ṭūsī's moral obedience is thus based on cosmology and Neoplatonic ontology, as well as on an interpretation of Suhrawardī. Obedience is no longer a simple moral attitude; rather it becomes the moral attitude *par excellence*, because it is rooted in ontological poverty with regard to divine richness.

Obedience is in essence 'blind'. It must be so. The example of the ignorant and the man of perfect intelligence illustrates this excellently. The first submits to the second his sense and his intellect; he submits the freedom of his wishes (*ikhtiyār-i khūd*). For he who obeys, obedience reaches the depth of his heart, since this expression of free will is the mirror of the divine Imperative. Ṭūsī clearly distinguishes between the wise and the ignorant, the paradigm of division between the loyal-faithful one of the *da'wat* and his disciple who has not yet attained higher degrees of gradation. The test to which he submits the obedient reminds us of certain extreme practices in eremitic education: 'If he tells him that bright daylight is the dark of night or that the dark of night is bright daylight, he will not object to this in his heart, nor ask the reason why and wherefore. Once this point has been reached, so that the free will and personal desire of the imperfect and ignorant person have become merged with, and annihilated in, the will and desire of the wise and perfect person, he the [disciple] will have emerged from the pit of ignorance and reached the degree of knowledge' [§302].

To obey, to submit, to cease to think for oneself, is to cease to see by one's own eyes. Evidence not guaranteed by the word of the Master is not

admitted. Conversely, apparent falsehood becomes truth if it pleases the Master that appearances are what they seem to be. For the truth is not what we see when we are indigent, but what the Master enunciates. Such is clearly the principle of exegetic authority, which transforms all forms of apparition into symbol. Hence, there exists a very strong link between, on one hand, the demands of spiritual exegesis (*ta'wil*) of the Book and the world, and on the other hand, the annihilation of the disciple's free will. Ṭūsī's theology reserves freedom for the Master alone, for in the last instance only God is free and only the Imam manifests this freedom. We are in the presence of a theology where the disciple rediscovers freedom just at the very moment he abandons it.

For after all, destruction is also absorption. Just as the conversion of Nature towards Soul absorbs one into the other, the annihilation of freedom raises this liberty to a higher level. The Plotinian scheme of conversion is put to the service of spiritual pedagogy. Let us add that the freedom of the Master (that is, pre-eminently, of the Imam) never proves to be better than in the paradox. To obey is to agree to see the opposite of what we see. Absolute obedience is the correlate of masterful control in so far as it reflects the Divine Imperative. To make oneself worthy of the Real, to submit, as little as it might be, to the height of His touch, however chaotic and indefinite, one must obey absurdly, one must obey blindly.

How does this obedience become true to man? To understand this, we should conceive the emanating effusion (*ifāḍat*) of the supreme Word, from universe to universe, as if it were a cosmic system of obedience ordered in hierarchy. Here again, we hear the distant echo of Suhrawardī. He defined the relationship between a superior, triumphant Light and a light immediately below it like a relationship of love and domination. Royalty, government, guidance: such are the powers of the superior Light. Generally speaking, the heritage of the *Theology* of Aristotle, so clearly present in these pages of Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, enables one to understand how perfection is ordered in a hierarchy throughout the 'chain of beings'. This effusion is completed in man, where it has the name of obedience, since every degree of emanation is just as well a degree of conversion, and the Neoplatonic couple of emanation and conversion, of descent and ascent, of origin and return, are henceforth interpreted by, and in the couple formed of, freedom and obedience.

Finally, let us return to the forms of *taslīm* in man. Its analysis cannot be made without complicating the already established system. In effect,

some say that when man performs an act of obedience to the Master of the Imperative, we can ask him: 'Have you done this with full conscious understanding of your submission or blindly?' [§306]. And one must measure his perfection by this obedience. What we called above 'blind obedience' is not exclusive of spiritual penetration; quite the contrary, it is obedience 'blinded' by the excess of knowledge, by the game of penetrating the effective-reality of the true Master and of the Real who guides him. Whereas true obedience presupposes the recognition of the Imperative, blind obedience, in the literal sense of the law, is the fruit of the lowest form of obedience, since it rests upon ignorance of the most perverse kind, that which ignores itself.

Thus, we should distinguish two forms of obedience: one which blinds itself by an excess of love and conversion; and another which blinds itself through lack of knowledge of the only knowledge which counts: the knowledge of the Master of the Imperative.

4. The Resurrector

The doctrine of manifestation (*maẓhar*)

At one level of meaning, the Resurrector (*qā'im*) appears at the end of each cycle of legalistic prophecy to accomplish the spiritual Resurrection (*qiyāmat*) and to complete the work of revealing hidden meanings (*bāṭin*) beneath the apparent meaning (*ẓāhir*) of the revealed letter [§319]. It is not a question here of giving the word 'Resurrection' a physical or corporeal meaning. Resurrection is not of the body, not an object of eschatological promise in the letter of revelation, but an act by which the loyal-faithful is delivered from his mode of corporeal being, from the world of creation, and his soul elevated to the realm of the Imperative. To understand how such an elevation is possible is to understand the fundamentally docetic scheme of Alamūtī Ismaili doctrine, and it is this aspect of the doctrine that we wish to evoke here.

It seems to us that Docetism, as a theory of knowledge, as well as a theory of Resurrection and Resurrector, offers real coherence to Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī's text. By 'Docetism', we mean a conception whose historic examples have first been given in the context of what have conveniently been called 'Christian heresies'. But it so happens that Docetism is also found in Shī'i Islam, at least if we admit that it designates, broadly

speaking, a conception of the man of God, wherein the Prophet commissioned as the Messiah (*masīḥ*) does not 'incarnate' the One and transcendent Divinity, but manifests this Unity in a human figure; not united to the Divinity by a hypostatic union, but linked to this Divinity by another kind of link, that which even constitutes both apparitional form (*maẓhar*) and the divine content of apparition (*maṣdar*). Between the form while revealing and the content as revealed lies the fine but essential distinction that separates the Principle from what proceeds from it, or rather the form in the mirror from the person who is therein reflected.

To understand the numerous pages dedicated here to the Resurrector, but also to the Prophet and to the *ḥujjat*, is therefore first to conceive how these physical figures, human and living in the world of creation, can be said to 'manifest' spiritual realities, and as a consequence, lead the loyal-faithful.

One finds, in effect, that whereas the hypostases emanating from the Principle, that is, the First Intellect and the Universal Soul, are respectively manifested in their created epiphanies, namely the *ḥujjat* and the Prophet, the Resurrector is the *maẓhār*, the locus or manifestation of the Imperative-Word. It is not inconceivable that all of the emanated realities have been thought through according to a Neoplatonic scheme, added and modified by the decisive introduction of the Imperative 'between' the paradoxical One and the First Intellect. What is more difficult to conceive is the theoretical act by which the figures (*ashkhāṣ*) or human individualities are identified as epiphanies of these hypostases. One must therefore analyse the structure of docetism as a theory of knowledge.

We learn from spiritual interpretation of human paradises and hells, that by these words we mean the different successive perfections and imperfections that man encounters in his own growth [§141–43]. Then Ṭūsī tells us that 'paradise is man and hell is man' [§151]. The key question is, therefore: what does the verb 'to be' mean? We will see that it is precisely this question which arises when it is affirmed that the Imam is the Master of the Sabbath. In what sense does 'being' enunciate itself in such affirmations?

Ṭūsī clearly tells us that all ideal realities, or concrete spiritual meanings (*ma'ānī*), which are effective-realities of apparent things (*ḥaqā'iq-i ẓāhir*), reside in the realm of the Imperative, assembled in the First Intellect. Paradise, acts of worship, good and beautiful deeds, in short all that eternally expresses the Divine Word, has an effective-reality.

Likewise, the bad and the wicked have in their manner a particular effective-reality in primordial ignorance. More generally, the structure of existence encompasses various degrees of origination and emanation. In the world of similitude or appearances, of Nature and sensory realities, things possess an apparent mode of being. In the realm of distinction, things possess various degrees or modes of being, which go from the unified multiple (imaginative or psychic mode of being) to a mode of being according to the unity of effective-realities (intelligible mode of being). Above and beyond the intelligible, each thing possesses its root, its foundation in the Divine Imperative itself. Spiritual exegesis allows, therefore, the ascent once more from sensory appearance to being in the Imperative. It is thus that each act of worship has for its effective-reality a particular intelligible essence, and for its generating centre a particular effusion from the existentiating Imperative.

We understand from now on that spiritual exegesis enables, in each sensory being, the unveiling of the presence of an intelligible essence, and of an effusion of the Imperative. The verb 'to be', therefore, designates the identity of the sensory and intelligible reality – but with one important condition however, the condition of Docetism itself: this identity includes in it the difference without effacing it, without abolishing it.

The sensory both *is* and *is not* the intelligible; it proceeds from the intelligible while retaining within itself an intelligible from which it proceeds, all the while maintaining open the gulf between the sensory and the intelligible. Identity is not identity of the identical and the different, but the difference within the identical, between the identical and the different. For example, the sensory practice of fasting is the effective-reality of the fast but it is not the entire intelligible reality situated in the realm of the Imperative. The identity designated by the copular verb 'is' designates paradoxical unity of the different and the identical.

Conversely, if we seek to understand why it will do that each effective-reality has a particular sensory and physical reality, we would say that all that exists at the level of the Imperative must effuse towards the First Intellect, that each spiritual reality (*ma'nā*) arising in the Intellect must proceed to an emanation in the Soul and finally in corporeal Nature. There is no hidden reality (*bāṭin*) without its epiphany in the sensory. To say that 'paradise is man' is to say, therefore, that it is necessary for the spiritual realities of Paradise to manifest themselves in man, in an individual human being.

It is thus that the docetic attitude, which sees in each person or physical individuation the manifestation of an effective-reality, translates into a particular usage of the vocabulary of being. The copular verb 'is' does not designate an absorbing synthesis, a dialectic where the degree of manifestation would include and surmount the Idea, but it would be the appearance, the parousia, of the Idea to the point where no difference would remain between the apparent and the hidden. If the apparent is hidden, it is to attest to the superiority of the esoteric over the exoteric; it is to make appear that which is not apparent. Conversely, what remains distant from the apparent, that which is purely eternal and spiritual, must also be the apparent which proceeds from self, which must render itself visible as manifest being, at an inferior degree, of a 'sign' or 'point of view' taken on superior reality. Thus, 'paradise is man' means that paradise would remain pure abstraction, would not be effective-reality, were it not to manifest in man – but not that this man who is paradise, 'incarnates' effective-reality exceeding his own manifestation, or manifests his own excess, in addition to his manifestation within manifestation itself.

Two consequences follow from this. The first is that no spiritual reality at all can be grasped if it is not in the visible manifestation of a particular individuality, real and perceptible. Natural bodies are the epiphanies necessary for intelligibles. Just as the Stoics believed that all temporal events were events of the body, so Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī proposes that all that is immaterial must become predicate of a concrete human being. But this predication of ' paradise is a man,' inverted therefore to 'a man is paradise,' does not make of Paradise a simple concomitant of the body of this man. Paradise manifests itself in this man, which means that it is he who remains the veritable effective-reality and constitutes the man in whom Paradise manifests itself.

The second consequence is the necessary plurality of epiphanies. Since effective-reality does not manifest in one person who would contain within himself the totality of the hidden reality, but exceeds his own manifestation, there is never total manifestation of the hidden in the apparent. We will see that it is precisely this that imposes upon the figure of the Resurrector his own dramatic plurality.

The Imam as the Resurrector

'The significance of Imam and Resurrector has not two but one and the same meaning.' This implies that the Resurrector 'extends his domination over religious law itself'. Religious law is legislation revealed to the Prophet and constituted by him. Imamate is revelation of the hidden meaning of this legislation. The Prophet is the exponent of the exoteric (*ẓāhir*), the Imam of the esoteric (*bāṭin*). In the figure of the Resurrector is condensed both the apparent and the hidden, legislative exercise and spiritual exigency. This translates into two operations combined. On the one hand, the Resurrector is the perfection of the Imamate; he is the ultimate meaning at last implemented by the mission of the Imams. His spiritual summons (*daʿwat*) unveils entirely the intelligible meanings of the letter of the prophetic revelations that have succeeded during six cycles of major prophecy (*ūlū al-ʿazm*). On the other hand, the Imam-Resurrector exercises temporal power that the Prophet had exercised by the intervention of his legislation. But this temporal power is put to the service of unveiling the true meaning of *sharīʿat*, of legislation according to the literal meaning of Revelation. The Resurrector exercises power as Prophet but solely in the service of revealing the hidden meaning of the Imamate. When he becomes apparent, he makes apparent the hidden which then no longer bears the status of esoteric; he renders exoteric what was once esoteric. What he enunciates is no longer in the form of law, but in the form of his own imperative (*amr*) as the manifestation (*maẓhar*) of the existentiating Imperative, the Word. That is why the Resurrector accomplishes the role of Imamate perfectly by completing the manifestation of intelligibles in the True-Reality from which they proceed. He completes prophethood just as well, by accomplishing the most important prophetic act, the act that renders apparent, which manifests the intelligible in the sense-perceptible. He transforms prophetic religion from legalistic practice to a spiritual community in the name of the summons itself.

In the Resurrector, two distinct epiphanies, according to whether one lives in concealment or in manifestation, exhibit intrinsic unity of the Imperative, which without reconciling them, unite the two dimensions of mercy and wrath, names in plural of one and the same essence. In periods of full manifestation (*ẓuhūr*) of himself as the perfection of hidden meaning, in short in those periods of pure and simple spiritual

Resurrection, the Resurrector 'opens the door to his convocation, which is the greatest mercy to all mankind, to all the world's inhabitants. He treats everyone with forebearance, kindness and tolerance, and under his great reign everyone prospers and is happy' [§371]. But during the time of concealment (*satr*), he manifests the Imperative not in the previous prophetic form of an exoteric law, but in the form of a rigorous liberating force which awakens the adept from his sleep in sense-perceptible existence: 'He would say and do such things as to make one block one's ears and close one's eyes, so as not to hear or see anything he says or does' [§372].

It is truly remarkable that Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī treats, in the same discourse, both the docetist doctrine of the Resurrector and his status of being 'far beyond good and evil'. The docetist doctrine presents diverse 'points of view' from which it is possible to perceive degrees of reality of the Imam; and the affirmation according to which the Imam, in his essence, is above and beyond the law has consequences of the highest level regarding these degrees.

We have seen that the hierarchy of realms would imply an expression of a superior degree in the level immediately below – a *manence* (immanence or an effusive presence), to borrow a term dear to Jean Trouillard, of the superior in the inferior, of the higher in the lower, preserving an effusion of intelligible reality from the first upon the second. It is thus that the effective-reality, or intelligible reality, bears the *manence* of the Imperative in abundance which effuses upon it; that the relative or sense-perceptible reality expresses and epiphanises intelligible reality, bearing the abundance of the latter.

Each degree, body, soul, intelligence, is the mirror of the degree or level above. The same applies for all existents, which have therefore a double nature, or rather a double point of view taken on their own reality, according to whether they are perceived in the realm of the Imperative or in the world of creation, in their eternal being of Resurrection or in the sense-perceptible epiphany of this 'being in the Imperative'.

The same is true for the Resurrector, but in a pre-eminent mode. The Resurrector possesses a substantial reality infinitely more eminent than all intelligible realities, since this substantial reality is in the realm of the Imperative, of the Word itself. The effective-reality (*ḥaqīqat*) of the Imam is eternal, situated above and beyond Intellect itself; it is pure freedom of the Imperative. That is why 'he does not need any perfection outside his

essence, not only in these realms but in the whole universe' [§374].

In his substance, the Imam is eternal; even more than intelligible, he is above and beyond the Intellect; he is the manifestation of the existentiating Principle itself. Each degree of primordial origination does not manifest itself only in the level immediately below. Not only does the *ḥaqīqat* manifest in the *bāṭin*, the *bāṭin* in the *ẓāhir*, but each one of these hypostases – Intellect, Soul, Body, and above them all the Imperative itself – has a human manifestation (*maẓhar*). In turn, this human manifestation accords with three successive levels: the realm of substantial-reality or of the Imperative; the realm of relation and relativity; and the realm of similitude or appearances.

The theoretical contribution, or rather, the doctrinal upheaval, that Ismaili gnosis imposes upon Plotinus' scheme of emanation,[37] is entirely expressed in the gesture by which the figure of Imam, *ḥujjat* or Prophet, in its effective-reality, attests to the abundance, the *manence*, of the epiphany of the Imperative or of one of the hypostases. Each figure becomes the eternal mirror of the One, according to the gradation from the paradoxical One to the One and many. In other words, to each figure of unity (corresponding to one of the first hypostases of Parmenides), corresponds its manifestation in a man, as perceived from the point of view of substance or the point of view of relation.

It is really in this epiphanic operation that the Neoplatonic scheme bestows moral and political effectiveness, a 'great politic' in Nietzsche's phrase. We would not wish to say that the Neoplatonic scheme submits itself to political requirements beyond itself, silenced in an ideology of various temporal powers, but that it becomes the interpretation of a transformation of the world, prophetic transmutation, especially the transmutation of the realm in and by the act of the Resurrection: philosophy becomes material strength when it becomes concrete spiritual power (*quwwat*). In order for man to be the Imperative and, by a force of strength unheard of, to convert the entire Neoplatonic edifice into mystical anthropology, which in turn imposes on the world a personality of great politic, it is necessary to have conditions foreign to Hellenic thought, such as those offered by docetic christologies.[38]

The Resurrector knows two types of epiphany. In the first place, he is the manifestation of the Imperative in the realm of effective-reality, where his eternal nature as Imam renders present (*ḥāḍir*) the Word. In the second place, in the realm of creation and similitude, this nature of

Imamate manifests itself according to the category of relationship. Each view taken on the human personification of the Resurrector is one with the view taken by the eternal Resurrector on the world. Each perception is the mirror of his perception. This perception of each person by the Imam, reflecting itself in the point of view that each adept has of the Imam, expresses the pluralising status of the world of creation. 'For example,' says Ṭūsī, the Imam 'sometimes is a child, sometimes an old person, and sometimes a youth' [§359].

Multiple views express multiple means of perceiving the Imam who is the central entry-point of these perceptive monads. He existentiates these multiple monads by being the centre where their visions are reflected. The world is an enormous game of mirrors all of which reflect, in infinite relationships, the substantial unity of the Resurrector. The apparent realm is the realm of appearances, whose effective-reality is above the whole of its appearances. It is a flourishing of epiphanies, whose centre is located above it, in the truth of the Imperative realm. That is why 'to see' during the reign of the Resurrector is to see all things as one in their eternal form, where each singular thing is one of the faces of the Resurrector.

Let us return to the first epiphany where the Resurrector, in the realm of the effective-reality, renders the Imperative eternally present. Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī writes: 'The sacrosanct Divine Essence has made the Imam – may salutations ensue upon mention of him – the manifestation of the sublime Word, the source of illumination, the lamp of divine guidance, the lantern of divine glory, the scales of obedience and worship, and the person who embodies this knowledge and love' [§350]. Ṭūsī thus makes a parallel between the position of the Imam and the names and attributes of God. 'His speech is the speech of God, his act is the act of God' [§351]. Here too, we must understand the precise meaning of the copular usage of the verb 'to be'. The speech of the Imam is that of God to the extent that speech is an attribute of God manifesting Divine Essence. Now, Divine Essence is situated at the level of the pure, indescribable, inexpressible, paradoxical One, which affects neither name nor attribute. In order for the indescribable to manifest itself in a process of some kind, it must emerge from its own ineffability to endow itself with the quality of being. The Imperative is this effusion of the paradoxical One denying its primordial unknowability, its supra-essential nothingness, to constitute the One who is, the First Intellect. As a consequence, the Resurrector

manifests effusion itself, this initial fluttering of being, this free effusion which institutes being from supra-essential nothingness.

Manifestations of the Imperative

Situated thus at the juncture between the indescribable One and the One who names Himself, the Imperative is the act of existentiation and non-being made to be.[39] The Imperative is not the indescribable Essence of what 'is' above and beyond all essence, the pure Real, and neither is it anymore what it originates at first, the One who is the Intellect. The Imperative is the Inexpressible that it expresses as well as the being it ordains. One must incessantly conceive the unity of these contradictories: the unity of a fluttering between Real and being, between supra-essence and essence, between negation and affirmation. Similarly, one must infer the unity of two contradictions from the speech of the Imam enunciating the truth of all figures of the Imamate: 'We are the most beautiful Names of God' [§352]. The epiphany of Names neither identify the Imam with, nor dissociate him from, the paradoxical One, since he manifests neither the named, the supra-essential Essence, neither the named-being, the emanation of the One in the Intellect, but the Word which names, the Name as nomination, existentiation, pure act of original language of being.

We may examine, from here onwards, the hierarchy of successive manifestations of the Imperative [§330]. Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī professes that the Prophet is the epiphany of the Universal Soul, and the *ḥujjat* is the epiphany of the Intellect from where the Soul proceeds. The couple formed by Imam and *ḥujjat* manifests the link which originates with the grace of the Imperative, between pure act of existentiation and the One who is, the One deploying Himself in the guise of being, whereas Prophethood typifies the One and the many, action of the One in the guise of the multiple, directed towards the Universal Body and opaque bodies which attract it. Prophethood bears witness to the legalistic role, identified at the exoteric level of the order, to the demiurgic mission of the Prophet within the populations of this world. Prophethood operates in the reign of sense-perceptibility and the sense-perceptible, whereas Imamate unveils the hidden, the intelligible. In the era of the Resurrection, the esoteric message announced in being by the *ḥujjat*, silent and concentrated in the pure liberty of the Imam, takes precedence over the legalistic interpretation of the Prophetic message.

The primacy of Imamate derives from the figure who manifests, in his human form, the pure non-represent-able act of primordial origination. The epiphanic form also derives from there its character of indescribable pre-eminence which places it above both negative and affirmative paths. Supreme authority is vested in he who configures the excess of the paradoxical One on all unity which might present itself in the guise of being and existence. The Imam is the human locus of that spontaneous perfection which exceeds all encompassing unity, whose 'definition' consists in the impossibility of being defined, received and condensed in whatever figure that might be, be it that of the One. In his substance, the Imam is the unimaginable, imperceptible form of pure freedom of the True-Reality.

The Real is not sense-perceptible or intelligible reality, but the *manence*, the abundance at the centre of each reality, of a point of excess which altogether ordains and defeats it, submitting it to an imperative freedom exceeding all necessary determinations. By the fact that it proceeds from the Imperative, each effective-reality (*ḥaqīqat*) deploys the effects of its own essence in a spontaneity of existence at all times superior to the sum of its existentiated attributes. The Real is, therefore, the non-configurable of each configuration of reality. On the other hand, the process which provides access from afar to the Real is negation of the negative path as well as of the affirmative path. The Real is neither the sum nor the negation of attributes of being, but the scintillation of this primordial ontological division.

The theological act whose philosophical version Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī provides here consists of equating a human figure to this pure scintillation of the True-Real. The Real in excess opens the path of form and presentation upon being by the grace of the Resurrector. Epiphany of infinite freedom in the finitude of man? Rather, it is the epiphany of the necessity necessitating and supra-rational of the One in a form which itself will be presence in the infinite, an infinite form.

This Imperative which ordains, this order in the Imperative, converts itself into the One *who-is*. The *ḥujjat* typifies this conversion from the existing towards being, whereas the Prophet prepares the existing to receive effusion from the Imperative. These processes, at the level of hypostases, are those of Intellect and Soul. The Intellect resembles the pleroma of effective-realities, and the Soul renders Nature apt to receive in matter the forms emanated from these intelligible realities. If the *ḥujjat* manifests

the First Intellect, it is necessary to conceive the imperative community, the community of loyal-faithful in the state of Resurrection living under the unity procured by the *ḥujjat*, which makes it proceed from the rank of the Imperative. The Imam and the *ḥujjat* are the imperative liberty manifesting according to two points of view: that of pure creative spontaneity of the Real, and that of the ordained act completed from this Reality of effective-realities. From the point of view of the great politic, the *ḥujjat* is the man of the completed order; he teaches, transforms in articulated language and organised meanings, the original language of the Resurrection; he structures the hierarchies of the order of gradation. Within the community, he represents the One *who-is* unifying various intellects, whereas the Imam is the abundance of the One *who-is-not* in this interpretation which proceeds from it.

Before clarifying the prophetic role, let us examine the consequences of this division of the epiphanic forms of the Imam and his *ḥujjat*, of the One *who-is-not* and the One *who-is*. In the community of followers, in the summons (*da'wat*), the principle which establishes a link between men, their collective structure, is typified by two points of view. From the point of view of the *ḥujjat*, this link is total obedience, similar in all points, to the order of intelligibles in the Universal Intellect. From the point of view of the Imam, which is to say from a superior point of view, this link is pure liberty of the One, detached from being, liberty non-being, not placed in the guise of being and existing. Each servant is, therefore, divided between two figures in their own effective-reality: the superior figure of the Imperative, that which makes it exist – *to be*, and the figure from whom it proceeds and who exists – *is*. Each participates, according to these points of view, in a power which is that of the Real, in a power which is that of the Intellect, in an Imperative which provokes the tempestuous becoming of oneself, in an order which attaches to each one the status of his own absolute reality. The register of the 'completed' is thus divided between creative spontaneity and order, such that the activity within the paradoxical One, between affirmation and negation, operates the effective-reality of each one of those who, by participating in the *da'wat*, receives from it the sign.

One thing is certain: this division takes place within the powers of completion, within the realm of the Imperative. The Prophet, the epiphanic form of the Soul, organises the inferior world of the inchoate according to the law and the cycles of sacrosanct history [§322–35,

421–24]. He has as a responsibility the apparent meaning and the letter of successive revelations. He is as necessary to human communities as the Soul can be to Nature.

The necessity of Prophethood, during the cycles of concealment of Imamate, is no less than the material cause for this concealment: man is incapable of receiving the Imperative. The norm of the Resurrection is, for a time, concealed since man is at this time incapable of being linked to the Divine Imperative. One must not represent Prophethood as the formal condition for Resurrection, but conversely, as the norm of the Resurrection which for some time liberates the necessity of legalistic Prophethood. During this time of concealment, man is given to similitude, to perceptions which are sensory and corporeal. Mankind's well-being cannot be assured except by law which institutes congregational worship, a form of collectiveness which submits to the category of relation and relativity, which can no longer as a whole consist of free monads, of unities which are substantial and completed. Prophethood, Ṭūsī tells us, is comparable to a government of a king and to medicine that heals. Religious law is curative, even if it is an imposed morality. The commandments of the Prophet correct what natural wickedness of men can give birth to, to evil or criminal habits.

Finally, the Prophet opens the path to the Imam by announcing the letter of the revelation and by preparing each person to receive, in the cycle of unveiling, the spiritual exegesis (*ta'wīl*) which will manifest the effective-reality. Immersed in the world of appearances where he introduces a unifying order of law, the Prophet remains dependent upon the condition of similitude. He is the man of the exoteric message and he remains bound to the law that binds. Hence the ambivalence of Ṭūsī's text and the sentiments which Prophethood inspires. It is valued for its fortunate curative effects that it has on the souls of men; but Prophethood appears and disappears in the course of cycles of concealment where the Real is veiled. Once the Resurrection which completes the cycle of unveiling is proclaimed, it is no longer the place for Prophethood to pronounce the letter bereft of its spiritual interpretation, and the legalistic link is transformed into an imperative community. The followers of the exoteric, who contradict the esoteric summons of the Imam, become henceforth no more and no less the people of opposition. To summarise: the period of the Prophets is inevitable and necessary, but the maintenance of their legislation beyond the time evolved is tantamount to ignorance and opposition.

Spiritual exegesis (*ta'wīl*)

The sign by which we will recognise that the Imam proceeds to the unveiling of hidden meaning and, by so doing, brings an end to the rule of law and the realm of the apparent, is *ta'wīl* or spiritual exegesis. Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī here provides many an example and from them initiates the doctrinal view.

Spiritual exegesis is comparable to the interpretation of dreams [§324]. Just as a dream encompasses in a few images many things, without limits of time and space, the obvious text condenses an infinity of meanings. Ṭūsī names the obstacle which hinders these meanings: it is the imagination and its prattle. The imagination (*khayāl*) has two aspects, two contrary powers. It has an eminently positive role when, for a man who dies, it configures his destiny and introduces hell or paradise 'born from his own life'. Upon the dissolution of the body, mortal composed matter, visionary imagination survives in the soul, and lives its own life, creating a world of delights or an abyss of tortures. But the imagination is also, and especially, a deceiving power [§242]. It resists intelligible meaning, it creates confusion and similitude. That is why *ta'wīl* consists first of vanquishing this resistance of the imagination, exactly the way he who interprets a dream sees through the ruses of the imaginary.

Spiritual exegesis of the Qur'ān is the true miracle of the Holy Book [§467]. It is in spiritual interpretation and by it, not in its letter, that the Book acquires its divine dimension. We will rediscover among the Nizārī Ismailis many salient points, characteristics of exegesis, similar to those practised by Philon of Alexandria.[40] Those who refuse spiritual interpretation, for example, are *ipso facto* reprobates and one can identify them with fierce believers of only the literal meaning, to those excluded from the summons. Those who listen to the teachings of the *da'wat* are attentive to spiritual interpretation, because they are not uniquely preoccupied with their bodies and sensory realities. If the truth hides itself under the veil of the letter, it is because it has thus masked the True-Real whose essence consists precisely in the withdrawal of Himself.

Finally, the Philonian allegory has this in common with Ismaili *ta'wil*, in that it detects in scripture signs or hints of relative imperfection of meanings, beckoning from itself, requiring exegesis: absurdity or strangeness of literal meaning, errors of fact, *aporia* [doubtful elements] that only exegesis can denounce.

It is thus that *ta'wīl* of a number of Qur'ānic verses refers to the theory of human soul, which goes from one degree of perfection to another, and those '*having wings – two, three, or four*' (35:1) are the various degrees of the soul of the theoretical soul, the fourth degree corresponding to four wings. Here *ta'wīl* enables us to decipher a philosophical meaning of scripture [§457–59]. The hidden meaning (*bāṭin*) unveils the spiritual depth of the servant of the Imam, capable of apprehending effective-realities by gnosis (*ma'rifat*). The philosophical meaning is, therefore, not neutral and it clarifies itself in the light of the summons. When it is unveiled, it is not an allegoric meaning of any kind, but it enunciates all by which the servant of the Imam lives, endures and experiences. The Holy Book, in its hidden meaning unveiled by the Imam, speaks of no one else than the Imam, and enunciates nothing other than a history of the spiritual life of the summons.

Taṣawwur 16 offers us a singularly rich example of *ta'wīl*. It is about the Qur'ānic verses in which the history of Adam and Iblis is narrated [§161–82]. The true and hidden meaning of Adam is of being the Prophet who instituted legalistic religion, which inaugurated a new cycle of concealment (*dawr-i satr*). It has been said to us that he is not the first man absolutely speaking, but the first man of this cycle he inaugurates. Therefore, before this period, there was a cycle of unveiling (*dawr-i kashf*), and Iblis was no other than one of the master teachers, a *ḥujjat*, whose task was to teach the hidden meaning, life in the state of Resurrection. The revolt of Iblis, the fall and repentance of Adam, the role played by Eve, are all interpreted as dramatic moments in the history of the *da'wat*. In the touching words of Hārith-i Murrah, that is to say Iblis, we hear the revolt of he who refuses the dissolution of the cycle of unveiling, who cannot understand how one can oblige him – he who controlled the essential, 'the internal core' of the summons, he who saw the effective-reality in full light – to henceforth go through the steps and obligations of the law, of worship by legislation.

It is quite likely that *ta'wīl* transposes into sacred history, elevated to the level of a trans-historic tragedy (like a Wagnerian opera made from a story of love or the chivalrous quest) what might effectively have taken place when the Imam decreed the *satr*, the concealment of the Resurrector under the apparent veil of a return to the similitude of external worship. In any event, the provisional dissolution of the messianic experience is here found to be transmuted into a moral and

spiritual fact which took place in transcendental history, and not only in empirical history: the event thus acquires archetypal value. The Qur'ān becomes a dramaturgy of humanity in conflict with its own destiny of Resurrection.

This impression that *ta'wīl* gives us, of referring the Book to eternal events of humanity when the latter encounters the Imperative, are confirmed by the detailed exegesis of major commandments. The meanings which *ta'wīl* unveil are moral and eschatological. Each one of the gestures of ritual is translated into a precise language of morality, such that the order of exterior legislation is mirrored by an internalisation and an intensification. Having attained an elevated degree of moral rectitude by ritual, the loyal-faithful becomes capable of knowing the Imam, of elevating his soul in the hierarchy of modes of knowledge of Imamate. Spiritual exegesis plainly deserves its name, since it is an elevation to the true-reality of Imamate.

The most important *ta'wīl* is that which pertains to the Imam himself. He enables his followers to move from one point of view to another; from a purely physical and temporal perception to the knowledge of the name of the Imam, from the Imamate to the Imam; to that ultimately of his essence. Knowledge crosses over the degrees of the body and the soul, from the Intellect to near the imperative essence of the Resurrector. *Ta'wīl* leads, therefore, to the Resurrection itself. It is also docetism in reality, since it develops knowledge according to diverse points of view, which order themselves in a hierarchy but do not merge. Thus, the essence of the Imam *is* and *is not* his form perceptible by the senses, depending on the *point of view* taken and the degree of perfection acquired by the believer.

Essence and attributes of the Imam

In his essence, the Imam has a pre-eternal nature. He is what he is before the beginning of time and its cycles. He precedes well in advance the creation of human beings according to gender. By his courage and mercy, 'Alī is incomparably superior to other men. Preceding and superior to all generations, the Imam finds himself at the end of the cycle of Resurrection, the one who will sound the second blast of the Trumpet. He is expressly designated by the term *al-masīḥ*, the Messiah. What precisely does the messianic act accomplish? What does the sounding of the Day

of Summons announce? Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī tells us that the Resurrector is the *maẓhar*, the human locus of the Word. He also tells us that 'Truth is that which is connected with the truthful master and falsehood is that which is detached from the truthful master' [§478].

The docetic doctrine of knowledge implies this important thesis: nothing is known except by its epiphany. Just as 'paradise is man', that all effective-reality is its very own epiphany, so the man of God, the Resurrector, is the man of the Real, the manifestation of True-Reality in the form of the Word, the Imperative. From this arises a surprising reversal of perspective: the Real is like the body and the bearer of the Real is like the soul. As much as the Real depends upon the bearer of the Real, all the distinct and different parts of this Real are in harmony, and all the elements of rupture are reassembled. But when it finds itself separated from the bearer of the Real, all the parts in harmony become different and plural, and all that was assembled divides and breaks off. When the Imam manifests the Real, the Real exists indeed emerging from the indescribable nothingness, to express its imperative power. One may believe that in this process, the Real is like the soul and the Imam like the body. But the opposite is the proper analogy. In the epiphany, what manifests calls into materialised being what it manifests. As the entire True-Real is within the Resurrector and the True-Real exceeds the figure of the Resurrector, it is vital that the six cycles of sacrosanct history of Prophethood and Imamate take place, that partial Resurrections complete the cycles, such that the Real finds itself regularly united with, then no less regularly separated from, the bearer of the Real.

But it is an event where the conjunction operates definitively, if we mean by that a messianic act where a cycle of legalistic religion is entirely completed. This act is typified by the two blasts of the Trumpet, enunciators of the Judgement. The first begins the final summons (like John the Baptist announcing the Resurrector, Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ's founding gesture as *ḥujjat* of the Imam is inaugurating the new summons.) The second is the summons of the Resurrector himself: 'He has proclaimed the manifestation of the hidden reality, and he has proceeded in the effusion of the light of mercy upon the world and upon the inhabitants of the world' [§477].

We will attempt, to conclude this brief evocation by summarising the characteristics, the most important properties, of the Imam of the Resurrection. The Imam possesses qualities such as might, mercy and

wrath which he derives directly from the Divine Imperative. In him, contrary qualities unite and 'from this point of view, his anger, hatred and punishment are the same as his mercy, compassion and goodwill' [§202]. The discord which reins in this world is a fact of ordinary politics by which everyone serves his own interests and satisfies his vain desires. In Platonic style, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī describes the circles of oppressive politics, that is to say, of politics which do not rule the Real: governors corrupt the governed, and the latter prefer a power that preserves their own vices. The Imam, physician of cities and of souls, is comparable to the Philosopher-King who 'extracts the eye of discord'. So striking are the parallels that one ought to relate these lines to what Plato writes in Book VI of the *Republic*. Referring to governors, Ṭūsī writes: 'The ultimate aim and final intention of rulers is to deceive and charm their subjects by distributing money and worldly positions, and to obtain dominion and control of their kingdom with their help' [§204]. As for the ultimate aim of those who are subjected to this authority, here it is: to receive orders, to obey the governor, but to continue all the same to derive personal benefits and to avoid loss.

The summons (*da'wat*) is fully accomplished on the Day of Spiritual Resurrection when the norm of legalistic religion is replaced by the illumination of intellects. It is *ipso facto* the only real-politic and dissolves a political conception of the world, described we see, strictly in Platonic terms. That is to say, the Imam is this point of the Real from which it proves to be possible to unite men by other means than extortion, oppression and egoism. The Imam is the axis of the Virtuous City. By exalting this dimension of Imamate, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī does not produce a doctrine of Prophethood among others within Islam, but he faithfully interprets the entire Ismaili quest in terms of real politic; he establishes in Islam – after al-Fārābī, the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā' and Suhrawardī – the notion of a real-politic which necessarily begins to appear as an anti-politic, since it is no longer the link between men which determines power (a corrupt link), but on the contrary, it is the creative power of the Real which determines the link.

Are we still capable of understanding the final thesis of this discourse? It exposes what we have lost sight of, what has to us become odious or incomprehensible, for lack of the requisite metaphysical courage: all politics are defeating, if politics are not of the Real.

Notes

Notes to the Preface

1. Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, *Rawḍatu't-Taslim, commonly called Tasawwurat*, ed. and tr. W. Ivanow (Leiden, 1950), pp. xxii–xxiii.

2. S.J. Badakhchani, 'The Paradise of Submission: A Critical Edition and Study of the *Rawḍa-yi taslīm*,' D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1989.

3. The five copies of the *Rawḍa* are now deposited in The Institute of Ismaili Studies Library in London.

4. Nasafi's authorship of this fragment has been identified by Hermann Landolt in his article on the Sufi master in a forthcoming volume of *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, where he also discusses Ismaili influence on Nasafi's thought.

5. For a full list and description of the fragments found in manuscript 'M', see Badakhchani, 'Paradise' (thesis), pp. 144–146.

6. Ṭūsī, *Rawḍa*, ed. W. Ivanow., p. xix.

7. The other Ismaili works attributed to Ṭūṣī in the collection are *Dar mar'ifat-i imām*, *Dar ṭā'at wa 'ibādat*, *Jawāb bi Kiyā Shāh Āmīr*, *Nāma bi ahālī-yi Qazwīn*, *Marātib-i mawjūdāt*, *Sayr wa sulūk*, and two untitled pieces.

8. For a comprehensive list of orthographical variations found in all manuscripts of the text, including changes introduced by W. Ivanow, see Badakhchani, 'Paradise' (thesis), pp. 422–465.

9. Ṭūsī, *Rawḍat*, ed. W. Ivanow, p. xxxv and note 1.

10. Abū Ja'far Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Ṭūsī, (d. 460/1067), also known as Shaykh al-Ṭā'ifa, was the author of two major Twelver Shi'i books on jurispru-

dence, namely *al-Tahdhīb* and *al-Istibṣār fī mā ikhtalafa fīhi min al-akhbār*.

11. Naṣīr al-Dīn 'Abd al-Jalīl Qazwīnī Rāzī was a Twelver Shi'i scholar who flourished in the mid-6th/12th century.

12. Ms. in The Institute of Ismaili Studies Library.

13. For more details see Muḥammad Taqī Bahār, *Sabk shināsī* (Tehran, 1337 Sh./1958), vol. 2, p. 140.

14. Ms. in the The Institute of Ismaili Studies Library. I am currently in the process of preparing a critical edition and translation of the *Dīwān-i Qā'imiyyāt*.

15. In a newly found manuscript of the *Haft bāb*, the author speaks of himself as the author of *Dīwān-i Qā'imiyyāt* as follows: 'Ḥasan, the Imam *'alā dhikrihi al-salām*, the supreme king of religion, the lord of Resurrection, gladdens this humble servant Ḥasan [i.e. the author of the *Haft bāb*] all the time. It is he who composed the praise of the religion, not me. But out of kindness he attributed it to me.' For more details on Ḥasan-i Maḥmūd see Badakhchani, 'Paradise' (thesis) pp. 58–59.

16. *Haft bāb-i Bābā Sayyidnā*, in *Two Early Ismaili Treatises*, ed. W. Ivanow (Bombay, 1933), pp. 4–44. English trans. M.G.S. Hodgson in his *The Order of Assassins* (The Hague, 1955), pp. 279–324.

17. *La Convocation d'Alamût: Somme de philosophie ismaélienne, Rawdat al-taslīm (Le jardin de la vraie foi)*, trans. Christian Jambet (Lagrasse, 1996), Introduction, pp. 121–122.

Notes to the Introduction

1. Cf. the twenty-seven 'bezels' (*faṣṣ*) of Ibn 'Arabi's *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, where the 'bezels' symbolise the wisdom of 27 Prophets from Adam to Muḥammad.

2. Cf. Henry Corbin, *Cyclical Time and Ismaili Gnosis*, trans. R. Manheim and J.W. Morris (London, 1983). The first two among the three articles by H. Corbin re-published in this volume are particularly relevant to the rich spectrum of ideas contained in our text.

3. For the following account see Farhad Daftary, *The Ismā'īlīs: Their History and Doctrines* (Cambridge, 1990), and Idem, 'Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and the Isma'ilis of the Alamūt Period,' in *Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī: Philosophe et Savant du XIII^e Siècle*, ed. N. Pourjavady and Ž. Vesel (Tehran, 2000), pp. 59–67. See also Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, *Contemplation and Action: The Spiritual Autobiography of a Muslim Scholar*. A New Edition and English Translation of *Sayr wa Suluk*, by S.J. Badakhchani (London, 1998).

4. The poem is quoted by a non-partisan source, Ṭūsī's later disciple Ibn al-Fuwaṭī. See M.T. Mudarris Raḍawī, *Aḥwāl wa āthār-i Abū Ja'far Muḥammad*

b. Muḥammad b. Ḥasan al-Ṭūsī (Tehran, 1354/1975–76), pp. 136f.

5. See Mudarris Raḍawī, *Aḥwāl*, pp. 211–113 and 479–483. Also see Jāmī, *Nafaḥāt al-uns*, ed. M. ʿĀbidī (Tehran, 1370 Sh./1991–92), pp. 434f. and Maʿṣūm ʿAlī Shāh, *Ṭarāyiq al-ḥaqāyiq*, ed. M. Jaʿfar Maḥjūb (Tehran, 1345 Sh./1968), vol. 2, p. 662. Rashīd al-Dīn's account (quoted by Raḍawī) suggests that ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad III was a *murīd* of this Sufi shaykh. F. Daftary (*The Ismāʿīlīs*, p. 695, n. 215) points out that according to the *Dabistān-i madhāhib*, the Sufi Shaykh had secretly embraced Ismailism.

6. Hamid Dabashi, 'Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī: The Philosopher/Vizier and the Intellectual Climate of his Times,' Chapter 32 of Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman, ed., *History of Islamic Philosophy* (London, 1996), part I, pp. 527–584.

7. For the astronomical works in particular, see F. Jamil Ragep, 'The Persian Context of the Ṭūsī Couple,' in *Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī: Philosophe et Savant*, pp. 113–130.

8. Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, *Contemplation and Action*. Also see my 'Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (597/1201–672/1274), Ismāʿīlism and Ishrāqī Philosophy,' in N. Pourjavady and Ž. Vesel, ed., *Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, philosophe et savant du XIII*[e] *siècle* (Tehran, 2000), pp. 13–30.

9. Mudarris Raḍawī, *Aḥwāl*, pp. 593f.

10. W. Ivanow, ed. and trans., *The Rawdatu't-Taslim commonly called Tasawwurat by Nasirud-din Tusi* (Leiden, 1950).

11. Corresponding with few omissions of specifically Sufi passages to the standard text as available in *Ganjīna-yi ʿirfān*, ed. Ḥ. Rabbānī (Tehran, n.d.), p. 273, line 16, to p. 277, line 16.

12. Note the distinction made there between two kinds of 'exaggerators' (*ghulāt*) claiming oneness with the Imam: those 'drowning themselves in the light of gnosis' and those 'drowning the Divine in their own persons'. This corresponds almost literally to a distinction made by the famous Sufi ʿAlāʾ al-Dawla al-Simnānī (d. 736/1336) between Ḥallāj and Pharaoh, both well-known for their claim to divinity, but for opposite reasons: the former, while forgetting himself, saw everything to be God; the latter, while forgetting God, saw everything to be himself. See Amīr Iqbāl Sijistānī, *Chihil majlis*, ed. N.M. Hirawī (Tehran 1366 Sh./1987–88), p. 142. German translation by H. Cordt, *Die sitzungen des ʿAlāʾ ad-dawla as-Simnānī* (Zurich, 1977), p. 110. For broader context see L. Massignon, *The Passion of al-Hallaj*, trans. H. Mason (Princeton NJ, 1982), vol. 2, pp. 356ff.

13. This piece has definitely an affinity with some of Ṭūsī's own concerns. See translator's footnote and my 'Khwāja Naṣīr ...,' pp. 21f. and 28f.

14. The compound verb *jamʿkardan* can definitely mean 'to author' in 13th century Persian. ʿAzīz-i Nasafī uses it consistently in this sense at the beginning of most of his *Rasāʾil*, ed. M. Molé as *Le Livre de l'Homme Parfait*, Bibliothèque

Iranienne, vol. 11 (Tehran/Paris, 1962).

15. No such name being on record among Ṭūsī's acquaintances or friends, this passage was one of the reasons for Mudarris Raḍawī (*Aḥwāl*, p. 594) to reject the attribution of the *Paradise of Submission* to him.

16. A useful apparatus showing the variants of four manuscripts ('A', 'B', 'M' and 'Q', as well as the readings chosen by Ivanow from 'A' and 'B') is appended in Dr Badakhchani's 1987 edition.

17. Translated by Marshall G.S. Hodgson, *The Order of Assassins: The Struggle of the Early Nizārī Ismā'īlīs Against the Islamic World* (The Hague, 1955), Appendix I.

18. Trans., Hodgson, *The Order*, pp. 295ff.

19. Nāṣir-i Khusraw, *Kitāb-i Jāmi' al-ḥikmatayn*, ed. H. Corbin and M. Mu'īn. (Tehran and Paris, 1953), Persian text, pp. 89 and 148.

20. For a basic orientation see H. Corbin, 'Naṣīr-i Khusraw and Iranian Ismā'īlism,' in R.N. Frye, ed. *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 4. (Cambridge, 1975), pp. 520–542.

21. *Knowledge and Liberation: A Treatise on Philosophical Theology*. A New Edition and English Translation of the *Gushayish wa Rahayish*, by Faquir M. Hunzai, with an Introduction and Commentary by Parviz Morewedge (London, 1998), index s.v. *amr*; *hast-i muṭlaq; kalima*. Cf. D. de Smet, *La quiétude de l'Intellect: Néoplatonisme et gnose ismaélienne dans l'oeuvre de Ḥamîd ad-Dîn al-Kirmânî (X^e/XI^e s.)* (Leuven, 1995), pp. 120ff.

22. See my 'Khwāja Naṣīr...,' pp. 18f.

23. Ibid., pp. 25f.

24. Ibid., pp. 26.

25. See Jean R. Michot, *La destinée de l'homme selon Avicenne* (Louvain, 1986), pp. 18f., 28f., 190ff.

26. *al-Milal wa al-niḥal*, ed. M.S. Kaylānī (Cairo 1387/1967), vol. 2, p. 31: *al-arwāḥ fī al-mabda' mastūratun bi al-ajsād ... wa al-ajsād fī al-ma'ād maghmūratun bi al-arwāḥ*. French translation by Guy Monnot in *Shahrastani: Livre des religions et des sectes* (Leuven, 1993), vol. 2, pp. 133f. See also my 'Aṭṭār, Sufism and Ismā'īlism,' in C. Shackle and L. Lewisohn, ed., *The Art of Spiritual Flight: Farīd al-Dīn 'Aṭṭār and the Persian Sufi Tradition* (London, forthcoming).

27. Monnot (*Livre*, II, p. 12) suggests that Shahrastānī was using an Ismaili source from eastern Persia representing the tradition of Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī and his type of argumentation against the philosopher Abū Bakr al-Rāzī.

28. Cf. Hodgson, *The Order*, pp. 332f.

29. Cf. W. Madelung, 'Abū Ya'qūb al-Sijistānī and Metempsychosis,' in *Iranica Varia: Papers in Honor of Professor Ehsan Yarshater* (Leiden, 1990), pp. 131–143 and, for the time being, my introduction to the translation of al-Sijistānī's *Kashf*

al-maḥjūb, in *An Anthology of Philosophy in Persia*, ed. S.H. Nasr (Oxford, 2001), vol. 2, pp. 71–79.

30. For Mullā Ṣadrā's concept of spiritual and bodily 'Return' (*ma'ād*) see especially the two final chapters of his *magnum opus*, *al-Asfār al-arba'a* (Qum, 1379/1959–60), vol. 9, pp. 119–382, and his *Risāla fī al-ḥashr*, recently translated into French by C. Jambet, *Se rendre immortel suivi du Traité de la résurrection* (Cognac, 2000).

31. E.g., *Asfār*, vol. 8, pp. 392f; vol. 9, p. 225. Note, however, that with regard to his theory of imagination as a more effective reality in the other world, Ṣadrā recognises Ghazālī as his true predecessor. He is, in fact, the unnamed *muḥaqqiq* referred to by Ṣadrā in his *Gloses* to Suhrawardī's *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*; see H. Corbin, *En Islam Iranien* (Paris, 1972), vol. 4, p. 100, and C. Jambet, ed., *Le livre de la sagesse orientale* (Lagrasse, 1986), as is evident from an identical quote in *Asfār*, vol. 9, pp. 151f., where the *muḥaqqiq* in question is named, as well as from the available text of *al-Maḍnūn bi-hi 'alā ghayr ahlihi* (Beirut, 1406/1986), pp. 159ff.

32. Cf. the copious notes by Āyatullāh Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, added to his edition of the *Āghāz wa Anjām* (Tehran, 1366/1987), pp. 75–232, especially pp. 114f. Other passages could be added to the evidence, e.g. *Asfār*, vol. 7, p. 10, on the difference between the 'Speech of God' (*kalām* = *'ālam al-amr*) and the 'Book of God' (*kitāb* = *'ālam al-khalq*), which reproduces the *Āghāz wa Anjām*, p. 45.

33. In Chapter 3, the difference between *amr* and *khalq* is made to correspond not only to that between *kalām* and *kitāb*, but also that between *qiyāmat* and *sharī'at*, and the end of the mystical journey (*sulūk*) is marked as union with the Beloved in 'resurrection' (*ḥashr* or *qiyāmat*), not *tawḥīd*. In Chapter 5, Ṭūsī uses the Nizārī terms *kawn-i mutashābih* [read *mushābihat*] and *kawn-i mubāyinat*, and in Chapter 6, he explains the Qur'anic 'Predecessors' (*al-sābiqūn*), the 'People of the Right' (*aṣḥāb al-maymana* = *ahl-i yamīn*) and the 'People of the Left' (*aṣḥāb al-mash'ama* = *ahl-i shimāl*), as the 'people of unity' (*ahl-i waḥdat*), the 'people of gradation' (*ahl-i rutbat* [read *tarattub*]) and the 'people of opposition' (or 'discord', *ahl-i taḍādd*), respectively.

34. *Jāmi' al-asrār wa-manba' al-anwār*, ed. H. Corbin and O. Yahya (Tehran and Paris, 1969), Arabic text p. 493.

Notes to Paradise of Submission

1. *Rawḍa-yi taslīm* is a compound name, derived most probably from two Qur'ānic verses: '*Those who believed and worked righteous deeds shall be made happy in a paradise* (rawḍa) *of delight*' (30: 15); and '*But no, by thy Lord, they will not believe until they make thee [the Prophet] the judge regarding the disagreement between them; then they shall find in themselves no impediment touching thy verdict, but shall surrender in full submission* (taslīm)' (4: 65).

2. There is no information available about Badr al-Dīn Ḥusayn, but the writer's dedication of this work to him suggests that he was a senior dignitary of the Ismaili *da'wat*, one of the 'noble leaders of religion' mentioned in the following lines.

3. The term *da'wat* refers to the 'call', 'summons' or 'invitation' issued to mankind by God through His Prophets to follow the right religion, as exemplified in the Qur'anic verse, *'Invite to the path of God with wisdom and beautiful preaching, and reason with them in the best of ways'* (16:125). Among the Ismailis, it came to be applied to the religious organisation developed for the purpose of propagating the faith, more formally known as *da'wat-i hādiyya*, 'the rightly guided mission' (as in *Taṣ.* 21, §226). Ṭūsī uses the word with varied meanings, such as preaching, mission or religion, according to the context. On the organisation of the Ismaili *da'wat*, see note 17 below.

4. After the Preamble, there follows in manuscripts 'A' and 'B' Ṭūsī's descriptive list of 28 *taṣawwurat*. In the English version, these chapters appear in the table of contents, with the exception of the 28th *taṣawwur*, the text of which is missing in all the manuscripts. In the Persian edition, however, the list of chapters has been retained within the Preamble.

5. As noted by Christian Jambet in his *La Convocation d'Alamūt*, p.123n1, Ṭūsī is here following Ibn Sīnā's *Ilāhiyyāt* of *Kitāb al-Shifā*, ed. I. Madkūr and A. 'Afifī (Cairo, 1380/1960), p. 37ff. It was Ibn Sīnā who, in his discussion of necessary (*wājib*), possible (*mumkin*) and impossible (*mumtani'*) existences, equated God with the Necessary Existent (*wājib al-wujūd*). Since Fatimid authors do not seem to have used the term previously, this is probably its first appearance in an Ismaili text. See *Taṣ.* 3, §21–23, for Ṭūsī's further reflections on the Aristotelian modalities of being, and Jambet's commentary on the same in the Appendix (Section 1) below.

6. Cited from Sanā'ī Ghaznawī, *Ḥadīqat al-ḥaqīqa*, ed. and English trans. J. Stephenson (New York, 1975), p. 1. The second hemistich refers to the Prophetic Tradition: 'These are the best words of mine and the Prophets before me: "There is no god except Allāh who has no partners"'. See al-Suyūṭī, *Jāmi' al-aḥādīth: al-jāmi al-ṣaghīr wa zawā'idihu wa al-jāmi' al-kabīr*, ed. Aḥmad 'Abd al-Jawād et al (Damascus, 1400/1979), vol. 7, p.164.

7. The term *mawlā*, usually translated as 'lord', 'master', 'protector' or 'guardian', and in the Qur'ānic context used for God, is also applicable in Shi'i doctrine to the Prophet and the Imams by virtue of being invested with divine authority. Hence, it conveys the same sense as *walī al-amr*, 'the Guardian-Lord of the Divine Command'. For details see al-Kulaynī, *al-Uṣūl min al-Kāfī*, Arabic ed. and Persian tr. M.B. Kamara'ī (Tehran, 1392/1972), vol. 2, pp. 71–86, and vol. 3, pp. 74–86; Ṭūsī, *Sayr wa sulūk: Contemplation*, pp. 38–39; and *Haft bāb*, pp. 8–9.

8. Ṭūsī interprets the Qur'anic expression *'lā malā lahum'*, 'no master for

them', to mean 'they have no Imam'. The essential distinction between 'infidel' and 'faithful' is the latter group's acknowledgement of a divinely guided *mawlā* among them. In other words, the measure of true faith is the acceptance of the Imam as authoritative guide to the knowledge of God. For Ṭūsī's further elaboration on the profession of faith (*shahādat*), see *Taṣ.* 26, §431–3.

9. The word *taḍādd* (from the Arabic root *ḍa-da-da*), means to contradict, in the sense of two opposing things where the existence of one implies the non-existence of the other. Elsewhere (e.g. *Taṣ.* 13, §118), the word has been translated as 'opposition' or 'discord' where two contrary entities may continue to co-exist in a state of conflict. In early Nizārī Ismaili literature generally, *taḍādd* represents the lowest level of being, subordinate to *tarattub* (gradation) and *waḥdat* (unity), each of which corresponds to a specific state of being and group of people. See also note 35 below.

10. Anonymous verse in Arabic. Ṭūsī continues his discourse on Divine Unity in *Taṣ.* 26, §429–33ff.

11. The author concludes several chapters of the text with this Arabic salutation, which denotes the end of discussion of a subject.

12. In medieval Ismaili thought, the '18,000 worlds' refers to the great cycle (*kawr*) of 360,000 years, which includes several smaller cycles (*adwār*, sing. *dawr*), each of approximately 7,000 years during which six Prophets are designated. In every cycle, the seventh millennium belongs to the Resurrector (*qā'im*). The Great Resurrection proclaimed at Alamūt in 559/1164 is considered to have taken place at the precise mid-point of the Great Cycle, that is, at the end of 180,000 years. See *Haft bāb*, pp. 40–41, and Khayrkhwāh-i Harātī, *Kalām-i pir: A Treatise on Ismaili Doctrine*, ed. and tr. W. Ivanow (Bombay, 1935), p. 35. For a detailed discussion of the Ismaili theory of cyclical history, refer to Corbin, *Cyclical Time*, pp. 30–58 and 84–103. See also *Taṣ.* 16, §169–82 and *Taṣ.* 26, §402–421 for Ṭūsī's further reflections on this subject.

13. *Mafrūgh*, 'becoming empty' or devoid of something. In its present context, the term means something that has been done and dispensed with, i.e., the 'primordial past', which relates to the physical world. *Musta'nif*, meaning 'forthcoming', i.e., the 'subsequent future', relates to the spiritual world. According to Shi'i theology, mankind dwells between the two realms of *mafrūgh* and *musta'nif* which, from another perspective, relates to the realms of predestination and free will respectively. See al-Shahrastānī's commentary on the Qur'ān, *Mafātiḥ al-asrār* (Tehran, 1368 Sh./1989), pp. 21(b)–23(b), and Ṭūsī's *Risāla-yi jabr wa qadr*, in *Majmū'a-yi rasā'il*, ed. M.T. Mudarris Raḍawī (Tehran, 1335 Sh./1956), pp. 25–26.

14. On the three Aristotelian modalities of being, see note 5 above.

15. *Ābā'* are the seven heavenly bodies of medieval cosmography, usually referrd to as *ābā'-i 'ulwī*, which are Saturn (Zuḥal), Jupiter (Mushtarī), Mars

(Mirrīhk), Sun (Āftāb), Venus (Zuhra), Mercury ('Uṭārid) and Moon (Qamar). Their movement through the twelve signs of the Zodiac was believed to influence the combination of the four basic elements (*ummahāt*) – fire, air, water and earth – thus producing variation in the species of plant, animal and human kingdoms (*mawālīd*).

16. *Khudāwand*, meaning 'lord', 'master', and its variants (such as *khudāwand-i ḥaqq* and *khudāwand-i marātib wa akwān*) is always used in the text for the Ismaili Imams, in which sense it is synonymous with the Arabic *mawlā* (see note 7 above). The most frequently occurring name in the text for the Imams in general is *muḥiqq*, meaning 'master of truth', 'truthful master', or 'bearer of truth' (see note 53 below). Other names mentioned by Ṭūsī are *mu'allim-i awwal* (first teacher) *mu'allim-i kullī* (universal teacher), *mārd-i kāmil* (universal man), *ṣāhib-i amr* (lord of the command), etc.

17. The *dā'ī* (lit. 'caller', 'summoner') is used here in its generic sense as a trained and authorised missionary or agent of the Ismaili *da'wat*. In its Fatimid form, the Ismaili *da'wa* was a complex hierarchy comprising several grades of *dā'īs* performing specific functions under the direction of a *ḥujjat* (lit. 'proof', 'evidence' of the Imam). The sources mention twelve *ḥujjats*, each in charge of a particular region called *jazīra*. The *ḥujjats* reported directly to the *bāb al-abwāb* ('gate of gates'), also known as *dā'ī al-du'at* (chief *dā'ī*), the highest rank in the *da'wa* under the Imam. The Nizārīs appear to have retained the basic organisational structure of the *da'wat* with a reduced number of ranks. (See also note 25 below on the changing profile of the *ḥujjat*.) A detailed account of the evolution and organisation of the Ismaili *da'wa* in its Fatimid and Nizārī phases is given in Daftary, *The Ismā'īlīs*, especially Chapters 3, 4 and 6.

18. *Fiṭrat*, translated here as 'natural constitution', refers to the original nature or state of human beings mentioned in the Qur'ān: '*The pattern on which He has created mankind; let there be no change in that creation*' (30: 30). The same meaning is conveyed in the Prophetic Tradition quoted in *Taṣ*. 17, §189. In the *Nahj al-balāgha*, ed. Ṣubḥī al-Ṣāliḥ (Beirut, 1967), p. 163, Imam 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib equates the confession of faith (*kalimat al-ikhlāṣ*) with primordial conscience. Ṭūsī devoted an entire chapter to the elucidation of *fiṭrat* in his *Āghāz wa anjām*, ed. Ḥasan Zāda Āmulī (Tehran, 1376 Sh./1997), pp. 9–11, where he says: 'The original nature [of man] is the beginning, and the return is going back to that state ... Coming from paradise to earth is heading from perfection to deficiency and falling from the original state ... Going back to Paradise from this world is heading from deficiency to perfection and reaching the original state.' For Ṭūsī's further reflections on this subject, see *Ṭas*. 20, §292–3, and *Ṭas*. 21, §249–51.

19. A tradition attributed to the Shi'i Imam Muḥammad al-Bāqir in Fayḍ al-Kāshānī, *Kitāb al-wāfī*, ed. Abū al-Ḥasan Sha'rāni (Tehran, 1375/1955), vol. 1, p. 89, and M. Riḍā al-Muẓaffar, *'Aqā'id al-imāmiyya* (Cairo, 1381/1961), p. 14. Ṭūsī

quotes the text in Arabic together with a Persian translation. In this and other similar reports in the text, the English version is based on the Arabic without reporting Ṭūsī's Persian rendering.

20. On the 18,000 worlds, see note 12 above.

21. Ṭūsī's further elaborations on this subject can be found in his *Risāla fī al-ʿilal wa al-maʿlūlāt* and *Ṣudūr al-kathra*, printed together with *Talkhīṣ al-muḥaṣṣal*, ed. ʿA. Nūrānī (Tehran, 1359 Sh./1980), pp. 509–516.

22. Ṭūsī's etymological explanation of *hayūlā* is incorrect, since the word is derived from Greek, not Arabic, but his description and classification follows that of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ in *Rasāʾil* (Cairo, 1928), vol. 3, p. 230. For details, see S.H. Nasr, *An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines* (London, 1978), pp. 58–59.

23. The 'perfections' attainable by natural entities are basically twofold: the first (*kamāl-i awwal*) is movement from potentiality to actuality, as in the case of the soul in an organic body (see §63 below), and the second (*kamāl-i duwwum*) is the forms procured by compound entities. For details, see Ṭūsī *al-Kamāl al-awwal wa al-kamāl al-thānī*, printed with *Talkhīṣ al-muḥaṣṣal*, ed. ʿA.A. Nūrānī (Tehran, 1359 Sh/1980), p. 521, and al-Tahānawī, *Kashshāf iṣṭilāḥāt al-funūn*, ed. M. Wajīh et al. (Tehran, 1967), vol. 2, pp. 1264–5. See also *Ṭas. 20* and *21* where Ṭūsī discusses the soul's progression through various stages of perfection.

24. The term *'hay'at'* literally means form, shape or image, and can also be translated as imaginal body. According to Ṭūsī, the formation of the imaginal body depends entirely on the faculty of imagination (*khayāl*), and it remains a component of the human soul upon the disintegration of the physical body.

25. See note 17 above. In its original Shiʿi context, the term *'ḥujjat'* was applied to the Prophet and the Imams as 'proof' or evidence of God's will among mankind. In Fatimid Ismailism, it referred additionally to a senior rank in the *daʿwa* hierarchy directly under the chief *dāʿī*. In the Nizari *daʿwat* of the Alamūt period, the *ḥujjat* was elevated to the highest rank as the Imam's chief representative in religious and temporal matters; and as such he was believed to benefit from the Imam's divinely-inspired knowledge (*ʿilm-i taʾyīdī*), referred to here as the 'light of the sublime Word'. On the functions of the *ḥujjat* and other dignitaries of the *daʿwat, see Taṣ.* 24, §381–8, and *Taṣ.* 25, §400.

26. This is the actualising or Agent Intellect (*ʿaql-i faʿʿāl*), also known as the Form-giving Intellect (*ʿaql-i wāhib al-ṣuwar*), the tenth Intellect associated with the sphere of the Moon, mentioned earlier in *Taṣ.* 2, §20 and §27.

27. On the notions of *mafrūgh* and *mustaʾnif*, see note 13 above.

28. Ṭūsī's typology of souls essentially follows Imam ʿAlī's words addressed to his disciple Kumayl b. Ziyād al-Nakhaʿī: 'People are of three kinds: first are those assisted with divine knowledge (*ʿālimān rabbānī*), another is a pupil (*mutaʿallim*) on the path of salvation, and [lastly] the ignorant and worthless people (*hamaj*

ra'ā').' *Nahj al-balāgha*, p.496. In his *Sayr wa sulūk: Contemplation*, pp. 50–52, §50–55, Ṭūsī equates the three groups with the 'people of the left', the 'people of the right', and 'the foremost' (*sābiqān*) mentioned in the Qur'ān (9:100; 56:10–11). See *Ṭas*. 17, 18 and 21 for a similar categorisation of human beings. See also note 32 below.

29. Ṭūsī was most probably familiar with al-Fārābī's notion of *al-madīna al-fāḍila* and the Platonic Republic, but he is referring here (§86–87) not to the attributes of a just ruler as to a well ordered and regulated city.

30. The Pen (*qalam*) and the Preserved Tablet (*lawḥ-i maḥfūẓ*) are Qur'ānic terms (68:1; 85: 22), signifying a state of transcendental eternality. Subject to diverse interpretations by commentators, the two terms occur frequently in Ismaili cosmological thought, where they symbolise the Universal Intellect and Soul respectively. This is also the sense conveyed by Ṭūsī here, as suggested further in *Taṣ*. 24, §332.

31. The *quwwathā-yi rūḥānī* is the same as the *rūḥ-i ḥayawānī* (animal or vital spirit) mentioned in this passage and §92 below.

32. The tripartite division of human beings into *'awāmm* (or *'āmm*), *khawāṣṣ* and *akhaṣṣ-i khawāṣṣ* is a more formalised expression of the groups mentioned earlier in *Taṣ*. 10, §79–83, and note 28. It corresponds broadly with the *ahl-i taḍādd* (people of opposition), *ahl-i tarratub* (people of gradation) and *ahl-i waḥdat* of *Taṣ*. 13, §118. Such typological constructions are a distinctive feature of early Nizārī Ismaili thought, as discussed by M.G.S. Hodgson in *The Order of Assassins* (The Hague, 1955), pp. 172–174.

33. The brevity and density of this chapter suggest that for some reason it was left incomplete, and Ṭūsī was therefore unable to elaborate further on the relationship between subject and attribute from the moral perspective alluded to here. The last paragraph, missing in Ivanow's edition, appears to be corrupted in all manuscripts. The translation here is based on the relatively more coherent version of manuscript 'M'.

34. The principle of *'ilm-i ta'līmī*, authoritative knowledge transmitted through direct teachings of the Imams forms the cornerstone of Shi'i theology. In Fatimid Ismaili thought, it was elaborated by Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-Kirmānī in various treatises, especially the *Kitāb al-riyāḍ*, ed. 'Ārif Tāmir (Beirut, 1960), but it was Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ who turned it into a forceful doctrine in his *al-Fuṣūl al-arba'a*, summarised by 'Abd al-Karīm al-Shahrastānī in *Kitāb al-Milal wa al-niḥal*, ed. M.S. Kaylānī (Beirut, 1965); partial English trans. A.K. Kazi and J.G. Flynn, *Muslim Sects and Divisions* (London, 1984), pp. 167–170. Ṭūsī subsequently provided a systematic exposition of the same in *Sayr wa sulūk: Contemplation*, pp. 28–54. See also Hodgson, *Order of Assassins*, pp. 54–56, 325–328, and Badakhchani, 'Paradise' (thesis), pp. 80–110.

35. On the *ahl-i taḍādd*, see notes 9 and 32 above. An alternative rendering

of *ahl-i tarattub* would be 'people of hierarchical order', since in early Nizārī literature the term designates those who have accepted the Ismaili *da'wat* and are expected to rise, in a progressive manner, to the rank of *ahl-i waḥdat* (people of unity) at the apex of the hierarchy.

36. The terms 'primordial decree' and 'subsequent decree' are related to the notions of 'primordial past' (*mafrūgh*) and 'subsequent future' (*musta'nif*), i.e., the realms of free will and predestination. See note 13 above.

37. A tradition attributed to the Imam Ja'far al-Ṣādiq, referring to Mu'āwiya's 'devilish' *'aql*. Al-Kulaynī, *al-Kāfī*, vol. 1, p. 16.

38. This saying is similar to the traditions attributed to Imams Zayn al-'Ābidīn and Ja'far al-Ṣādiq in al-Kulaynī, *al-Kāfī*, vol. 3, pp. 3–10.

39. The *kawn-i mushābahat*, translated here as the 'realm of similitudes', refers to the external world of multiple sense perceptions, as well as the state of deception and illusion engendered by it in the common man. It is contrasted to the *kawn-i mubāyanat* (realm of distinction), the state of cognitive discrimination where it becomes possible to distinguish appearance from reality, truth from falsehood; which in turn leads to the *kawn-i waḥdāniyyat* (realm of unification) where only the truth prevails in its unalloyed purity and totality. Ṭūsī goes on to elaborate on these realms in various contexts (*Taṣ*. 15, 16, 17, 21, etc.).

40. *Fiṭrat*: see note 18 above and *Taṣ*. 17, §189.

41. The expressions [*a'lā*] *''illiyyin'* and *'asfal-i safilīn'* are derived from the Qur'ān, verses 83:18 and 95:15 respectively.

42. On the three realms of similitudes (*mushābahat*), distinction (*mubāyanat*) and unification (*waḥdāniyyat*), see note 39 above.

43. Ṭūsī expresses here a rare instance of racial prejudice, derived from a mixture of ignorance and fantasy, about the people of Africa, that was commonplace in medieval European and Middle Eastern societies.

44. The 'Sacrosanct Hierarchy' refers to the foremost order of spiritual beings who stand closest to the divine realm, above the position of angels. The Qur'ān alludes to this rank as '*the uppermost horizon*' (*al-ufuq al-a'lā*) and '*a distance of two bow-lengths or even nearer*' (*qāb-i qawsayn aw adnā*) (53: 8–9).

45. This maxim, which has its antecedents in classical Greek philosophy, found its way into the Islamic milieu, being attributed to the Prophet Muḥammad in al-Majlisī, *Biḥār al-anwār* (Tehran, 1956–1972), vol. 2, p. 32, and is frequently quoted in Sufi sources.

46. In Muslim eschatological tradition, the departed soul on its way to Paradise has to pass over a bridge in Hell which is, as described in the Prophet's words, 'finer than a hair and sharper than a sword'. Ṭūsī elaborates on this subject in *Āghāz wa anjām*, pp. 2–14. For other interpretations see Khayrkhwāh-i Harātī, *Kalām-i pīr*, Persian text, p. 107; M.H. Tihrānī, *Imam shināsī* (Tehran, 1405/1984), vol. 1, p. 167; and Henry Corbin, *Spiritual Body and Celestial Earth: From*

Mazdean Iran to Shī'ite Iran, tr. N. Pearson (Princeton NJ, 1977), pp. 40ff.

47. Ṭūsī alludes here to the correspondence between the manifest (*ẓāhir*) and the hidden (*bāṭin*), and the physical and spiritual worlds, which is central to the Ismaili system of *ta'wīl*. In *Sayr wa suluk: Contemplation*, pp. 40–41, §31–33, he argues that 'if there were a sensible thing here which did not have an intelligible entity corresponding to it there, its appearance would be a deception, like a mirage.'

48. On the three categories of knowledge, see *Taṣ*. 13.

49. See note 12 above.

50. This is a couplet in Arabic from an unknown poet.

51. Ibn Ḥanbal, *al-Musnad*, ed. M.N. Albānī (Cairo, 1986), pp. 120, 145; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, English tr. A. Ḥasan (New Delhi, 1985), vol. 3, pp. 1290–1291. See also note 18 above on *fiṭrat*.

52. In Ṭūsī's commentary on Ibn Sīnā, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt wa al-tanbīhāt* (Tehran, 1378/1959), vol. 2, p. 1, he speaks of 'sensual impurities' (*al-shawā'ib al-ḥissiya*) and 'temptations of habit' (*al-wasāwis al-'ādiyya*) as serious obstacles to arriving at a clear understanding of philosophy, be it natural or divine (*al-ṭabī'ī wa al-ilāhī*). In *Āghāz wa anjām*, pp. 4–5, he adds 'conventional laws' (*nawāmis-i amthila*) as the third obstacle, and speaks of the three as 'satanic chiefs' (*ru'asā' al-shayāṭīn thalātha*) causing man's aversion from the path of God.

53. Ṭūsī uses the term '*muḥiqq*', translated here and elsewhere in the text as 'truthful master' or 'master of truth', in the sense of a Prophet or Imam whose legitimacy and authority has been established. This follows the etymological usage of the *Nahj al- balāgha*, p. 78. However, the plural *muḥiqqān* as well as the expression *ahl-i ḥaqq* (e.g. §211) may be rendered more formally as 'followers of truth' (e.g. §195) or the 'rightful people' (e.g. §129). Ṭūsī explores the meaning of *muḥiqq* further in *Taṣ*. 24, §345.

54. Attributed to Imam 'Alī in *Nahj al-balāgha*, p.58. See also 'Alī Mishkīnī, *al-Hādī ilā mawḍū'āt Nahj al-balāgha* (Tehran, 1364 Sh./1984), pp. 204–206.

55. The author quotes this text in Arabic without citing his source.

56. A well-known saying of Imam 'Alī from *Nahj al-balāgha*, sermon 93, p. 137. For a different version and chain of narrators, see M.B. Maḥmūdī, *Nahj al-sa'āda fī mustadrak nahj al-balāgha* (Beirut, 1976), vol. 2, pp. 437–438.

57. Al-Suyūṭī, *Jāmi'*, vol. 1, p. 157; Faḍl b. al-Ḥasan al-Ṭabarsī, *al-Iḥtijāj* (Najaf, 1350/1931), p. 194.

58. Quoted earlier in §202 above.

59. Al-Suyūṭī, *Jāmi'*, vol. 2, p. 489.

60. Attributed to Imam 'Alī, speaking to Kumayl b. Ziyād, from *Nahj al-balāgha*, p. 497.

61. In contemporary Persian, *ta'līmāt riyāḍī* means mathematical instruction, which forms part of the pedagogy which Ṭūsī has perhaps in mind here for the

initial stage of human development.

62. See note 39 above.

63. On the functions of the three 'intelligences' in the soul's progression, see *Taṣ.* 20.

64. This sentence is only found in manuscript 'T', where it appears at the beginning of §231 above.

65. The transcription of this passage follows manuscripts 'M' and 'T'. The only significant difference between them is that the former has '*ta'līm*' and the latter "*ilm*' for the second stage of the summons. Also, 'M' has 'Prophets' instead of 'the Prophet', thus making the four stages a general rule applicable to all prophetic eras. For a developmental perspective of the 'four summons' in Ismaili thought, see Badakhchani, 'Paradise' (thesis), pp. 68–123.

66. Ṭūṣī elaborated on the concepts of *tawallā* (solidarity) and *tabarrā* (disassociation) in another treatise (*Tawallā wa tabarrā*, edited together with *Akhlāq-i muḥtashimī*, by M.T. Danīshpazhūh, Tehran, 1339 Sh./1960), where he discusses how a strong sense of solidarity with 'Alī and the Imams, together with disassociation from all base instincts, can enable one to arrive at the state of gnosis (*ma'rifat*).

67. A Prophetic Tradition, cited in al-Suyūṭī, *Jāmi'*, vol. 6, p. 760; al-Kulaynī, *al-Kāfī*, vol. 3, p. 137; al-Majlisī, *Biḥār al-anwār*, vol. 70, pp. 185–213; and al-Qāḍī al-Nu'mān, *Kitāb al-Majālis wa al-musāyarāt*, ed. al-Ḥabīb al-Faqī et al (Tunis, 1978), p. 520.

68. This saying is reminiscent of the words of the Nizārī Imam Ḥasan who enunciated the Great Resurrection (*qiyāmat-i qiyāmāt*) at Alamūt in 559/1164, and was assassinated two years later. The collection of his sermons, known as the *Fuṣūl-i muqaddas wa mubārak*, has not survived but is quoted frequently in early Nizārī literature, where he is usually referred to by his honorific name of '*alā dhikrihi al-salām* ('may salutation ensue upon mention of his name'). Ṭūsī cites several passages from the *Fuṣūl* in *Ṭas. 24*. In the *Sayr wa Sulūk: Contemplation*, p.32, §15, he recounts the deep impression left upon him by his first reading of the *Fuṣūl*. For a historical narrative of this Imam, see Daftary, *The Ismā'īlīs*, pp. 386–391, 553, and Hodgson, *Order of Assassins*, pp. 143–159.

69. See note 15 above.

70. See note 18 above.

71. A Prophetic Tradition cited in A.J. Wensinck, ed., *al-Mu'jam al-mufahras li-alfāū al-ḥadīth al-nabawī* (Leiden, 1943), vol. 4, p. 73.

72. This couplet comes most probably from the poet Ḥasan-i Maḥmūd who collaborated with Ṭūsī in the compilation of the *Rawḍa-yi taslīm*, as discussed in the Preface above.

73. From an Arabic poem by Labīd b. Rabī'a al-'Āmiri, a contemporary of the Prophet who is reported to have considered these the poet's most veracious

words. *Sharḥ Dīwān Labīd*, ed. Iḥsān 'Abbās (Kuwait, 1962), p. 256; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīh Muslim* (Cairo, 1375/1955), vol. 4, p. 41.

74. Attributed to Imam 'Alī in al-Kulaynī, *al-Kāfī*, vol. 1, p. 154, and 'Abbās Qummī, *Mafātīḥ al-janān* (Tehran, 1398/1977), p. 186. In his *Sayr wa sulūk: Contemplation*, Ṭūsī quotes similar sayings of 'Alī: 'I recognise You through You, and You are my Guide to Yourself,' (p. 38, §28) and 'I know God through God and I lead people to God' (p. 43, §37). See also Annex (section 2, note 8).

75. This and the following aphorisms ('Act in such manner ...'), are evocative of the Qur'ānic verse: '*On the day when every soul will be confronted with all the good it has done, and all the evil it has done*' (2:30). For similar expressions, see Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, *kitāb al-birr*, *ḥadīth* 55, and *kitāb al-janna*, *ḥadīth* 84; Ṭūsī, *Āghāz wa anjām*, pp. 12–18; and Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, *Mafātīḥ al-ghayb*, Persian tr. M. Khwājawī (Tehran, 1404/1983), pp. 1008–1028.

76. Another saying derived probably from the *Fuṣūl* of Imam Ḥasan *'alā dhikrihi al-salām*.

77. See note 52 above on the three major obstacles to human perfection.

78. *Mu'allim-i kullī*, 'complete' or 'total' teacher, refers to the Prophet and the Imams (see note 16). The term can also be translated as 'universal teacher' or the 'teacher of comprehensive knowledge'.

79. A tradition reported in al-Kulaynī, *al-Kāfī*, vol. 1, pp. 332–334. Al-Kulaynī uses *lasākhat* (dispersal) instead of *lamādat* (perish), which is perhaps a better rendering. The same tradition is attributed in §421 to the Prophet.

80. Ṭūsī provides both Arabic and Persian texts of this and the following prayers of Imam Zayn al-'Ābidīn, from *al-Ṣaḥīfa al-kāmila al-Sajjādiyya*, ed. Fayḍ al-Islām (Tehran, 1375/1955). The English translations are derived, with minor modifications, from W.C. Chittick, *The Psalms of Islam* (London, 1988).

81. *Al-Ṣaḥīfa*, prayer 16, verse 30, p. 117; *Psalms of Islam*, pp. 59–60.

82. *Al-Ṣaḥīfa*, prayer 20, verses 3–4, pp. 129–130; *Psalms of Islam*, pp. 67–68.

83. *Al-Ṣaḥīfa*, prayer 20, verse 9, p. 133; *Psalms of Islam*, pp. 69–70.

84. *Al-Ṣaḥīfa*, prayer 22, verse 13, p. 153; *Psalms of Islam*, p. 83.

85. From an Arabic poem alluding to a saying of Imam 'Alī, cited in al-Majlisī, *Biḥār al-anwār* (Tehran, 1376/1956), vol. 73, p. 261. With minor variance, the poem reads: 'Be patient with the jealousy of the envious person, because your patience will kill him./Envy is like a fire which devours itself if it does not find anything else to devour.' Ṭūsī quotes the same verse in his *Akhlāq-i Muḥtashimī*, p. 284.

86. The term '*ḥāl-i wujūd*' is perhaps to be understood in the sense of *fiṭrat*, original nature (see note 18 above).

87. These lines, although not recorded among Ṭūsī's poems, resemble his poetic style. For poems attributed to Ṭūsī, see M. Zanjānī, *Sargudhasht wa 'aqā'id-i falsafī-yi Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī* (Tehran, 1335 Sh./1956) pp. 153–160,

and Raḍawī, *Aḥwāl*, p. 627. Some verses of Ṭūsī are also quoted in Khayrkhwāh-i Harati, *Faṣl dar bayān-i shinākht-i imām.*

88. Imam Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn, *al-Ṣaḥīfa*, prayer 2, verses 9–12, p. 45; *Psalms of Islam*, p. 21. The words in brackets appear in manuscript 'T' only in the Persian version of the quote.

89. Attributed to the Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, according to al-Barqī, *Kitāb al-maḥāsin*, ed. S.J. Muḥaddith (Qumm, 1331 Sh./1952), pp. 262–266.

90. A Prophetic Tradition cited in Badīʿ al-Zamān Furūzānfar, *Aḥādīth-i mathnawī* (Tehran, 1347/1969), p. 99. Furūnzānfar refers to a number of variants of this *ḥadīth*, including '*Inna min al-bayāni la-siḥran*.' See also Wensinck, *al-Muʿjam al-mufahras*, vol. 1, p. 393.

91. See notes 9 and 35 above.

92. Cf. Ṭūsī, *Sayr wa sulūk: Contemplation*, p. 45, §42–45.

93. In Shiʿi literature the word '*mustabṣir*' is often used as a synonym for *muʾmin*, 'true believer', in contrast to those who profess Islam only verbally (*muslim*), in keeping with Qurʾān 49: 14: '*The desert Arabs say, "We are the faithful (muʾmin)." Say [to them]: You have no faith, but rather say "we submit"*.' Thus, in the present context, 'he will submit' (*musallim*) could be read as *muslim*.

94. From *al-Ṣaḥīfa*, prayer 9, verses 5–7; p. 87; *Psalms of Islam*, p. 41.

95. The *dawr-i kamāl* refers to *zamān-i qiyāmat*, the age of Resurrection.

96. A statement of the classical Ismaili definition of *taʾwīl* as found, for example, in Nāṣir-i Khusraw, *Wajh-i dīn*, ed. M. Ghanīzāda and M. Qazvīnī (Berlin, 1343/1924), pp. 51–61. Manuscript 'M' reads, '*al-taʾwīl zāda unsī ilā Allāh*,' meaning '*Taʾwīl* adds to my intimacy with God,' which corresponds more closely to Ṭūsī's definition of *tanzīl* in §322 above.

97. The concept of *maẓhar* (translated in the text as 'locus', 'manifestation' or 'epiphany') constitutes one of the key features of Nizārī Ismaili thought. Based on the principle of correspondence between the spiritual and material worlds (see note 47 above), it defines the Imam in his spiritual essence as the *maẓhar* of the Word (*kalima*) or Command (*amr*) of God. The locus is not the Imam's physical body which is mortal and changeable, but his inner, spiritual reality which is regarded as eternal and immutable. Ṭūsī comments on this subject further in *Taṣ.* 27, §516–17. See also Henry Corbin, *Cyclical Time*, pp. 103–117, and Christian Jambet's Commentary in the Appendix for a discussion of certain parallels between the Ismaili doctrine of *maẓhar* and Christian doceticism.

98. See note 30 above.

99. Ṭūsī's views about the pseudo-prophet (*mutanabbī*) and the possessed (*mamrūr*) follow Ibn Sīnā's *al-Mabdaʾ waʾl-maʿād*, ed. A. Nūrānī (Tehran, 1363 Sh./1984), pp. 119–120.

100. A well-known tradition of the Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, cited in al-Barqī, *Kitāb al-maḥāsin*, pp. 255–59; al-Majlisī, *Biḥār al-anwār*, vol. 75, pp. 394–443; and M.R.

al-Muẓaffar, *'Aqāyid al-imāmiyya* (Cairo, 1381/1961), p. 72.

101. The Persian text reads: '*ḥaqq bī ū kufr bāshad wa bā ū bi-ham shirk.*' Ṭūṣī seeks to explain, through this turn of phrase, that truth is to be found at mid-point between the two extremities of *bī* (=without), i.e., non-recognition of the Imam which is tantamount to infidelity, and *bā* (=together with), i.e., regarding him as co-equal with the truth, which is akin to associationism. See also note 104 below.

102. Variants of this saying, attributed to Imam 'Alī, appear in al-Kulaynī, *al-Kāfī*, vol. 4, pp. 65–70, and 'Alī Tihrānī, *Mishkāt al-anwār fī ghurar al-akhbār*, ed. Ṣāliḥ al-Ja'farī (Qumm, 1965), pp. 91–107.

103. Attributed to Imam Ḥusayn b. 'Alī in al-Kulaynī, *al-Kāfī*, vol. 1, pp. 336–347 and al-Majlisī, *Biḥār al-anwār*, vol. 7, p. 18.

104. The first point of view, that the Imam does not possess human form and is therefore inaccessible to mankind, is contrasted with the second view, that he is totally human, without any special ontological status and therefore accessible to everyone. Ṭūsī rejects both views to argue that while the essential, spiritual reality of the Imam is beyond human comprehension, it can only be recognised through his human form according to individual capacities.

105. Cited previously in §270 (note 79).

106. For this and other quotations in §351–52 attributed to Imam 'Alī, see al-Kulaynī, *al-Kāfī*, vol. 1, pp. 256–262, 336–340, 347–359; Ḥāfiẓ Rajab al-Bursī, *Mashāriq anwār al-yaqīn fī asrār Amīr al-mu'minīn* (Tehran, n.d.), pp. 160–172; Ḥaydar Āmulī, *Jāmi' al-asrār wa manba' al-anwār*, ed. Henry Corbin and Osman Yahia (Tehran, 1969), p. 411; and M. Momen, *An Introduction to Shi'i Islam* (New Haven, 1958), pp. 147–160.

107. See note 66 above.

108. A Prophetic Tradition, cited in Ibn Hishām, *al-Sīrat al-nabawiyya*, ed. Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī (Cairo, 1955), vol. 1, p. 224, and al-Qāḍī al-Numān, *Kitāb al-Majālis wa al-musāyarāt*, p. 56. Salmān al-Fārisī, a Persian companion of the Prophet Muḥammad, is venerated in Shi'ism for his defence of Imam 'Alī's right of succession to the Prophet and subsequent role in the conversion of Iran to Islam. For details, see Louis Massignon, *Salmān Pāk: et les prémices spirituelles de l'Islam Iranien* (Tours, 1934), pp. 16–19; Corbin, *Cyclical Time*, pp. 74–76, 170–174; and Ḥ.M. al-Miṣrī, *al-Ṣaḥābī al-jalīl Salmān al-Fārisī* (Cairo, 1972), pp. 122–169.

109. Abū al-Qāsim Aḥmad Musta'lī (d. 495/1101), the younger son of the Fatimid Imam-caliph al-Mustanṣir (d. 487/1094), was proclaimed his successor by the *wazīr* al-Afḍal, in place of the older brother and heir-designate Nizār, thus causing the Nizārī-Musta'lī division among the Ismailis. For details see Daftary, *The Ismā'īlīs*, pp. 256–261.

110. See notes 28 and 32 above.

111. Cf. Matthew 5:18 ; Luke 16:17.

112. Text in Arabic, probably a saying of the Imam Ja'far al-Ṣādiq. Similar traditions are found in al-Kulaynī, *al-Kāfī*, vol. 1, pp. 379–396.

113. In Ismaili terminology, the term *mustawda'* is applied to an acting or temporary Imam, i.e., a trustee of the actual or permanent (*mustaqarr*) Imam who may be in concealment or unable to declare his Imamate openly. Thus, al-Ḥasan b. 'Alī, who is recognised as second Imam by the Twelver Shi'is, is reckoned in Fatimid tradition to be a *mustawda'* Imam, representing the *mustaqarr* Imam, his younger brother al-Ḥusayn. See W. Ivanow, *Ibn Qaddāḥ: The Alleged Founder of Ismailism* (Bombay, 1957), p. 131; Daftary, *The Ismā'īlīs*, pp. 104–105, 114–115; and M. Canard, 'Fāṭimids', in *EI2*. Ṭūsī returns to this subject in §360–63 below, and *Taṣ.* 26, §405–10.

114. Malik al-Salām is Melchizedek of Biblical tradition (Genesis, 14: 18–20), where he is described as king of Salem and high priest of El-Elyon, the God Most High. He blessed Abraham and gave him bread and wine when the latter returned from battle. The king-priest is variously identified in Judaeo-Christian and Gnostic traditions with Sem the son of Noah, Jesus Christ and as a heavenly being of lofty status. In *Taṣ.* 26, §404, Ṭūsī refers to Malik al-Salām as the *waṣī* (legatee) of Abraham. See also note 136 below.

115. This is Ṭūsī's only explicit statement in the text regarding his personal circumstances at the time of writing. It is not clear, however, whether he is alluding to his quarters at Alamūt where he did much of his writing, or to the approaching threat of the Mongols intent on the destruction of the Ismailis.

116. Attributed, in slightly different words, to the Imam Ja'far al-Ṣādiq, in al-Kulaynī, *al-Kāfī*, vol. 2, *Kitāb al-ḥujja*, *bāb* 59, pp. 51–54.

117. Al-Kulaynī, *al-Kāfī*, vol. 1, p. 49.

118. Al-Kulaynī, *al-Kāfī*, vol., 1, pp. 371–378.

119. Al-Kulaynī, *al-Kāfī*, vol. 1, pp. 371–378. For a detailed study of the concept of Divine Light (*nūr Allāh*) in Shi'ism, refer to M.A. Amir-Moezzi, *The Divine Guide in Early Shi'ism: The Sources of Esotericism in Islam*, tr. David Streight (New York, 1994), especially Chapter 2, pp. 29–59.

120. Attributed to the Imam Ja'far al-Ṣādiq in al-Kulaynī, *al-Kāfī*, vol. 1, p. 164, but cited as a Prophetic Tradition in Ḥaydar Āmulī, *Jāmi' al-asrār*, p. 126.

121. Ṭūsī means that some followers of a hidden Imam fail to abide by the precautionary measures of *taqiyya* governing his concealment, as was the case in the time of Imam Ḥasan *'alā dhikrihi al-salām* who is reported to have disguised himself as a grandson of Muḥammad b. Buzurg-Umīd, the commander of Alamūt, until his true identity was divulged. For more details, see Daftary, *The Ismā'īlīs*, pp. 385–386, and Hodgson, *Order of Assassins*, pp. 146–148.

122. On *tabarrā* and *tawallā*, see note 66 above.

123. Similar traditions of the early Shi'i Imams are found in al-Kulaynī, *al-Kafī*,

vol. 1, p. 387.

124. Ṭūsī's point is that the words and actions of the Imams are not always susceptible to conventional norms of human interpretation and judgement. In the Qur'ānic story of Moses and Khiḍr (18:60–82), for example, the Prophet is bewildered by the seemingly arbitrary and unreasonable behaviour of his travelling companion and guide, but which eventually proves to be prescient and legitimate. In Ṭūsī's opinion the same principle applies to the Imam's behaviour. For details, see al-Shahrastānī, *Majlis-i maktūb-i mun'aqid dar Khwārazm*, ed. and French tr. Diane Steigerwald as *Discours sur l'Ordre et la création* (Saint-Nicholas, Quebec, 1999), pp. 101–104.

125. Attributed to Imam 'Alī, in al-Kulaynī, *al-Kāfī*, vol. 2, pp. 333 ff., and al-Majlisī, *Biḥār*, vol. 2. pp. 183 ff. Ṭūsī's Persian translation of the Arabic text reads: 'Our affair is one hardship after another, one mystery after another, one ordeal after another. No one can bear it except an angel close [to God], a Prophet sent as a messenger, or a believer whose heart God has tested with faith.'

126. From a sermon delivered by Imam 'Alī after his election as caliph. *Nahj al-balāgha* (Beirut, 1967), sermon 16, p. 57, and al-Qāḍī al-Nu'mān, *Sharḥ al-akhbār*, ed. M.H. Jalālī (Qumm, 1414/1993), vol. 1, pp. 371, 482–483.

127. Ṭūsī is probably quoting here the words of Imam Ḥasan *'alā dhikrihi al-salām*, or his successor Nūr al-Dīn Muḥammad (d. 607/1210) who elaborated his father's doctrine of *qiyāmat* into systematic form.

128. Quoted earlier in §127, cf. note 37 above.

129. For similar expressions attributed to Imam Ja'far al-Ṣādiq, see al-Kulaynī, *al-Kāfī*, vol. 3, pp. 2–9.

130. Ṭūsī returns here to the observation made in §345 above. For a similar line of argument, see his *Sayr wa sulūk: Contemplation*, pp. 52–53, §56–7.

131. Similar traditions of the early Shi'i Imams are recorded in al-Bursī's *Mashāriq anwār al-yaqīn*, pp. 111, 122 and 164–70. The Arabic expression *fī al-dharr* literally means 'in the specks [of Light],' referring to the meta-historical time of *mīthāq* (Divine Covenant), i.e., *rūz-i alast* (Day of Pre-eternity).

132. The same as the Agent Intellect (*'aql-i fa''āl*) mentioned in *Taṣ*. 2, §20.

133. Text in Arabic, probably from the *Fuṣūl* of Imam Ḥasan 'Alā Dhikrihi al-Salām. Ṭūsī's Persian gloss reads: 'From the time that I am your *walī*, I have neither spoken to you nor uttered a single word.'

134. The Persian text of this passage appears to be defective in places, probably due to a scribal error.

135. The term *waṣī* (pl. *awṣiyā'*), which literally means 'trustee', 'legatee' or 'executor of will', is a technical expression in Shi'ism for the immediate successor to a Prophet, and equivalent to *asās*, meaning 'foundation', i.e., the 'founder-Imam' who becomes the progenitor of a line of Imams. Both terms are applicable more specifically to the Imam 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib.

136. On Malik al-Salām, see note 114 above. According to al-Qāḍī al-Nu'mān (*Asās al-ta'wīl*, ed. Ārif Tāmir, Beirut, 1960, p. 112), the *waṣī* of Abraham was Ishmael. For Idrīs Imād al-Dīn (*Zahr al-ma'ānī*, cited by Corbin, *Cyclical Time*, p. 97, n. 86), Malik al-Salām and Ishmael were the same personage.

137. Dhū al-Qarnayn is identified in Shi'i and Sufi traditions with Khiḍr, the companion of Moses mentioned in the Qur'ān (see note 124 above).

138. On *mustawda'* (temporary) and *mustaqarr* (permanent) Imams, see *Ṭas.* 24, §355, and note 113 above.

139. Ma'add was the legendary ancestor of a North Arabian tribe bearing his name.

140. For a general discussion of the *wasīs* of the Prophets and their identities in Nizārī Ismaili thought, see Hodgson, *Order of Assassins*, pp. 170–172 and 230.

141. Nasr was the name of an idol venerated by the people of Noah: 'Alī Akbar Dihkhudā, *Lughat nāma* (Tehran, 1979).

142. A Prophetic Tradition cited in al-Suyūtī, *al-Jāmi'*, vol. 1, p. 157.

143. Attributed to Imam Ja'far al-Ṣādiq, in al-Shahrastānī, *Mafātiḥ al-asrār*, vol. 1, p. 111a. See also *Majlis-i maktūb*, p. 16.

144. The provenance of this tradition has not been established. Perhaps it is an interpretation of the Qur'an, *Sura al-Qiyāma*, 75: 19 ('*Then, more, it is for Us to explain [the meaning] thereof*') that was common in esoteric milieus. See Hermann Landolt, 'Suhrawardī between Philosophy, Sufism and Ismailism: A Re-appraisal,' *Dāneshnāmeh*, 1 (2003), pp. 13–29.

145. Cited in al-Bukhārī, *al-Jāmi' al-Ṣaḥīḥ* (Cairo, 1932), vol. 6, p.206.

146. The same interpretation of 'heaven' and 'earth' is conveyed in the words of Imam [Ḥasan] *'alā dhikrihi al-salām* in *Taṣ.* 24, §357.

147. A similar interpretation of the missions of the six Prophets in two groups occurs in the *Kitāb al-Iṣlāḥ* of the 4th/10th century Ismaili *dā'ī*, Abū Ḥātim Aḥmad b. Ḥamdān al-Rāzī, ed. Ḥasan Mīnūchihr and Mahdī Muḥaqqiq, with an Introduction by Shin Nomoto (Tehran, 1998), p. 88.

148. See note 79 above.

149. Cited in Ibn Ḥanbal, *al-Musnad*, vol. 4, p. 96; al-Kulaynī, *al-Kāfī*, vol. 1, p. 342; al-Barqī, *Kitāb al-maḥāsin*, pp. 153–156; al-Qāḍī al-Nu'mān, *Da'ā'im al-Islām*, ed. A.A.A. Fyzee (Cairo, 1951–61), vol. 1, p. 31; and al-Mu'ayyad fi'l-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *al-Majālis al-Mu'ayyadiyya*, vol. 1, ed., Muṣṭafā Ghālib (Beirut, 1974), p. 119. For variants of this *ḥadīth*, see Ḥasan Tihrānī, *Imām shināsī* (Tehran, 1404/1983), vol. 3, pp. 13–19.

150. In this passage, Ṭūsī follows Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ's line of argument on the recognition of truth in *Fuṣūl-i arba'a* (*Four Chapters*), as summarised in al-Shahrastānī's *al-Milal wa al-niḥal*, and the short treatise entitled *Rāh-i ma'rifat*, in Badakhchani, 'Paradise' (thesis), Persian text, pp. 91–101. See also note 34 above.

151. A Prophetic Tradition, cited in al-Shahrastānī, *Nihāyat al-aqdām fī 'ilm*

al-kalām (London, 1934), Arabic text, p. 494. See also Tihrānī, *Imām shināsī*, vol. 1, pp. 222–232.

152. A Prophetic Tradition cited in al-Bursī, *Mashāriq anwār al-yaqīn* (Tehran, n.d.), p. 122, and often discussed in Shi'i and Sufi sources.

153. Al-Suyūtī, *al-Jāmi'*, vol. 3, p. 508.

154. Cited in al-Suyūtī, *Jāmi'*, vol. 3, p. 509.

155. Ibn Ḥanbal, *al-Musnad*, vol. 5, p. 419, and al-Qāḍī al-Nu'mān, *Sharḥ al-akhbār*, vol. 1, pp. 99–101 and 108–109. See also L. Veccia Vaglieri, 'Ghadīr Khumm,' in *EI2*, vol. 2, pp. 993–994.

156. The 'Pillars of Islam' in Fatimid Ismailism are seven: purification (*ṭahārat*), imamate (*wilāyat*), prayer (*ṣalāt*), fasting (*ṣawm*), alms-giving (*zakāt*), pilgrimage to Mecca (*ḥajj*), and religious endeavour (*jihād*): al-Qāḍī al-Nu'mān, *Da'ā'im*, vol. 1, p. 2. In Twelver Shi'ism, the pillars are counted as five, excluding *ṭahārat* and *jihād*: al-Kulaynī, *al-Kāfi*, vol. 3, pp. 32–43.

157. In Ṭūsī's interpretation of the 'seven pillars', the *shahādat* includes profession of belief in one God (*tawḥīd*), the prophethood of Muḥammad (*nubuwwat*) and the imamate of 'Alī (*wilāyat*).

158. For a similar esoteric exegesis of the *sharī'at*, see Ṭūsī's *Maṭlūb al-mu'minīn*, in *Two Early Ismaili Treatises*, ed. W. Ivanow (Bombay, 1933), pp. 51–55. Cf. the Fatimid versions of al-Qāḍī al-Nu'mān, *Ta'wīl al-da'ā'im*, ed. M. Ḥasan al-A'ẓamī (Cairo, 1967–72), and Nāṣir-i Khusraw, *Wajh-i dīn*, ed. M. Ghanīzada and M. Qazvīnī (Berlin, 1343/1924).

159. Quoted earlier in *Taṣ*. 15, §150 (note 45). For Ṭūsī's interpretation of the term 'lord' (*mawlā* and *walī*) for the Imam, see *Taṣ*. 1, §3, and notes 7–8 above.

160. *Tengrī* is a Mongolian expression for God: Shīrīn Bayānī, *Dīn wa dawlat dar īrān-i 'ahd-i Mughul* (Tehran, 1367 Sh./1988), p. 126.

161. Ṭūsī's collaborator, Ḥasan-i Maḥmūd Kātib, has apparently versified this paragraph in his collection of poems, *Dīwān-i Qā'imiyyāt* (unpublished ms.), in the following manner:

> You are the Most Sacred, the King and Judge.
> Here in this world, people describe You differently.
> Persians call You *Khudā*, Arabs *Allāh*,
> Turks *Tengrī*, and Europeans *Deus*.
> No doubt, without exaggeration,
> You can be called by all these names.
> But, with the specific name of the *Qā'im*,
> You are exalted, above and independent of such epithets.

162. Ṭūsī refers here to the dialectics of the theologians (*mutakallimūn*), on which see al-Shahrastānī, especially his *Majlis-i maktūb*, pp. 99–101.

163. Mentioned earlier in *Taṣ.* 25, §352. On this and other sayings in §438, attributed to Imam 'Alī, see note 106 above.

164. *Sipās*, a Persian word meaning gratitude, appreciation or praise, is normally used with regard to God. Ṭūsī's etymological explanation, however, is his own construction.

165. That is, 'Iraq-i 'Ajam, the region of Jibāl in north-western Iran, as distinct from 'Iraq-i 'Arab, which is present-day Iraq.

166. A similar analogy of the pilgrimage to Makkah with the quest for the Imam, and one's arrival at the Ka'ba with the recognition of the Imam, is offered by Nāṣir-i Khusraw in his *Wajh-i dīn*, pp. 262–266. See also his *qaṣīda* on the inner meaning of the *ḥajj* in the *Dīwān*, ed. M. Mīnuwī and M. Muḥaqqiq (Tehran, 1353 Sh./1974), no. 141, pp. 300–301.

167. This is in conformity with Ṭūsī's opinion of wine in the *Akhlāq-i Nāṣirī*, , ed. M. Mīnuwī and 'A.R. Ḥaydarī (Tehran, 1356 Sh./1977), tr. G.W. Wickens, *The Nasirean Ethics* (London, 1964), pp. 176–178, and *Āghāz wa anjām*, pp. 40–41.

168. Ṭūsī elaborates on this feature of Paradise in his *Āghāz wa anjām*, pp. 69–70.

169. Ibn Hishām, *al-Sīrat*, vol. 2, p. 371; Ibn Ḥanbal, *al-Musnad*, p. 82; Sharaf al-Dīn Mūsawī, *al-Murāja'āt* (Beirut, 1979), pp. 198–199. See also al-Qāḍī al-Nu'mān, *Sharḥ al-akhbār*, vol. 1, p. 321.

170. For a comprehensive historical analysis of the events following the Prophet's death, see Wilferd Madelung, *The Succession to Muḥammad: A Study of the Early Caliphate* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 28–56 and 214.

171. On Salmān, see note 106 above.

172. Cited in Ibn Hishām, *al-Sīrat*, vol. 1, p. 70; al-Suyūṭī, *Jāmi'*, vol. 4, p. 315; and al-Qāḍī al-Nu'mān, *Kitāb al-Majālis*, p. 56.

173. The sayings of Imam 'Alī cited in §472–74 can, with minor differences, all be found in *Haft bāb-i Bābā Sayyidnā*, trans. Hodgson, *Order of Assassins*, Appendix 1. Similar expressions attributed to the early Shi'i Imams are assembled by Amir-Moezzi in his *Divine Guide*, pp. 29–97.

174. The Battle of the Camel was fought between 'Alī and Ṭalḥa, Zubayr and 'Ā'isha in 36/656.

175. The allusion here is to the Imam *'alā dhikrihi al-salām* and his declaration of *Qiyāmat*. See notes 68 and 121 above.

176. *'Urfa* refers to the middle stage of something or the eve before any event in the calendar. For various readings of this word, see *Farhang-i Ānandarāj*, ed. M. Dabīr Siyāqī (Tehran, 1335 Sh./1957), vol. 4, p. 2912.

177. The source of this tradition has not been established.

178. Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ (d. 518/1124) was the founder of the Nizārī Ismaili movement in Iran, with its headquarters at Alamūt. He deputised as the *ḥujjat* (proof) of the early Nizārī Imams who are said to have remained hidden following the

Musta'lī-Nizārī schism in the Fatimid *da'wat*. For a detailed historical account, see Hodgson, *Order of Assassins*, pp. 41–82 passim, as well as Daftary, *The Ismā'īlīs*, pp. 337–372, and his 'Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ and the Origins of the Nizārī Isma'ili Movement,' in F. Daftary, ed., *Mediaeval Isma'ili History and Thought* (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 181–204 and p. 201, n. 8.

179. What Ṭūsī provides here is a concise rendering of Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ's doctrine of *ta'līm*, as expounded in his *al-Fuṣūl al-arba'a*. See note 34 above, as well as Christian Jambet's discussion of *ta'līm* in his Commentary (Appendix, Section 2).

180. A Prophetic Tradition, cited in al-Bukhārī, *al-Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 6, p. 158.

181. These words are derived from a sermon on the *Qiyāmat* by the Imam Ḥasan *'alā dhikrihi al-salām*, which is partially quoted in Abū Isḥāq Quhistānī, *Haft bāb*, pp. 34–44. On the event of the *Qiyāmat* inaugurated at Alamūt, see in particular Hodgson, *Order of Assassins*, pp. 148–159. Ṭūsī's description of the sounding of the trumpets follows closely the Qur'ānic account of the Resurrection (6: 73; 18: 99; 20: 102, etc.).

182. Attributed to the Prophet, in La'lī Badakhshī, *Thamarāt al-quds*, ed. Kamāl Ḥāj-Sayyid-Jawādī (Tehran, 1376 Sh./1997), p. 880.

183. Al-Kulaynī, *al-Kafī*, vol. 3, p. 356.

184. Mentioned earlier in *Taṣ.* 2, §28, where Ṭūsī introduces his teleological view of the human being as the ultimate end and perfection of creation. See Christian Jambet's Commentary (Appendix 2, section II.1: The Nature of Man) for a discussion of the subject.

185. As mentioned in the Preface, this name refers to Nāṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī himself, suggesting that the scribe reproduced the colophon from the original autograph copy.

Notes to the Annex [1] and [2]

1. The Annex forms part of ancillary material that was copied by the scribe of manuscript 'M' and selected here for its relation to other parts and contexts of the *Rawḍa-yi taslīm*. For a discussion of this material, see our Preface above.

2. On Khwāja Muḥammad Bāsa'īd there is no reliable report.

3. The reference is to 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad, who succeeded to the Nizārī imamate in 618/1221 at the age of nine. During his 44 years of imamate, he encouraged intellectual life among his followers and provided refuge to scholars of other communities fleeing from the Mongols; it was under his patronage that Ṭūsī produced the *Rawḍa-yi taslīm*. For more details see Daftary, *The Ismā'īlīs*, pp. 407–418 and 422–423.

4. From a *qaṣīda* by Sanā'ī, which reads: 'Through religion one can enter the valley of needfulness,/otherwise, how can man arrive at meaning without pass-

ing through the names?' *Dīwān*, ed. M. Mudarris Raḍawī (Tehran, 1352/1983), p. 52. For a commentary on the poem, see Sha'fī'ī Kadkanī, *Tāzīyānahā-yi sulūk* (Tehran, 1372 Sh./1993), pp. 73–79 and 249–267.

5. The expressions *āftāb-i 'ālam-i ḥaqīqī*, *āftāb-i 'ālam al-dīn* and *āftāb-i 'ālam-i ḥaqīqī-yi dīnī* in this passage refer to the Imams in general and more precisely to the *nūr* (Light) of the Imamate (see note 119 above).

6. Attributed to Salmān al-Farsī and mentioned in one of the *Fuṣūl* of 'Alā Dhikrihi al-Salām entitled '*Faṣl-i Pārsiyān*', which is partially preserved in manuscript 'M'. On Salmān, see note 108 above.

7. *Ghulāt* (sing. *ghālī*) comes from the Arabic root *gha-la-wa*, meaning augmentation or exaggeration. In Shi'i Islam, the term has been used (often pejoratively) for individuals or groups with a propensity to divinise the Imams. In our text, however, it is interesting that two kinds of *ghulāt* are mentioned, the 'literalist' and 'discerning', maintaining definite views about their spiritual stauts vis-à-vis the Imam. On the *ghulāt* generally, see M.G.S. Hodgson, 'Ghulat' in *EI2*, pp. 1119–1121.

8. As attributed to Imam 'Alī in *Ṭas.* 21, §256 and note 74. In the *Sayr wa sulūk: Contemplation*, p. 39, §30, there is a similar expression on which Ṭūsī comments: 'This [station] is the noblest degree of certainty, the most perfect mode of knowledge, unlike the knowledge of cause and effect which does not give certainty.'

9. On *bāb* and *ḥujjat*, see notes 17 and 25 above.

10. In other words, during the period when the Imam is in concealment (*satr*), his foremost deputies, the *bāb* and the *ḥujjat*, may exercise authority and leadership on his behalf; but in the period of his manifestation (*kashf*), they revert to their subordinate positions in the hierarchy of the *da'wat*.

11. In the *Sayr wa sulūk: Contemplation*, p. 44, §39, Ṭūsī observes: 'The followers of *ta'līm*, however, believe in the principle that everyone, whatever his degree may be, knows his own instructor, who in turn knows his own instructor, [and so on] to the first instructor, who knows God through God. As a result, everyone also comes to know God through God.'

12. On the *Fuṣūl-i muqaddasa*, see note 68 above.

Notes to the Appendix: A Philosophical Commentary

1. This Commentary is an abridged version of Christian Jambet's Introduction to his French translation of *Rawḍa-yi taslīm* under the title of *La Convocation d'Alamūt: Somme de philosophie ismaélienne* (Lagrasse, 1996), pp. 7–122, and is published here with the author's permission. The translation was prepared by Hafiz Karmali, a doctoral candidate at École Pratique des Hautes Études at the Sorbonne. For the purpose of this publication, English sources are cited in the

notes where possible, and a few additional references have been inserted between brackets. The numbers marked by § in the Commentary refer to the relevant passages of S.J.B's English translation of the *Rawḍa.*

2. Michael Chodkiewicz, *Un océan sans rivage, Ibn Arabi, Le Livre et la Loi* (Paris, 1992), p. 157.

3. Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-Kirmānī, *Rāḥat al-ʿaql*, ed. M. Kāmil Ḥusayn and M. Muṣṭafā Ḥilmī (Cairo, 1953), p. 51ff.

4. See G. Lardreau, *La Véracité, Essai d'une philosophie négative* (Lagrasse, 1993).

5. For a different interpretation see Hodgson, *Order of Assassins*, p. 232.

6. Abū Isḥāq Quhistānī, *Haft bāb*, p. 7 ff.

7. If the division must be made between the desire for truth and that of modern science, it is at this point. Descartes exhibited the property of truth most appropriate to modern science: nothing true, if it is without master, that is, by methodical exercise of his natural light.

8. Regarding the Ismaili conception of intellect, refer to the article by Shahrokh Meskoob, 'Mansha' wa maʿnāy-i ʿaql dar andīsha-yi Nāṣir-i Khusraw,' *Iran Nameh*, 7 (1989), pp. 239–257, 405–429.

9. Al-Shahrastānī, *Kitāb al-milal wa al-niḥal*, English tr., Kazi and Flynn, *Muslim Sects*, pp. 167–170. On the *Fuṣūl*, see note 34 above to the English translation of Ṭūsī's text.

10. Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, *Faḍā'iḥ al-Baṭiniyya wa-faḍā'il al-Mustaẓhiriyya*, ed. 'A. Badawī (Cairo, 1964). English tr. Richard J. McCarthy, in *Freedom and Fulfillment* (Boston MA, 1980), pp. 175–286.

11. Henry Corbin, 'The Ismāʿīlī Response to the Polemic of Ghazālī,' in S.H. Nasr, ed., *Ismāʿīlī Contributions to Islamic Culture* (Tehran, 1977), pp. 69–98. [See also Farouk Mitha, *Al-Ghazālī and the Ismailis: A Debate on Reason and Authority in Medieval Islam* (London, 2001).]

12. *Moralia. Les notions morales dans la littérature persane du IIIe/IVe au VIIe/XIIIe siècles* (Paris, 1968). This section is based on my contribution 'Aperçus philosophiques de la morale de Naṣir al-dīn Ṭusi dans les Taṣavvorāt,' in *Pand-o Sokhan: Mélanges offerts à Charles-Henri de Fouchécour*, ed. C. Ballaÿ et al. (Tehran, 1995), pp. 117–131.

13. In Ch. H. de Fouchécour, *Moralia*, pp. 444–447, we read: 'As happiness was the peak aimed for by the Sufi-inspired morality of al-Ghazālī ... it is perfection which is the key notion of Ṭūsī's morality ... Human virtues have for themselves, according to Ṭūsī, an internal compelling force which leads them to perfection in actuality. Ṭūsī is fundamentally convinced that nature has a profound disposition towards perfection; moreover, there is in man a 'divine particle' which predisposes him to accede to the gift of wisdom.' (p. 466)

14. Ṭūsī, *Akhlāq-i Nāṣirī*, English tr. G.M. Wickens, *The Nasirean Ethics.*

15. *A contrario*, we cite Wilferd Madelung's correct judgement in his *Religious Trends in Early Islamic Iran* (Albany, NY, 1988), p. 104: 'In his Nasirean Ethics he found no difficulty in identifying the Ismā'īlī prophets and imams with the philosopher kings, the rulers of the Virtuous City and the Regulator (*mudabbir*) of the world in the Platonic thought of al-Fārābī.' Richard Walzer has stated (in his *Greek into Arabic*, Oxford, 1962, p. 240) the metamorphoses endured by Aristotle when he is cited in Muslim treatises of morality, and with Miskawayh already Aristotle's theses are viewed in the network of the Platonian problematic. Regarding the influence of Iranian intellectuals on Mongol power, see A.S. Melikian-Chirvani, 'Le Shāh-Nāme, la gnose soufie et le pouvoir mongol,' *Journal Asiatique*, 272 (1984), pp. 329–331.

16. Here, for example, is what we read: 'Thus he becomes Almighty God's vicegerent among His creatures, entering among His particular saints, and standing as a complete and Absolute Man (*insān-i tāmm-i muṭlaq*). Complete and absolute is one who has the persistence and perseverance to aspire to blessedness in everlasting felicity and abiding, eternal ease, by His proof and command, and who makes ready to receive his Master's abundance (*fayḍ-i Khudāwand-i khwish*). At length, between him and his Master no veil intervenes, but he receives the ennoblement of proximity to the Divine Presence. This is the sublimest degree and the remotest felicity possible to the species of Man.' Ṭūsī, *Akhlāq-i Nāṣirī*, Persian text, p.71; English tr., Wickens, *The Nasirean Ethics*, p. 52.

17. For details see Christian Jambet, *La Grande Résurrection d'Alamût, les formes de la liberté dans le shi'isme ismaélien* (Lagrasse, 1990), pp. 371–387.

18. [*Akhlāq-i Muḥtashimī*, ed. M.T. Dānishpazhūh (Tehran, 1339 Sh./1960).]

19. The influence of Miskawayh's *Treatise on Ethics* on Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī is apparent in the *Akhlāq-i Nāṣirī*. But one cannot ignore also the similarity of some of these themes with those of the present treatise, such as the role of the Imam, or rather the theme of the 'perfect ones', defined by a curious synthesis of Peripatetism and radical Shī'ī eschatology. See M. Arkoun, *Traité d'éthique: Traduction, introduction, notes du Tadhīb al-akhlāq de Miskawayh* (Damascus, 2nd ed., 1988), pp. 116, 161 and 184.

20. Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb al-Shifā'*, *Kitāb al-nafs*, ed. F. Rahman (London, 1959), p. 239 ff.; *Kitāb al-Ishārāt wa al-tanbīhāt* (Tehran, 1360 Sh./1981), vol. 3, pp. 381–387.

21. A major theme in the reformed Ismailism of Alamūt; see Ṭūsī, *Sayr wa Sulūk: Contemplation*, pp. 40–42; *Kalām-i pīr*, pp. 81–84; Abū Isḥāq, *Haft bāb*, pp. 48 ff; Khayrkhwāh-i Harātī, *Faṣl dar bayān-i shinākht-i imām*, p. 7; Sayyid Suhrāb Walī Badakhshānī, *Sī wa shish ṣaḥīfa*, ed. H. Ujāqī (Tehran, 1961), p.30. See also the *ta'wīl* of the letters of the *basmallah* by Abū Firās in his *Kitāb al-īḍāḥ*, ed. 'Ārif Tāmir (Beirut, 1965), p. 98 ff.

22. Regarding the 'drama in heaven', see Corbin, *Cyclical Time*, pp. 37–43.

23. [*Taj al-'aqā'id wa ma'din al-fawā'id*, ed. 'Ārif Tāmir (Beirut, 1967), p.143.]

24. *Maṭlūb al-mu'minīn*, p. 51.

25. See Corbin, *Cyclical Time*, pp. 30–58, 84–103; Daftary, *The Ismā'īlīs*, pp. 139–141, 393–394.

26. The freedom of the Nocturnal Council reflects the unity of virtue and is based on astral theology. Its arbitrary nature corresponds to the Divine (cf. Plato, *The Laws*, XII). No one doubts that radical Shī'a theology does not rise to the challenge as it seems to be the case here. A comparison with al-Fārābī's discourse imposes itself.

27. In this critique of 'self' we hear an echo of Manṣūr al-Ḥallāj (d. 309/921). But here, the soul does not annihilate itself in the unimaginable creative will of 'Thou'. It effaces itself to be reborn in the theophanic mirror of the Imam who becomes *ipso facto* the equivalent of the Pole (*quṭb*). In 'true reality', man see things as they are; he moves from the relative world, from simple possibility of being to necessity of being. The vocabulary of Ibn Sīnā is combined with the visionary perception in the state of *baqā*, of existence that subsists. One is also strongly reminded of the 'intensification of perception' according to Leibniz.

28. See Joseph Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (Oxford, 1964), p. 166 ff.

29. In the era of *satr*, moral concern asserts itself in one area, namely rapport with the Imam. It is expressed in the important Ismaili doctrine of language which Ṭūsī presents in *Taṣ*. 25. We have been able to conclude that, in this case, the Imam is placed at the level, not of explicit language but of language itself. On the other hand, the human voice is a bodily force made from spiritual matter; it is the medium for symbolic speech. Which is why the relationship between master and disciple is a model of morality *par excellence*. The faculty of listening responds to that of speaking; it consists of receiving without excess or defect the meaning of what we hear. From this can be deduced a hierarchy of speakers and listeners which reaches completion, at its peak, in the couple of Imam (absolute speaker) and *ḥujjat* (first listener). Speech, hearing and silence of the Imam are one and the same thing, since the Imam is above these three states. The silence of the Resurrector is *the language* itself, the abyss from which are born speech and hearing, as is witnessed by these words: 'From the time that I became your spiritual master (*walītukum*), I have not spoken to you,' and 'That which I said prior to our time, [concerning] the call and summons to the knowledge and worship of God, was a relative kind of discourse (*sukhan-i iḍāfī*), but now both the knowledge and worship of God are one immediate word' (§398). By 'knowledge of God', the Imam thus designates the real presence of the Resurrector. Speech becomes necessary when real presence of the Divine Imperative, manifested in the figure of the Resurrector, is eclipsed, and this speech essentially becomes the

discourse of ethical purification, transmitted from the 'speaker' to the 'listener'.

30. These pages seem to us abundantly reminiscent of Mazdaean themes. First, the 'True Speech' of Ahūrā Mazdā, which battles against the lying speech of Ahrīman; then and especially, *Farawashī* is the external twin of the human soul, his angelic double, good and incorruptible. An angel guides the soul in its battle against evil. The pair of soul and *Farawashī* corresponds in Ṭūsī's view to the couple of human soul and luminous angelic effusion.

31. It is the role of Light of Espahbad. See al-Suhrawardī, *Kitāb Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, ed. H. Corbin, in *Opera Philosophica et Mystica* (Tehran-Paris, 1976), vol. 2, p. 206; tr. H. Corbin, *Le Livre de la sagesse orientale* (Paris, 1985), p. 194.

32. The lifestyle of the ascetic is in itself an illness and not a blessing. This theory was transmitted to the west by Constantine the African, the copier of Isḥāq b. 'Imrān. See Raymond Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky, Fritz Saxl, *Saturne et la mélancolie* (Paris, 1989), p. 144 ff.

33. This division between an affective and a positive melancholy was born in medical knowledge when it was a matter of treating afflictions whose descriptions were remarkably exact. These descriptions were enriched ever since the Hellenistic period until the early physicians of Islam. Ṭūsī follows the legacy of Avicenna, by receiving among patients afflicted with melancholy, the ascetic who fasts and keeps vigil in excess. The work of Isḥāq b. 'Imrān played a significant role in the analysis of this subject. See Manfred Ulmann, *Islamic Medicine* (Edinburgh, 1978), p. 73.

34. Pierre Hadot, *La Citadelle intérieure* (Paris, 1992), p. 62 ff.

35. Galien, 'Les passions et les erreurs de l'âme,' in *L'Ame et ses passions* (Paris, 1955), p. 19ff.

36. [Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Ḥikmat al-muta'āliyya fī al-asfār al-'aqliyya al-arba'a*, ed. M. Riḍā al-Muẓaffar (Qumm, 1379–83/1959–63), 9, p. 235 ff.]

37. The scheme of procession is, in fact, the one presented by the *Theology* attributed to Aristotle. The Imperative to which the Intellect unites is attested to in the 'long rescension' of this work, a doctrine of the Word which is not found in Plotinus. Shlomo Pinès has shown the profound affinity which links this doctrine with the construction of Ismaili philosophy in his article 'La longue recension de la "*Théologie* d'Aristote" dans ses rapports avec la doctrine ismaélienne,' *Revue des Etudes Islamiques*, 22 (1955), pp. 7–20.

38. The significance of spiritual filiation of christologies of the 'True Prophet' within Shī'ism had been a subject of constant reflection for Henry Corbin. It would be appropriate to prolong this reflection by showing in detail how Shi'a Islam and the various currents of Judaeo-Christianity weave the vast network of a coherent docetic christology, then to confront the destiny of the latter with what Hegel called 'the spirit of Christianity and its destiny'. See Corbin, *Cyclical Time*, pp. 102–117, 181, and his preface to *l'Evangile de Barnabé*, ed. and tr. L. Cirillo and

M. Frémaux (Paris, 1977).

39. See our interpretation of Abū Ya'qūb al-Sijistānī's *Kitāb al-iftikhār* in *La Grande Résurrection d'Alamūt*, p. 175 ff.

40. See J. Pépin, 'Remarques sur la théorie de l'exégèse allégorique chez Philon,' in *Philon d'Alexandrie* (Paris, 1967), p. 133–167, and the work of Benny Lévy, *Le Logos et la Lettre: Philon d'Alexandrie en regard des pharisiens* (Lagrasse, 1988).

Bibliography

Abū Isḥāq Quhistānī. *Haft bāb*, ed. and tr. W. Ivanow. Bombay, 1959.

ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib. *Nahj al-balāgha*, ed. Ṣubiḥi al-Ṣāliḥ. Beirut, 1967.

Amir-Moezzi, Mohammad Ali. *The Divine Guide in Early Shiʿism: The Sources of Esotericism in Islam*, tr. David Streight. Albany, NY, 1994.

Āmulī, Āyātullah Ḥasanzāda. *Āghāz wa Anjām*. Tehran, 1366 Sh./1987.

Āmulī, Sayyid Ḥaydar. *Jāmiʿ al-asrār wa manbaʿ al-anwār*, ed. H. Corbin and O. Yahia. Tehran-Paris, 1961.

Badakhchani, Jalal Hosseini. 'The Paradise of Submission: A Critical Edition and Study of "*Rawḍa-yi taslīm*," commonly known as "*Taṣawwurāt*," by Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī.' D.Phil. thesis, Oxford University, 1989.

Badakhshānī, Sayyid Suhrāb Walī. *Sī wa shish ṣaḥīfa*, ed. H. Ujāqī. Tehran, 1961.

Badakhshī, Laʿlī. *Thamarāt al-quds min shajarāt al-uns*, ed. Kamāl Ḥāj-Sayyid-Jawādī. Tehran, 1376 Sh./1997.

Bahār, Muḥammad Taqī. *Sabk shināsī*. Tehran, 1337 Sh./1958.

Bayānī, Shīrīn. *Dīn wa dawlat dar Īrān-i ʿahd-Mughul*. Tehran, 1367 Sh./1988.

al-Barqī, Muḥammad b. Khālid. *Kitāb al-maḥāsin*, ed. S.J. al-Dīn Muḥaddith. Qumm, 1331 Sh./1952.

al-Bukhārī, Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl. *al-Jāmiʿ al-Ṣaḥīḥ*. Cairo, 1932.

al-Bursī, Ḥāfiẓ Rajab. *Mashāriq anwār al-yaqīn fi asrār amīr al-muʾminīn*. Tehran, n.d.

Chittick, William C. *The Psalms of Islam*. London, 1988.

Chodkiewicz, Michel. *Un océan sans rivage, Ibn Arabi, Le Livre et la Loi*. Paris, 1992.

Corbin, Henry. *En Islam iranien*, vol. 4. Paris, 1972.

——*Spiritual Body and Celestial Earth: From Mazdean Iran to Shī'ite Iran*, tr. N. Pearson. Princeton, 1977.

——'Naṣīr-i Khusraw and Iranian Ismā'īlism,' in R. N. Frye, ed. *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 4. Cambridge, 1975, pp. 520–542.

——'The Ismā'īlī Response to the Polemic of Ghazālī,' in *Ismā'īlī Contributions to Islamic Culture*, ed. S.H. Nasr. Tehran, 1977, pp. 69–98.

——*Face de Dieu, face de l'homme: herméneutique et Soufisme*. Paris, 1983.

——*Cyclical Time and Ismaili Gnosis*, tr. R. Manheim and James W. Morris. London, 1983.

——*History of Islamic Philosophy*, tr. L. Sherrard. Paris, 1993.

Dabashi, Hamid. 'The Philosopher/Vizier: Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and the Isma'ilis,' in F. Daftary, ed., *Mediaeval Isma'ili History and Thought*. Cambridge, 1996, pp. 231–245.

Dabashi, Hamid. 'Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī: The Philosopher/Vizier and the Intellectual Climate of his Times,' in Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman, ed., *History of Islamic Philosophy*. London, 1996, pp. 527–584.

Daftary, Farhad. *The Ismā'īlīs: Their History and Doctrines*. Cambridge, 1990.

——*The Assassin Legends: Myths of the Isma'ilis*. London, 1994.

——'Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ and the Origins of the Nizārī Isma'ili Movement,' in F. Daftary, ed., *Mediaeval Isma'ili History and Thought*. Cambridge, 1996, pp. 181–204.

——'Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and Ismailis of the Alamūt Period,' in N. Pourjavady and Ž. Vesel, ed., *Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, philosophe et savant du XIII^e siècle*. Tehran, 2000, pp. 59–67.

Fayḍ al-Kāshānī, Muḥammad Muḥsin b. Shāh Murtaḍā. *Kitāb al-wāfī*, ed. Abū al-Ḥasan Sha'rānī. Tehran, 1375/1955.

de Fouchécour, Charles Henri. *Moralia. Les notions morales dans la littérature persane du III^e/IV^e au VII^e/XIII^e siècles*. Paris, 1968.

Furūzānfar, Badī' al-Zamān. *Aḥādīth-i mathnawī*. Tehran, 1347 Sh./1969.

Ganjīna-yi 'irfān, ed. Ḥ. Rabbānī. Tehran, n.d.

al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad. *Faḍā'iḥ al-Baṭiniyya wa faḍā'il al-Mustaẓhiriyya*, ed. 'A. Badawī. Cairo, 1964. English tr., Richard G. McCarthy, in *Freedom and Fullfilment*. Boston, MA, 1980, pp. 175–286.

Hadot, Pierre. *La Citadelle intérieure*. Paris, 1992.

Ḥaft bāb-i Bābā Sayyidnā, ed. W. Ivanow, in *Two Early Ismaili Treatises*. Bombay, 1933, pp. 4–44; English tr. Hodgson, in *The Order of Assassins*, pp. 297–324.

Hodgson, Marshall G.S. *The Order of Assassins: The Struggle of the Early Nizārī Ismā'īlīs Against the Islamic World*. The Hague, 1955.

——'The Ismā'īlī State,' in *The Cambridge History of Iran: Volume 5, The Saljuq*

and Mongol Periods, ed. J.A. Boyle. Cambridge, 1968, pp. 422–482.
Ibn Ḥanbal, Aḥmad b. Muḥammad. *al-Musnad al-Imam Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal*, ed. M.N. Albānī. Cairo, 1986.
Ibn Hishām. *al-Sīra al-nabawiyya*, ed. Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī. 2nd ed., Cairo, 1375/1995.
Ibn Miskawayh. *Tadhīb al-akhlāq wa-taṭhīr al-'arāq*, tr. M. Arkoun as *Traité d'ethique*. Damascus, 1969; 2nd ed., Damascus, 1988.
Ibn Sīnā, Ḥusayn b. 'Abd Allāh. *Kitāb al-Ishārāt wa al-tanbīhāt*, ed. Sulaymā Dunyā. Cairo, 1957; Tehran, 1360 Sh./1981.
— *al-Mabda' wa al-ma'ād*, ed. A. Nūrānī. Tehran, 1363 Sh./1984.
— *Kitāb al-Shifā*, ed. I. Madkūr and A. 'Affifi. Cairo, 1956; ed. F. Rahman. London, 1959.
Ibn al-Walīd, 'Alī b. Muḥammad. *Taj al-'aqā'id wa ma'din al-fawā'id*, ed. 'Ārif Tāmir. Beirut, 1967.
Idrīs 'Imād al-Dīn b. al-Ḥasan. *Zahr al-ma'ānī*, ed. Muṣṭafā Ghālib. Beirut, 1991.
Ikhwān al-Ṣafā'. *Rasā'il Ikhwān al-Ṣafā'*. Cairo, 1928. 4 vols.
Ivanow, Wladimir. *Ibn Qaddah: The Alleged Founder of Ismailism*. Bombay, 1957.
Jambet, Christian. *La Convocation d'Alamūt*: see Ṭūsī, *Rawḍat al-taslīm*.
— *La Grande résurrection d'Alamût*. Lagrasse, 1990.
— 'Aperçus philosophiques de la morale de Naṣir al-din Ṭusi dans les Taṣavvorāt,' in *Pand-o Sokhan: Mélanges offerts à Charles-Henri de Fouchécour*, ed. C. Ballaÿ et al. Tehran, 1995, pp. 117–131.
Khayrkhwāh-i Harātī, Muḥammad Riḍā b. Sulṭān Ḥusayn. *Faṣl dar bayān-i shinākht-i imām*, ed. W. Ivanow. 3rd ed., Tehran, 1960; English tr., *On the Recognition of the Imam*, tr. W. Ivanow. 2nd ed., Bombay, 1947.
— *Kalām-i pīr: A Treatise on Ismaili Doctrine*, ed. and tr. W. Ivanow. Bombay, 1935.
al-Kirmānī, Ḥamīd al-Dīn Aḥmad. *Rāḥat al-'aql*, ed. M. Kāmil Ḥusayn and M. Muṣṭafā Ḥilmī. Cairo, 1953.
— *Kitāb al-riyāḍ*, ed. 'Ā. Tāmir. Beirut, 1960.
Klibansky, Raymond, Erwin Panofsky and Fritz Saxl. *Saturne et la mélancolie*. Paris, 1989.
al-Kulaynī, Muḥammad b. Ya'qūb. *al-Uṣūl min al-Kāfī*. Arabic ed. and Persian tr., Muḥammad Bāqir Kamara'ī. Tehran, 1392/1972.
Labīd b. Rabī'a al-'Āmirī. *Sharḥ dīwān Labīd*, ed. Iḥsān 'Abbās. Kuwait, 1962.
Landolt, Hermann. 'Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (597/1201–672/1274), Ismā'īlism and Ishrāqī Philosophy,' in N. Pourjavady and Ž. Vesel, ed., *Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, philosophe et savant du XIIIe siècle*. Tehran, 2000, pp. 13–30.
— 'Suhrawardi Between Philosophy, Sufism and Ismailism: A Re-appraisal,'

Dāneshnāmeh, 1 (2003), pp. 13–29.
— "Aṭṭār, Sufism and Ismā'īlism,' in C. Shackle and L. Lewisohn, ed., *The Art of Spiritual Flight: Farīd al-Dīn 'Aṭṭār and the Persian Sufi Tradition*. London, forthcoming.
Lardreau, G. *La Véracité, Essai d'une philosophie négative*. Paris, 1993.
Madelung, Wilferd. *The Succession to Muḥammad: A Study of the Early Caliphate*. Cambridge, 1997.
— 'Naṣīr ad-Dīn Ṭūsī's Ethics Between Philosophy, Shi'ism, and Sufism,' in R.G. Hovannisian, ed., *Ethics in Islam*. Malibu, CA, 1985, pp. 85–101.
— *Religious Trends in Early Islamic Iran*. Albany, NY, 1988.
— 'To See All Things Through the Sight of God: Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's Attitude to Sufism,' in N. Pourjavady and Ž. Vesel, ed., *Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, philosophe et savant du XIII^e siècle*. Tehran, 2000, pp. 1–11.
Maḥmūdī, Muḥammad Bāqir. *Nahj al-sa'āda fī mustadrak Nahj al-balāgha*. Beirut, 1976.
Majlisī, Muḥammad Bāqir. *Biḥār al-anwār*. Tehran, 1956–1972.
Marquet, Yves. *La Philosophie des Ikhwān al-Ṣafā'*. Algiers, 1975.
— 'Sabéens et Iḫwān al-Ṣafā'', *Studia Islamica*, 24 (1966) pp. 35–80; 25 (1966), pp. 77–109.
Massignon, Louis. *Salmān Pāk et les prémices spirituelles de l'Islam Iranien*. Tours, 1934.
— *The Passion of al-Hallaj*, trans. H. Mason. Princeton, NJ, 1982.
Melikian-Chirvani, A.S. 'Le Shāh-Nāme, la gnose soufie et le pouvoir mongol,' *Journal Asiatique*, 272 (1984), pp. 329–331.
Meskoob, Shahrokh. 'Mansha' wa ma'nā-yi 'aql dar andīsha-yi Nāṣir-i Khusraw,' *Iran Nameh*, 7 (1989), pp. 239–257, 405–429.
Michot, Jean R. *La destinée de l'homme selon Avicenne*. Louvain, 1986.
Mishkīnī, 'Alī. *al-Hādī ilā mawḍū'āt Nahj al-balāgha*. Tehran, 1364 Sh./1985.
Mitha, Farouk. *Al-Ghazālī and the Ismailis: A Debate on Reason and Authority in Medieval Islam*. London, 2001.
Momen, Moojan. *An Introduction to Shi'i Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi'ism*. New Haven, CT, 1985.
Mudarris Raḍawī, Muḥammad, *Aḥwāl wa āthār-i Abū Ja'far Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Ḥasan al-Ṭūsī*. Tehran, 1354 Sh./1975.
Mudarrisī Zanjānī, Muḥammad. *Sargudhasht wa 'aqā'id-i falsafī-yi Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī*. Tehran, 1363 Sh./1984.
Muslim b. al-Ḥajjāj al-Qushayrī. *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*. Cairo, 1375/1955.
al-Muẓaffar, Muḥammad Riḍā. *'Aqā'id al-imāmiyya*. Cairo, 1381/1961.
Nasafī, 'Azīz-i. *Rasā'il*, ed. M. Molé as *Le Livre de l'homme parfait*. Tehran and Paris, 1962.
Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, philosophe et savant du XIII^e siècle, ed. N. Pourjavady and Ž.

Vesel. Tehran, 2000.

Nāṣir-i Khusraw. *Dīwān*, ed. Mujtabā Mīnuwī and Mahdī Muḥaqqiq. Tehran, 1353 Sh./1974.

——*Kitāb-i Jāmi' al-ḥikmatayn*, ed. H. Corbin and M. Mu'in. Tehran and Paris, 1953.

——*Gushāyish va rahāyish*, ed. and tr. by Faquir M. Hunzai as *Knowledge and Liberation: A Treatise on Philosophical Theology*. London, 1998.

——*Wajh-i dīn*, ed. M. Ghanīzāda and M. Qazvīnī. Berlin, 1343/1924; *Wajh-i dīn*, ed. G.R. A'wānī. Tehran, 1977.

Nasr, Sayyed Hossein. *An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines*. London, 1978.

—— and M. Aminrazavi, ed. *An Anthology of Philosophy in Persia*. Oxford, 2001.

al-Nu'mān b. Muḥammad, al-Qāḍī Abū Ḥanīfa. *Asās al-ta'wīl*, ed. 'Ārif Tamir. Beirut, 1960.

——*Da'ā'im al-Islām*, ed. A.A.A. Fyzee. Cairo, 1951–61; English tr. A.A.A. Fyzee, completely revised by I.K. Poonawala, *The Pillars of Islam*, vol. 1. New Delhi, 2002.

——*Kitāb al-majālis wa al-musāyarāt*, ed. al-Ḥabīb al-Faqī et al. Tunis, 1978.

——*Sharḥ al-akhbār fī faḍā'il al-a'imma al-aṭhār*, ed. M.Ḥ. Jalālī. Qumm, 1414/1993.

——*Ta'wīl al-da'ā'im*, ed. M. Ḥasan al-A'ẓamī. Cairo, 1967–72.

Pandiyyāt-i jawānmardī, ed. and tr. W. Ivanow. Leiden, 1953.

Pépin, J. 'Remarques sur la théorie de l'exégèse allégorique chez Philon,' in *Philon d'Alexandrie*. Paris, 1967, p. 133– 67.

Pinès, Shlomo. 'La longue récension de la *Théologie* d'Aristote dans ses rapports avec la doctrine ismaélienne,' *Revue des Études Islamiques*, 22 (1954), pp. 7–20.

Poonawala, Ismail K. *Biobibliography of Ismā'īlī Literature*. Malibu, CA, 1977.

Pourjavady, Nasrollah. 'Irfān-i Khwāja Naṣīr dar *Awṣāf al-ashrāf*,' in *Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, philosophe et savant du XIII[e] siècle*, Persian section, pp. 39–56.

Ragep, F. Jamil. *Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī's Memoir on Astronomy: al-Tadhkira fī 'ilm al-hay'a*. New York, 1993.

——'The Persian Context of the Ṭūsī Couple', in *Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī: Philosophe et Savant*, pp. 113–130.

al-Rāzī, Abū Ḥātim Aḥmad b. Ḥamdān. *Kitāb al-iṣlāḥ*, ed. Ḥasan Mīnūchihr and Mahdī Muḥaqqiq. Tehran, 1998.

Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm. *al-Ḥikmat al-muta'āliyya fī al-asfār al-'aqliyya al-arba'a*, ed. M. Riḍa al-Muẓaffar. Qumm, 1379–83/1959–63.

——*Mafātīḥ al-ghayb*, Persian tr. M. Khwājawī. Tehran, 1404/1983.

Sanā'ī Ghaznawī, Abū al-Majd Majdūd. *Dīwān*, ed. M. Mudarris Raḍawī. Tehran,

1952/1983.

——*Ḥadīqat al-ḥaqīqa wa sharīʿat al-ṭarīqa*, ed. M. Mudarris Raḍawī. Tehran, 1329 Sh./1950; ed. and English tr. J. Stephenson. New York, 1975.

Schacht, Joseph. *An Introduction to Islamic Law*. Oxford, 1964.

Shafīʿī Kadkanī, M.R. *Tazīyānahā-yi sulūk*. Tehran, 1372 Sh./1993.

al-Shahrastānī, Abū al-Fatḥ Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Karīm. *Kitāb al-Milal wa al-niḥal*, ed. M.S. Kaylānī. Beirut, 1965; ed. ʿA.M. Wakīl. Cairo, 1968. Partial English tr. A.K. Kazi and J.G. Flynn, *Muslim Sects and Divisions*. London, 1984.

——*Mafātīḥ al-asrār wa maṣābīḥ al-abrār*. Tehran, 1368 Sh./1989.

——*Majlis-i maktūb-i munʿaqid dar Khwārazm*, ed. and French trans. Diane Steigerwald as *Discours sur l'Ordre et la création*. Saint-Nicolas, Quebec, 1998.

al-Sijistānī, Abū Yaʿqūb Isḥāq b. Aḥmad. *Kitāb al-iftikhār*, ed. M. Ghālib. Beirut, 1980.

Sijistānī, Amīr Iqbāl. *Chihil majlis*, ed. N.M. Hirawī. Tehran 1366/1987–8; German trans. H. Cordt, *Die sitzungen des ʿAlāʾ ad-dawla as-Simnānī*. Zurich, 1977.

Smet, Daniel de. *La Quiétude de l'intellect: Néoplatonisme et gnose ismaélienne dans l'oeuvre de Ḥamîd ad-Dîn al-Kirmânî (Xe/XIes)*. Louvain, 1995.

al-Suhrawardī, Shihāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā. *Kitāb Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, ed. H. Corbin. Tehran-Paris, 1976; French tr. H. Corbin, *Le livre de la sagesse orientale*. Paris, 1985.

al-Suyūṭī, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Abībakr (Jalāl al-Dīn). *Jāmiʿ al-aḥādith: al-jāmʿ al-ṣaqhīr wa zwāʾiduhu wa al-jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, ed. Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Jawād et al. Damascus, 1400/1979.

al-Ṭabarsī, Faḍl b. Ḥasan. *al-Iḥtijāj*. Najaf, 1350/1931.

——*Majmaʿ al-bayān fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān*. Mashhad, 1379/1976.

al-Tahānawī, Muḥammad Aʿlā b. ʿAlī. *Kashshāf iṣṭilāhāt al-funūn*, ed. M. Wajih et al. Tehran, 1967, reprint.

Tihrānī, ʿAlī. *Mishkāt al-anwār fi ghurar al-akhbār*, ed. Ṣāliḥ al-Jaʿfarī. Qumm, 1965.

Tihrānī, Muḥammad Ḥusayn. *Imām shināsī*. Tehran, 1405/1984.

al-Ṭūsī, Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan. *al-Nihāya fī mujarrad al-fiqh wa al-faṭāwī*, ed. M.T. Dānishpazhūh. Tehran, 1343 Sh./1964.

Ṭūsī, Naṣīr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Muḥammad. *Āghāz wa anjām* (*Tadhkira*), ed. Īraj Afshār. Tehran, 1335 Sh./1956; ed. Ḥasan-Zāda Āmulī, Tehran, 1376 Sh./1997.

——*Akhlāq-i muḥtashimī*, ed. M.T. Dānishpazhūh. Tehran, 1339 Sh./1960.

—— *Akhlāq-i Nāṣirī*, ed. M. Mīnuwī and ʿA.R. Ḥaydarī. Tehran, 1356 Sh./1977; English tr. G.M. Wickens, *The Nasirean Ethics*, London, 1964.

——*Asās al-iqtibās*, ed. Mudarris Raḍawī. Tehran, 1326 Sh./1947.

——*Awṣāf al-ashrāf*, ed. N. Māyil Harawī. Mashhad, 1361 Sh./1982.

——*al-Kamāl al-awwal wa al-kamāl al-thānī*, with *Talkhīṣ al-muḥaṣṣal*, ed. 'A.A. Nūrānī. Tehran, 1359 Sh./1980.

——*Maṭlūb al-mu'minīn*, ed. W. Ivanow, in *Two Early Ismaili Treatises*. Bombay, 1933, pp. 43–55.

——*Mujārat-i Ṭūsī*, Ms. in the Library of The Institute of Ismaili Studies, London.

——*Rawḍat al-taslīm, commonly called Taṣawwurat*, ed. and English tr. W. Ivanow. Leiden, 1950; French tr. Christian Jambet as *La Convocation d'Alamût: Somme de philosophie ismaélienne, Rawdat al-taslīm (Le jardin de la vraie foi)*. Lagrasse, 1996.

——*Risāla fī al-'ilal wa al-ma'lūlāt*, with *Talkhīṣ al-muḥaṣṣal*, ed. 'A. Nūrānī. Tehran, 1359/1980, pp. 509–515.

——*Risāla-yi jabr wa ikhtiyār*, in *Majmū'a-yi rasā'il*, ed. M.T. Mudarris Raḍawī. Tehran, 1335 Sh./1956, pp. 8–27; English tr. in P. Morewedge, *The Metaphysics of Ṭūsī*, part 2, pp. 1–46.

——*Sayr wa sulūk*, ed. and English tr. S.J. Badakhchani as *Contemplation and Action: The Spiritual Autobiography of a Muslim Scholar*. London, 1998.

——*Sharḥ al-ishārāt wa al-tanbīhāt*. Tehran, 1378/1959.

——*Ṣudūr al-kathra*, with *Talkhīṣ al-muḥaṣṣal*, ed. 'A.A. Nūrānī. Tehran, 1359/1980, p. 516.

——*Talkhīṣ al-muḥaṣṣal*, ed. 'A.A. Nūrānī. Tehran, 1359 Sh./1980.

——*Taqwīm-i 'Alā'ī*, in Mudarris Raḍawī, *Aḥwāl wa āthār*, pp. 561–563.

——*Tawallā wa tabarrā*, with *Akhlāq-i muḥtashimī*, ed. M.T. Dānishpazhūh, pp. 562–570.

Ulmann, Manfred. *Islamic Medicine*. Edinburgh, 1978.

Veccia Vaglieri, Laura. 'Ghadīr Khumm,' in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., vol. 2, pp. 993–994.

Walker, Paul E. *Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-Kirmānī: Ismaili Thought in the Age of al-Ḥākim*. London, 1999.

Walzer, Richard. *Greek into Arabic*. Oxford, 1962.

Wensinck, A.J., ed. *al-Mu'jam al-mufahras li-alfāẓ al-ḥadīth al-nabawī*. Leiden, 1943.

Yādnāma-yi Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī. Tehran, 1336 Sh./1957.

Zayn al-'Ābidīn, 'Alī b. Ḥusayn. *al-Ṣaḥīfa al-kāmila al-Sajjādiyya*, ed. Fayḍ al-Islām. Tehran, 1375/1955; English tr. W. Chittick, *The Psalms of Islam*. London, 1988.

Index



مرد خدا همیشه آن مُحقّ یگانه بود که او را در عالم همتا و انباز نبوده و نتواند بود: **وَحْدَهُ لاشَریكَ لهُ**.

و بعد از آن مقام دیگر آن است که خدا را به مرد خدا شناسند و این مرتبه و درجهٔ ابواب و حُجج اعظم را تواند بود که ایشان مظهر عقل اول و معلول اول باشند و نیز قابل اول باشند تا آنچه از مرد اول قبول کنند بباقی خلق رسانند، چه میان خدا و ایشان یك واسطه بیش نبود. پس ایشان خدا را به آن واسطه شناسند و چون در معلول اول کثرت به قوّت است عدد این طبقه و مرتبه زیادت از یکی تواند بود، در هر روزگاری. امّا در وقت ظهور امام [**۱۹٤**] وقت، لذکره السّلام، این جماعت پوشیده باشند چنانکه در وقت طلوع آفتاب کواکب پوشیده شوند و در روزگار ستر ظاهر شوند.

و بعد از آن مقام مقامهای جماعتی بود که میان خدا و ایشان وسایط افتد و معرفت این جماعت آن بود که هر کس در[هر] مقامی که بود به معرفت معلم خود عارف بود تا صورت نفس او همان بود بعینه که در نفس معلم بود تا به انتهای همهٔ معرفتها ــ به معرفت عارف به حقیقت که مرد خداست ــ متّحد گردد: **وَإلَیهِ یُرْجَعُ الأمْرُ[کُلُّه]**. و طاعت هر قومی هم بر قیاس معرفت تواند بود چه در فصول مقدّسه آمده است چنانکه معرفت کلّی، جزوی و حقیقی [و] اضافی بود، طاعت نیز بحسب آن جزوی و کلّی [ملکی؟] وحقیقی و مجازی باشد.[۱۱۶] والسّلام.

۱۱۶. عبارت در نسخه خطی مقدم و مؤخر است.

دست هامیان داشته و گویند این خود او می کند. این راغُلات حشوی خوانند و فرق میان غُلات مُحَقِّق و غُلات حشوی آن است که غُلات مُحقِّق خود را در نور معرفت مستغرق بمی کنند و غُلات حشوی الهّیت [را] در شخص خود مستغرق بمی کنند. چنین که از این بعضی باز می گویند که ما هر یکی خود اوئیم، آنچه گوئیم و کنیم و اندیشیم خود او کرده باشد. کُفری صریحتر و شرکی فضیحتر از این نیست. نعُوذُبالله منه. خدای تعالی بدست داراد و عاقبت همگنان بخیر آواراد. إنّه ولي جزاء المحسنین. [۱۹۲]

۲

اللّهم مولانا

آنچه گفته است همچنان که خداشناسی به حقیقت به مرد خداست، [۱۹۳] امام شناسی به حقیقت به مرد امام است تا به آخر سخن، این معنی بر اطلاق درست نباشد و إلاّ لازم آید که مرد امام را نیز به مردی دیگر شناسند، علیهذا تا به امتناع ادا کند.

پس دانستنی در این موضع بر سبیل اختصار اینست که بدانند که هرکس را در معرفت مقامی است چنانچه می آید: **وَمَا مِنّا إلاّ لَهُ مَقَامٌ مَعْلُومٌ** مقام بلندتر آن است که خدا را بخدا شناسند: **شَهِدَاللّهُ أنهُ لا إله إلاّهُوَ**. و این مقام جز مرد خدا را نتواند بود که مظهر امر و کلمهء خداست و متوسط میان خدا و خلق. تا بروئی که با خدای دارد خدا را شناخته باشد و بروئی که باخلق دارد خلق را با خدا رساند و به معرفت او خدا شناس شوند.

و چون امر و کلمه از عالم وحدت است که **وَمَا أمْرُنَا إلاّ وَاحِدَةٌ**،

گُوید] اَخْتَرتُ هوی علیٍ علی هوائی، نمی گوید وَصَلتُ بشخصی وشکلی إلی علیٍ و وحدانیّته.

تو چشم خود را می بینی و آفتاب را می بینی، و می بینی که بینند[گی] تو از اوست، چُون گوئی که خود من آفتابم؟ تا خود را به شکلی و شخصی می بینی، در آمدن و شدن و گُفتن و کاری کردن و محبّتی در تو موجود که آن محبّت را استمداد از نور معرفت آفتاب ربّانی است، همچنان که آن بیننده بچشم جسمانی نتواند گُفتن که خود آفتابم، این [۲٤۸] بیننده به نور آفتاب عالم دینی هم نه توانند گُفتن که من آفتاب عالم دینی ام.

آری تو به خود نیستی و به او هستی، همچنان که چشم جسمانی به خود بیننده نیست، به او بیننده است. امّا چشم خود او نیست. پس او نیز پیوسته است به او و لیکن خود نه اوست و بی او نه بیننده باشد و نه داننده.

از اینجاست که بهری غُلات مُحقّق گُفته اند که آنچه اصل است و مقصود است نور معرفت و محبت امام زمان است که از روی رحمت با ما ارزانی داشته است. امّا این جسم که به حجاب آن نور معرفت و محبت است به این آتش بسوزیم تا این حجاب برخیزد و همه آن نور محبت و معرفت بماند که ما به آن نور محبت و معرفت به او پیوسته ایم. چُون حجاب شخصی برخاست، نور محبت و معرفت بماند که خود اوست.

ایشان این چنین گُفته اند، نه گُفته اند که هر یکی از ما خود اوئیم، و

مُحتجب باشد از نور آفتاب هیچ نتواند دید، او نیز اگر به او پیوسطه نباشد، هیچ نتواند دانستن از حَق و باطل.
و نشان پیوستگی بآفتاب جسمانی آن است که هیچ حجاب در پیش نباشد. همچنان که حجاب آفتاب جسمانی سایه زمین یا خانه تاریك است یا سایه ابر و میغ است، حجاب از آفتاب عالم دین حجاب هوای خود است که بحجاب آن نور آفتاب دینی می باشد. پس نشان آنکه به آفتاب جسمانی پیوست [**۲٤۷**] یعنی مُتّحد شد آن است که سایه ها از پیش او بر خاست و باصره به صفای نور او پیوست. و پیوستن به نور حقیقی و نشان اتّحاد به آفتاب عالم دینی حقیقی آن است که او را هیچ هوی بسر خود نباشد و بهمگی خود را به او سپُرده باشد.
گُفتارش و کردارش موافق امر و رضای او باشد، تا گُفتش گُفت او باشد[و] کردارش کردار او باشد، تا همهء حرکات و سکناتش مُقدّر باشد بامر و رضای او. چُون چنین باشد همچنان باشد که بینش جسمانی او بیکبار به صفای نور آفتاب پیوسته باشد از حجابها باکنار. او نیز به صفای نور آفتاب عالم دینی پیوسته باشد از همهء حجابهای دُنیائی و هوای هاویه باکنار.
تا او خودی خلقی خود و هوای خود در تحت امر و رضای آفتاب عالم دین [دینی؟] مُستغرق نکرده [کرده؟] باشد، تا او و خلقی او [را] که هوای اوست نیست نگرداند، به این صفای [صفات؟] نور محبت و نور معرفت نتواند رسیدن. اتّحاد چنین است [که سلمان می

میتابد که آنرا قوّت ناطقهء نفسانی گویند تا خیر از شرّ و مُحَق از مُبطل و حَق از باطل باز می دارند.

اگر این باصرهء جسمانی به نور آفتاب جسمانی مُتّحد نگردد نامُمکن است که هیچ بتواند دیدن [۲٤٦] و چون به او متحد شد این نیست که این چشم خود آن آفتاب است. اگر گویند که این چشم که به این آفتاب جسمانی متحد شد خود این آفتاب است، بایستی که بی آفتاب بینندهء چیزها بودی و نیست. او را بینندهء بسر خود، به نسبت آن قدر بینندهء که دارد، هم از او دارد. ‹ امّا آفتاب که او روشن کننده جهان و جهانیان است، به بینش این کس و هیچ کس دیگرش حاجت نیست. اگرنا مُتناهی بینش های همهء جهان ها [فرا]هم آوری، که همهء بینش های همهء جهان آفتاب نباشد و این بینش ها بدون نور آفتاب ایشان را هیچ بیننده نباشد. ›[115]

اکنون آن کس را که بینش به نور آفتاب عالم حقیقی پیوست و به نور او و به او حَق را از باطل و مُحَق را از مُبطل بدانست نه آن است که از خود به او بود و به نور معرفت او پیوست.

چنانچه این چشم جسمانی بی نور آفتاب جسمانی آفتاب نیست، امّا به او بیننده هست و به نور او پیوسته هست، اگر بینش

---

۱۱۵. عبارت در نسخه ی خطی چنین است: امّا آفتاب بی بینش این کس که او روشن کننده حهان و جهانیان است که هیچ دیگرش حاحت نیست و اگر نامتناهی بینشهای همه جهانها هم آوری که همه بینشهای همه جهان آفتاب نباشد واین بینشهای نور آفتاب ایشان را هیج بیننده نباشد

دو عالم ناگزیر است به همه حال تا [در] این عالم خلقی که **بَثَّ مِنْهما رِجَالاً کَثِیْراً وَنِسَاءَ** [۲۴۵] ظهور نکنند به عالم حقّی [خلقی؟][۱۱۴] خدائی نتوانند رسیدن، زیرا که مردم فرزند دو عالم اند.

و در این مثالی بگویم که نزدیك این دو کون و دو عالم است، در جسم و روح، به تن فرزند عالم جسمانی اند و به روح فرزند عالم روحانی. همچنان که پرورش تن به چیزهای ها بَر اِزای تن است، پرورش جان به چیزهای ها بَر اِزای جانست. چنانچه تن بی غذای جسمانی پرورش نیابد، جان بی غذای ها بَر اِزای او متلاشی گردد و بنماند. لاجَرَم چون غذا ها بر ازاء نیابد، نه ها بر ازاء بغذا می کند تا از آن این چنین نُکره و شَیطنه پدیدار می آید.

و هم در این باب مردم را دو قوّت است، قوّتی که به توسط آفتاب جسمانی اشکال و الوان را در میابد و قوّتی که به توسط آفتاب روحانی حَق از باطل و مُحِقّ از مُبطل باز می دارند. و آن قوّتی که ادراك اشکال و الوان محسوسات می کند، آنرا باصره جسمانی خوانند و آن قوّتی که ادراك چیزهای محمود و مذموم و حَق و باطل و خیر و شر می کند آنرا باصره عقلانی می خوانند.

آفتاب ظاهر جسمانی به باصره‌ء جسمانی می تابد تا باصره‌ء جسمانی به آن آفتاب جسمانی چیزها بمی بیند و جهانی در تحت باصره‌ء او می آید. وآفتاب عالم روحانی به باصره‌ء روحانی

۱۱۴ . کلمات داخل کروشه که با علامت سوال همراه است شکل اصلی کلمه در نسخه خطی می باشد.

تا مستضعفان را به آن بی راه کنند و روی از مولانا و دعوت او بگردانند. امّا به سبب آنکه گُفته من بسوی فایده خود پرسیده ام، فایده ترا شمّه ئی گفته آید چنانکه سُکون النفس پدیدار آید و بدانی که اتّحاد حقیقی چونست.

اوّل تو این بدان که دو عالم است، عالم خلقی و عالم خدائی و دو حُکم است یکی بسوی عالم اضافی که آنرا شریعت خوانند و یکی بسوی عالم آخرت که عالم حقیقی خدائی است که آنرا قیامت خوانند و دو حاکم یکی بسوی عالم اضافی شرعی خلقی، بسوی مصالح عالم خلقی و خلق که آنرا پیمبر خوانند، و یکی حاکم بسوی عالم حقیقی ربّانی که آنرا قائم خوانند.

یکی را دین چنانکه می آید: تُکَلَّم الناس مِن الدّین، **الرّحمن الرّحیم مالِك یَوم الدّین** و یکی را به مقصد دین که قیامت است. اوّل به راه در آیند تا به مقصد رسند، به شریعت در آیند تا به قیامت رسند، به ظاهر در آیند تا به باطن رسند، به تنزیل در آیند تا به تأویل رسند، به لفظ درآیند تا به معنی رسند [و] به اوّل درآیند تا به آخر رسند.

مصرع:

به معنی کی رسد مردم گُذر نا کرده بر اسما

اکنون عالم خلقی را شریعت و کثرت و اضافی خوانند و عالم خدائی را عالم حقیقت و وحدت و قیامت خوانند. و خلق را از این

ملحقات[112]

۱

سوال خواجه محمد باسعید

خواجه محمّد با سعید می گفت مردمانی هستند که می گویند که ما از خود بدر آمده ایم و همگی خود بمولانا داده ایم و ما را منی جُداگانه نیست. همه اوست، پس هر چه می گوئیم و می کنیم گفتار و کردار ما همه اوست و بسیاری از این سان بوالعجبیها، بزبان می گویند و به فعل نمی کنند.

چون این سوال بر رأی جهان آرای مقدّس عرضه داشتند فرمودند جَل ذکره که با خواجه محمد بگو که کسانی که چنین نام ما به قاعده کرده اند و می گویند همه فُلانست، بعبارت ایشان همه ما خداوند محمد است و مائی ما خود اوست، ما در میانه نه ایم، همه اوست، ایشان اگر نه نام ما به قاعده کنند و آن جنس گویند و کنند اسماعیلیان از ایشان نشنوند، نه، که روا دارند که به آن معامله که ایشان می کنند و به آن مُحاکات [۲۴۴][113] که بزبان می گویند سنگ سار کنند ایشان را آن نام ما تله ایست ایشان را

---

۱۱۲. در S , N و W : تصّور بیست و هشتم در سوالاتی که متسافهة بر مسامع همایون لایزال سامعاً للبشر امضاء داده ام و جوابها که فرموده اند.

۱۱۳ . نسخه های N, S و W با تصور ۲۷ به پایان میرسند. شماره صفحات داخل متن در بخش الحاقی نمایانگر شماره ی صفحات نسخه M میباشد.

دعوت و کلمات بسیارفایده و عُذر و دُرر بی نظیر است اتفاق مطالعه تمامی این کتاب افتاد و از فواید آن به قدراستطاعت استفادت کرده آمد واز مولانا تعالی او را و دیگر بندگان دعوت هادیه را توفیق خیرات و حسنات خواسته شد. اَللّهُمَ انْفَعنا بِما عَلَمْتَنا [وَعَلِّمْنا] بِما یَنْفَعُنا درحق همگنان به اجابت مقرون باد بحق المصطفی من عباده.

هذا الخط [کذا] احوج خلق اللّه إلیه محمدالطوسی

تمت الکتاب [کذا] ۹۶۸ فی تاریخ

۱۲ شهر ربیع الثانی

۹۶۸

می کند و بمردم به نهایت می رسد مظهر عقل اول اینجا می باشد که مردم است از برای آنکه می بینیم که عاقلان در درجات عقول مترّتب و متفاضل اند و ترتّب و فضیلت عقلی بر عقلی لازم می آید، تا آنجا که عاقلی می باشد که او بی هیچ تعلیم همه بمی داند و استنباط حقایق اشیاء از نفس خود می کند و به هیچ کس و به هیچ چیزی خارج از خود اِلاّ بتأیید مظهر کلمهء اعلی که بالای اوست محتاج نمی گردد. هم به ذات خود کامل می باشد و هم غیر خود را به کمال می رساند. و به این سبب می دانیم که او مظهر عقل اول است.

[۵۱۸§]و این موجودات را مبدائی است و کمالی و خدای تعالی وجودشان از بهر کمال داده است و مبدأ از بهر معاد، و می باید که سلسله وجود از آنجا که به مبدأ ابتدا کرده است در معاد که انتهاست باهم رسد. و میدانیم که سلسله وجود نه بروحانیّات سرباسر میزند نه به هیاکل و اجرام فلکی و نه به ارکان و نه به انعقاد و نه به نبات و نه به حیوان بلکه به عقل شخص انسانی چنین سرباسر میزند وَعود إلی ما بَدأ مِنه لازم می آید. والسّلام.

این کلمات در آخر کتاب **روضهءتسلیم** به خط شریف سلطان الدعات فی الآفاق و خواجه کائنات نصیرالدولة والدین اختیار مولی العالمین اعلاه مولانا تبت است که روز سه شنبه منتصف شوال سنه اربعین و ستمأه، در خدمت مخدوم اعظم سیّدالدعات صلاح الدولة والدین منشی جهان مبدع النظم والنثر حسن محمود دام معالیه که جامع این نُکت

که بر عقل اول افتاد آنجا هانه ایستاد و تقاضای و جود موجودی دیگر کرد، یعنی نفس کلی. و چون از عقل اوّل بر نفس کلی افتاد آنجا هم نه ایستاد و تقاضای وجود موجودی دیگر کرد، یعنی افلاك. و چون از نفس کل بر افلاك افتاد آنجا هم هانه ایستاد و تقاضای وجود موجودی دیگر کرد، یعنی ارکان. و چون از افلاك بر ارکان افتاد و آنجاهم هانه ایستاد و تقاضای وجود موجودی دیگر کرد، یعنی موالید. و چون از موالید بر انعقاد افتاد آنجا هم هانه ایستاد و تقاضای وجود موجودی دیگر کرد، یعنی نبات. و چون بر نبات افتاد آنجا هم هانه ایستاد و تقاضای وجود موجودی دیگر کرد، یعنی حیوان. و چون بر حیوان هم افتاد آنجا هم هانه ایستاد و تقاضای وجود موجودی دیگر کرد، یعنی انسان. و چون بر انسان افتاد آنجا هاایستاد و غایت و نهایت این موجودات به او ختم گشت. و او از این همه مقامات و کمالات مجموعی بود که به عجائب ترکیب جسد و غرائب تصانیف نفس خود به کل عالم تشبُّه کرد. [حال آنکه] روحانی مجرّد بر یك کمال بمانده است و بس.

[§۵۱۶] و انسان به حکم آنکه به مثابت مظهر اسرار کونین و مجمع آثار عالمین است با این همه کمالات چه جسمانی و چه روحانی مشرّف و [۱۲۹] مُتحلّی است و لوازم جسد جسمانی او به تأثیر نفس روحانی او به استفادتی که با امور جسدانی اکتساب می کند فاضلتر می شود.

[§۵۱۷] ومعلوم است که هر ماهیّت [را] که در عالم اعلی مصدری است در این عالم مظهری است، و چون عقل از مردم ابتدا

[§۵۱۳] و جمله حالات انسانی بر تعاقب روزگار و ترادف لیل و نهار متجدد می شود و در هر تجددی از آن چندان غرائب قدرت و بدایع حکمت، به حکم شرفی بعد شرفی، ظاهر می گردد که قیاس و شمار آن نداند إلاّ او که عالم السّر والخفیّات است و محیط به جمیع [۱۲۸] الجهات.

[§۵۱٤] و آنکه انسان غایت و نهایت موجودات است و غرض از این همه یك دلیل است وآن این است که مَثَل اوّل الفکر آخر العمل خاص به اوست. مثلاً کسی اندیشه کند که او را تختی باید تا بر آن نشیند. اوّل چوب را که علّت هیولانی است مهیا کند، پس أُستاد را که علّت فاعلی است بیاورد و استاد شکل تخت را که علّت صُوری است معین گرداند و علّت غائی آن باشد که مرد بر آن تخت نشیند. غرض آن است که [اگرچه] تخت پس از چوب و استاد موجود شد و مرد پس از آنکه تخت ساخته شد بر تخت توانست نشست [امّا] باول مقصود تخت و نشستن بر تخت بود. حال انسان و تقدّم او برتبت شرفی و تأخر او بزمان بر دیگر موجودات همین است، که اگر چه او پس از این متوسطان جسمانی و روحانی با دیدارآید، باول غرض و مقصود از این همه او بُود.

[§۵۱۵] و دلیل واضح بر حقیقت این حال آن است که فیض امر

قدرت عمل مباشرت می باشد و نه ادراك لذت اینجا بر می نشیند که عنین عاجز باضطرار درآن معرض نیاید و حوابی بصلاح و سدادکه او را در تهذیب اخلاق که یکی از آن حمله کسر قوّت شهوی است و خوف و خشیت الهی مراقبت رضای ربّانی دامن گیرد و به اختیار بترك آن بگوید.

من ذکری باشد از کمال عالم آخرت و خاموشی من فکری باشد در مبدأ و معاد و این جهان [و] آن جهان و نظر من عبرتی باشد از عجایب آفرینش خلق و امر.

[۵۱۰§] و در احتمال بلا و فتنه و شدائد و نوائب، میان آن کس که او را در آن هیچ اختیاری نباشد و میان آن کس که او را اختیاری باشد تفاوت بسیار است. زیرا که آن کس که او را در میان دو کار یکی به غایت سهل و دیگری به غایت صعب هیچ اختیار نباشد، احتمال صعوبت از او چنان عجب ننماید که از آن کس که او را در آن کار اختیار باشد.

[۵۱۱§] از عجائب احوال او در احتمال نوائب و مقاسات شداید یکی این است که چندانکه بلاهای عظیم و محنتهای ألیم بیشتر روی به او می نهد، یقین او بر خدای تعالی و آنکه مصلحت هر دو جهانی او در آن است زیادت می گردد و جوهر نفس او در بوته امتحان می گدازد تا هر غش و نقصان که در او می باشد از بین میرود و از میان آتش همچون زر خالص و مجرّد بیرون می آید.

[۵۱۲§] ومثل عنّین عاجز که او را نه قدرت عمل مباشرت باشد و نه ادراک لذّت آن، اینجا برمی نشیند که ‹ عنّین عاجز به اختیار بترك آن نگوید [بل] او به اضطرار درآن معرض [می] آید وجوانی بصلاح وسداد وتهذیب اخلاق را ــ که یکی از آن جمله کسر قوّت شهوی ست وخوف و خشیت الهی و مراقبت رضای ربّانی ــ دامن [می] گیرد.›[111]

۱۱۱. عبارت در تمام نسخ مغلوط و درهم ریخته است مثلاً درQ: عنین او را نه

استغناء و نسیان بر ایشان مستولی نشود و به این اسباب روی از او تعالی بنگردانند و با درکات هوای هاویه‌ء شیطانی نیفتند.

[§۵۰۶] چه اگر خلق را در این عالم، فقر و فاقه دامن نگرفتی ایشان را بهر گونه حرفت و صنعت در اعمال با [طیب] خاطر طلب اسباب معاش خود نبایستی کرد و رنجها بر شخص و نفس خود نبایستی نهاد [و] هیچ عقل معیشتی کامل نشدی و اگر نوائب روزگار چنانکه میفرماید: الحَمدُ للّه الذّی جَعَل النّوائب صیقل الاحرار، صیقل النفوس نگشتی هیچ عقل قیامتی آخرتی از قوّت به فعل نیامدی.

[§۵۰۷] و او تعالی خلق خویش را صحت به آن دهد تا به سلامت بدن خویش در آلآء و نعماء او می نگرند و نصیب و روزی مقسوم از طیّبات الرزق که بر ایشان کرامت کرده است بر می گیرند و در راه او تعالی بکار او مشغول می باشند و شکر و حمد او عزّ اسمه می گذارند.

[§۵۰۸] ومرضشان [۱۲۷] به آن دهد که تا کفارت گناهانشان حاصل آید و به تضرع و ابتهال که به جناب عزّت صمدیّت او بر می دارند ثقل خطیئات و مأثم ایشان سبکتر می گردد و میل نفوس ایشان به توبت و انابت و گذاردن سجده شکر و حمد او عزّاسمه زیادت می شود و عرصه توکل و یقین شان بر او تعالی مجال واسعتر بر می گیرد.

[§۵۰۹] ربّي أمَرَني أن يَكوُنَ نُطقي ذِكراً وصُمتي فِكراً ونَظري عِبرةً. یعنی پروردگار من مرا فرموده است تا چنان باشم که نطق

نقصان هر عضوی از اعضاء فرض باید کرد. زیرا که حکمت او تعالی چنان اقتضاء کرده است که هر چیزی از این به کوکبی از این کواکب تعلّق دارد و [اگر] لازم نیاید که به آن سبب هر [**۱۲۶**] نطفه که از صلبی برحمی رسد خلق کامل موجود نشود، او را تعالی نقیض حکمت خود باید کرد. و تأثیر فعل کواکب که مدبرات امرند و آفرینش عالم خلقی تعلق به واسطه ایشان دارد، از وجود عاطل گردانند که او تعالی به حکم **لا یسألُ عمّا یفْعَلُ وَهُم یُسألون** حکم قضا و قدر خود بر نهج ارادت و مشیّت خود میدارد.

[**§۵۰۳**] و آن که در وجود آید و آنکه با عدم می شود و آنکه عمر دراز و نیک بخت باشد و آنکه کوته عمر و بد بخت باشد، در هر حالی از این احوال سرّ[ی] غریب مُضمر است و حکم[ی] عجیب مُدغم، که بر اهل خرد و دانش پوشیده نماند.

[**§۵۰٤**] وهر یك علی الانفراد از خسیس ترین ایشان تا به شریف ترین بر خُلق و طبیعت و حرفت و خاصیّت و شکل و صورت و نقصان و کمال و عیب و هنر و مرض و صحّت و قوّت و ضعفی اند که وجود بعضی سبب نظام و عمارت و رونق و طراوت این عالم می باشد و وجود بعضی موجب عبرت و انتباه از خواب غفلت و رَقَده جهالت.

[**§۵۰۵**] واین بلایا و منایا و آفات و نکبات به حکم حقیقت از جمله‌ء رحمت های واسعه او تعالی ست تا در دنیا بَطَری بر ایشان غالب نشود و به مزخرفات و آرایش های دیو فریبنده‌ء این منزل فانی مغرور نگردند، و استعلا و طغیان و استکبار و عصیان و

شریف تر باشد و کاملتر از آن کس که او به شکل سبب روشنائی اجسام و ابصار باشد.

[۵۰۰§] و از تقدیر الهی چنان اقتضا کرد که نفایس و اطایب این عالم [از] خِساس و اجانب باشد، چون زر و نقره از خاك و سنگ، مشگ از نافِ نخجیر صحرائی و عنبر از روث جانور دریائی و عسل از مگس و شکر از نی و دُر و مُروارید از صدف و اطلس از کِرم و قصب از گیاه و مردم از نطفه.

[۵۰۱§] و کل موجودات روحانی و جسمانی از عقل اول تا نفس کلی، تا افلاك و ارکان همه میانجی و متوسط اند تا انسان از عدم در وجود آید. و این همه آفت و بلیّت و تغییر و استحالت که لازم احوال او می افتد از تأثیر سماویّات می باشد و از نُحوستی که به درجهء طالع او میرسد. و زحل و مرّیخ را که یکی را نحس اکبر می گویند و یکی را نحس اصغر از آن است که فعل زحل در غایت و نهایت برودت است و فعل مرّیخ در غایت و نهایت حرارت. اما اگر برودت زحل به مشارکت برودت قمر و آلات زهره نبودی هیچ ماهیّت در این عالم کون و فساد منعقد نگشتی. و اگر حرارت مرّیخ به مشارکت حرارت آفتاب و [آلات] مشتری نبودی، هیچ چیز از اشیاء عقد و نشو و نما نیافتی.

[۵۰۲§] و مشتری و زهره که یکی را سعد اکبر می گویند و یکی را سعد اصغر [ازآن است] که اگر فعل و تأثیر ایشان در خلقت مولودی بی مشارکت نحسین و دیگر کواکب فرض کنند عدم عظام و اعصاب و اوتار و رباطات و خون و لون و بشره و موی و

[§٤٩٧] پس شما را در عجایب قدرت و بدایع حکمت او تعالی فکر باید کرد تا بدانید که در کار هر موجودی از موجودات علوی و سفلی چندان غرایب حالات و لطائف کمالات مضمر است که عقول مفارق به کنه و به غایت آن نرسد و افکار ملائکه از نعت و وصف آن قاصر و عاجز آید.

[§٤٩٨] و اینکه شما می گوئید که اشخاص بشری از اول ولادت تا انقطاع نَفَس آخرین از بلاها و نکبتها و حوادث و شدائد و تغییر و استحالت خالی و ایمن نمی تواند بود و روحانیّات و هیاکل از این همه فارق و منزه اند، سخنی راست است اما شما را بباید دانست که همچنان که آفرینش روحانیّات و هیاکل که فاعلان اند و آفرینش ابداعی اند ‹ نوع انسان[نیز] در شخص انسان ــ[که] آفرینش اشخاص بشری که منفعلانند، آفرینش حادثی جسمانی است ــ من الازل إلی الابد باقی بماند.› [۱۱۰]

[§٤٩٩] امّا این هیاکل سماوی که اشخاص نورانی اند واز شوائب واستحالت مصون، به حکم شکل سبب روشنائی اجسام و ابصارند[**۱۲۵**] و این پیمبران که جسم و جسد هر یك از ایشان مجموعی است از این موادّ هیولانی و به این همه آفات و بلیّات مخصوص، به حکم معنی سبب نور دلها و مصوّر ارواح باشند. و آن کس که به معنی سبب روشنائی دلها و مُصَوِّر ارواح باشد

۱۱۰. عبارت در تمام نسخ مغلوط و در هم ریخته است مثلاً در M: و نوع انسان من الازل الی الابد در شخص انسان آفرینش اشخاص بشری که منعقدات اند آفرینش حدثی زمانی است و شخص انسان من الازل الی الابد در نوع انسان باقی...

نفوس ایشان به عقول ایشان و از عقول ایشان به عقل اول و به عقل اول به او تعالی.

[§۴۹۵] و اهل حقّ در ابطال باطل ایشان و تحقیق حق چنین گفته اند که به آن شرفی که شما روحانیّات را اثبات میکنید، ما در آن موافق شمائیم، امّا اینکه شما بیك بار نیابت متوسطان روحانی میدارید و متوسطان بشری را باز میدهید، برحق نه اید. و بیرون از این مناقضه ئی سخت عجب بر شما افتاده است و شما آن بنمی بینید و حسّ آن بنمی یابید و آن اینست که شما مقرّید که میان او تعالی [۱۲۴] و خلق متوسط می باید تا به واسطه او به او تعالی تقرب نمائید و شما در این سخن که می گوئید متوسطه اند و در متوسطی نه اشخاص بشری اند بلکه روحانیّات مجرّد، پس نیك ببینید که تا از این انکار شما اقرار لازم می آید و از این نفی که می کنید اثبات.

[§۴۹۶] اگر هیچ دیگر نیست، شما این عالم را به این شکل که هست مثلاً روحانیّات سماوی و افلاك و انجُم و کواکب و ارکان و معادن و نبات و حیوان همه به جای خویش بی انسان فرض کنید، تا خود نظام و رونق و عمارت عالم و اثبات حق و باطل و خیر و شر و جسم و روح و مبدأ و معاد و دنیا و آخرت فرض توانید کرد، و نام آن بر زبان توانید گرفت یانه؟ و معلوم است که نه. و بدایند که اگر چنین بودی نهایت آفرینش به این ختم افتادی و انسان در این عالم نیامدی و آفرینش این موجودات عبث بودی. نعُوذُباللّه منه.

اولیٰ دانیم نه اشخاص بشری را. و [۱۲۳] به این هیاکل تقرّب کنیم بسوی نفوس ایشان و بنفوس ایشان تقرّب کنیم به عقول ایشان و بعقول ایشان به عقل اوّل و به عقل اول به او تعالی.

[§۴۹۲] و آنانکه از روحانیّات به هیاکل آیند و از هیاکل به بُتان، گویند این هیاکل را ــ که تقرّب ما به ایشان تقرّب به روحانیّات است ــ طلوع و غروب است وقتی فوق الارض باشند و وقتی تحت الارض، و آن وقت که فوق الارض باشند بروز پنهان آیند و بشب پیدا و گاهی که تحت الارض باشند به شب پنهانند و بروز پیدا و بشب که پیدا آیند وقتها می باشد که [به] میغی یا حجابی دیگر چون تغییرات هوا از نظر ما غایب می شوند و ما از ایشان محجوب می مانیم. پس ما در اینجا در زمین از هر جوهری که بهر هیکلی از این هیاکل هفتگانه نسبت دارد به طالع مسعود و اختیار مقبول صورتی بسازیم.

[§۴۹۳] مثلاً، صورت زحل از سرب و آهن و سنگهای سخت و صورت مشتری از ارْزیزْ و سپیدروی و الماس، و صورت مرّیخ از سنگ سرخ و مس، و صورت آفتاب از زر و یاقوت و بیجاده و صورت زهره از مروارید و زَبَرجَد و جَزْع و صورت عطارد از فیروزه و برنج و مغنیسیا و صورت قمر از نقره و بلور و سنگ سفید.

[§۴۹۴] وما دانیم که چه کسوت و چه انگشتری و چه نقش بر آن و چه بخور و چه عطر و چه عزایم و چه قربان لایق هر هیکلی باشد و با این شرایط معیّن به این بتان که حالشان این است تقرّب کنیم بسوی هیاکل ایشان و از هیاکل ایشان به نفوس ایشان و از

وجودی ابداعی از امر او تعالی و نوعشان در شخص و شخصشان در نوع ابداً دائماً سرمداً.

[۴۹۰§] و گویند اینان به متوسطی اولی اند نه پیمبران که اشخاص بشری اند [مرکب] از این عناصر چهارگانه هیولی که جسمانیات است. هم می زایند، هم می میرند و هم رنجور می شوند و هم مانده می گردند. عالم ایشان کون با فساد، مسئول با سائل، حیات با موت، نور با ظلمت، کمال با نقصان، وجود با عدم، ثبات با تغییر، بقاء با فناء، جوانی با پیری، صحت با مرض، قدرت با عجز و علیهذا. وهیچ حرکت فکری و قولی و فعلی از ایشان صادر نمی شود و نمی تواند شد بی قوّت فیضی که از امر او تعالی به واسطه روحانیّات به ایشان می رسد. و هرچه پیمبران و دیگر مردم در این عالم می گویند و می کنند مقدّر است بر تأثیرات کواکب و حرکات افلاك در هر طالع کائناً من کان.

[۴۹۱§] و اگر کسی در عالم بدرجه ئی می رسد که جهان به فضل او معترف می شود و در کمال بلاغت و شرف صناعت او به عجایب میماند چون بمی نگری آن هم از یك نظر مسعود عطارد می باشد که بر فلك خُرد تر از او ستاره نیست وبا این همه به بخاری ضعیف که بر دماغ او می زند به رنجوری های صعب در میماند و وقت می باشد که دیوانه می شود و از آن لحظه که از مادر بزاید تا آن وقت که بمی میرد پیوسته در استحالت و تغییر می باشد و از خطرات و نکبات و آفات و بلیّات طُرفة العِینی ایمن نیست. پس به این اسباب مذکور هیاکل سماوی را به متوسطی

و این استعانت و استمداد بی آنکه در مقام اِبتهال و تضرّع ایستیم و اقامت نماز و روزه و قربان و بُخُور و عزایم بشرط مرعی داریم دست ندهد.

[۴۸۸§] پس چون این شرایط بر این جمله بجای آوریم به کمال استعداد اختصاص یابیم و نفوس ما مناسب و مشابه روحانیت گردد و آن وقت حاجت خویش بر روحانیّات بر داریم تا ایشان که وسائط و ارباب و شفیعان ما اند پیش او تعالی ــ که ربّ الارباب و خالق و رازق ما و ایشان است ــ از جهت ما شفاعت کنند و به شفاعت ایشان حاجات ما در حضرت صمدّیت روا گردد و بر این تقدیر تقرّب ما بروحانیّات تقرّب به عقول ایشان باشد و از عقول ایشان به عقل اول و از عقل اول به او تعالی.

[۴۸۹§] و آنانکه از روحانیّات به کواکب آیند گویند اگر چه قوّت و قدرت بجمله روحانیّات راست و ما به تقرّب ایشان به حضرت صمدّیت تقرّب مي نمائیم اما هر روحانیّتی را هیکلی جداگانه [۱۲۲] است، یعنی کواکب و آن کواکب را فلکی جداگانه ــ روحانیت به مثابت جان و کوکب به مثابت تن ــ و این کواکب که روحانیّات را به مثابت اجسادند هیاکل نورانی شفاف اند و در حالتی از اشرفُ الحالات ایستاده، عالم ایشان کون بی فساد، مسئول بی سائل، حیات بی موت، نور بی ظلمت، کمال بی نقصان، وجود بی عدم، ثبات بی تغییر، بقاء بی فنا، جوانی بی پیری، صحت بی مرض و قدرت بی عجز و علیهَذا. نه می زایند و نه می میرند، نه رنجور می شوند و نه مانده می گردنند. وجودشان

منتهی مرکز الارض از روحانیّات است و تصرف در جوامع اجزای عالم ایشان می کنند، و ایشان از موادّ هیولانی مجرّداند و از قوا و آلات جسدانی منزّه و نه به تغیّرات زمانی متغیر می شوند و نه به تبدّلات مکانی متبدّل. و همیشه به تسبیح و تقدیس او تعالی مشغول و یك طُرفة العین از آن غافل نمی شوند. و کار ایشان مِن الازل إلی الابد همین است. ایشان ابداً و دائماً به ثبات و بقاء جوهر مخصوص اند و از استحالت و فنا مصون.

[§۴۸۶] پیمبران و اصحاب [۱۲۱] وحی و الهام در قد و قامت و چهره و صورت و جمله اعضاء و جوارح و طعام و شراب و لباس و نکاح و رنج و راحت و فقر و غنا و عجز و قدرت و مرض و صحت و موت و حیات و علیهٰذا، با ما همسراند و ما با ایشان در آن مشترکیم. پس به این اسباب از کجا واجب می شود که ما را فرمان ایشان باید بردن و صلاح کار هر دو جهان خود را بر امر و نهی ایشان مقدّر داشتن. پس ما در تقرّب به او تعالی روحانیّات را به متوسطی اولیٰ داریم و در شفاعت بحضرت صمدیّت التجا به ایشان کنیم و پناه بدیشان بریم.

[§۴۸۷] و دانیم که تا میان نفوس ما و روحانیّات مشابهت یا مناسبتی بادیدار نیاید نه به ایشان التجا توانیم کرد و نه پناه به شفاعت ایشان توانیم برد و این مشابهت و مناسبت آن وقت حاصل آید که ما نفوس خود را از همه اخلاق مذموم مهذب کنیم و به همهٔ اخلاق محمود آراسته گردانیم. و هم دانیم که این تهذیب در خصال و اخلاق بی استعانت و استمداد از روحانیّات میسّر نگردد

حکمت قائمی از روی کار برداشتم. وَلَه الحَمدعلی ذَلك حمدالشاکرین، ابدالابدین. والسّلام.

تصور بیست و هفتم

در کار بت پرستان و کسر مقالت ایشان

[۴۸۳§] اگر مردم عالم چنین تصوّر می کنند که ایشان بدست خود بُتی بمی سازند و در پیش او سجده می کنند و او را بمعبود و خالق خود می دارند، اهل حق گفته اند که ایشان بت را بخالق و معبود خود نمی دارند، بل بمتوسط می دارند میان خود و خالق و معبود خود **هولاءِ شُفَعَاؤُنا عِنْدَاللّهِ مانَعبُدُهُمْ إلاّ لِیُقَرِّبُونا إلی اللّهِ زُلْفی.** یعنی ایشان شفیعان ما اند بنزدیك خدای و ما نپرستیم ایشان را إلاّ بسوی تقرّب خدای. اگر چه در آنهم بر خطای عظیم اند، بل بر کفر صریح [و] از روی وهم و ظن وخیال برآن سخن ها می گویند.

[۴۸۴§]و ایشان سه صنف اند: صنف اول مقرّاند به آنکه عالم را خالق وصانعی هست مُبدِعِ مُبدعَات و مُخترِع مخترعات و آفریننده و روزی دهنده. خالقی که عقول و اوهام خلق بکُنه صفات عزّت و وحدانیت او نرسد و به تقرّب او راه نباشد إلاّ به متوسطان. اما گویند روحانیّات سماوی به متوسطی اولیٰ اند نه اشخاص بشری. صنف اول بر روحانیّات مجرّد هاایستند. صنف دوم بر کواکب که هیاکل روحانیّات اند بباشند و صنف سیم از روحانیّات به کواکب آیند و از کواکب به بتان که ایشان را بدست خود ساخته اند.

[۴۸۵§] بر این تفصیل آنها که بر روحانیّات مجرّد هاایستادند گویند حیات و حرکت کَل اجسام متحرك من لدُن فلك المحیط إلی

توانند داد. زیرا که محق جان و صورت حقّ است و عاقل جان و صورت عقل و عالِم جان و صورت علم. حقّ به مثابت تن و محق به مثابت جان.

[§۴۸۰] مثلاً اجزای بدن مردم از مواد متضادّ مرکب شده است و تا جان که مؤلف و دارنده و محیط اوست متصرّف و مدبّر او می باشد همه‌ء مختلفات او متّفقات می باشد و همه‌ء متفرقات او مجتمعات. و چون تصرّف و تدبیر نفس از او زائل می شود همه‌ء متّفقات او مختلفات می باشد و همه‌ء مجتمعات او متفرّقات.

[§۴۸۱] حال حقّ و مُحِقّ همچنین است که تا حقّ به محق بسته می باشد همه‌ء مختلفات اومتّفقات می باشد و همه‌ء متفرّقات مجتمعات و چون از محقّ باز می گسلد همه‌ء متفقات مختلفات می باشد و همه‌ء مجتمعات متفرّقات.

[§۴۸۲] و چون وقت به آن رسید که آخر دور شریعت به اوّل زمان قیامت پیوندد، آسمان و زمین به زلزله افتد و کُلِ اسرار و آیات و شواهد و علامات از پرده غیب آشکارا شود و آفتاب حقیقت این خبر که مابین النَفخَتین اَربَعونَ عاماً یعنی میان نفخه صور اوّل و نفخه صور دوم چهل سال باشد ــ نفخ صور اوّل دعوت سیّدنا قدّس اللّه روحه، و نفخه صور دوم دعوت قائم علی ذکره السّلام، از مشرق انتظار طلوع کرد ــ علی ذکره السّلام ظهور معنوی بفرمود و فیض انوار رحمت [۱۲۰] بر جهان و جهانیان گُسترد. چنانکه میفرماید لذکره السّلام پرده‌ء تقیّه به سطوت و

عالم بر خود حاکم کرده بودند ـــ و اگر گفت نه بس، [پس] خود اقرار داد که به حاکمی حاجت است.

[§٤٧٨] و میزان دعوت مبارك براین نهاد که: حقّ در همه وقت آن باشد که محقّ وقت لذکره السّلام فرماید نه آنکه از مُحِقّ گذشته شنیده باشند. و هرحقّ که عالمیان از مُحِقّ گذشته شنیده باشند و بدست بر پیچیده، اجزائی است که به گُسستگی از مُحِقّ وقت از کلّ و مبدأ خود باز گسسته است و به پیوستگی به مُحِقّ وقت به کلّ و مبدأ خود رسیده. ودر کلّ عالم هیچ حق به فرض هانتوان نهاد ـــ که به خود [۱۱۹] در، حقّ باشد ـــ تا چون مردم آنرا بدست افزار کنند محق باشند و هیچ باطل بفرض ها نتوان نهاد ـــ که به خود در باطل باشد ـــ تا چون مردم برآن بروند مبطل باشند. إلاّ که حقّ آن است که به مُحِقّ بسته باشد و باطل آنکه از مُحِقّ باز گسسته. چه حقّ و باطل ـــ من حیث الحق والباطل ـــ دو معنی مجرّد ذهنی اند که تا معیّن و مشّخص نمی شوند در خارج وجود ندارند و چون معیّن و مشّخص می شوند عین و شخص باطل مرد کافر و مبطل.

[§٤٧٩] و همچنین عقل معنی مجرّد ذهنی است و من حیث العقل در خارج وجود ندارد و چون خواهند که در وجود عینی از عقل خبر دهند به عاقل از آن خبر توان داد. و علم [نیز] معنی مجرّد ذهنی است و من حیث العلم در خارج وجود ندارد و چون خواهند که به وجود عینی از علم خبر دهند به عالِم از آن خبر

بیفتادی. این مردی کند ازفرزندان من چون روزگار به آن رسد که دعوت قیامت که کمال همهء ادیان وملل است بِسَرِ شرایع در آید.

[§۴۷۵] وآنکه گفته اند که مَثَل شرایع پیمبران چون ایّام روزه است و مَثَل دعوت حجّت چون عُرْفه و مثل دعوت قائم لذکره السّلام چون روز عید، تا همچنان که روزه بعُرْفه رسد و به توسط او به عید پیوندد شرایع پیمبران [نیز] بدعوت حجّت قائم به نهایت رسد وبه توسط او در دعوت قائم علی ذکره السّلام پیوندد.

[§۴۷۶] ومعنی این کلمه که پیمبر علیه [وعلی] آله السّلام در بشارت اقتراب قیامت گفته است که من امیدوارم که خدایتعالی مرا بیش از نیم روز در گور بنگذارد، چون پرسیدند که این نیم روز چند باشد، می گوید پانصد سال: **إنّ یَوْماً عِنْدَ رَبِكَ كألفِ سَنَةٍ مِمّا تَعُدُّونَ** یعنی چون از عهد او پانصد سال بگذرد دعوت قیامت بامیان آورند.

[§۴۷۷] و سیّدنا قدّس اللّه روحه که حجّت اعظم مولانا قائم القیامه است و مسیح دور قیامت و نافِخ صور اوّل، در پانصد سال هجرت برخاست و بطلب این دین ویژه یگانه به حضرت مقدّس مولانا مستنصر لذکره السّلام شد و بنظر انوار تأیید مخصوص گشت و به حکم و فرمان بیآمد و دعوت هادیه ثبتها اللّه آشکارا کرد و به اوّل که صور دعوت مبارك به دمید این ندا که در خداشناسی به کسی حاجت است [یانه] به جهان در داد و گفت خرد بس یا نه بس؟ پس آن کس که به جواب گفت که خرد بس، پنداشت به آنچه بگفت به حاکم بوُد ـــ چون بدید خرد را همهء

مِنْ مُستغْفِرٍ أغْفَرَلَه، هل مِنْ تائبٍ أتُوبُ علیه.

می گوید چون علی ابن ابیطالب که دیگر باشد؟ به خدای که روز جنگ جَمَلْ او را دیدم که اسب درمیان دو صف میگردانید [با بازوان برهنه] و می گفت که آن روی خدا که خواهند رو هاخدا کنند و خدا را بشناسند منم. آن پهلوی خدا که خدا می گوید در حقّ او تقصیر کردند منم. گناهکار کیست تا توبه اش هاپذیرم و آمرزش که میخواهد تا [او را] بیامرزم.

[§٤٧٣] و از وعده ها و بشارتها که میفرماید او لذکره السّلام یکی اینست:

وَلأبَنیَنّ بمصرَ منْبَراً ولأنَقُضَنّ بدمشق حَجَراً، ثُمّ لاغْزُوَنّ بَلَدالْدیلم، وَلأبْلُغَنّ ماوراءَ ها منْ الأُمَمِ وَلأسْهَلَنّ جبالها ولأقطَعَنّ أشْجارَها ثُمّ لاغْزُوَنّ بَلادَ الهندِ وَالصّینِ [والروم].

میفرماید به مصر منبر بنَهم ودمشق بستانم و پس به دیلمان روم کوهستانش را نرم بکنم و پس دشتش[۱۰۹] را دارها بزنم وآن اُمّتان را که از پس ایشان باشند یعنی مازندران و گیلان و مُوقان، به همه برسم وبعد ازآن بغزای هندوستان و چین و روم بروم.

[§٤٧٤] یکی پرسید یامولانا أخبرنا بانكَ تحیا بَعدالموت، یعنی یا مولانا ما را خبر میدهی به آنکه تو باز خواهی زیستن پس از موت و این همه بکردن؟ یا کسی از ذرّیه و اولاد تو بکند؟ فرمود: هیهَات هیهَات، ذَهَبْتَ فی غیرمذهب، **[۱۱۸]** یَفْعَلَهُ رجُلٌ مِنْ اولادي. یعنی چون دوری تو از این و به این که بگفتی از راه

۱۰۹. نگاه کنید به هفت باب بابا سیدنا ص. ۱۷: درختان از بیخ برکنم

لذکره السّلام عین مباینت، نه، که حکم عالم وحدت الهی.

[§۴۷۱] وآن غایت که او لذکره السّلام بکار قیام می نمود، اهل اسلام بیرون ازخواص او چنان به خلافت آن اشخاص مغرور شده بودند که إلاّ مَن شاء اللّه کسی باخلاص و اعتقاد به امامت او بنگفت. و چون او لذکره السّلام مباینت در مشابهت شریعت اظهار فرمود عقاید و ضمایر اکثر امت بر احکام ظاهرشرع و خلافت بوبکر وعمر وعثمان ــ که اشخاص آن احکام بودند ــ چنان قرار گرفته بود که آن همه فتنه های عظیم که در تواریخ روزگار معیّن است و هنوز منقطع نگشته با میان آمد.

[§۴۷۲] ازکلمات قدسی اولذکره السّلام [که] در مناجات بر لفظ مقدّس رانده است یکی اینست:

> وَقَدْ جَعَلْتَنی مِنْ اَهْلِ مَعْرِفَتِكَ اَلْمُعْتَصِمینَ [۱۱۷] بِحَبْلِ تَوْحیدِكَ قَبْلَ مُرُورِالدهُورِ وَمُضی الاَزْمِنة وَخُلوِّ الأعْصارِ، قَبْلَ خَلْقِ الذَکَرِ وَالاُنثی وَتَناسُلِ القُرُونِ وَتَوارُثِ الاعْقابِ.

یعنی بارخدایا تو مرا از اهل معرفت خود کرده ئی و آنکه به حبل توحید تودست دَرْ زده ام پیش ازگذشتن دهرها و خالی شدن روزگارها و آفریدن خلایق نر و ماده و پیش از تناسل قرون و توارث [نسلها].

و عبداللّه عبّاس می گوید:

> عَقَمَتِ النساءُ بمثل علی ابن ابي طالب، امّا واللّهُ إنی رأیْتَهُ یَوْمِ الجَمَلِ کاشِفاً عَنْ ذراعه یجولُ بین الصفّین یقولُ: أنا وَجه اللّه الذي لاتولی إلاّبه. أَنَا جَنْب اللّه الذي فرّطتم فیه. هلْ

[§٤٦٨] و پیامبر علیه السّلام از کار مولانا علی لذکره السجود و التسبیح به این خبر بشارت داده و آن اینست که فیکُم مَنْ یقاتِلکُم [۱۱٦] علی تأویلِ القُرآن کَما قاتَلتُکُمْ عَلی تَنْزِیلهِ یعنی آن کس در میان شماست که با شما بر تأویل قرآن همچنان شمشیر زند که من بر تنزیلش زدم.

[§٤٦٩] و وصایت او لذکره السّلام در میان مُعْظم امّت و اکثر اهل مِلّت چنان مخفی و مبهم باز بود که بعد از انتقال پیمبر علیه [وعلی] آله السّلام خواص و عوام مجال آن یافتند که ابوبکر را به اجماع به خلافت هاداشتند و پس از آن عمر در پیش کار افتاد و از تعبیه الهی و حکمت ربّانی که مولانا علی لذکره السّلام در آن به جای آورد خالی نبود. زیرا که می بایست که اوّل ظاهر احکام شریعت که بر عموم مشابهت هر پیمبری مقدّر است ثابت گردد تا پس از آن معنی و حقیقت آن احکام که خصوص مباینت است با میان آید. و آن کون را اشخاص می بایست که عین و شخص آن حکم و آن کون باشند. و ایشان آن اشخاص بودند.

[§٤٧٠] و مَثَل این حال چنانست که اوّل شبی بمی بایست تا در آن شب صبحی پدیدار آید و در آن صبح آفتاب طلوع کند. و مَثَل ایشان چون شب بود و مَثَل سلمان علیه السّلام که سلمان منّا اهل البیت، من عرَفَهُ کانَ مؤمناً وَمَن انکَرَهُ کان کافِراً، چون صبح، و مَثَل مولانا علی لذکره السّلام چون آفتاب. و حکم ایشان عین مشابهت و حکم سلمان علیه السّلام اثر مباینت و حکم مولانا علی

ادراك مقصد کلّی [ده چندان] زیادت شود و مَثَل او چون مردی باشد [که] مرضی به مزاج او راه یافته امّا قوت طبیعت بر قوّت مرض غالب و متزاید که به اندك مداوا که احتمال کند قوتّی بسیار باز افزاید. و آنجا هم بر این تقدیر حسنات در تزاید باشد.

[§۴۶۵] و امّا سیئه ئی که جزای آن هم بمانند آن باشد یعنی که تا به آن درجه رسیدن که کمال کلّی او را حاصل آید [و] آن نقصان که لازم نفس او باشد به حسب مقدار خود اثر کند. و آنکه سیّئات به حسنات بدل شود آن است که روی نقصان نفس با روی کمال بیکی شود و آنجا نقصان زائل و مرتفع شود و کمال راسخ و ثابت گردد.

[§۴۶۶] و آنکه جمله گناهان آمرزیده شود آن است که آنجا اضافات به حقایق اضافات و حقایق اضافات به حقیقت مطلق متّحد شود، امکان در وجوب مستغرق گردد و اتصال کلّی به آن مراد اوّل که نور محض است حاصل آید.

[§۴۶۷] وجمله آیات قرآن را، از فاتحةُ الکتاب تا خاتمه آن، هریك را تأویلی [است] که این کلمات اثریست از آن بیان که فرموده اند تا اهل حقّ وخرد بدانند که قرآن را بیرون از این ظاهر تنزیل معنی و مقصودی دیگراست که طلب آن می باید کرد. و قرآن از جهت تأویلی چنین معجز است نه از جهت تنزیل مطلق. پس تأویل قرآن هیچکس نداند إلاّ خدای و راسخان در علم: **وَمایَعْلَمُ تأوِیلَهُ إلاّاللّهُ وَالرّاسِخُونَ فِی العِلمِ.**

وجود مُقدَّر.

[§٤٦٢] یکی اینکه **فَمَنْ یَعْمَلْ مِثْقالَ ذَرَّةٍ خَیْراً یَرَهُ وَمَنْ یَعْمَلْ مِثْقالَ ذَرَّةٍ شَرّاً یَرَه**، یعنی آنجا خیر و شر را بمثقال ذرّه جزا خواهد بود. ویکی **مَنْ جآءَ بالحَسَنَةِ فَلَهُ عَشْرُ أمْثَالِهَا وَمَنْ جآء بالسَّیِّئَةِ فَلایُجْزی إلاَّ مِثْلَهَا**، یعنی آنجا هر حسنه را ده چندان جزا خواهد بود و هر سیّئه را همانند آن. ویکی آنکه **یُبَدِّلُ اللّهُ سیِّئآتهم حَسَنات**، یعنی آنجا جمله‌ء سیئات به حسنات بدل خواهد شد. ویکی **إنَّ اللّهَ یَغْفِرُ الذُنوبَ جَمِیعاً اِنَّهُ هُوَ الغَفُورُ الرَّحِیم**، یعنی آنجا جمله‌ء گناهان آمرزیده خواهد شد که او تعالی غفور ورحیم است.

[§٤٦٣] وسخن اهل تأویل و حقیقت در این معانی اینست که آنجا که خیر و شرّ را بمثقال ذرّه جزا خواهد بود آن است که نفس انسانی به وقت آنکه از قوّت روی به فعل می آورد [۱۱۵] مَثَل تکافی نور و ظلمت او همچون مرد نافَه می باشد [که] قوّت مرض و قوت طبیعت او متکافئین باشد. مثلاً به رایحه ئی که از غذا بمشام او رسد، یا آنکه به قلیل وکثیر از آن تناولی کند قوّتی باز افزاید یا ضعفی روی نماید. هم بر این تقدیر اِرتقاء و اِنحطاط او را در درجات و درکات خیر و شرّ و کمال و نقصان به ذرّه اثر باشد.

[§٤٦٤] وآنکه هر حسنه را ده چندان جزاست و هر سیّئه را به مقدار آن، آن است که چون نفس انسانی مستعد قبول انوار گردد، به هردرجه ئی که از محسوسات بر معقولات ارتقا کند قربت او به

مغلوب گشته است بپرّان، يعنى او را بر انگيز و در حركت آور تا مغلوبيش بغالبى بدل شود.

[§٤٥٨] وچون اوّلين درجه‌ء نفس در اين طيران ادراكات حسى انفعالى است اولى [**١١٤**] اجنحه گويد، يعنى نظرش ضعيف باشد [و] چنان نمايد كه او را يك پر بيش برنيامده است. و چون ادراكات حسّى به تصور نفسى پيوندد مثنى گويد يعنى از تخيّلات جزوى به تصورات كلّى متوجه گردد و ابتداء قوت نظرش باديدار آيد و چنان نمايد كه او را دو پر برآمده است.

[§٤٥٩] و چون تصور نفسى به علم عقلى متّحد شود ثلاث گويد زيرا كه آنجا قوت نظرش به كمال رسد و چنان نمايد كه او را سه پر برآمده است. و چون كمال تَحَقُّقِ علم عقلى به تَعَيُّن ذاتى لازم آيد رُباع گويد، زيرا كه آنجا قوّت نظرش در حقايق نامتناهى مى شود و چنان نمايد كه او را چهار پر برآمده است و او بغاية الغايات و نهاية النهايات كه همين مرتبه‌ء چهارم است برسد.

[§٤٦٠] وهمچنين **اِقْتَرَبَتِ السّاعَةُ وَانْشَقَّ الْقَمَرُ**، آنكه چون حكم قيامت كه آخرت است نزديك رسد امور عالم كون و فساد كه ماه مستولى آن است دست ازهم بِدارَد.

[§٤٦١] و نيز از آيات قرآن چندين عبارت بر مى آيد بر يك معنى مقدّر كه اگر حكم آن بر ظاهر تنزيل حَمْل كنند احكام مختلف [و] متباعد نمايد و بر حيرتى هرچه تمامتر ادا كند و چون بتأويل و حقيقت آن رجوع كنند احكام متوافق باشد [و] بر ترتيب

حقایق باشد و [به] شخص صحیح المزاج خاص باشد که از انتکاس به استقامت و از استقامت به وحدت رسیده باشد. و با ایشان به هیچ تقیّه حاجت نباشد و نشاید. نه بینی که هرکس که مزاج او اندك و بسیار تغیّری پذیرفته باشد و کم و بیش مرضی لازم آمده باشد البته او را شراب ندهند و نتوان داد، و چون مزاجش بحال صحت باز آمده باشد او را از شراب منع نه کنند و نتوان کرد.

[§٤٥٥] وهمچنین **وَسَقَاهُم رَبُّهُم شَرَاباً طَهُوراً** آنکه فیض انوار الهی ــ بی هیچ توسط متوسطان جسمانی و روحانی ــ به نفس او پیوندد و میان او و کلّ مبدأش هیچ حجاب و واسطه نباشد.

[§٤٥٦] و همچنین **حور عِین** آنکه صورةٌ حاضرةٌ فی هویّتهِ مَع الإشتها دفعةً واحدةً، یعنی آنچه آرزوی او باشد از ادراك لطایف معقولات صورتی حاضر گردد هویّت او را، یعنی نفس ناطقه ممیزّه او را، و او به آن سرمداً مسرور و مُبتهج باشد و بدایات و نهایات معارف او را با یکدیگر ازدواجی حاصل شود که نتایج [آن] صُور مَلَکی و ارواح قُدسی باشد.

[§٤٥٧] وهمچنین **أولِي أجْنِحَةٍ مَثنی وَثُلاثَ وَرُبَاعَ**، آنکه نفس انسانی در آن حال که به ظلّ حواس از تصور صور معقولات در حجاب می افتد مَثَل او همچو مرغی می باشد که پَرَشْ باندرون می شود، به این سبب گفته اند: وَقِّعِ الطائر واَطِرَ الواَقِع یعنی پرنده را بنشان و نشسته را بپراَن. یعنی حس را که می پَرّد یعنی غالب گشته است بنشان، یعنی او را بزیر حکم عقل در آور تا غالبیش به مغلوبی بدل شود و عقل را که بنشسته است یعنی

به خانه کعبه نهادن از حکم تنزیل به طلب امام شدن است و رسیدن بخانهء کعبه از حکم تأویل شناختن امام است لذکره السّلام.

[§۴۵۳] وهمچنین جهاد آنکه بداند که جهادها بسیار است و آن با چهار قسمت آورده اند: جهادجسمانی، جهاد روحانی، جهاد عقلانی و جهاد حقیقی. جهاد جسمانی جهاد أعْدائك مِن الخارج، آنجا که بقوت دل و بازوی خود با دشمنان جسمانی جهاد کند. و این دیگر جهاد أعْدائك مِن الداخل، مثلاً روحانی آنکه بأثر نور خود باعین ظلمت خود جهاد کند و عقلانی آنکه آنجا بعین نور خود بأثر ظلمت خود جهاد کند. و حقیقی آنکه به هویّت واجب او تعالی باخودی ممکن خود و هرچه جز او تعالی باشد و به او تعالی شرك آورد جهاد کند.

[§۴۵۴] وهمچنین جنّات آنکه کمالات است، کمالی پَسِ کمالی، تا به کمال آخر، چنانکه شرحش در [تصور ۱۵] بهشت و بهشت ها بیامده است. و چهار جوی بهشت آنکه به حکم تنزیل آب و شیر [۱۱۳] و انگبین و شراب است و به حکم تأویل بر چهار نوع علوم است بر مقادیر عقول انسانی مقدّر. مثلاً آب چون علم بدیهی ضروری عامّ که همه کس گفتن را بشاید و مانعی نباشد. و شیر چون علم نظری که به طفلان یعنی ضعفاء العقول خاصّ باشد و عسل چون علم تعلیمی که ادای آن جز از یك جنس مردم را نشاید، یعنی کسانی که از کون نظر هاپیش آمده باشند و از اِنتکاس به استقامت متوجّه گشته. و شراب چون علم تأییدی که آن کشف

لذّات و شهوات این جهانی صبر اختیار کنند و از هر فکر و قول و فعل که نه مطابق عقل باشد و نه باجازت عقل ــ یعنی نه بامر مُحِقّ بسته ــ پرهیز واجب دانند.

[٤٥٠§] وهمچنین زکوة آنکه همچنان که مال مرد به نصابی **[۱۱۲]** می رسد که کسی دیگر را از آن نصیبی تواند بود، بر حسب مکنت و استظهار خود چیزی از آن به اهل احتیاج دهد تا سلك عطا و عطا دهنده و عطا پذیرنده در کون جسمانی به مال جسمانی با میان آید.

[٤٥۱§] ودر کون روحانی، عِلمی که صورت معاد را بشاید و از ماورای خود هاگرفته باشد و به آن کامل فی ذاته شده، در اینجا به افاضت آن برمادون خود به قدر قبول او ادا کند و مُکمّل لِغیره باشد. تا همچنان که سعی کرد به آن درویش که در کون جسمانی به مال جسمانی توانگر شود، سعی کرده باشد تا این کس در کون روحانی به نعیم روحانی توانگر شود و سلك عطا و عطا دهنده و عطا پذیرنده در کون روحانی به مال روحانی با میان آید.

[٤٥۲§] و همچنین حجّ آنکه از خانه خود مثلاً به عراق شود و از عراق به بغداد و از بغداد به بادیه و از بادیه به خانهٔ کعبه، نفس او را استحالت و خوی به کمالات تا به منتهای کمالات حاصل شود و آن استحالات و انتقالات ارتقاء باشد از علم ضروری بر نظری و از نظری بر تعلیمی و از تعلیمی بر تأییدی، تا معنی **الیوم حجّ أکبرّ إلی البیتِ العَتیقِ الأطهَر** حاصل آمده باشد و جواب **وَاللّهُ یَدْعُوآ إلیَ دارِالسَلاَم** را به **لَبّیكَ اللّهَمّ لَبّیك** باز داده. ونیز روی

[۴۴۸§] و نشستن به تحیّات آنکه چون این شرایع بر این جمله تمهید افتاد، دلش از حرکت جهات مختلفه بیارامید [و] نفس او به تسلیم طبیعی **فِي مَقْعَدِ صِدْقٍ عِنْدَ مَلِيكٍ مُقْتَدِرٍ** قرار گرفت، دو سلام یکی به راست و یکی به چپ باز می دهند [یعنی] آنکه چون این دو امکان یعنی عامّ خلقی و خاصّ امری برخاست و تحقیق این هر دو عالم به عالم وحدت الهی **وَالسَّابِقُونَ السَّابِقُونَ أُولَئِكَ الْمُقَرَّبُونَ** حاصل شد، سلامی بر اهل یمین که [**فَسَلَامٌ لَكَ مِنْ أَصْحَابِ الْيَمِينِ**] ویکی بر اهل شمال که اهل ترّتب اند لازم آمد.[۱۰۸]

[۴۴۹§] وهمچنین روزه آنکه به روزه کسر قوّت شهوی بباشد، زیرا که نفس انسانی در اوّل بدایت مُلکی میل به لذّات و شهوات و آداب این عالم می کند و به این سبب در صدمهٔ انتکاس و ورطهٔ انحطاط درجهٔ وجود می افتد و درمان این إلاّ به حبس نفس از میل ممکن نمی گردد. و روزه که مَثَل حبس نفس است از میل، بامیان آوردند تا در سالی سی روز، هر روز تا شب دهان از طعام و شراب بسته دارند و از مشتهیات که مألوف ذوق و مرغوب طبیعت باشد مجتنب و محترز باشند و برآن تجّبر و اکراه صبر کنند تا به ترتیب و درجه هم از آن منوال صورتی در نفس مرتسم شود و به آن رسد که همهٔ اعضاء و جوارح و قوتهای اندرونی و بیرونی از همه ناشایست ها بسته دارند و بر همهٔ

۱۰۸. به قرینه متن آیات ۱۰ و ۱۱ از سوره واقعه به سطر ماقبل نقل و آیه ۹۱ از همان سوره به جای آن تبت شد.

و حس الم هائی که در این عالم به لذّت میماند می یابد [و] لذّت عالم آخرت که لذّت خاص باشد مُجرد از شوائب اِلم به مذاق عقل او می رسد. پس به حکم این مقدّمات آن میل که به دنیا داشت به آخرت کند و آنچه به مکروه داشت چون به رضای او تعالی نزدیك بیند به محبوب دارد و شکر برآن گزارد و آنچه به محبوب می داشت چون از رضای او تعالی دور بیند به مکروه دارد و صبر بر آن کند تا الحمد که جامع این هر دو طرف است بر زبان گیرد و راست باشد. والسّلام.

[٤٤٦§] وهمچنین نماز آنکه تا به نماز کسر قوّت غضبی بباشد و آن چنانست که نفس انسانی به اوّل وَهْلَه که در محل قوّت می باشد و به ظل حواس از فعل خاص خویش محجوب، استعلا [۱۱۱] و عصیان و استکبار و طغیان بر او غالب می شود و به مداومت و مواظبت بر نماز، هرشبانه روزی پنج وقت در مقام رکوع و سجود ایستادن و روی تضرّع بخاك تذلّل آوردن، هیأتی از تواضُع و تخاشُع که مبدأ استعداد خوف و خشیت ایزدی باشد اداء به **اتّقُوا اللّهَ وکُونُوا مَعَ الصّادقین** کند در نفس او پدیدار آید.

[٤٤٧§] و رُکوع نیم سُجود است، چون تسلیم اختیاری به امر او تعالی، و [از] دو سجود یکی [تصنّعی یعنی تسلیم بر دلایل مصنوعات فعلی و خلقی، که آثار فعل او تعالی است و دیگر تکلیفی یعنی تسلیم][۱۰۷] بردلایل مصنوعات قولی و امری که آثار علم او تعالی است.

---

۱۰۷. مطالب داخل کروشه قیاساً به قرینه متن افزوده شد.

هم به شکل و هم بمعنی. شکل چنانکه گفته شد و معنی چنانکه بداند که او را از این عالم به ضرورت مفارقت می باید کرد و از آن تجمّل مملکت و تنعّم سلطنت هیچ چیز باخود نتواند بُرد و آن همه اینجا بخواهد گذاشت، وِزْر و وَبال وتَبَعه ومَظْلمه که جمله آن از حَیِّز دوزخ جاودانی وعذاب و عقوبت نامتناهی [است] به او بخواهد ماند و بنظر عقل و بصیرت روشن و معیّن ببیند که چندانکه در دنیای او میافزود از آخرت او می کاست و چندانکه از دنیای او می کاست در آخرت او میافزود.

[§٤٤٤] مرد عاقل مثل دنیا و بقای مدت دنیا [را] چنین زده است که مثلاً کسی عزم رفتن [از] اقلیمی به اقلیمی کند و راهش بر منازل و مراحل باشد و اورا در اوّلین منزل مانعی در راه آید و بضرورت چندان متوقف باشد که آن مانع از راه برخیزد و چندانکه در آن منزل متوقف باشد اسباب مایحتاج قوام جسم هم چندان طلبد که بیمار دارو [به کار دارد] و بکفاف قانع باشد و داند که اگر قانع نباشد و چیزی زیاده از کفاف طلبد همچنان باشد که بیمار دارو زیادت از قدر حاجت به کار دارد و در خطر هلاکت افتد. و چون مانع از راه برخیزد او به دل فارغ از آن منزل تحویل کند، اگر آنجا کسب فُضْله مایحتاج نکرده باشد که به وقت رفتن دلش به آن باشد.

[§٤٤٥] وچون این حال براین جمله بداند معلوم او شود که چندانکه از امور دنیائی او می کاهد در امور آخرتی او می افزاید

دوری آورد از او تعالی به مکروه دارد و صبر برآن کند.

[§۴۴۱] و شرحش آن است که اوّل افزایشی که عین کاهش است وکاهشی که عین افزایش است بداند و این آن وقت بتواند دانست که نفس او از قوّت به فعل آید و چیزها را چنانکه هست ببیند که مادام که در محل قوت باشد چیز ها را بعکس آن تواند دید، که هست و افزایش دنیا را افزایش داند و آنرا به محبوب دارد و شکر برآن گذارد و کاهش دنیا را کاهش داند و به مکروه دارد و صبر برآن کند، و چون از قوّت به فعل آید بداند افزایش دنیا عین کاهش است و کاهش دنیا عین افزایش.

[§۴۴۲] مثلاً کسی را بیند که در عالم او را از خورد و پوشش آنقدر که به آن بتواند زیست حاصل باشد و بیرون از آن به هیچ اسباب دیگر در وجوه معیشت خود محتاج نباشد و او را باید که پادشاه عالم شود و در طلب آن ایستد و هر زیادتی که او را در آن مطلوب روی نماید ــ از یك ناحیت تا به اقلیمی و از یك مرد تا بصد هزار و علیهذا ــ احتیاج به اسباب ضبط و اهتمام آن گنج و خزانه و انبار و لشگر و دیگر انواع به سر احتیاجی در می آید تا آنجا که چون به غایت همّت خود برسد و پادشاه عالم شود إلاّ کُلّ احتیاج مطلق به او بنماند.

[§۴۴۳] پس چون حقیقت این حال از غبار شُبهه مجرّد گردد وصورت این مقال نفس ناطقه او را از آینهء یقین تجلّی کند بداند که آن افزایش [۱۱۰] که او بافزایش می داشت عین کاهش بود

نام نیکو و صفت بزرگ خدائیم. وبِنایُعرفُ اللّهُ وبِنایُطاعُ وَبِنایُعْصی یعنی بما خدای را بشناسند و بما خدای را بپرستند وهرکه طاعت ما دارد طاعت خدا داشته باشد و هرکه عصیان ما کند عصیان خدا کرده باشد.

[§٤٣٨] پس هرکه خواهد که نام حقیقی او تعالی بر زبان گیرد و او را تعالی بنام حقیقی او بشناسد گو این کس [را] که دعوی و دعوت او اینست و به این دعوی و دعوت متفرّد بشناس. والسّلام.

[§٤٣٩] وهمچنین **اَلْحَمْدُ لِلّه** آنکه پارسی الحمدللّه آنست که "سپاس خدایرا" و این سپاس سِه پاس است، یکی فکر و دوم قول و سیّم فعل. و می باید که این هر سه بر مقتضای خرد به حقیقت باشد و خاصّ خدای را جلّ وعلا [۱۰۹] و این هر سه آنگه بر مقتضای خرد به حقیقت خالص خدای را باشد که آن مقصود را که قصد به اوست و آن مطلوب را که نهایت به او، متوکّلُ عَلیه باشد یعنی هر چه صادقتر.

[§٤٤٠] والحمد راه است به این مقصد کلّی، و مقصود کلّی آن است که آنجا شکر و صبر هر دو به یك معنی اند. پس به این وجه الحمد جامع صبر و شکر است و آن کس قدم در این راه تواند نهاد و به این مقصد تواند رسید که الحمد [را] چنانکه حقّ الحمد است بر زبان تواند گرفت. و این آن وقت باشد که او کمال غایت محبوب ومکروه خود [را] در این عالم معیّن کند. و آنچه قربت آورد به او تعالی به محبوب دارد و شکر بر آن گذارد و آنچه

اگر گویند مسمی قدیم است و اسم محدث و [در] میان اسم و مسمی هر دو یکی است، چه معنی اسم و مسمی [را]؟ اگر گویند هر یکی یکی، کثرت دیگر چه باشد إلاّ این. و به این وجوه سدّ باب این سخن لازم آید و مرجعش آن باشد که خلق را در کون مشابهت خلقی چاره نیست از آنکه به او تعالی اشارتی کنند و او را به نامی بخوانند. وخلایق عالم از این سه قسمت بیرون نه اند عامّ و خاصّ و اخصِّ خاص. و هرکس در او تعالی از آنجا سخن تواند گفت که خود اوست، او را تعالی اسما به میان آمده است، به اضافه با اینها ــ از آنجا که اینها اند ــ نه از آنجا که اوست.

[§٤٣٧] مثلاً مردم عامّ، اللّه و رحمان و رحیم و دیگر اسماء مترادف می گویند، بی بحث احوال آن که اضافی است یا حقیقی. و خاص، این اسما مترادف می گویند از روی اضافه، و بالای این آن اسم که او تعالی آن اسم را به خود خاص کرده است هم می گویند از روی حقیقت. و اخصّ خاص، این اسماء مترادف و بالای این آن اسم که او تعالی به خود خاص کرده است هم می گویند از روی اضافه و حقیقت، و بالای این اسم آنجا که اسم و مسمی هر دو یکی است ــ مطلق و منزّه از صفت و صفت کننده ــ ‹ هم می گویند از روی تنزیه. و این آن اسم اعظم مُعیّن و مُشخصّ است که می گوید: نَحْنُ اَسْما اللّه الحُسنی ›[۱۰۶] وصَفاتُهُ العُلیا یعنی ما

---

۱۰۶. M: ندارد.

مَبدأ ما است در ضمن شهادت اوّل می آید و خویشتن شناسی حقیقی که معاد ما است در ضمن شهادت دوم لازم آید و اداء به آن کند که مَنْ عَرَفَ نَفْسَهُ فَقَدْ عَرَفَ رَبَّهُ.

[٤٣٤§] قیام نماز: همچنان که استقامت در وضع خلقت بیامده است، استقامت نفس در قبول امر الهی حاصل آید. و نیّت نماز آنکه اندیشه و گفتار و کردار خود [را] از هرچه جز او تعالی باشد و نه بسوی او تعالی و شرك آورد به او تعالی دور دارند، [و] از حول و قوت خود بیرون آیند و اعتماد بحول و قوت اوتعالی کنند.

[٤٣٥§] وهمچنین **بِسمِ اللّه** آنکه اسم چیزی آن باشد که آن چیز را به آن اسم بشناسند، و اورا تعالی نه بیك اسم خوانند بل به اسماء بسیار چنانکه عجم خدا می گویند و عرب اللّه و ترك تَنْکری و فرنگ داوو و هندو هَرِی نارَن و فیلسوف واجب الوجود و علیهذا. و در همهء عالم از امم اسلام و کفر و شرك هیچ امت نیست که او را تعالی به نامی نمی خوانند که اگر نام او به حقیقت آن بودی این جمله طوایف از امم عالم همه رستگار و خداشناس بودندی ــ و معلوم است که نه اند ــ و هم معلوم است که او را تعالی نامی حقیقی هست که او را به آن بتوان شناخت.

[٤٣٦§] و اوّل سوال اینست که بباید گفت یا اسم قدیم است و مُسمی مُحْدَث، یا مسمی قدیم است و اسم محدث، **[١٠٨]** یا اسم و مسمی هر دو یکی است، یا هریکی، یکی. اگر گویند اسم قدیم است و مسمی محدث، کفر و شرك دیگر چه باشد إلاّ این. و

معاد و اوّل و آخر چاره نیست البته از اقرار به خدای و این اقرار به حکم مبدأ و نظر اول در اعتقاد صورتی باشد و در لفظ صفتی، که اگر از حکم [نظر] اول و مبدأ این اقرار نباشد ادا به تعطیل کند.

[§۴۳۱] و از حکم نظر دوم و معاد این مبدأ، آن باشد که بدانند که این صورت [اعتقاد و لفظ] صفت از آنجاست که خلق است، نه از آنجا که او تعالی است، زیرا که حقیقت ذات او تعالی را إلاّ او تعالی نتواند دانستن. پس از حکم نظر دوم نفی و سلب صفت او لازم باشد.

[§۴۳۲] و این هر دو نظر یکی به حکم مَبدأ ما باشد ــ من حیثُ الناظر ــ و یکی به حکم مَعادما ــ من حیث المنظوُر فیه [۱۰۷]. نظر اول که صفت است به اضافه‌ء مَبدا و نظر دوم که نفی صفت است به اضافه معاد ما. و او تعالی از هر دو منزّه و از این تنزیه هم منزه، تا معنی اللّه اکبر درست آید و حکم عالم خلقی که آنجا وصف گویند و حکم عالم امری که آنجا تنزیه ــ **أَلاَلَهُ الخَلق والامر** ــ به جای خویش مرعی ماند. بإذن اللّه وحُسن مشیّته.

[§۴۳۳] و همچنین شهادت آنکه به این دوشهادت یعنی اَشْهدُأنْ لا اله الا اللّه، واشهدُأنّ مُحَمداً رَسول اللّه، از شهادت اوّل اقرار عامّ اضافی که **وَلَئِن سَأَلْتَهُمْ مَنْ خَلَقَهُم لَيَقُولُنَّ الله** حاصل آید واز شهادت دوم اقرار خاص امری که **انّ اللّهَ مُولی الّذینَ آمَنواُ وأنّ الکافِرینَ لامَولی لَهُم** حاصل آید. وخویشتن شناسی اضافی که

از حقایق کرده و اصحاب تأویل هریك را معنی و حقیقتی تقریر کرده اند، چه به جُمل و چه به تفصیل.

[۴۲۷§] امّا مجمل: طهارت آنکه از آئین و سنت گذشته دست بداری. شهادت آنکه خدا را بخدا بشناسی. نماز آنکه پیوسته ازخداشناسی گوئی. روزه آنکه با مبطلان سخن به تقیّه گوئی تا پیوسته به روزه باشی. زکوٰة آنکه آنچه خدای تعالی بتو ارزانی داشته به دیگر برادران دین ارزانی داری. حجّ آنکه دست از این سرای فانی بداری و طلب سرای باقی کنی. جهاد آنکه خود را در ذات خدای تعالی معدوم کنی.

[۴۲۸§] امّا تفصیل: طهارت آنکه می باید همچنان که ظاهر جسمانی از نجاست جسمانی به آب پاك کنند، باطن روحانی را از نجاست ذاتی که تصور صُور معکوس است، به علم ــ که مثل آن بآب زده اند ــ پاك کنند و اوهام وخیالات شیطانی که بحجاب فطرت اولی شده است از یاد ببرند.

[۴۲۹§] همچنین اللّهُ اکبر: إنه اکبَرُ مِنْ أن یوُصَفْ یعنی او تعالی بزرگوارتر ازآن است که او را صفت کنند، و اکبر مِن أنْ لایوصفَ یعنی او تعالی بزرگوار تر از آن است که او را صفت نکنند. و لفظ اکبر بمجرّد لفظ چنان است که کبیری هست از جنس او، تعالی عن ذلك، و اوتعالی از آن کبیر کبیرتر، واین شرك وکفر باشد. نعُوذُ بِاللّه منها.

[۴۳۰§] و ملخّص این سخن به آن آید که حکم دو وجهی در این نگاه باید داشت و این دو وجهی آن است که خلق را در مبدأ و

شرفی بر همهٔ انبیا لازم آمد.

[§۴۲۴] و از این روی می گوید علیه السّلام: بُعِثْتُ بِجَوامِعِ الکَلِمْ یعنی همهٔ سخنها اینست که من آورده ام. وبُعِثْتُ بِصَلاحِ دُنیاکُم وَنجاتِ آخِرَتِکُمْ یعنی من برای صلاح دنیا و نجات آخرت شما آمده ام، **وَماأَدْرِی مایُفعَلُ بِی وَلابِکُم** یعنی نمیدانم تا به قیامت بامن و شما چه خواهند کرد.

[§۴۲۵] وچون به وصایت مولانا علی لذکره السّلام این نصّ و اشارت الهی که **یاأَیُّهَا الرَّسُولُ بَلِّغْ مَاأُنْزِلَ إِلَیْکَ مِن رَبِّکَ وَإِنْ لَمْ تَفْعَلْ فَما بَلَّغْتَ رِسَالَتَهُ** نازل گشت یعنی بگذار آن رسالت که ترا برای آن فرستاده ایم و اگر بنگذاری پیمبر نباشی، او علیه السّلام هم در آن حال نبوّت خود با امامت او سپرد و شریعت به قیامت متّحد کرد و گفت: منْ کُنتُ مَولاهُ فهَذا علیٌ مولاه، اللّهمَ والِ مَن والاهُ وَعادِ منْ عاداهُ وانْصُرْ مَنْ نَصَرَهُ واخْذُلْ منْ خَذَلَهُ وأدرِالحَقَّ مَعهُ حَیثُ دَار، یعنی هرکه من خداوند او بودم این علی خداوند اوست، بار خدایا دوست دار آن کس را که او را دوست دارد و دشمن دار آن کس را که او را دشمن دارد و نصرت آن کس کن که نصرت او کند و خذلان آن کس کن که خذلان او کند و حق با او میگردان چنانکه او می گردد.

[§۴۲۶] و این هفت ارکان شریعت که او علیه السّلام اساس ملّت برآن ممهد گردانیده، چنانکه در پیش برفت، چون دعوت او مبدأ قیامت بود همه خَلقیّات بود از امریّات کرده، و جسمانیّات [۱۰۶] از روحانیّات کرده، و عملیّات از عِلْمیّات کرده و اضافات

را به هر دو ــ کالجامع بینهما ــ و موسی را به تنزیل مخصوص کردند و عیسی را به تأویل و محمّد را به هر دو کالجامع بینهما.
[§۴۲۱] وچون دور محمد علیه السّلام مبدأ دور قیامت بود و قیامت بامام لذکره السّلام که قائم قیامت است خاص، اگر چه از روزگار آدم تا به روزگار او پیمبران مرموز و مکشوف بامام وقت خود لذکره السّلام اشارتها می کرده اند و بشارتها میداده اند، امّا ذکر جلالت و عظمت امام لذکره السّلام [را] هیچ پیمبری از خاتم الانبیا آشکاراتر برزبان نگرفته است: لَوْخَلَتِ الأرضُ مِنْ امامٍ ساعةً لَمادَت بِاهْلِها وجای دیگرمیفرماید: وَمَنْ ماتَ وَلَمْ یَعْرِفْ اِمام زَمانِهِ فقدْ ماتَ مِیته جَاهِلیّةٍ.
[§۴۲۲] و در دعوت او علیه السّلام حکم مبدأ، که آنجا مُحِقّ را بحق شناسند و هم حکم وسط که آنجا هم حق را بمحق شناسند و هم محق را بحق، و [هم] حکم آخر که آنجا حق را بمحق شناسند هرسه ظاهر و معیّن است [۱۰۵] اعْرِفِ الحقَ تَعرف اَهلَهُ، علی مَعَ الحق ّوالحقّ مَعَهُ،أدرِالحَقّ مَعَهُ حَیْثُ دار. مبدأ و وسط وآخر.
[§۴۲۳] وآنکه می گوید: کُنْتُ نَبیاً وآدم بینَ الماء والطین، یعنی من پیمبر بودم که آدم هنوز درمیان آب و گِل بود همین است که اوّل الفکر آخرالعمل، یعنی آنچه به اوّل مقصود و غایت و کمال می باشد به آخر ظاهر می گردد. و بر این تقدیر چون کمال شرایع همهٔ پیمبران از آدم تا به عیسی علیه السّلام او بود، اگر چه وجود او از وجود همهٔ انبیا به زمان مؤخر بود، تقدّم او به رتبت

را از حالی به حالی نگردانند [۱۰٤] صورت که غایت کمال آن چیز باشد در او نتوان پوشید. مثلاً تا نطفه باستحالت حَوالی و تغیّرات از حالی به حالی نگردد، آن صورت که برآن ایستاده باشد باز نگذارد و به مراتب علقه و مضغه و لحم و عظام — ‹ که به هر مقام از این که رسید به جان نزدیکتر شد — بر نگذرد و هرگز به تمامی صورت انسانی نتواند رسید.›[۱۰۵]

[§٤۱۸] حال اِکمال و اِبطال شرایع همچنین تصور باید کرد که اگر حکم پیمبر اوّل بر حال خود بماند و حکم پیمبر دیگر پس از آن نیاید و در نهایت آن قائم قیامت تصرّف نکند، محکومان آن حکم هرگز از راه بمقصد و ازاسم بمعنی و ازمشابهت به مباینت و ازاضافه به حقیقت و از شریعت به قیامت نه توانند رسید.

[§٤۱۹] و اصحاب تأویل گفته اند که این شش روز که در قرآن می آید که آسمان و زمین را در این مدّت آفریده اند، [به] این شش روز ادوار این شش پیمبر مُرْسَل را می خواهند و هر دوری روزی، و هر روزی هزار سال: **وَإنَّ یَوْماً عِنْدَ رَبِكَ كَألفِ سَنَةٍ مِمَّا تَعُدّوُنَ**. یعنی روزی از آن خدای هزار سال است.

[§٤۲۰] و به آسمان، احکام ظاهر جسمانی را خواهند و به زمین احکام باطن روحانی را، یعنی احکام ظاهر جسمانی و احکام باطن روحانی به این شش دور این شش پیمبر مرسل تمام شد و گفته اند که آدم را به اسما مخصوص کردند و نوح را به معانی و ابراهیم

۱۰۵. M: ندارد.

نوح به مثابت نطفه ودعوت ابراهیم به مثابت علقه و دعوت موسی به مثابت مضغه و دعوت عیسی به مثابت لحم و عظام و دعوت محمد به مثابت تمامی صورت.

[§۴۱۵] چون آفرینش شرعی براین ترتیب به محمد علیه السّلام تمام شد و به تمام دیگر حاجت نبود اورا خاتم انبیا خوانده اند و اعتبار کلّی در آنکه او خاتم انبیا بود آن است که هر پیمبرِ دیگر که پیش از او میآمد اشارت به پیمبری دیگر که پس از او خواهد بود می کرد و می گفت شریعت من به شریعت او به کمال می رسد ‹ و محمد علیه السّلام گفت پس از من قائم بیاید علی ذکره السّلام و شریعت من به قیامت او به کمال رسد.›[۱۰۴]

[§۴۱۶] و خلایق عالم را بقائم قیامت بیم کرد و بشارت داد. و او چون آخرین منادی و مبشر قیامت بود می گوید: بُعِثْتُ أناوَالسّاعَةُ کَهاتَینِ وَاَشارَ بِسَبابَتَیه یعنی من و قائم هر دو بهم میآمدیم چون دو انگشت سبابه که برابر یکدیگر بدارند و من به کَمْ چیزی در پیش افتادم. و چون بعد از او شریعتی دیگر نخواست بود و دعوت همه پیمبران و شرایع ایشان به دعوت او درقیامت خواست بست، پس خاتم جمله پیمبران و شرایع ایشان او بود.

[§۴۱۷] وحکم هر پیمبری که به سَرِ احکام پیمبر پیشین درآمده است غرض آن اکمال بوده است نه ابِطالش، امّا آن اکمال از راه ظاهر و شکل به ابطال مانسته است نه به اکمال. زیرا که تا چیزی

۱۰۴. فقط در M.

[§٤۱۱] و آنکه امامان حقّ لذکرهم السّلام را وقتی فرزند آدم و وقتی فرزند نوح خوانده اند و وقتی فرزند ابراهیم، به سبب مصلحت ها و اضافه بوده است که ایشان لذکرهم السّلام در آن میدیده اند و نگاه می داشته و اگر نه ایشان تقدّس ذکرهم نه از نسل پیمبران بوده اند و نه از نسل حکیمان و نه از پادشاهان و نه از هیچ نسل دیگر إلاّ از نسل مبارك خود.

[§٤۱۲] و چون محمد علیه [وعلی] آله السّلام خاتِم ادوار شرایع بود و فاتِح دور قیامت و همهء شرایع و دیانات به شریعت و دین او به کمال می رسید، مَثَل او [چون] روز آدینه [۱۰۳] جامع پنج روز گذشته که به شنبه پیوندد، یعنی به قائم علی ذکره السّلام. زیرا که شنبه مَثَل است و ممثول آن قائم لذکره السّلام.

[§٤۱۳] واو را ازآنجا خاتم الانبیاء گفته اند که إنَّ اللّه [تبارك وتعالی] أسَّسَ دینَه عَلی مِثال خَلقِه لِیُسْتَدَلّ بِخَلْقِه عَلی دینْهِ وبِدینْهِ علی وَحْدانیّته. یعنی خدای تبارك و تعالی اساس دین خویش بر مثال خلق خویش نهاد تا دلیل گیرند بخلق او بر دین او و بدین او بر وحدانیّت او.

[§٤۱٤] و هم براین تقدیر ترتیب آفرینش امری شرعی برترتیب آفرینش خلقی مقدّر است مثلاً آفرینش خلقی بشش مرتبه تمام می شود یعنی سُلاله و نُطفه و عَلَقَه و مُضغه و عِظام و تمامی صورت. آفرینش امری شرعی [نیز] بشش پیمبر صاحب وحی تمام می شود یعنی آدم و نوح و ابراهیم و موسی و عیسی و محمد علیهم السّلام. و براین تقدیر دعوت آدم به مثابت سلاله است و دعوت

در بطن اسحاق برفت >[۱۰۳] و به اوّل آن انوار رسید که بر فرزندان مولانا اسماعیل لذکره السّلام فایض گشت. و مصطفی محمد علیه السّلام آن خلاصه بزرگ که آخر آن آثار و اوّل آن انوار به او متّحد شد و او در سلطنت و نبوّت وعظمت ومملکت به روحانیّت قول و جسمانیّت فعل متفرّد گشت.

[§۴۰۹] و پیمبران را علیهم السّلام هر یك ضدّان و فرعونان بسیار بوده اند، چه در پنهان و چه در آشکارا. و آنچه در میان اُمم مشهور است ضدّ آدم ابلیس و ضدّ نوح نسْر و ضدّ ابراهیم نمْرود و ضدّ موسی فرعون و ضدّ عیسی یهودا و ضدّ محمد ابولهب.

[§۴۱۰] و محافظت شرایع پیمبران بامامان مستقر لذکرهم السّلام تعلق داشته است، امّا ایشان به مصلحت هائی که درآن می دیده اند و به حکمت های الهی که در آن می دانسته اند وقتی آن محافظت به ذات مقدّس خود می کرده اند، و وقتی به خلفا و کسانی دیگر باز می گذاشته اند. که اگر آن محافظت علی الدّوام ایشان کردندی روحانیّت آن شرایع به همه اوقات برقرار خود بماندی و این همه خلافها با میان نیامدی. امّا چون خدای تعالی این اختلافات را سبب اتّفاقات گردانیده است چنانکه محمد مصطفی علیه [وعلی] آله السّلام می گوید اِختلاف اُمّتي رَحْمةً ایشان [نیز] لذکرهم السّلام آنچه مصلحت اهل روزگار درآن می دیده اند می فرموده اند و استمرار این قاعده بر این جمله واجب می داشته اند.

---

۱۰۳. M: ندارد.

بَعْضُها مِنْ بَعْض تا نهایت عُمر عالم.

[§۴۰۳] وصی نوح سام بود لذکره السّلام، و سام را فرزند نوح خواندند.

[§۴۰۴] و وصی ابراهیم ملك السّلام بود تقدس ذکره، و او را فرزند ابراهیم خواندند.

[§۴۰۵] و وصی موسی ذوالقرنین بود لذکره السّلام و اورا هارون خوانده اند و به این اسم مشهورتر بوده است. و چون می بایست که وصی موسی هارون باشد لذکره السّلام و [او] در عهد موسی انتقال کرد، و موسی آن وصایت را بافرزندان هارون می بایست سپُرد، و هارون را دوپسر طفل بود. [موسی] یُوشع بن نون را در کار وصایت کرد و سّر ولایت به مُستودعی هاداشت تا او آن وصایت با پسران هارون سپُرد. و حکمت در [این] آن بود که تا فایده تعیین نصّ که موجب بقاء وصایت[۱۰۲] است ظاهر گردد.

[§۴۰۶] وصی عیسی مَعَدّ بود لذکره السّلام که او را شمعون صفا هم خوانده اند و به شمعون مشهورتر بوده است.

[§۴۰۷] و وصی محمد مصطفی مولانا علی بود لذکره السّلام.

[§۴۰۸] و گفتند بعد از ابراهیم علیه السّلام مُلك و نبوّت و دین و امامت در دو بطن برفت. یکی بطن ظاهر بود، یعنی بطن اسحاق و یکی بطن مخفی بود یعنی بطن اسماعیل. آثار مُلك و نبوّت در بطن اسحاق [۱۰۲] برفت < و انوار دین و امامت در بطن مولانا اسماعیل. و عیسی علیه السّلام آخر آن آثار بود که

۱۰۲. در تمام نسخ "خلافت" به قرینه متن تصحیح شد.

او راه برکمال و معاد نماید، گویای مطلق.

[§۴۰۱] پس به وجهی یك کس است که او گویاست و آن گویایی اضافهٔ اوست بامادون او، و هم آن کس خاموش است و آن خاموشی اضافهٔ اوست به ارادت او باماورای او که به حقیقت ذات اوست و دیگران همه به وجهی گویایان خاموشند و به وجهی خاموشان گویا، و به وجهی هم گویا اند و هم خاموش و به وجهی [۱۰۱] نه گویا اند و نه خاموش، و به وجهی از گویائی روی بخاموشی دارند و به وجهی از خاموشی رو بگویائی. والسّلام.

تصور بیست و ششم

در ادوار شش پیمبر اولوالعزم، از آدم تا به محمد علیهم السّلام وامامان حقّ تقدّس ذکرُهُم وظهور دعوت قائم و اظهار دعوت قیامت

[§۴۰۲] پیمبران علی جمعهم السّلام هریك را وصی بوده است [که] نور امامت به حکم استقرار در او مستقر و علم نبوت به حکم استیداع دراو مستودع، وآن وصایت[۱] از آنجا می بوده که امامان حقّ لذکرهم السّلام هریك در روزگار هر پیمبری به حکم مصلحت مردم آن روزگار که درآن می دیده است به وصایت آن پیمبر ظهور می کرده است. وصی آدم شیث بود لذکره السّلام و شیث را فرزند آدم خوانده اند. و آثار آن علم که خدای آدم را بیاموخت و انوار آن کلمات که توبه آدم به توسط آن قبول افتاد خاصّ به او بود. و آن وصایت از روزگار آدم در فرزندان شیث لذکره السّلام برفت ذُرِّيَّةً

۱. ۱۰۱ M: وسایط.

و بندگان را معنی این سخن از کلمات مقدّسه علی ذکره السّلام معلوم شود و آن اینست که:

من این عبارات و قصه ها که می گویم هم بعدم شما است که بعدم شما با شما می نمایم. وآنکه گفتم پیش ازما دعوت با خداشناسی و خداپرستی سخن اضافی بود و اکنون با خدا شناسی و خدا پرستی سخن بیکبار بُود ــ چنانکه عرب بانگ سگ کند تا باشد که سگ جواب دهد. اگر گویند تو نیز لفظی می گوئی که آنرا معانی موهوم است [می گویم] من بلفظ اِرهاف معقولات و تَفَهُّم اِبطال موهومات و تَقَدُّم اعدام معدومات می کنم و بکردم. والسّلام.

[§۳۹۹] پس او لذکره السّلام به اعتبار باذات مقدّس خود هیچ نگفت و هیچ نطق نزد و باعتبار با کمالاتی که بجهت اکمال عالم و استکمال عالمیان اظهار کرد بیرون از او لذکره السّلام در هژده هزار عالم هیچ گویا و هیچ ناطق نبوده است و نیست و نخواهد بود.

[§۴۰۰] وحجّت اعظم امام به وجهی گویای مطلق است و به وجهی خاموش مطلق، زیرا که او به آن روئی که با ماورای خود دارد و ماورای او از گویایی و خاموشی منزّه و او را [از] اتّحاد با ماورای خود بعدم ذات خود معرفت و تسلیم حاصل، خاموش مطلق است و به اضافه بامادون او که سررشته اضافات و حقایق اضافات بقوت تأیید ماورای او بدست او باشد و طالبان راه حقّ را

ومجمعی از آثار هر دو عالم و احتیاجات و کمالات او کمالی بالای کمالی تا به **أنّ إلی ربّكَ المُنتَهی** و او را کامل فی ذاته و مُکمل لغیره می بایست بود او را به اصوات [و] به تَبَیُّنِ حروف حاجت افتاد وخدایش بداد.

[§۳۹٤] و صوت او قول جسمانی شد از موادّ روحانی کرده یعنی قول [او] مظهر معانی فکری او گشت و مثالات و دلالات شد از معقولات که ماده گویائی و شنوائی است، که گویائی به اعتبار باکمال غایت به مثابت قابل آن [است].

[§۳۹۵] و به وجهی گویای به حقیقت آن کس باشد که سخن او ادای کلّی باشد که نفوس ناقصان بقبول آن از حَیِّز نقصان به حدّ کمال رسند. و شنوای به حقیقت آن کس است که او را دفعةً واحدةً قابل باشد بی زیادت و نقصان.

[§۳۹٦] و چون استعداد نفوس بر یك مرتبه نیست و این گویایان و خاموشان و شنوایان هر یك در درجات مترتّب و متفاضل اند یکی بالای دیگری تا به حجّت امام لذکره السّلام که او مکمل علی الاطلاق باشد و گویائی و شنوائی و خاموشی او بیك معنی آید.

[§۳۹۷] وامام لذکره السّلام از این همه متعالی و منزّه [۱۰۰] است وگویایان را گویائی و شنوایان را شنوائی و خاموشان را خاموشی او داده است و او دهد.

[§۳۹۸] واز سخن های یکی از ایشان است لذکره السّلام که باجماعت خود گفته است که: مَا نَطَقْتُ لَکُم مُنْذُ وَلِیتُکُم یعنی از آنگاه که ولیّ شما ام با شما هیچ سخن نگفته ام و نطق نزده ام.

تصور بیست و پنجم
در ماهیّت سخن و گویائی و شنوا ئی و خاموشی

[§۳۹۰] چنانکه هر چیزی را در این عالم مادّه و صورتی است، سخن راهم مادّه و صورت است. مثلاً نَفَس زدن مردم به مثابت مادّه است و حروف مُقطّعه به مثابت صورت، حروف مُقطّعه به مثابت مادّه است [۹۹] و حروف مُؤلفه به مثابت صورت، و حروف مُؤلفه به مثابت مادّه است و کلمه به مثابت صورت، وکلمه به مثابت مادّه است وکلام مرکب که کلام مفهوم باشد به مثابت صورت.

[§۳۹۱] و مبدأ سخن آن است که اصوات متقاطع شوند و از مخارج خود بصورت حروف مقطّعه بیرون آیند و حروف مترکّب گردد و اوّل مؤلّفه شود، پس کلمه، پس کلمات، پس سخن تمام ومفهوم، وتفاهم ایشان از یکدیگر به این وجه حاصل آید.

[§۳۹۲] و حیوان و انسان با یکدیگر در صوتْ من حیث الصوت مشترك اند و امتیازی که دارند به تَبیُّنِ حروف است و آن به انسان حاصل است نه بحیوان. زیرا که مقصود از هرچیز کمال غایتی است و کمال غایت صوت هدایت است وکمال غایت هدایت به فعل آمدن نَفْس از محلّ قوّت برفع موانع وحجابات. وچون حیوانات به تکلیف هدایت مکلّف نه اند، تفاهم ایشان به همان صوت که دارند حاصل است و همان صوت بی تَبَیُّنِ حروف از واهب صور حاصل آمد.

[§۳۹۳] وچون انسان که عالم صغیر است نموداری بود ازعالم کبیر

به سیاست شکلی به نظام هادارد.

[§۳۸٦] و مَثَل زبان علم به آب زده اند که او به لطافت اجزای خویش در باطن زمین خوض کند و انواع نباتات و اصناف گلها و ریاحین برویاند. مثلاً نفوس انسان را که در محل قوّت باشد تربیت چنان دهد که چون از قوّت به فعل آیند غرائب خصالات و عجایب کمالات هر یك ظاهر گردد بمشیة اللّه العزیز.

[§۳۸۷] ومَثَل دست قدرت بآتش زده اند که باحراق جوهر خویشتن، هرچه دریابد بسوزد و متفرق و متلاشی گرداند، یعنی زَنَدْ و کُشَد و مانند آن. و وقتی که دست قدرت بر مُلك حاکم و مسلط باشد اگر زبان علم همچون دیگر اهل مملکت فرمان او نبرد، وجود شکلی جسمانی بر او بنماند. و اگر دست قدرت به هدایت زبان علم توسل نجوید، از کمال شرف نفس در عالم معاد بی بهره ماند.

[§۳۸۸] و وقت باشد که از کمال قدرت و شُکوه سَطْوَت و سلطنت دعوت مبارك اقتضا چنان کند که امام لذکره السّلام، حکم زبان علم و کار دست قدرت هر دو به زبان علم مفوّض گرداند و ظاهر وباطن دعوت بیکی کند.

[§۳۸۹] < و تو امام لذکره السّلام را خواه امام گو،> [۱] خواه وَجْهُ اللّه الباقی خواه صفت اعظم و نام بزرگ خدای، و خواه مظهر کلمهٔ اعلی و خواه مُحِقّ وقت، او بی خلایق همه و همه ی خلایق بی او هیچ، که همه یك معنی دارد. والسّلام.

۱. M ۱۰۰: ندارد.

قوت اشراق عقل اوّل در او پدیدار آید و مَثَلِ مرتبهء او ‹ همچنین به ماه از اینرو زده اند که ›[۹۹] همچنان که جرم ماه به خود تاریک باشد و به نور آفتاب منّور شود و در غیبت آفتاب خلیفت او باشد و به مقدار نوری که بحسب طاقت خود از آفتاب هاگرفته باشد جهان را روشن دارد، نَفْس حجّت اعظم که به خود در هیچ نداند و هیچ نباشد و به لمعان انوار تأیید امام لذکره السّلام منّور گردد و در غیبت امام خلیفت او باشد وبقوت قبول فیض انوار علم که به قدر استعداد خود هاگرفته باشد خلق را از امام لذکره السّلام بیاگاهاند و بامام راه نماید و حقّ امامتِ امام و جماعت امام با همهء خلایق بحجّت و برهانی که هیچ عاقل مُنصف انکار آن نتواند کرد بدرست کند و نفوس متعلّمان را که مُستعد قبول صورت کمال باشند ــ علاّمةٌ بالقوه ــ به صورت ها ی کمالی که بخشد و به ادای فعلی که کند، علاّمةٌ بالفعل گرداند.

[۳۸٤§] و کار حجّت اعظم آن است که [۹۸] او دعوت حقیقی امام بپای دارد. و حجّتان ایشان به حقیقت و ذات همه یکی باشند و آنجا نتوان گفت که یکی از یکی بزرگتر باشد. امّا مردم آن حجّت [را] که بواسطه او کشف حقایق بیشتر باشد و دعوت او که بامام لذکره السّلام کند جامعتر و عظیم تر، مرتبهء او بزرگتر دانند.

[۳۸۵§] و کار دست قدرت آنکه چون دَرِ توبه دْربندد، یعنی دعوت قولی نکند، او را والی و فرمانده گرداند تا کار جماعت

۹۹. T: همین کرده اند.

وداعی الدّعات داشته اند و سِرّ این مسئله معلوم نداشته و امام را دیده و اقوال و افعال او را مشاهده کرده، منکوس و معترض شده اند و مخذول و مضطرب گشته. نعُوُذباللّه منه.

[§۳۸۱] وایشان را لذکرهم السّلام رجالی باشد، بعضی متعلم و بعضی معلم، بعضی داعی و بعضی باب [۹۷] باطن و بعضی زبان علم و بعضی حجّت اعظم و بعضی دست قدرت. امّا داعی و باب باطن به وجهی هر دو یکی باشند و زبان علم و حجّت اعظم هم چنین. امّا متعلم و معلم و حجّت و امام: اگر کسی باشد که نداند، ببایدش آموختن و چون بیاموخت به غیر خودش نباید آموخت، این متعلم باشد. و کسی باشد که نداند، ببایدش آموخت و چون بیاموخت به غیر خودش بباید آموخت و این معلّم باشد. و کسی باشد که بی آنکه از کسی بیاموزد، یعنی بی آنکه به تعلیم جسمانی و اکتساب و تلقینی محتاج گردد، همه داند و از هیچ کس نباید آموخت، یعنی آن علم از فیض انوار تائید [امام] بخاطر او متحّد می شود و به غیر خودش باید آموخت، این حجّت باشد.

[§۳۸۲] وکسی باشد که از آموختن و نیاموختن مُنزّه و خداوندِ این همه و بخشنده‌ء آن معرفت که کمال عقل به آن حاصل آید، یعنی مظهر کلمه اعلی و واهبُ المَعْرفة التی هی کَمال العَقْل، و مقصود از کار او همین که او را بشناسند و دوست دارند و در حزب و گروه و جماعت او باشند و این امام باشد لذکره السّلام.

[§۳۸۳] و حجّتِ اعظم او مَظهرِ عقل اول باشد، یعنی ظهور و

عالم آنرا بحق دارند چون او گوید باطل است، باطل دانند و هر چه آنرا بباطل دارند چون اوگوید حق است، حق دانند و او را بنشان کنند در هر حال و زمان[۹۸] نه قول وفعل او را. حق بی او کفر دانند و با او بهم شرك. و این کس باین اسباب بأعلی علیین رسد که مَقرّ سابقان است. و آن کس که خُلِقَ الکافِرُ مِن ذنبِ المؤمن صفت حال او باشد به جُحوُد و عُنود خود که کند و باعتراض که بر او لذکره السّلام آورد به عدم نامتناهی و خذلان همیشگی افتد. نعُوذُبالله منه.

[۳۷۹§] و از این دو حال یعنی از آنِ محق و مبطل، حقیقت این اشارت که هم سخن ایشان است لذکره السّلام: عَرَفَنی فِی الذّر مَنْ عَرَفَنی وأنْکَرنی غَیرأهل الیمین، یعنی باز شناخت مرا آن کس که در ازل باز شناخته است و انکار کرد مرا، آن کس که او را نه از اهل یمین آفریده اند. و اهل بصر و بصیرت را روشن گردد ان شاء الله تعالی.

[۳۸۰§] امّا زُهد و عصمت او، که اگر با میزان خلق باز خوانند بزهد و عصمت ندارند. چون اضافه خلایق عالم بامام لذکره السّلام، چون اضافه موری ضعیف است با خلق کامل، نه، به صد هزار درجه کمتر. و هیچ مردم در حرکات و سکنات خود از موری نه که از هیچ حیوانی دیگر پرهیز و تقیه نکند. امام لذکره السّلام چون بیرون از خود هیچ چیز دیگر را نبیند از چه پرهیزد و از که تقیه کند؟ وبسا عالِمان که ایشان خود را به مثابت قاضی القضاة

۹۸. T+ ومکان.

و ظهوری نبودی، و هر کونی از این اکوان را به او اضافه و اتصالی نبودی، آن اکوان را وجود نبودی. پس از این روی به حکم اضافه ابدالابدین در این عالم ظهوری داشته و دارد. ازاین روی هم پدر است و هم فرزند، وقتی کودك و وقتی پیر و علیهذا.

[§۳۷۶] وهرکه با خود برآن باشد که امام را لذکره السّلام به حکم شریعت صاحب شرع کار باید کرد تا امام باشد، و به زُهد و عصمتی که خلایق آنرا زهد و عصمت دارند تمسّك باید نمود تا معصوم باشد، از زمره‌ء آنان تواند بود که آنجا که در عقل سخن رود وصف حالشان این باشد: تِلكَ النَّكْراء وَتِلْكَ الشَّیطنةُ وهَی شَبیهةٌ بِالعقلِ ولیَستْ بالْعَقْلِ، و او را یك ذرّه از حال امامت خبر نباشد.

[§۳۷۷] و چون اعمال و حرکات امام لذکره السّلام ببینند دیوانه بباشد و آنرا از عظایم منکرات شمرد و سخنهائی گویدکه **تَكادُ السَمَاوَاتُ يَتَفَطَّرْنَ مِنْه،** زیرا که او لذکره السّلام حُکم از بالای خردهای خلایق کند تا آن کس که خُلقَ المؤمنُ مِن [نور] الحقّ فإذا أمرهُ الحقُّ یعْرِفهُ وصف حال او باشد، به نور فطرت باسر آن افتد و داند [۹۶] بی هیچ شك و شبه، که حق متابع اوست نه او متابع حق، زیرا که او خداوند حق است و هوا و مراد او را سببی نباشد، زیرا که آنجا که اوست سَبَب و مُسبَب و مُسبِب هر سه یکی است.

[§۳۷۸] وهمچنین داند که او آن مُحِقّ به ذات است که محقان بقبول آن حق که فیض و اثر اوست محق باشند. و هر چه خلایق

دشواری، پوشیده ئی پس پوشیده ودرشتی پس درشت، احتمال او نکند إلاّ فرشته‌ء مقرّب یا پیغمبر مرسل یا مؤمنی که خدای تعالی دل او را بایمان امتحان کرده باشد. وهم از سخنان ایشان است لذکره السّلام: لَتُغَرْبَلُنَّ غربلةً وَلَتبلْبَلُنَّ بَلبَلة وَلَتُساطُنَّ بسوط[۹۷] حتّی یَصیرِ أعلاکُم أسفَلَکُم وأسفَلُکُم أعلاکُم. یعنی شما را همچو گندم در غربال و آب جوشان در دیگ [۹۵] می پزند و بهم بر میزنند، تا زیر بالا می شود و بالا زیر می گردد. و کسانی که زبان علم ایشان بوده اند گفته اند: یعنی شما را در کرْد و وَرْد امتحان افکنند و زیر و زبر می کنند تا آنچه خلاصه باشد برسر می آید و آنچه باقی باشد با زیر میافتد.

[§۳۷٤] وآنکه گفته اند که امام هرگز در این اکوان اضافی نیامده است و نیاید، مقصود از این آمدن در این عالم اکوان [اضافی] آن است که تا هر کون از این اکوان کمالی که نداشته باشند حاصل کنند. و امام لذکره السّلام ـــ نه در این اکوان اضافی که در کل عالم ـــ به هیچ کمال خارج ذات خود محتاج نیست، نه، که وجود و کمال این اکوان اضافی و همه آفرینش به حقیقت او می بخشد. پس از اینروی، به حکم حقیقة الحقایق هرگز در این اکوان اضافی نیامده است و نیاید.

[§۳۷۵] اما به اضافه، از آن روی که تظاهراً بالاضافة إلی اهلها لاظهوراً بالذات حقیقةً در هرکون از این اکوان تظاهری دارد، بجهت وجود این اکوان. زیرا که اگر او را در هر کونی از این اکوان نظری

---

۹۷ در همه ی نسخ + القدر.

خوانند و چون ظهور معنوی کند یعنی هم دعوت قولی کند هم فعلی او را مالك القُلوب والرقاب خوانند.

[§۳۷۱] وچون مصلحت همهٔ خلایق عالم در هر وقت و زمان در آن باشد که او لذکره السّلام فرماید، وقت باشد که مصلحت در آن بیند که بر تخت نشیند و‹ مُلك ›[۹۵] و گنج و لشگر و خزانه بسیارش باشد و دَرِ دعوت خود که رحمت بزرگترین است بر خلایق عالم بگشاید وبا همه کس علی العموم حِلم و رِفق و مُدارا فرماید وهمگنان در عهد بزرگوار او مُرّفه و نیکو حال باشند.

[§۳۷۲] و وقتی باشد که از همهٔ اسباب تجمّلِ مملکت و تنعّمِ سلطنت تحاشی نماید و خلایق را در کَرْد و وَرْد امتحان افکند و محنتهای شاق بر ایشان گمارد و با هیچکس مجامله بکار ندارد و با دین و مُلك آن کند که کم دلی طاقت آن آورد ــ چنانکه همهٔ حقها از حقّی ببُرّد و هیچ حق بنگذارد که او را به آن باز توان شناخت ــ و آن کند و گوید که در گوش پنبه دَرْ باید کردن و چشم برهم باید نهادن ‹ که نشنود و نبیند که او چه می کند و می گوید. ›[۹۶]

[§۳۷۳] از سخنهای ایشان یکی اینست:امرُنا صعبٌ مُستصعبٌ و سرّنا مُستترٌ مستوحشٌ لایَحتَملها إلاّ مَلَكٌ مقرّب او نبّی مرسلٌ او مؤمنٌ اِمتحن اللّهُ قلبَه بالایمان. یعنی امر ما دشواری است پسِ

۹۵. T: مملکت.

۹۶. T: ندارد.

[§۳۶۷] سوم معرفت امامت او و ایمان و تسلیم به او، که در این معرفت مباینت محقّ و مبطل به کلی می باشد و نیکان به تبرا از بدان جدا می شوند و به تولیّ در جماعت امام حق می آیند.

[§۳۶۸] چهارم معرفت ذات او به حقیقت صفات او، که این معرفت به تنزیه و تقدیس است [و] از این دیگر معرفت ها بکُل الوُجوه مبرا است. آنجا نفوس مقدّسه و عقول منوره را قوّت آن نیست که بر روی آفتاب این معرفت باز نگرند: تاهَت دُونَ بلوغه الخواطِر، وعَمتِ الأبصارُ للبصائر، وَانْدَرَست المعقولاتُ و انکسرتِ المعلوماتُ وماتت الأنْفُسُ المقدسةُ وانْعَدمتِ العُقُول المنوّرة.

[§۳۶۹] و در کَرّات[۹۴] و رَجعات ایشان لذکره السّلام فرموده اند که حکم اضافت و حقیقت نگاه باید داشتن: از آنروئی که حق را مراتب است و ایشان هر یك اظهار مرتبه و سرّی [۹۴] و مصلحتی مُرتِّب و مُبایِن می کنند، نتوان گفت که کراتشان نیست، و از آن روی که حق را وحدتی هست و این مراتب آنجا همه یکی می باشد و ایشان به حکم حقیقت همه یکی اند ــ نه شخصشان از شخص انفصالی هست و نه معنویّت از معنویّت ــ نتوان گفت که رجعتشان هست.

[§۳۷۰] و معنی امام و قائم هر دو یکی است، اما مردم آن امام را قائم خوانند که در شریعت تصرّف زیادت کند. و چون قائم ظهور شکلی کند یعنی دعوت فعلی کند، نه قولی، او را مالِكُ الرّقاب

۹۴. در تمام نسخ "کرامات" به قرینه متن تصحیح شد.

[§۳۶۲] و وقتی بر آنکه قطعْ و فِترتْ و امتحان خواسته است بودن، تا تَستَرُّ[۹۳] و تَقیّه صعب واجب دیده اند و آن فرزندان جسمانی را بر روی آن فرزند که هم به جسمانی و هم به روحانی و هم به حقیقت خود او بوده است برکشیده اند و نِفاذُالنَفس کرده و او را بنص شکلی به این یك باز پوشیده.

[§۳۶۳] و وقتی به آنکه بندگان گرد فضولی گردیده اند و بی رضا و اجازت ایشان در تعیین و تشخیص و سجده طاعت آن امام مستقر شروع نموده [اند].

[§۳٦٤] وخلق را همچنان که در مقدّمه بیامد، معرفت امام از آنجا که امام است ممکن نیست، اما به حکم اضافه با خلق، آن معرفت با چهار قسم آورده اند تا هرکس بر حسب مرتبهء وجود خود از معرفت او بی نصیب نماند.

[§۳٦۵] اوّل معرفت شخص او بصورت جسمانی او، که در این معرفت با حیوان مشترك اند و خصمان را همان معرفت حاصل می شود. اما اگر این معرفت نباشد، چون خواهند که پیش او سجده کنند، ندانند که پیش کِه سجده باید کردن و روی بر زمین بسوی کِه باید نهادن.

[§۳٦٦] دوم معرفت اسم عام و نسب جسمانی او، که در این معرفت مبطلان با محقّان و مُنافقان با مؤمنان مشترك اند. و اگر این معرفت نباشد و خواهند که دعا کنند، ندانند که در دعا کِه را خوانند و در استجابت و استغفار نام کِه برند.

۹۳. فقط درT، در سایر نسخ: ستر.

امّا مادام که تو میدانی که این نطفه در پشت پدر یکی نورند، نورٌ یَنتقِلُ فی الاصْلاب، به آنکه این نور به رحم مادر آید به ناقص باشد؟[۹۲] و نَحْنُ مِنْ نُورالله گوئی، نوُرالله به چیزی بزیان شود؟ یا نور خدائی به سببی و حالی بزیان شود؟ حدیثُ خُرافَةٍ یا اُم عَمْرو. یا این نطفهٔ عقلانی این وقت که بمردی بالغ بود بکامل تر بود، یا چیزی به نور خدای پوشیده بود؟ که وقتی ندانست و وقتی دیگر بداند، یا بهری از ایشان بدانند و بهری دیگر ندانند! این کار نه اینجا نهاده است که تا مردم می پندارند. إلی ههنا کلام علی ذکره السّلام است

[§۳۶۰] ونص های جسمانی که ایشان لذکره السّلام بر پسران جسمانی ــ که به شکل از ایشان بوده اند و بمعنی از ایشان نبوده اند ــ کرده اند، از آنجا که حکم حقیقت است و مصلحت هائی که ایشان ببینند همان حکم دارد. اذا بَلَغ الکلام إلی الله فأمسکوا.

[§۳۶۱] امّا از آنجا که حکم اضافه است و داعیان و حُجتان ایشان تقریر کرده اند، آن احکام وقتی بر آن مقرر بوده است که ایشان لذکرهم السّلام [۹۳] این کون ظاهر جسمانی را زور می داده اند و بندگان را به گناهان و کفران نعمت که کرده باشند و روی از حجّت و خلیفت و شخص معرفت ایشان بگردانیده و در عالم عدل و عقوبت داشته اند.

---

۹۲. T+ چیزی که نه نورخدا باشد بنور باشد ونحن ...

[پس] این کامل [۹۲] کیست؟ پیمبران حالشان نه چنین است، حُجّتان حالشان نه چنین است، حکیمان هم حالشان نه چنین است، پادشاهان هم نیست. استفهام خود اینست: اگر این کامل را وجود بنماند ناقصان کامل نگردند، پس چه درمان است إلاّ که سر بر فرمان این امامان ما نهند که نه پسران پیمبران اند و نه از کسی دیگر. ‹ و امامان از ظاهر تا باطن از نسل و صلب پاك امام اند، یکی از پس یکی.›[۹۱] امام هم در نطفه و هم در پشت پدر کامل، هم در رحم پاك مادر کامل. امام در همه وقت کامل [وهم امام] و اگر نه چرا گفتی الامام یَعرفُ النطفةَ التی یَکُوُن منها امام بَعْدِه، و اگر او را حال نطفه و بالغی یکی نبودی، نگفتی عُجِنَتْ نُطْفَتُهُ بِعَقله، تغییر در حال ایشان بحسب رأی العین ما: مثلاً وقتی کودك، وقتی پیر، وقتی بُرنا و مانند آن، روا باشد زیرا که اگر چه او متغیر نیست، تواند بودن که ما بچشم متغیر ببینیم، یا دو ببینیم چون پدر و پسر، زیرا که اَحْوَل یکی را دو ببیند و آن کس که گِرد خود گردد چون هاایستد خانه را گردنده بیند و اگر چه خانه ثابت است امّا چون دماغ او گردنده است خانه را گردنده تواند دیدن و یا چون ذوق صفراوی که طعم شکر را تلخ پندارد.

صفات به همه حال واجب و ضروری است پس بدانند که آن کامل کیست.

۹۱. T و M: ندارد.

وباطن را به آن سبب زمین خوانند که زمین مرکز است و آسمان محیط و اگرچه به شکل محیط بر مرکز محیط است، ولی به حکم معنی و حقیقت مرکز سبب وجود محیط است، و محیط سبب وجود مرکز نیست. **وَما أنا مِنَ المُشرِکین**، یعنی او را با اینان هیچ کس انباز نگیرم.

[§۳۵۸] **إنَّ صَلاتِي وَنُسُكِي وَمَحْيَايَ وَمَمَاتِي لِلّه ربِّ العَالَمِینَ**. صَلاتي، یعنی دعوت به او خواهم کردن. نُسُکي، یعنی اعتقاد ها او بندم. زیراکه عبادت اقرار است به خدائی خدای و زندگانی این گهان و آن گهان بسوی او که خداوند این عالمها است می بایدم. خداوند این گهان وآن گهان و خداوند مبدأ و معاد وخداوند اجساد و ارواح یعنی اوّل وآخر وظاهر وباطن.

[§۳۵۹] ‹ وعَلی الجُمله نه همه چیزی باز شاید نوشتن،›[۸۹] خاصه در وقتی چنین به تعجیل و پوشیده و جای تاریك. اما مجمل سخن اینست که:

اگرامامت کامل است هرگز بنگردد و از جای خود بِنَشَوَد، چنانکه نه امامی با امام نباشد و امامی بنه امام. و اگر امامت کامل[۹۰] نیست کاملی به همه حال ضروری است،

۸۹. عبارت درT وسایر نسخ: علی الجمله نه همه چیزی بتوان گفتن یا باز شاهد نوشتن...

۹۰. عبارت در تمام نسخ به استثنایT مغلوط و در هم ریخته است، متلاً در S: کامل نیست نه باصل و نه بذات و نه بمرتبه پس امام کامل باصل و ذات و

به هیچ کس محتاج نباشد که به تعلیم او به کمال رسند. کاملی چنین ضروری است، و آنجای به همه حال هاباید ایستادن.

[§۳۵۷] چنانکه در قصّهء ابراهیم می آید، **فَلَمّا جَنَّ علیهِ اللَّیْلُ**، یعنی [۹۱] درحدّ باطن باشد **رَأی کَوکَباً** یعنی داعی را دید **قالَ هَذا رَبّي**، یعنی پنداشت که او آن کامل است. **فَلَمّا اَفَلَ** یعنی خود فرو شد ‹ حواله بماه کرد، **فَلَمّا رَأی القَمَرَ** یعنی حجّت را دید **قالَ هَذا رَبّي**، یعنی پنداشت که او آن کامل است. **فَلَمّا اَفَلَ**، یعنی خود›[88] فرو شد و حواله بآفتاب کرد یعنی بسوی امام اشاره کرد **قالَ هَذا رَبّی هَذا اکبَرُ**، یعنی بدانست که او آن کامل است. بسوی آن دیگران می گفت **لاأحِبُ الآفِلِین** ــ یعنی چون بحّد بالائین رسیدم حدّ زیرین را با حدّ بالائین به انباز نگیرم ــ إلاّ آفتاب را که در حَق او نمی گوید **لاأحِبُّ الآفلین**. می گوید: **وَجَّهْتُ وَجْهِی لِلَذی فَطَرَ السَّماوَاتِ وَالأَرضَ حَنِیفاً وَمَا أنا مِنَ المُشْرِکِینَ** یعنی چون ملك السلام را بشناختم و روی هااو کردم، بدانستم که آفریدگار زمین و آسمان است یعنی بدانستم که ظاهر پیمبران که آنرا آسمان خوانند و باطن حُجّتان که آنرا زمین خوانند همه از اوست، زیرا که باطن آسمان و زمین عالم دین باشد. چنانکه این آسمان و زمین عالم دنیا است.

۸۸. T: ندارد.

زمین از جای بشود و حکم شنبه از جای بنشود، یعنی بنگردد. یعنی پیمبران و حجّتان ‹ گردننده باشند، وقتی این باشد وقتی آن، وقتی در این ›[۸۶] امت وقتی در آن امت و امام هرگز بنگردد. نَحْنُ أُناس سَرمَدیّون. چنانکه نطفه که به پشت پدر امام نبوده باشد و برحم مادر همچنین نه کامل، و هرگز نشاید که امام حقیقی نباشد و آن امام مُستودع چون مولانا حسن خود دیگر است، چه آنجا که حقیقت است نشاید که هیچ امام گذشته یا آینده از دیگری بهتر باشد، یا وقتی بهتر باشد و وقتی دیگر نه. مثلاً آن وقتی که بالغ باشد نشاید بهتر باشد از آن وقت که ‹ نطفه بوده باشد، یا آن وقت که نصّ بکنند بهتر باشد از آن وقتی که نص نکرده بودند. ›[۸۷] که نص نه بسوی آن کنند که او امام باشد، بلکه بسوی آن کنند که مردم او را بشناسند و اگر نه، آنجا که اوست این همه حالات یکی است. زیرا که به همه حال در میان خلق خدا کاملی باید باشد تا ناقصان را به کمال رساند. اگر بفرض هانهند که این نه اوست، یکی دیگر باید که باشد که اگر هر ناقص تری به کامل تری محتاج باشد آن کامل تر به کامل تری، به همه حال به کاملی هاباید ایستادن که او

---

۸۶. T: ندارد.

۸۷. T: ندارد.

زیرا که مردم ناگزیرند از این سه فرقه: اهل ظاهر، اهل باطن و اهل حقیقت. بسوی اهل ظاهر به حکم ظاهر، امام به ظاهر باید که پسر امام بود، تا ظاهر جسمانی دنیا را وجود شکلی ظاهرش که هست بماند. وهمچنین باید که به حکم معنی [۹۰] و باطن و کون عالم روحانی هم امام پسر امام بود، از بهر بقای وجود کون باطن و معنی و کون عالم روحانی. و به حکم حقیقت هم باید که خود او باشد از بهر وجود حقیقی. زیرا همچنان که وجود حقیقی به حکم حقیقت واجب است، وجود معنوی به حکم باطن و معنی واجب است. و چنانکه وجود کون باطن و معنی به حکم باطن واجبست، وجود کون ظاهر به حکم ظاهر هم واجبست.

[§۳۵۶] ‹ هم از کلمات مقدّس علی ذکره السّلام: ›[۸۵]
اگر مردم دانستندی که امامت چیست، هیچکس را مانند این شُبهت ها نیفتادی، اگر دانند که هر جا متغیراتی باشد بی ثابتی وجودش نتواند بودن ـــ چنانکه خط محیط را بی نقطه مرکز ـــ زیرا که هر گردنده و جنبنده را گرداننده و جنباننده ئی باید و جنباننده به اضافه با گردنده و جنبنده ثابت و کامل باید که باشد، تا تواند او را گردانیدن و جنبانیدن، اینست که گفته اند: آسمان و

۸۵. T: تصور در حقیقت امامت.

تغیّر و استحالتی ونه در آخر نهایتی. و اگر چه او جوهر قائم و باقی است [و] سبب [و] علتِ همه‌ء موجودات و خداوند وجود بخش همه آفرینش اوست و به حقیقة الحقایق ازنوع و شخص منزه، اما به حکم اضافه به این عالم جسمانی که او را شخص و نوعی نماید، شخص او نوع اوست و نوع او شخص اوست و شخص او بنوع او باقی است اَبَدْ ُالابدین.

[§۳۵٤] و کلمه‌ء توحید درنسل مقدّس و عقب مبارك او متوارث و متناسل ـ در یك نسل [و] دریك ذات ـ **ذُرِّيَّةً بَعْضُهَا مِنْ بَعْضٍ**، که انقطاع نپذیرد ابدالدهر.

اما امام و فرزندانش از کلمات مقدّس علی ذکره السّلام:

[§۳۵۵] بدانکه این امامت حقیقتی است [که] هرگز بنَگردد و متغیّر و متبدّل نباشد و همیشه در نسل موالینا متناسل بود و از ایشان بنگردد نه به شکل نه بمعنی و نه به حقیقت. اما حال دیگران هر یك را بوجهٍ مّا اتصالی است با ایشان ـ اعني بمولانا اتصالی هست به وجهی ـ یکی بمعنی از او بود و به شکل نه، چون سلمان: سلمان منّا اهل البیت، و یکی به شکل از او بود بمعنی نه، چون مستعلی و یکی به شکل و بمعنی از او بود[٨٤] چون مولانا حسن و یکی آنکه به شکل از او بود و بمعنی ازو بود و به حقیقت خود او بود همچون مولانا حسین و مولانا علی.

٨٤. T+ و نتوان گفت که به حقیقت اوست.

وکلٌ خلیقةٍ منقادةٌ لَنا بِقُدرتهِ وصائرةٌ إلی طاعتِنا بِعزّته وکسوت وحدت خود درو پوشیده و بقاء سرمدّیت خویش به او ارزانی داشته و از اسماء و صفات خود او را صفتی بخشیده که به آن ظهور می کند و انوار آن اسم وآثار آن صفت بر او ظاهر می گردد. قول او قول خدا، فعل او فعل خدا، امر او امر خدا، کلمهء او کلمهء خدا، حکم او حکم خدا، ارادت او ارادت خدا، علم او علم خدا، قدرت او قدرت خدا، روی او روی خدا، دست او دست خدا، سمع او سمع خدا و بصر او بصر خدا.

[§۳۵۲] او را رسد که گوید نَحنُ اسماء اللّه الحُسنی وصفاته العُلیا یعنی نام بزرگ و صفت اعظم خدای، معین و مشخص منم. عرفت اللّه قبل خلق السمَوات والارض یعنی منم که خدای را پیش از آفریدن زمین و آسمان بشناختم. نَحنُ [فی] مکان من اللّه اذْ کُنّا بِهِ فَنَحنُ هُو **[۸۹]** یعنی ما از خدا به جایگاهی ایم که چون ما با او باشیم ما او باشیم وأنَا رافِع السمَوات، وأنا باسِط الارضِین وأنا الاوّل والآخر والظاهر والباطن وأنا بکلّ شییءٍ علیم. یعنی من آنم که افراشتم آسمانرا وآنم که گسترانیدم زمین را، منم اوّل، منم آخر و ظاهر و باطن و منم به همه چیزی دانا. و او را همیشه در این عالم جماعتی باشد که او را به آن جماعت شناسند و آن جماعت را به او، و شناختن او بجماعت آنکه او را خداوند جماعت دانند و شناختن جماعت به او آنکه جماعت را جماعت او دانند.

[§۳۵۳] و او را لذکره السّلام، نه در اوّل بدایتی و نه در وسط

[§۳٤۹] و از این دو وجه، از یکی کفر لازم آید و از یکی شرک پس به آن آید که ‹ معرفت امام از آنجا که امام است دیگر است و از آنجا که خلق است دیگر ›[۸۳] و معرفت امام از آنجا که امام است ها بَرازای امام خلق را ناممکن است. زیرا که حس و عقل هیچکس به معرفت ذات و حقیقت صفات او نرسد. اما معرفت او از آنجا که خلق است، ها بَرازای خلق، ممکن است و اگر هرکسی بر حسب مرتبهٔ که در وجود یافته است در معرفت او چیزی بداند و بگوید روا باشد. چون رحمت بزرگترین خدای تعالی بر خلایق عالم پدیدار آمدن امام زمان است چون خلق در میان خلق، تا خلق خدای را به او شناسند حقّ مَعرِفَته و به او خدای را طاعت دارند حقّ طاعَته.

[§۳٥۰] ذات مقدّس، امام لذکره السّلام [را] به مظهر کلمهٔ اعلی و منبع نور و مشکات هدایت و قندیل عزّت صمدیت و میزان طاعت و عبادت و او را شخص معرفت و محبت خود کرده است. و او را مرکز آسمان و قطب زمین گردانیده تا آنچه گردنده و ایستاده است به او بر جای مانده است و دوام شخص و روح عالم بدوام شخص و روح او باز بسته. لَوخَلَت الارضِ مِنْ اِمامٍ ساعَةً لَمادتْ بِاهلها.

[§۳٥۱] و او را از جسمانی و روحانی به حقیقت استغنا داده و هر دو را محتاج او گردانیده و انس و جن و ملائك را در تحت فرمان او آورده و او را صاحب و مالك الرقاب ایشان گردانیده:

---

۸۳. فقط در T.

[§۳٤٦] پس توان دانست که این ضعیف ترین همهٔ ضعیفان از تصوری که بنظر رحمت[۸۱] بی نهایت او لذکره السّلام هاایستاده باشد چه در قلم تواند آورد. امّا واجب نمود از آنچه بر آن رخصت و اجازت فرموده اند کلمه ئی چند بنوشتن وباللّه التوفیق وعلیه التوکل.

[§۳٤۷] می آید که: المؤمِنُ لایُقَدَّرٌ قَدره، یعنی مؤمن آن است که قدر او بنتوان دانست. چون حال مؤمن اینست، توان دانست که حال خداوندی که مؤمن به ایمان و تسلیم [به] او مؤمن [است چون] باشد؟ و یك صفت از صفات جلال او اینکه او آن خداوند است که بارادت او معدوم بموجود باشد و بقول او ممتنع بواجب.

[§۳٤۸] واینجا دو وجه است: اگر گویند امام به هیچ وجه بخلق نماند انکار حس و محسوس کرده باشند و اگر گویند به همه وجه بخلق مانَدْ انکار عقل و معقول. اگر گویند هیچکس را به معرفت امام راه نیست، گفته باشند که مَعْرِفَةُ اللّهِ مَعْرِفَةُ اهْلِ کُلِّ زَمانٍ اِمامَهُم الّذِی یَجِبُ عَلَیهِمْ طاعَتُهُ. یعنی خداشناسی آن است که اهل هر روزگاری امام خود را که طاعت او بر ایشان واجب است بشناسند، سخنی مجازی باشد، نعُوُذباللّه منه. و اگر گویند همه کس را به معرفت امام راه است، گفته باشند که امام محسوس حس و ‹ معقول›[۸۲] عقل همه [۸۸] کس باشد.

---

۸۱. M: ندارد.

۸۲. M: ندارد.

وحکماء خواسته اند که کسی را به آن رسانند که از مغایبات ملکوت خبر دهد، خشکی بر دماغ او غالب کرده اند و مرّه سودا بر مزاج او مستولی گردانیده و او را سخت بدوانیده، بزده و برنجانیده تا هر چه در آن حال از او پرسیده اند بگفته است و راست آمده.

[§٣٤٤] و حال ممروران به حکم تَصُّوری که این ضعیف را بر حسب ادراك خود فهم [٨٧] افتاده اینست. امّا اگر همه‌ء علمای عالم خواهند که در مدّت عمر ممروری چنین از کلمه معقول به او درست کنند نه توانند و او ادراك آن کند امکان ندارد. والحُکم لِلّه العلی العظیم.

[§٣٤٥] امّا **امامت**: چون در این حال که ثبت این تصّورات کرده می شود روزگار ستر و تقّیه است و حضرت جلّت قدرته تقّیه می فرمایند، و فرمان ایشان است لذکرهم السّلام که التَقيّةُ ديني ودين آبائي، بندگان دعوت هادیه به حکم آنکه در آسمان و زمین و دنیا و آخرت حقّی بیرون از او هانه نهند و هانه توانند نهاد، او را محق دانند که حق بی او کفر باشد و با او بهم شرك، متابعت امر او لذکره السّلام کنند و به موجب تقّیه، حقیقتی که هر یك را به قدر عقل ضعیف خود هاایستاده باشد در دل می دارند و بزبان بنگویند و بر کاغذ ننویسند تا شرایط فرمان بر حسب ضعیفی و بیچارگی خود به جای آورده باشند و از معرض خشم او لذکره السّلام اجتناب نموده.

و اگر چنین بودی کار هیچ نبی در نبوّت مستقیم نگشتی. پس ایشان به حکم آن مقدار از آن تأثیرات سماوی که با طالع ایشان می تابد دعوی نبوت می کنند و عاقبت به قدر ت و قوت امر الهی که به نبوت آن نبی پیوسته باشد، دروغ ایشان معلوم می گردد و ایشان مقهور و مخذول میگردند. بمشیة اللّه تعالی وحُسن معاونته.

[§۳۴۲] و وجود آن متنبّی [و] باول قوّت و شوکتی داشتن و به آخر مخْذول و مقهور گشتن هم از جمله مواهب و رحمتهای او تعالی است تا ضّد و شِبه نبوّت که ممکن است در مقابل نبی و نبوّت او ظاهر گردد و عالمیان [به] بینند و بشنوند و پس از آن وجود او که منبع آن شُبهت باشد از میان بر گرفته شود و اعتقاد اهل ایمان در قبول اوامر و نواهی آن نبی بحق صافی تر و ثابت تر گردد. ومِن اللّه الهدایه وبِه التُوفیق.

[§۳۴۳] امّا **ممروران**: مردم عوام ایشانرا پری دار خوانند، و حال ایشان چنانست که خشکی بافراط بر دماغ ایشان مستولی می شود و مرّه سودا بر مزاج ایشان غالب می گردد و فکر ایشان در تصرّف امور عقلی عاجز می ماند و خیال ایشان که کمال قوت روح حیوانی است دائم المحاکات و متّصل برمثال برقی که بجهد هامی ایستد و هم در آن حال میان نفس این ممرور و نفس کلی روزنی گشاده می شود و از مُغایبات لوح محفوظ چیزی با نفس او می تابد و او از آن خبر می دهد. امّا اگر ممرور را نه رنجانند و به غایت کوفته و مانده نگردد، چیز ها که گوید چنان راست نیاید.

و قدرت که به آن زاید باشد چون بتوان دانست؟ پس اگر کسی خواهد که پیمبر را به معجز بشناسد اوّلش بباید شناخت که غایت قوّت و قدرت بشر هر یك علی الانفراد تا کجاست و شبه مُعجز چون سحر و طلسم و مانند آن کدامست، از سر یقین صادق معتمدٌ علیه، تا چون علم او به این همه محیط شود، آن قدرت و قوت که بالای قوّت و قدرت همهء خلایق باشد و آنرا بمُعجز میدارد معین گردد. و معلوم است که هیچ مخلوق را این ممکن نباشد، و اگر باشد او را خود به پیمبر چه حاجت. پس هم پیمبر باید تا او مُعجز از نه مُعجز باز شناسد. و آن کس که از مدّعی نبوّت مُعجز خواهد آن است که او عقل خود را به میزان کرده است و خود را بوزن خدائی خدا و نبوت نبی بر می سنجد و آن وقت که به مُعجز به او ایمان آورد، به عقل خود ایمان آورده باشد نه به او. والسّلام.

[§٣٤١] امّا **متنبیان**: حال مُتنبیان چنانست که در آن وقت که از جهت وجوب پیمبر صاحب وحی، اَشکال فلکی به شکلی که وجود آن موجود مناسب آن افتد متشکل می شود. اگر چه قصد و غرض اول به تعیین از جهت وجود آن یك شخص باشد، [٨٦] امّا، در آن حال از مسیرات و مناظرات و مطارح شعاعات کواکب، انوار و آثاری که با طالع او تافته باشد اثری با طالع بهر[ی] دیگر که به آن طالع نزدیك باشند می تابد و در مزاج و خلقت و طبیعت و شخص و نفس ایشان تأثیرمی کند. امّا اثر ضعیف، که اگر اثری قوی بودی ایشان هر یك پیمبری بودی، یا به درجهء پیمبری نزدیك

به حکم **مَاینُطِقُ عَنِ الهَویِ إنْ هُوَ إلاّ وَحْیٌ یُوحی** مُباین.

[§۳۳۸] و مُعجز به حقیقت مُعجز علم و حجّت است نه مُعجز فعل و قدرت. زیرا که آن وقت کسی که به قدر ت بر همهٔ عالم مسلط شود، تواند بود که گرگی یا شیری برو مسلط شود و نتوان گفت که آن گرگ یا شیر از او بهتر باشد. و آنجا **[۸۵]** که عِلم است کسی باشد که حجّت علمی اظهار کند و در آن مُهر عجز بر لب جمله ناطقان عالم نهد که هیچ کس نه کسر او بحجّت تواند گفت و نه به جواب در مقابل او نطق تواند زد.

[§۳۳۹] و نیز در این عالم مُعجزی و شبه مُعجزی، یعنی سحری و طلسمی هست و در کون مشابهت هر دو بهم می مانند و نشاید که هر دو را بر حال تشابه بگذارند، بضرورت مباینتی باید میان هر دو. و مباینت به علم و حجّت باشد نه به فعل و قدرت. زیرا که ما به المُشابهة غیر ما به المُباینة باید. یعنی چیزی که مشابهت به آن چیز باشد مباینت به آن چیز نتواند بود. مثلاً، اگر مُشابهت در سمع باشد مُباینت به بصر باشد و اگر در حس باشد به عقل، و هم بر این تقدیر اگر مشابهت در فعل و قدرت باشد، مُباینت به علم و حُجّت باشد.

[§۳٤۰] پس این ‹ شکل مُعجز قدرت ›[۸۰] اینجا باسر شد و لامحال این مُعجزه قوّت و قدرتی است که از جنس او همهٔ خلایق عاجز باشند و تا نهایت قدرت و قوت بشر معلوم نباشد، آن قوّت

۸۰. T: قدرت و معجز شکلی.

امّا اگر حکم عموم بر همه یکسان نراند قاعده دعوت و ملت او هرگز ممهد نگردد و ثابت و مقرر نشود. تو آن کس را خواه پیمبر خوان، خواه واضع ملت خواه صاحب شریعت، خواه روح الامین، خواه مظهر نفس کلی که همه یك معنی دارد.

[۳۳٦§] امّا ذکر **مُعجز**: عوام عالمیان در مُعجزات پیمبران سخن بسیار گفته اند و بیشتر از آن خرقِ عادات است و اگر کسی خواهد که به حجّت عقلی با ایشان تقریر کند گویند در این فکری نباید کردن و آنرا معنی و حقیقتی طلبیدن فایده ندارد. و سخن اهل حق در این معانی اینست که چون پیمبران علی جمیعهم السّلام میان خلق و امر واسطه اند و به سبب آن مثابت از انوار ربوبیت به قدر احتمال و حسب استعداد هر یك آثاری برآنها ظاهر شده است، از فیض مواد الهی غریب نباشد [که] اگر روحانیات معاون و منتصرِ ایشان گردد، ایشان به قوّت آن روحانیات در امور عالم جسمانی تصّرفها کنند وهریك به مُعجزات و کرامات مخصوص گردند چنانکه از مُعجزات هر پیمبری باز گفته اند. امّا گویند بر همین ظاهر بنباید ایستاد و حقایق هر یك از آن طلب باید کرد که ظواهر بمثابت جسم است و حقایق بمثابت روح.

[۳۳۷§] در مُعجزات و کرامات پیمبران گویند: ایشان از آنجا که حَیِّز جنس است به حکم **أَنَا بَشَرٌ مِثْلُكُم** با دیگر مردم در ترکیب جسد و چهره و صورت و طعام وشراب و لباس و نکاح و هر چه تعلق بآفرینش خلقی دارد مُشارك اند و ازآنجا که حَیِّز فصل است

می باشد. و چیزی که هزار سال و ده هزار سال بر آن گذشته باشد او آنرا در آن ساعت در خواب می بیند و معلوم است که آن بنظر نفس می بیند نه بنظر چشم. و تعبیر آن بر قلّت و کثرت معارضه خیال و قوت و ضعف نفس مقدّر باشد. اگر خیال در آن معارضه نکرده باشد، آن خواب راست باشد و در تعبیر آن به معبّر حاجت نیفتد و اگر خیال در آن معارضه کرده و بمحاکات او تبدیل پذیرفته و با اضغاث و احلام بهم بر آمیخته، در تعبیر آن به مُعبّر حاجت افتد. و آنجا که قوّت نفس از معارضه و محاکات خیال زیادت باشد مُعبّر را در آن پیْ بار نباید شد و بآسانی و سرعت فهم باسر آن افتد و خلاف این صعب و دشوار باشد، تا بجائی که امکان ندارد به تخیّل پی بار تواند شد و سر از آن بدر آوردن. وقبول وحی و تنزیل پیمبران و تأویلات آن از بشارات و انذارات هم از این نوع است.

[§۳۳٥] و مَثَل صاحب شریعت با امت خود چون مَثَل پادشاهی باشد که او دْر نِگرد و خلایقی بسیار را **[۸٤]** ببیند، بعضی دیوانه و بعضی عاقل و همه را علی الاطلاق در بند و زنجیر کشد. و یا همچو طبیبی که درنگرد و بیماران بی قیاس بیند مختلفُ الامراض و تندرستان را جماعتی بسیار و همه را بر عموم بیك شربت مطلق مُداوا و یك جنس طعام و غذا فرماید. اگر چه مقصود پادشاه آن بُود که دیوانگی از دیوانگان بشود و مقصود طبیب آنکه بیماری از بیماران برود و تندرستان از آن فارغ باشند،

چنانست که ما در خواب می بینیم و او در بیداری می بیند، بإلقاء الشي إلی الشيء بِالسُرعة، یعنی از نفس کلی که لوح محفوظ است با نفس مُطَهر او می تابد [۸۳] و از این روی که می گوید **اَنَا بَشَرٌ مِثْلُکُمْ** از پیوند و مادّت و مشارکت با دیگران [و] هر چه تعلق باعمال جسمانی دارد خالی نمی تواند بود. و امتیاز او به آن است که **یُوحی إلَیَ** و چون یُوحی إلی از مشارکت اَنَا بشرٌ مثلُکُم معّرا نیست، نزول وحی و الهام بی مُعارضهء خیال نباشد. و آن معارضه از پردهء رقیق شفاف [و] صافی تصور باید کرد که چندانکه بر می آید[79] کثیف تر می شود تا آنجا که بغایت کثافت رسد.

[§۳۳۳] و هر کس که نفس او به نور حقایق روشن شده باشد و بر دقایق تقریرات اهل تأویل وقوفی یافته در قرآن نگرد، این همه معین بیند. مثلاً، آیاتی یابد که تنزیل و تأویل آن هر دو یکی باشد چون **وَاَشْرَقَتِ الأرضُ بِنُورِ رَبِّها** وآیاتی یابد که میان تنزیل و تأویل آن بُعدی باشد هر چه عظیم تر چون **وَالعادِیاتِ ضَبْحاً** و مانند آن.

[§۳۳۴] ومَثَل تنزیل و تأویل چون خواب است و تعبیر، که تا مرد بیدار می باشد چیزی می بیند مثلاً در پس دیوار خانه که او در آنجا می باشد، بمی خسبد و حواس او بمی آرامد و نفس او را مشغول بمی دارد، ماضی و مستقبل و حال در آنچه می بیند یکی

---

۷۹. T+ اندك اندك.

و هر چیزی را درجنس خود نهایتی پدیدار کرد. مثلاً، نباتی را نهایت انعقادی کرد و حیوانی را نهایت نباتی و انسانی را نهایت حیوانی. و قوّت نَبَوی را بنهایت انسانی. تا همچنان که آفرینش این موالید بمردم سخنگوی بنهایت رسید، آفرینش مردم سخنگوی به پیمبر صاحب شرع بنهایت رسید.

[۳۳۰§] و نیز کلمهء اعلی و عقل اوّل و نفس کلی را هر یك در این عالم مظهری است. مظهر کلمهء اعلی امام لذکره السّلام، منزه از تصور و تصویر و متعالی از وصف و تنزیه. و مظهر عقل اوّل حُجّت اعظم امام لذکره السّلام، صورت بخش کمال. و مظهر نفس کلی پیمبر، استعداد دهنده نفوس در دور مبدأ قبول آن صورت را که کمال غایت است.

[۳۳۱§] و چون از تقدیر او تعالی زمان و وقت به آن رسد که صاحب شریعتی برخیزد و امور عالم جسمانی با چیزی دیگر شود و ملّت و دولت و امزجه و السنه و اخلاق و مراسم و معاملات نوعی به نوعی دیگر تبدیل پذیرد [آنگاه] اَشکال فلکی بنوعی متشکل گردد که شخص نبوی که مظهر نفس کلی باشد و قابل الهام و حامل امانت وحی پدیدار آید و به مناسبت و ملاقات حسی که او را با امت و امت را به او حاصل شود، ادا و قبول میان او و میان امّت لازم گردد، او هم متعلم باشد و هم معلم. متعلم از آنجا که علم از روحانیات و ملائکه به وحی و الهام هاگیرد و معلم از آنجا که آن علم بر امّت خود بر حسب مقادیر عقول ایشان فیض کند.

[۳۳۲§] وقبول وحی و الهام او از ملاء اعلی و ملکوت اعظم

[§۳۲۷] وجهی دیگر آنکه نوع انسان را باجتماع بر صلاح که آنرا ملّت و شریعت خوانند حاجت افتاد از برای دو کار، یکی تمانع دیگری تعاون. تمانع آنکه تا آنچه دارد برو بماند و تعاون آنکه آن اشخاص فُرادی بمصالح خود قیام نه توانند نمودن و در صناعات و معاملات که بی آن بنتوانند زیست از معاونت بنی جنس خویش مستغنی نتوانند بود، تا آنچه ندارد او را حاصل شود و لابُد آن تمانع و تعاون را حدود و احکامی بباید و هیچکس به خودی خود آن حدود و احکام نتواند نهاد، که اگر نهد همان خلاف که در مقدمه بیامد لازم باشد. و واضع آن کسی باید که خدای تعالی او را ولیِّ امر خود کرده باشد و طاعت او بطاعت خود باز بسته: **مَنْ يُطِعِ الرَّسُولَ فَقَدْ اَطاعَ اللّٰهَ** و از اثبات نبوّت این وجهی دیگر است.

[§۳۲۸] و نیز سوال کنند که عقول انسانی همه به قوّت اند یا [**۸۲**] همه به فعل؟ اگر گوید همه به قوّت اند، لازم آید که در میان عالمیان عالِمی نباشد و همه ناقص و جاهل باشند، و اگر گوید همه به فعل اند لازم آید که در میان عالمیان جاهلی نباشد و همه کامل و عالِم باشند. پس بضرورت بباید گفت که بعضی به قوّت اند و بعضی به فعل، و آنانکه عقل ایشان به قوّت باشد اینانرا که عقل ایشان به فعل باشد مُحتاج، تا آنکه عقل آنانرا از قوّت به فعل آورند.

[§۳۲۹] و نیز خدای تعالی موجودات را یکی بر یکی تفضیل داد

یا همه کردنی است، یا همه ناکردنی، یا بعضی کردنی و بعضی ناکردنی. اگر گوید همه کردنی است، او را بفتوای او هم در حال بتوان کشت و اگر گوید همه ناکردنی است، او را به این فتوی هم در حال ببابد مُرد. پس اگر خواهد نه کشتنی باشد و نه مُردنی، بایدش گفت که این حرکات بعضی کردنی و بعضی نا کردنی است، و چون کردنی و ناکردنی با میان آمد حدود و احکامی که آنرا شریعت خوانند با میان آمد و آنرا واضع باید.

[§۳۲۵] و اینجا سوال کنند که همه کس، کایناً مَن کان، شاید که آن واضع باشد یا هیچ کس نشاید، یا بعضی شاید و بعضی نشاید؟ اگر جواب از آن دو قسمت اول دهد، هر آنچه بر آن دو قسمت اوّل لازم آمد بر این لازم [آید پس] بضرورت بباید گفت بعضی شاید که آن واضع باشند و بعضی نشاید.

[§۳۲۶] دیگر بار سوال کنند که آن واضع باید که من قِبَل اللّه باشد مؤید و مأمور به حکم[۷۷] الهی، یا آنکه او را باجماع هادارند؟ ‹اگر گوید آنکه او را باجماع هادارند›[۷۸] هر قوم که بمتابعت او بر خیزند قومی دیگر بمخالفت او برخیزند و آن خلاف هرگز دَرْباقِی نشود و به آن آید که آن واضع باید که مِن قِبَل الله تعالی باشد و در دعوی و دعوت خود یگانه. از اثبات نبوّت این یك وجه است.

---

۷۷. T+ و حکمت.

۷۸. T· ندارد.

از عنایت او تعالی چنان اقتضا می کرده است که آن انوار الهی که معقولات مطلق است و تأییدات محض، به پیمبران و شجر و ثمر ایشان به حکم: التَنْزیلُ مَنزِلَةٌ مِنْ تِلك الدَّرجَةِ محسوس و موهوم و مخیّل می شده است و مردم آنرا به حکم مجانست حسی و وهمی و خیالی قبول می کرده اند و برآن مواظبت می نموده و آن قواعد و قوانین نظام جزویات می بوده، متضمن قوام کلیّات. مثلاً، صلاح عوام عالمیان بالتزام آن اوامر و نواهی حاصل می آمده و نفوس خواص ملت به آن وسائل و وسائط مستعد قبول کمال می گشته که از عَملیّات بر عِلمیّات و از علمیّات بر عقلیّات ارتقاء می کرده اند.

[§۳۲۳] وامام لذکره السّلام، برسر دورکمال می باشد. هم به مبدأ محیط و هم به کمال . انوار امر ابداعی بفرمان او بصورت معرفت و محبّت و طاعت و عبادت خاص حقیقی بر نفوسی که مستعد کمال امر باشند می تابد و به امام لذکره السّلام و شجر و ثمر ایشان به حکم: ‹ التَأویلُ ردُّ الشی إلی اولّه ›[۷٦] همان محسوسات و موهومات و مخیّلات عین معقولات مطلق وتأییدات محض محقق باز می شود. قُلِ الحَمْدُلِلّهِ علی ذالك حمد الشاکِرین.

[§۳۲٤] و امّا ذکر نبوّت اگر کسی انکار کند و گوید پیمبری [۸۱] نباید. او راگویند حرکات انسانی از سه حال بیرون نیست.

---

۷٦. در M : زاد انسی الی اللّه، که ظاهراً با تعریف خواجه از تنزیل موافقت بیشتری دارد.

اسما در بایست آمدن تا به معانی رسند و به راه در بایست آمدن تا به مقصد رسند، و از آنجا دو حکم با میان آمد. یکی حکم شریعت و دنیا؛ از آنجا که خلق است به اضافه با خلق، وحاکمان آن حکم پیمبران علی جمیعهم [۸۰] السّلام. و یکی حکم قیامت و آخرت؛ از آنجا که خدا[۷۴] است به اضافه با خدا، و حاکمان آن حکم امامان حق لذکرهم السّلام که قائمان قیامت اند.

[§۳۲۰] زمان شریعت را که آن وقت طاعات بشرط تعیین اوقات فرمایند و دعوت با ظاهر اعمال جسمانی کنند و استغراق طاعات باشد در اوقات، دور ستر خوانند و به پیمبر علیه السّلام خاص باشد.

[§۳۲۱] و زمان قیامت را که آن وقت طاعت برفع تعیین اوقات فرمایند و دعوت با خدا و خدائی کنند واستغراق اوقات باشد درطاعات، دور کشف [خوانند] و به امام لذکره السّلام خاص باشد.

[§۳۲۲] و پیمبرعلیه السّلام بر سر دور مبدأ می باشد، به مبدأ محیط، تا انوار امر او تعالی به توسط او بصورت طاعت و عبادت مشترك عامّ اضافی به خلایق می رسد. و چون اکثر مردم درین عالم باول وهْلَه از حسنهٔ قبول امر الهی محجوب می باشند و ادراکاتشان إلاّ به مُجانست[۷۵] حس و وهم و خیال ممکن نگردد و

۷٤. در چاپ ایوانف: خلق.

۷۵. T+ و مشاکلت.

اَللّٰهُمَ إنَّكَ منَ اَلْضعْفِ خَلَقْتَنا وَعَلى الْوَهنِ بَنَيْتَنا، وَمِن ماءٍ مَهِينٍ ابْتَدَأتَنا، فَلاحَوْلَ لَنا إلاّ بِقُوتِكَ، وَلاقُوَةَ لَنا إلاّبِعَوْنِكَ. فأَيِّدْنا بِتَوْفِيقِكَ وَسَدِّدْنا بِتَسْدِيدِكَ وَاُعْمِ أَبْصارَ قُلُوبنا عَمّا خالَفَ مَحبَتَكَ وَلاتَجْعَلْ لِشيئٍ فى جَوارِحِنا نُفُوذاً فى مَعْصِيَتِكَ.

تصور بیست و چهارم

در کار نبوّت و امامت و در نبوّت ذکر مُعجز و مُتنبی وممرو ر و در امامت ذکر مُتعلم و معلم و حُجّت[۷۳]

[۳۱۷§] چون بنیاد آفرینش این عالم بر تضادّ و ترتّب است و مردم در این عالم هم بر تضادّ و ترتّب اند، و در جانب تضادّ عدم استعداد است و در جانب ترتّب کمال استعداد، نفوس خلایق [هم] در قبول انوار اشراق امر الهی متفاوت و مختلف اند، همچو قابلان جسمانی که در قبول انوار آفتاب جسمانی متفاوت و مختلف اند. مثلاً، چون سنگها یکی سیاه بغایت و دیگران را هر یك سیاهی کمتر و جوهر او روشنائی پذیر تر تا آبگینهء شفاف که او از آن جانب نور هاگیرد و به این جانب دهد.

[۳۱۸§] و چون مردم امر او تعالی [را] بی توسط قبول نتوانست کرد، از متوسط امر چاره نبود و کسانی که خاطر های ایشان در برابر امر الهی چون آبگینه در برابر آفتاب بود پیمبران بودند.

[۳۱۹§] و اوّل به سبب آن پیمبران بایستند که خلق را اوّل به

---

۷۳. عنوان تصور در T: تصور در اثبات انبیا.

تکلیفی، تسلیم اهل کون موهوم روحانی تسلیم اختیاری و تسلیم اهل کون موجود عقلانی تسلیم طبیعی.

[§۳۱۳] تسلیم تصنّعی تکلیفی چنانکه کسی بر زبان چیزی بگوید به حکم ضرورت مالی یا جانی یا نوع دیگر، خاص بسوی خود و هوا و مراد خود، و در دلش از آن هیچ نباشد.

[§۳۱٤] تسلیم اختیاری چنانکه مثلاً کسی در این عالم به اسبابی مشغول باشد، در کمال لذّت و بهجت و وَرایِ آن مطلوبی ندارد، نا گاه امر معلم صادق به او رسد که او را بترك آن همه بباید گفت و خود را در رنج و مشقّتی هر چه صعبتر افکندن. به اوّل وهْلَه اعتراض بدل او در آید و برنجد امّا هم بر اثر آن اعتراض و رنجیدگی رجوع با دین و دعوت حق کند و داند که اگر چنانچه او میفرماید [۷۹] برغبتِ دل [و] بی اِکراه و اجبار بنکند، در وجود از جماد کمتر باشد و دین و دنیای او هبآءً مَنثُورا شود و از مقصود خود بهر دو جهان محروم ماند، هم در حال از سر صدق و نیّت صافی و خلوص عقیدت ترك اسباب آن لذّت گیرد و آن اختیار کند که معلم فرموده باشد، نه آنچه او را باید.

[§۳۱۵] تسلیم طبیعی و آن نه حد هر متعلّمی باشد و آن به حجّتان و امامان حقّ لذکرهم السّلام، که نور فطرت بر نظر ایشان از افق تأیید نگرد، خاص باشد و آنجا چیز هائی دیده شود که کم دلی طاقت آن آورد.

[§۳۱٦] قالَ مَولانا زینُ العابدین لذکرهِ السّلام:

رساند واقف شود و چون این وقوف حاصل آید بصیرت او تمام باشد و داند که او را [به چه] کسی تسلیم باید کرد و چون اوامر و نواهی آن کامِل کمال بخش به او رسد تا آنجا که مُستبصِر تواند بود مُستبصِر باشد و آنجا که مُستبصِر نتواند بود مسلم باشد.

[۳۱۰§] و اگر متعلّم وار و مستفیدانه در مسائل علمی خُوضْ و شروعی کند باید که نیّت و عقیدتش آن باشد که به لذّتهای عقلانی که او را حاصل شود، اعتقاد او در تسلیم به معلم صادق قوی تر و صافی ترگردد نه آنکه بایدش که در علم به مثابتی رسد که آنچه معلم صادق داند او بداند که این تجاوز حدّ متعلّم باشد، نعُوذُبالله منها.

[۳۱۱§] ودر هر کونی از این اکوان اضافی، چه در کون محسوس جسمانی که اوّل درجهء وجود است و ناظر در او همهء متباینات را متشابهات بیند و متابع شهوات بدن و منقاد دواعی طبیعت و مطاوع هوای نفس باشد، و چه درکون موهوم روحانی که دوم درجهء وجود است و ناظر را در آن روئی با متشابهات باشد و روئی با متباینات و وقتی به حالات دنیا میل کند و وقتی به امور آخرت التفات نماید، و چه در کون موجود عقلانی که سیّم درجهء وجود است و در آنجا درجات نامتناهی می شود و ناظر درو همه متشابهات را متباینات بیند و مُحِقّ و حقّ روشن به معرفت الٰهی [و] مجرّد از اوهام و خیالات شیطانی، تسلیمی هست ها بَر اِزای هر کونی:

[۳۱۲§] تسلیم اهل کون محسوس جسمانی تسلیم تَصَنُّعی

پرسید که این تسلیم با بصیرت کردی یا برعمیا، وکمال او به آن تسلیم حاصل باید دانست.

[§۳۰۷] و بهری گفتند اوّل بصیرت باید آنگاه تسلیم، که هر تسلیم که نه از سر بصیرت باشد تقلید باشد نه تسلیم. و بهری گفتند بنیاد آفرینش خلقی بر تضادّ و ترتّب است، و در تضادّ نه بصیرت باشد و نه تسلیم. و آنجا نه علم فایده دهد و نه عمل و نه جَهد را تأثیر باشد و نه توکل را، و آنجا همهء مجتهدان مُخْطی باشند، زیرا که آنجا تسلیم نه از سر بصیرت باشد و عمل نه از سر علم، و نه جهد از سر توکل. و در آن کون نفس در انتکاس باشد و در **ظُلُماتٌ بَعْضُها فَوقَ بَعْضٍ** و هر حرکت فکری و قولی و فعلی که کند، درکه ئی شیب درکه ئی می شود تا بدرکهء اسفل. پس آن بصیرت و تسلیم که در کون تضادّ نماید به حقیقت نه بصیرت و تسلیم باشد، بلکه شِبه بصیرت و تسلیم.

[§۳۰۸] و در ترتّب بصیرت و تسلیم هر دو باشد به حقیقت، آنجا هم علم فایده دهد و هم عمل و هم جهد را تأثیر باشد و هم توکّل را و آنجا همهء مجتهدان مُصیب باشند، زیرا که آنجا تسلیم از سر بصیرت باشد و عمل از سر علم و جهد از سر توکّل و در آن کون نفس در استقامت باشد در انوار خیرات و حسنات بر وجهی که روی در زیادت دارد نه در نقصان، هر حرکتی فکری و قولی و فعلی که کند درجه ئی بالای درجه ئی می شود تا به درجهء اعلی.

[§۳۰۹] و بصیرت هیچ چیز دیگر نیست [۷۸] إلاّ آنکه مرد بر احتیاج ذات ناقص خود به مُتممی و مُکملی که او را به کمال

العِلمِ جهلاً.

[۳۰٤§] و هم بر این ترتیب وجود ارکان به تسلیمی که به مسیر افلاك دائره و مطارح شعاعات کواکب می کنند مجتمع و ممتزج می شوند، و افلاك به تسلیمی که به نفس کلّ می کنند در اماکن طبیعی خود ‹ بمی ›[۷۲] مانند، و نفس کلّ به تسلیمی که به عقل اوّل می کند کامل می شود. و شرف عقل اوّل بر همهء موجودات به آن است که تسلیم او کلمهء اعلی را خالص تر وصافی تر است واو در ارادت وعلم و قدرت [**۷۷**] از مشارکت با کلمهء اعلی بهتر از دیگر موجودات بمی پرهیزد.

[۳۰٥§] وچون مقصود از افاضت کلمهء اعلی بر عقل اوّل ــ یعنی او را سکون سرمدی و کمال مطلق و معرفت به حقیقت بخشید و فیض عقل بر نفس یعنی آن کمال که امکان قبول آن داشت، او را بداد و فعل نفس در طبیعت یعنی صور اشیاء که از عقل هاگرفته بود بر او فیض کرد و فعل طبیعت در مادّت یعنی آن صور که نفس بر او فیض کرده بود ازو استخراج کرد ــ آن بود [که] تا موالید از انعقاد ابتدا کند پس به نبات پیوندد، پس به حیوان انجامد پس بر انسان ختم افتد و سلسله وجود بانسان سر با سر زند،[پس] تسلیم که کمال درجهء عقل به آن است به او خاص افتاد.

[۳۰٦§] و چون احوال انسان در استعداد قبول مختلف و متفاوت توانست بود، بهری گفتند چون مرد بصاحب امر تسلیم کرد بباید

---

۷۲. T: نمی.

را با تصرّف انسان می دهد تا انسان او را بعضی از برای قوام جسم و قوّت روح حیوانی که به آن حساس متحرك می باشد به غذای خود می کند و مصالح و مهمات خویش به واسطه بعضی ساخته می گرداند، از حیوانی بانسانی می رسد.

[۳۰۲§] و انسان جاهل و ناقص چون خود را با تصرّف انسان عاقل و کامل می دهد و حس و عقل خود را تسلیم او می کند، یعنی اختیار خود[را] به کلی با دست او می دهد تا او بر وجهی که مصلحت می داند او را از حالی به حالی میگرداند و از جائی به جائی میرساند تا به آن حدّ که اگر او زندگانی خواهد، او مرگ نخواهد، و اگر او مرگ خواهد، او زندگانی نخواهد، و اگر با او گوید روز روشن شب تاریك است و اگر گوید شب تاریك روز روشن است، او را بدان اعتراض در دل نیاید و گِرد چون و چرا نگردد، تا چنین باشد و اختیار و ارادت انسان ناقص و جاهل در اختیار و ارادت انسان عاقل و کامل معدوم و مستغرق شود و از درکه‌ء جهل به درجه‌ء علم رسیده باشد.

[۳۰۳§] وآن عاقل کامل که ناقص جاهل را به او تسلیم باید کرد تعلیم مُعلم دعوت هادیه ثبّتها اللّه است که علم و رأی او با حق و مُحِقّ بسته است نه هر عاقلی و عالمی که به محق وقت اقرار ندهد و از حد عقل و علمی که خود آنرا به عقل و علم دارد برنگذرد، که این کفر محض باشد نعُوذُباللّه منه. زیرا که عقل او آن باشد که شَبیهةٌ بِالعَقْلِ ولیستْ بِعَقل، و علمش آنکه: إنّ مِن

یعنی او در بندگی تو به آن درجه بود که نزدیکان خود را که عنود تو کردند از خود دور کرد و آنان را که دور بودند چون استجابت دعوت تو کردند به خود نزدیك گردانید. و دوست داشت بسوی تو آنانرا که از او دور بودند و دشمن داشت بسوی تو آنانرا که به او نزدیك بودند. و این است معنی وحقیقت الدّین هُوالحُبّ فِی اللّه والبُغْض فی اللّه. والسّلام.

تصور بیست و سوم
در اقسام تسلیم

[۳۰۰§] احتیاجات ممکن الوجود بواجب تعالی زیاده از آن است که تقریر آن در تصرّف اوهام خلایق آید و از مرکز تحت الثَری تا محیط فلك الاعلی، تا نفس کلّی، تا عقل اوّل همهٔ موجودات، مِن حیث ذاتهم واِحتیاجهم، در حرکت آمده اند و روی با کُلّ و مبدأ خود نهاده اند و هریك بحسب استعدادی که دارند از منازل خسیس تر بمنازل شریف تر ترقی [۷۶] می کنند و کمال هر یك آنجا محقق می شود که ماورای خود را تسلیم می کنند.

[۳۰۱§] مثلاً چون خاك خود را با تصرّف نبات می دهد، تا نبات در او بیخ میزند و صفْو و لُباب و خلاصه او را به غذای خود می کند و بلند می شود و خاصیت های او ظاهر می گردد، از خاکی به نباتی می رسد. و چون نبات خود را با تصرّف حیوان می دهد ــ تا حیوان او را به غذای خود می کند و جسم و هیکل و حواس او کمال می یابد، از نباتی به حیوانی می رسد. وچون حیوان خود

دوست را بدشمن بباید داشت.›[۷۰]

[§۲۹۹] واصل ثابت در این معنی که اعتبار کلّی به آن تواند بود آن است که ما که بندگان دعوت حقّیم دانیم که آنروز که [**فَیَوْمَئِذٍ لا**] **یَنفَعُ الَّذینَ ظَلَمُوا مَعْذِرَتُهُم** از ما این سوال خواهند کرد که اگر راست می گوئید که مولانا امام زمان را لذکره السّلام دوست میدارید بگوئید تا کدام دوست را بسوی او دشمن و کدام دشمن را بسوی او دوست داشته اید و این را جوابی مقبول خواهند. و آنجا که پرده از روی کارها بر گرفته باشند إلاّ راستی هانپذیرند. هیچ مغالطه از پیش بنشود و جواب مقبول نه آن باشد که گوئیم که فلانکس که دشمن مولانا بود، چون ما را دوست داشت ما او را دوست داشتیم،[۷۱] بلکه جواب مقبول آن باشد که بتوانیم گفت که فلانکس که دشمن مولانا بود اگر چه ما را دوست داشت ما او را دشمن داشتیم و فلانکس که دوست مولانا بود، اگر چه ما را دشمن داشت، ما او را دوست داشتیم.

وَأَقْصی الأُدْنَینَ عَلی عُنودِهِم عَنكَ، و قَرَّبَ الأَقْصَیْنَ عَلی اِسْتَجابَتِهِم لَكَ وَوالی فِیكَ الأَبْعَدینِ وعادی فیك الأقْربین

۷۰. عبارت در تمام نسخ مغلوط و در هم ریخته است مثلاً در T و Q: و مرا با این دوست دشمنی و به آن دشمن دوستی نباید کرد و این دوست را به دشمن و آن دشمن را بدوست نباید داشت.

۷۱. T + و فلانکس که دوست مولانا بود چون مارا دشمن داشت ما او را دشمن داشتیم.

بدانند که بد کیست و چون بدی از لوازم نقصان است، بد مطلق آن کس تواند بود که نفس او در عین نقصان باشد به همه‌ء وجوه. و من اگر به همه‌ء وجوه در عین نقصانم و به همه‌ء وجوه به کمال نرسیده ام و بحسب آن نقصان که در ذات منست بد توانم بود، پس این بدی که مرا گفتند راست است نه دروغ و مرا از راست نباید رنجید و آنرا منکر نباید بود. و از نقصان خودم می باید رنجید، نه از آنکه نقصان مرا بمن می نماید. ودفع این بدی از خود می باید کرد، نه به دفع سخن اویم از خود برمی باید خواست. و اگر چه دشمن است وآنچه می گوید به دشمنی می گوید مرا از سخن دوست و دشمن آن باید خواست که عاقبتِ خیر و منفعت نفس من در آخرت به آن باشد.

[§ ۲۹۸] وچون من انتباه از سخن دشمن می یابم و از سخن دوست دَرْ خواب غفلت ــ نه که در مرگ جهالت ــ می افتم، منّتی تمام از این دشمنم همی باید داشت. تا چون چنین بکرده باشم، این معانی موجب کمال نفس من گردد و هر گامی که در طریق قطع کمالات بر گیرم [۷۵] بدرجه ئی از درجات عالیه برسم. پس این کس که مرا چنین می نکوهد و در بدی من این همه می گوید، دشمن مجازی و دنیائی من است و دوست حقیقی آخرتی.< مرا با این دشمن دشمنی و با آن دوست دوستی نباید کرد و این دشمن را بدوست و آن

ایشان را از آن منع نماید و بهر عُجْبی که او را باز می افزاید، بُعدی از نور هدایت و قُربی بظلمت [۷٤] ضلالت لازمه احوال او می گردد و به **اِنَّهُم عَنْ رَبِّهِمْ یَومئِذٍلَمَحْجُوبُون** می انجامد. نعُوذُباللّه منها.

[§۲۹٦] پس در مدح و ستایشی که کنند و یکی را به نیکی بستایند فکری بباید کرد و بباید اندیشید که اولاً نیکی چیست تا بدانند که نیك کیست و چون نیکی از لوازم کمال است باید دانست که نیك مطلق آن کس تواند بود که برخیر تمام و کمال باشد. و[پد]یدار است که این مرتبه‌ء کدام بنده‌ء دعوت باشد. و چون داند که او آن کامل نیست و آن نیکی که بسوی او می گویند دروغ است، بدروغ خُرّم نشود ودر وجود خود به غلط نیفتد وگوید: با این همه نقصان و عیب و عوار که بمن محیط شده است، اگر خود را چنان دانم که مرا می ستایند و به آن مقام فرود آیم، گفته باشم که من آن کاملم و اگر این سخن در دل من جای گیرد عُجْب و حماقتم بیفزاید و بهر التفاتی که مرا به خود بینی و خود دوستی بادیدار آید با درکه ئی از درکات هاویه افتم. پس این کس که مرا چنین می ستاید و در نیکی من این همه می گوید دوست مجازی دنیوی من است و دشمن حقیقی آخرتی.

[§۲۹۷] و درآنکه یکی را بَدْ گویند و به بدی بنکوُهند هم فکری بباید کرد و بباید اندیشید که اولاً بدی چیست تا

و تَضريب و بُهتان و عُجْب و غُرور و لجاج و تَعصب و حُبّ مال و جاه و اهل و ولد و محْمِدَت و رياست و آنچه از لوازم اين باشد:

بکن نفى اين خُلقهاى دَنى بنوعى که از بيخشان برکنى

بلى هريکى راچنان چون سزد درآور بفرمان عقل[69] و خرد

به شکلى که مانع معاون شود بتسکين دارنده ساکن شود

[§٢٩٤] و حقيقت آن است که تا مرد عيب و عَوار و نُقصان خود نبيند نفس او عالم خود را با ياد نتواند آوردن و به مدارج خيرات و معارج کمالات بر گذشتن [نتواند] و به سبب آنکه او خويشتن دوست مى باشد معرفت عيب و نقصان او بر او پوشيده و مشکل و متعذّر مى شود و اِعجاب او به خويشتن که هيچ ضرر و خطر چندان نيست باديدار مى آيد.

[§٢٩٥] و دروغزن در نهايت دورى از حق و مُرائى از دروغزن بد تر است. و مُعْجب بدتر است از مُرائى زيرا دروغزن همين دروغى گويد و بَس و مُرائى دروغ بقول گويد و به فعل باز نمايد و مُعْجب به سبب آنکه دروغزن و مرائى مدح او گويند و از غايت حَب مدح و اعجاب او به خود، قول و فعل ايشان را محمود و مرضى شمرد و نه خود از آن بپرهيزد و نه

٦٨. T: اضرار.

٦٩. T: رأى.

باید و نه این تقصیر. و ابطال این هر دو قوّت بوجه اِکمال باید کرد و آن اینست که هر دو را بزیر حکم عقل دهند تا چنانکه آنجا امّاره بودند و مانع، اینجا مأمور گردند و معاون. چنانکه آنجا مدّبر کار عقل بودند اینجا عقل مدّبر کار ایشان گردد [۷۳] وملائکه میان ایشان ــ یعنی غضب و شهوت را، که غضب به مثابت نر است و شهوت به مثابت ماده ــ عقد نکاح بندد و از آن ازدواج نتایجی مطابق حال وجود تولد کند چون عِلم و عَقل و تَذکُر و عِفت و سَخاوت و شُجاعت و حقّ و صِدق و صَلاح و صواب و سِداد و رِشاد و مَحبت و صَداقت و مُوافقت و مُواخات و امانت و صیانت و صَبر و سُکون[۶۵] و وَقار و حَیا و قَناعت و تَواضُع و تَوکل و رَضا و نَصیحت و آنچه از لوازم این باشد.

[§۲۹۳] و اگرالعَیاذبالله، این دو قوّت بر عقل مستولی شوند، نور و صفاء نفس بظلمت و ضلالت ایشان محجوب شود و شیطان میان ایشان عقدِ نکاح بندد و از ازدواج ایشان نتایج عکس حال وجود تولّد کند چون جَهل و جُنون و نسیان و رِیا و ‹ فِسق ›[۶۶] و بُخل و بَددِلی و باطل و دروغ و شرّ و فساد و خطا و زَلل و عَداوت و بُغض و مُخالفت و خِیانت و بی صبری و تَهتُّك و بی شرمی و حِقد و حِرص و ‹اِستبداد›[۶۷] و ‹اِصرار›[۶۸] و تَکبّر و خَشم

۶۵. T: صواب.

۶۶. T+ فجور.

۶۷. T: استعداد.

صالح که از آن خون صافی درخشان[63] تولد کند و بخار آن خون صافی به مایه قوّت روح حیوانی که مَرکَب نفس انسانی است شود و مزاج را باعتدال دارد بر خود حرام می کنید و غذا های ناموافق، که از آن خون غلیظ و کثیف تولد کند و از آن خون کثیف غلیظ بخار تیره بر خیزد و بمایهٔ روح حیوانی شود، میخورید تا مزاج به آن از اعتدال منحرف می شود و جنون و سودا و مالیخولیا بر شما دست می یابد.

[§۲۹۰] و اینکه شما در آن می کوشید که این دو قوّت یعنی شهوت و غضب [را] به کُلی باطل کنید، بباید دانست که اگر کسی را قوّت غضبی نباشد حمیّتی نباشد و چون حمیّتی نباشد نه در اعداد اقسام مردان آید و نه در اعداد اقسام زنان. و اگر غضب به یکبار بر نفس او مستولی گردد فرقی نباشد میان او و سُبُعی.

[§۲۹۱] و اگر شهوتش نباشد توالّد و تناسل که بقای نوع انسان و آبادانی عالم به آن متعلق است دَرْباقِی شود و او بنفی قوّت شهوی هم از اَعداد اقسام مردان بیرون آید و هم از اَعداد اقسام زنان. ‹ و اگر شهوت به یك بارگی بر او مستولی گردد فرقی نباشد میان او و بهائمی.›[64]

[§۲۹۲] واین دو وجه که گفته شد در غَضَب و شَهْوَت هیچ کدام نیك نیست: کلا الطرفین فِي قَصدِ الأُمُور ذَمِیمٌ یعنی نه آن غلّو

---

۶۳. در T؛ سایر نسخ: درانسان.

۶٤. T: ندارد.

[۲۸۸§] وعلی هَذاالقیاس چون همه‌ء خُلقهای نامحمود از شهوت و غضب می خیزد بعضی از زاهدان اسلام را چنان هاایستاده است که این دو قوّت را به کلی باطل می باید کرد و به این سبب در تعطیل حواس میکوشند و در صومعه تاریك می شوند و غذا را از خود باز میگیرند مگر اندکی، تا به جائی رسد که از ایشان به تعجب باز می گویند که فلان زاهد را در غذا، کمال زُهد به غایتی رسیده است که در چندین شبانه روز غذای خود را با چندین مقدار آورده و آن نیز غذای نا موافق چون جُو و کاوَرْس و بلوط و متواتر اللّه اللّه می گوید و شوقی عظیم می نماید و در میانه از پای [۷۲] در می افتد و از خود بمی شود ــ یعنی مارا در این ساعت از مکاشفات غیبی دری گشوده شد و با حضرت صمدیّت ملاقات جسمانی افتاد ــ و باشد که خلقی بسیار بر متابعت کسی چنین اجتماع کنند و چیزهای بسیار از کرامات و معجزات به او منسوب گردانند.

[۲۸۹§] سخن اهل حق در این معنی با ایشان اینست که حکمت الَهی اقتضا چنان کرد که حواس آدمی آلت طلب کمال نفس او باشد و شما پیش از آنکه نفس به آن کمال برسد آلت کمال نفس ضایع می کنید و پیش از آنکه چشم عقل به آن بینا شود چشم حس باطل می کنید. مَثَل شما چنانست که یکی بر اسب نشیند و عزم مقصدی کند و پیش از آنکه بمقصد رسد در راه اسب را پِیْ کند و ممکن نباشد که پیاده بتواند رفت و در راه حیران بماند و دَدْ و دامش هلاك کنند، یا بنوعی دیگر هلاك شود. زیرا که غذای

چون نعمت و موهبتی بر کسی بیند گوید بار خدایا او را از آن برخورداری ده و مرا همچنان یا زیادت از آن بروزی کن و در دیگر اخلاق مذموم که بر شمردن آن تطویلی دارد.

[§۲۸٦] و همچنین حکما گویند اصلاح اخلاق همچون مداوای طبیب و بیمار است که هر جسد که این اخلاط چهار گانه چون صفرا و سودا وخون و بلغم در او باعتدال باشد کمال صحّت و قوام بنیت حاصل تواند بود. و اگر یکی از این جمله زیادت شود و یا نقصان پذیرد حلول مرض و سُقْم بر حسب آن زیادت و نقصان در جسد پدید آید و طبیب اجساد بسوی آن باید تا بعد از وقوف بر دلایل و اطلاع بر حقایق ــ مُتَوکِلاً علی اللّه مُبْتَغیاً لِمَرضاتِهِ ــ به حذاقت و مهارت خویش بعلاج آن مشغول گردد و زیادت را بنقصان و نقصان را بزیادت متبدل گرداند و امور جسد را بحال استقامت باز آورد.

[§۲۸۷] وطبیب ارواح که تهذیب اخلاق به او خاص باشد بسوی آن باید تا حال اخلاق که این چهار قوّت از آن با چهار طبایع نهاده اند، عزم را با یبوست و نرمی را با رطوبت و تیزی[٦۲] را با حرارت و ساکنی را با برودت باز بیند و معلوم کند تا کدام یك غلبه زیادت دارد و چون معلوم شده باشد آنرا به ضدش تعدیل کند. مثلاً حِدّت بحِلمْ و خِفّت به وَقار و شهوت به عفاف و غضب به رضا و هزل به جد و بُخل به عطا و عِجلت به تأنی و اِمساك به سخا.

---

٦۲. درT: تیزی، در سایر نسخ: سردی.

عقل کرده و عملش جسمی از روح کرده.

[§۲۸٤] وهمچنین مثلاً کسی که بخیل باشد، مرد دعوت او را گوید از چندین مالی که داری چندین بده، او را از دل بر نیاید و چون تکلیفش کنند اگر از خدای نترسد، مُعترض شود و از دنیا و آخرت برآید. اما اگر از خدای بترسد و رجوع با خداترسی کند و بدهد ‹ اگر چه در اوّل به جبر و اکراه باشد چون یکبار و دوسه بار چنین کند عاقبت سخی شود.›[۶۱]

[§۲۸۵] وهمچنین اگر حسد غالب باشد، چون رجوع هم با خداترسی کند داند که درهمه عالم هیچ مخلوق به خواست خود به هیچ نعمت و حرمت نتواند رسید إلاّ به عطائی که خدای تعالی او را به آن اختصاص داده باشد. اندیشه کند که اگر من بر او به آن موهبت و عطیّه که خدای تعالی او را داده است حسد برم، به حسد من آنچه او را روزی کرده است هیچ بنخواهد کاست و چون حسد که از نفس من برخیزد و خواهد که در امور و اعمال او اثر کند ــ و نتواند ــ هرآینه آن حسد به نفس من باز گردد به حکم: النَّارُ تأکُلُ [۷۱] نَفْسَها إنْ لمْ تَجِدْ ما تأکُلُهُ و نفس مرا بطعمه خویش کند و **خَسِرَ الدُّنیا وَالآخِرَةَ** باشم و به خشم او تعالی گرفتار.[پس] بتدریج خود را از آن باز میدارد و از حَول و قوّت خود بیرون می آید و اعتماد بر حول و قوت او تعالی می کند و آن اندیشه خیر از ضمیر در عمل می آورد تا عاقبت به آن رسد که

۶۱. فقط در M و T.

را که بر روی ناخنی بتوان نوشت به قاعده کند، کل مکارم اخلاق با جمله معاملاتی که اوّل میان خود و خدای و آخر میان خود و خلق خدای نگاه باید داشت و شرح و تفصیل آن در مضمون مجلدات بسیار نگنجد، او را حاصل شود.

[۲۸۰§] مثلاً چون این خدا ترسی در فکر به قاعده کند، فکر که انبعاث شعاع عقلانی است که از نفس ناطقه انسانی بر می خیزد به سبب [آن] مناسبت حق گیرد و آن مناسبت حق سبب اتصال نفس او به نور دعوت حق گردد و از قوّت روحانیت آن فرشته ئی بر فکر او موکّل شود که همیشه فکر او را بحق آراسته می دارد.

[۲۸۱§] و چون همین خداترسی در قول به قاعده کند، قول که مظهر معانی فکری است مَثَل معلومات گردد و آن مَثَل معلومات منبع **قُولُوا قَوْلاً سَدِيْداً** شود و از قوت روحانیت آن فرشته ئی بر قول او موکّل شود که همیشه قول او را بصدق آراسته میدارد.

[۲۸۲§] و چون همین خداترسی در عمل به قاعده کند، عمل آنچه از فکر بر قول می آید از قول ظاهر شود و به واسطه آن به صورت صنایع جسمانی معین می گردد و شعار **يُصْلِحْ لَكُمْ اعْمَالَكُم** پذیرد و از قوت روحانیت آن فرشته ئی بر عمل او موکّل شود که همیشه عمل او را بخیر آراسته می دارد.

[۲۸۳§] و هروقت که چنین باشد این کس را فکر حق و قول صدق و عمل خیر که نَردبان پایه معراج عالم آخرت است حاصل آمده باشد. و فکرش عقلی باشد از امر کرده و قولش روحی از

[§۲۷۷] وهمچنین در میل بدوست و قصد بدشمن:

اَلّهمّ صلّ على مُحَمّدٍ وَآل مُحَمد، وَاَرْزُقْني التَحَفُظْ من اَلخطاء وَالاحْتِراز مِن الزَلل فِي اَلدُنيا وَالآخرة في حال الرضا وَالغضَب حَتّى أكونَ بما يَرِدعَلىّ منهُما [وَما سَواهما] في الأَولِياْ وَالاَعْداء بِمَنزلة سواء عاملاً بطاعَتكَ مُؤثراً إرْضائك حتّى يأمن عَدوُي مِن ظُلْمي وجُوري ويئسَ وليِي مِن ميلي وإنحَطاطِ هوائي.

یعنی بار خدایا صلوات ده بر محمد وآلش: و روزی کن مرا نگاه داشتن از خطا و باز ایستادن از زلل در دنیا و آخرت و در حال خوشنودی و خشم. تا از آنچه بر من آید از آن و آنچه بیرون از این هر دو است در دوستان و دشمنان، به منزلتی راست باشم کار کننده به طاعت تو و برگزیننده‌ء رضای تو تا ایمن باشد دشمن من از بیداد و جُور من و ناامید شود دوست من از میل من و افتادن هوای من.

[§۲۷۸] و این چند کلمه از کلمات قدسی که در **صحیفه‌ء کامله** میفرماید لذکره السّلام، و صد هزار هزار دریاهای نور که در آن کتاب بزرگوار از کلمات مقدّسه موج می زند، اثری است اینجا از جهت اساس تهذیب اخلاق ثبت افتاد و باقی [چون] طالبان حق طلب کنند بیابند إن شاء اللّه.

[§۲۷۹] وهم از سخنهای معلم کلّی است که اگر متعلم إتَّقُوااللّه

فتنه میفکن به بَطَر و عزیزم کن و درآنم مبتلا مکن به کِبْر و بنده توأم کن و تباه مکن عبادت من به عُجْب [٦۹] و بِران بسوی همه کس بر دست من نیکی، و آنرا نیست مگردان به منّت نهادن. و ببخش مرا معالی اخلاق و در آنم نگاه دار از فخر، بلند مکن در میان مردم درجه ئی إلاّ که فرو نهی مرا از[آنجا] که منم درجه ئی مانند آن، و تو باز مکن مرا عزّی ظاهر إلاّ که تو بازکنی مرا ذلّتی پوشیده آنجا که منم به قدر آن.

[**۲۷٦ §**] و همچنین در معامله با خلق خدای:

اللّهُمَ صَلِّ على مُحَمَدٍ وَآله: وَسَدِّدْني لأن أُعارِضَ مَن غَشني بِالنّصح وَأُجْزِي مَنْ هَجَرَني بِالبِرِّ وَأُثيبَ مَنْ حَرَمَني بِالبذْلِ وَأُكافي مَنْ قَطَعَني بِالصِّلَة وَأُخالِفَ مَن اغْتابَني إلى حُسْنِ لذكر وَأَنْ أشكُرَ الحَسَنَة وَأُغْضِي عَن السيِّئَة.

یعنی بار خدایا صلوات ده بر محمد و آلش: و راستی آنم ده که به نصیحت پیش آن کس آیم که به خیانت با پیش من آمده باشد و جزا دهم آن کس را که از من بریده باشد به نیکی، و ثواب دهم آن کس را که مرا محروم کرده باشد به بخشش، و مکافات کنم آن کس را که از من بریده باشد به پیوستن، و یاد آن کس کنم به نیکی که در پی من بد گوئی کند و شکر کنم نیکوئی را و چشم بر هم نهم از بدی.

تا به آخر روزگارم، ودر میان این همه ترا یاد کنم تا آن وقت که زبانم گنگ بباشد، پس چشم بکرانه های آسمان برندارم از شرم تو و سزاوار نباشم که یك بدی از بدیهای من سترده شود.

[§۲۷۵] همچنین در کار جاه و مال و آنکه از خدای تعالی چه باید خواست:

اَللّهُمَّ صَلِّ على مُحَمَّدٍ وَآله: ‹ وَاكفِنى مايَشغَلُنى الاهتِمامُ بِهِ وَاستَعمِلنى بِما تَسألُنى غَداً عَنهُ وَاستَفرِغْ اَيّامى فيما خَلَقتَنى لَهُ ›[۵۹] وَأَغْنِنِي وَاَوسِعْ عَلَيّ فى رِزْقي وَلاتَفْتِنّي بالبَطْرِ وَأعِزّني وَلاتَبْتَلِني بالكِبْر. وَعَبِّدني لَكَ وَلاتُفْسِدْ عِبادَتي بالعُجْب وأجْرِ للناسِ عَلى يَدي الخَير ولاتَمْحَقْهُ بالمَنّ وَهَبْ لي مَعالي الاخلاقِ واَعْصِمْني مِن الفخْرِ وَلاتَرْفَعْني فى الناسِ دَرَجَةً إلاحَطَطَتَني عِنْدَ نَفْسي مِثْلَها ولاتُحْدِثْ لي عِزاً ظاهراً إلا أحْدَثتَ لي ذِلَّةً باطِنَةً عِندَ نَفسِي بِقَدْرِها.

یعنی یا رب صلوات ده بر محمد و آلش: ‹ و کفایت کن مرا آنچه مشغول کند مرا اندیشه کردن به آن و ها کار دار مرا در آنچه بپرسی مرا فردا از آن و ببرد از روزگار من در آنچه بیافریده ئی مرا به سوی آن ›[۶۰] و توانگرم کن و روزی بر من فراخ گردان و درآنم به

۵۹. فقط در T.

۶۰. در نسخه T عبارات عربی و ترجمه آنها با سایر نسخ فرق هائی دارد که چون مفهوم همه آنها مانند یکدیگر است از تکرار آن خودداری شد.

نتایج و آثار ایشان باشد مقهور گردند و احزابشان منهزم و خرد فرشتگی چیره گردد و نفس را از این اشارت مقدّس که: **إِنَّ إِلَيْنَآ إِيابَهُمْ، ثُمَّ إِنَّ عَلَيْنَا حِسَابَهُم** نسبتی حاصل آید.

[§۲۷٤] مثلاً در خویشتن دوستی و آنکه از ستایش دروغ خرّم گردند و از نکوهش راست برنجند [می باید که] در این کلمات مقدّسه که میفرماید لذکره السّلام اندیشه کنند:

يا الٰهى لَوْ بَكَيْتُ إليكَ حَتّى تَسْقُطَ اَشْفارُ عَيني، وانْتَحَبْتُ [لَكَ] حتّى يَنْقَطِعَ صَوْتي، وَقُمْتُ لَكَ حتّى تَيْبَسُ قَدَماي، وركَعتُ لَكَ حتّى يَنْخَلِعَ صُلْبي، وَسَجَدتُ لكَ حتّى تَتفقّاء حَدَقَتايَ، وَاَكَلْتُ تُرابَ الارْض طولَ عُمري، وَشَرِبْتُ ماء الرَّمادِ آخِرَ دَهْري، ثمّ ذكَرتُكَ فى خِلالِ ذلك حتّى يَكِلَّ لِساني، ثمّ لَمْ اَرْفَعْ طَرْفَي إلى آفاقِ السَمآء اسْتِحياءً مِنْكَ، مااسْتَوْجَبْتُ بِذَلكَ مَحْوَ سَيِّئةٍ واحِدَةٍ مِن سَيِّئاتي.

یعنی ای خدای من، اگر بگریم در پیش تو تا آن وقت که بیفتد مژکهای چشم من، و زاری کنم بسوی تو تا آن وقت که وابُرّد آواز من، و بر پای بایستم بسوی تو تا آن وقت که بخوشد هر دو پای من، و رکوع کنم بسوی تو تا آن وقت که از هم بشود مهرهای پشت من، و سجود کنم بسوی تو تا آن وقت که بدرآید هر دو سیاهی دیده من، بخورم خاك زمین همه عمر و بیاشامم آب خاکستر

لازم [شمرند].

[§۲۷۱] واعتقاد بندگان، بی هیچ شك و شبه، بل از سریقین صادق مُعتَمَدٌ علیه، آنکه بیك نظر رحمت که ایشان فرمایند و بدامن قبول که بر تضرع و استغفار خلایق اوّل و آخر پوشند، گناه و خطای ایشان آمرزیده شود و سیّئات ایشان به حسنات مبدل گردد.

[§۲۷۲] وبسوی آنکه تا بندگان دانند که در خود به غلط نباید افتاد و از خداوند چون بباید ترسید و او را چون تسلیم باید کرد و خود را چون باید شناخت و به جهت خود چه باید خواست [اشاراتی] بر الفاظ مقدّس رانده اند ــ و از غایت رحمت بر بندگان و تنبیه ایشان، بر خود حواله فرموده اند ــ موازناتی است در افکار و اقوال و اعمال ‹تا›[۵۷] بندگان ‹ مطیع دانند که ایشان از آن منزّه اند و متعالی، و آن همه بسوی بندگان ›[۵۸] فرموده اند تا ایشان را از خواب غفلت دْرهَراسانند و از مرگ جهالت خلاص دهند و بروح ایمان زنده باز کنند.

[§۲۷۳] و هر اشارتی از آن به کفهء میزانی نهند و فکر و قول و عمل خود را با دیگر کفه، تا اگر چه ها بَر اِزایِ فرمان امام لذکره السّلام خود ممکن نباشد، ها بَر اِزای خود، خوف و خشیتی در نفس پدیدار آید و به قوت آن همهء رؤسای ابالسه و شیاطین که استعِلا و طُغیان، استکبار و عصیان **[۶۸]** واستغناء و نسیان

---

۵۷. T: با.

۵۸. M: ندارد.

است و قول صدق و عمل خیر و هر سه با فرمان امام وقت لذکره السّلام پیوسته دارد.

[۲۶۸§] وهیچ کس به خودی خود نه استقامت در خود تواند آورد نه حقّی بتواند اندیشید و نه راستی بتواند گفت و نه عمل خیری بتواند کرد إلاّ [که] بفرمان او لذکره السّلام [و یا که] آن فرمان بتأیید او لذکره السّلام بکسی پیوندد و یا به تعلیم معلمی[۵۵] که بتأیید او لذکره السّلام مخصوص گشته باشد.

[۲۶۹§] واز سخنهای معلم کلّی یکی آن است که اصل و سرمایه‌ء همه‌ء اخلاقِ نیك، دوستی امام وقت است لذکره السّلام. و نشان [آن] او را دوست داشتن و خود را دوست نداشتن است ‹ زیرا که هرکس که او به مثقال ذرّه ئی خود را دوست دارد او را لذکره السّلام دوست نداشته باشد،›[۵۶] زیرا که هرکه دوستی او را با دوستی خود بر آمیزد آن دوستی نه خالص او را لذکره السّلام باشد و چون نه خالص او را باشد هانپذیرد.

[۲۷۰§] پس قوی تر بنیادی که در تهذیب اخلاق نهند آن است که خود را دوست ندارند و [اطاعت] اوامر و اشارات امامان حق لذکرهم السّلام [را] ــ که ایشان سبب و علت وجود همه‌ء کاینات و موجودات اند، از جسم و روح منزّه و به هر دو محیط، ولوَ خَلَت الأرضْ مِن امامٍ ساعةً لَمادَتْ [لساخت؟] بِأهلها در شأن ایشان ــ

۵۵. T: معلم کلی.

۵۶. M: ندارد.

حواس غالب تر می گردد و سُورت و غلبهء این ‹قوت ها›[٥٤] زیادت می شود و نفس به این سبب از فعل خاص خویش که اِحاطت اوست به معلومات و جَولان او در فضای معقولات محجوب تر می ماند و تا اخلاق مهذّب نشود و جوهر نفس از قوای طبیعی و شوائب بهیمی و وساوس عادتی و نوامیس امثله مجرد نگردد، نه صلاح دنیا حاصل آید و نه نجات آخرت متوقع باشد.

[۲٦٦§] چون کلّ اخلاق و معاملات در هر روزگاری به پیوستگی بامر مُحِقّ وقت لذکره السّلام بنیك بوده است و به گسستگی از امر او لذکره السّلام ببد، اصل تهذیب اخلاق بفرمان محق وقت بودن است و به او تسلیم خالص بکردن، زیرا که نتوان دانست که هر محق در هر وقت مردم را بکدام اخلاق تربیت فرماید و مصلحت ایشان در چه بیند. و به این سبب اگر بر اخلاق و عادتی که محقی برآن رخصت و اجازت داده باشد [نباید] چنان هاایستد که چون محقی دیگر بخلاف آن اشارتی کند و مصلحتی بیند آن حکم به خود هانگیرد و در اضطراب آید و آن اضطراب سبب اعتراض گردد و آن اعتراض ادا به استحالت کند. نعُوذُباللّه منه.

[۲٦۷§] وهمچنان که در عالم خلقی انسان را استقامت قامت حاصل آمده است و او به این استقامت از دیگر حیوانات ممتاز گشته، می باید که او را در عالم امری استقامت نفس به قبول دین حق حاصل آید تا به آن استقامت از مردم که بمردم ماند و به حقیقت نه مردم باشد، [٦۷] ممتاز گردد. وآن استقامت فکر حق

---

٥٤. T: خیالهای.

حقیقت در این اکوان نیامده اند اما به حکم اضافه آمده اند.

[§۲۶۳] **امّا حشر ارواح**: این جسم مردم جان مردم را همچون گوری است و هر نفس که میل و اشتیاق او به عالم جسم و طبیعت باشد و بدست شیاطین شهوت و غضب اسیر [و] از امر او تعالی غافل، به حکم حقیقت مرده مرگ جهالت باشد، در لَحَد جِسم مُظْلَم افتاده و بشهوات هوای هاویه گرفتار [٦٦] شده.

[§۲٦٤] الحَشْر، حَشْرِ انفُسهم الميّتة بموت الجهالة، النائمة في ألحاد الاجساد المظلمة بشهوات الاهواء الهاوية؛ پس او را به نَفْخِ صُور قیامت یعنی ندای دعوت قائم لذکره السّلام از گور جسد برانگیزند، یعنی در او هراسند و بروح ایمان زنده باز کنند: **اِستَجِيبُوا لِلّه ولِلرّسُولِ إذا دَعا كُم لِمَا يُحْيِيكُمْ**. والسّلام وَالحَمْدُ لِلّهِ رَبِّ العَالمين.

تصور بیست و دوم

در تهذیب اخلاق

[§۲٦٥] اوّلین قدم که در راه کسب کمالات نفسانی نهند و به واسطه آن استعداد قبول موادّ عقلانی یابند و از آن مقام علی التدریج به درجهء امام شناسی که خدا شناسی است رسند، تهذیب اخلاق است. از برای آنکه در اوّل که اجساد بشری قابل نفوس جزوی می شوند و نفوس جزوی در اجساد بشری تصرّف می کنند نفس بغایت ضعیف می باشد و غلبه با دست قوّت های حسّی و خیالی و وهمی می افتد و چندانکه اجساد قوی تر می شوند،

کامل گشته، و هر دو یکی بوده یعنی جسمانی روحانی شده.

[§۲۶۰] و برجمله هرحرکت فکری و قولی وعملی که از خلق صادر شود، یا موجب ثواب او باشد یا موجب عقاب او و از آن افعال بدنی و روحی حشر او کنند و درمعاد همان با پیش او آورند. آنچه موجب ثواب او باشد در صورتی محبوب [و] نیکو چون فرشته به او نموده و همراه سازند تا ابد الابدین. و آنچه موجب عقاب او باشد در صورتی نا مرغوب [و] زشت چون دیو: اِنّما هِی أعْمالُکم تَرُدّ إلیَکُم. ‹ بر سرش آورده همراه ساخته هم جنس شود، تا اسفل سافلین.›[۵۳]

[§۲۶۱] و نیکان بلذت: فاعْمل عَمَلاً یَسرّك ان تَراه، مُلتَذْ باشند و بدان به الم: **نُرَدُّ فَنَعْمَلَ غَیْرَ الّذی کُنّا نَعْمَلُ**، متألم.

[§۲۶۲] **امّا معاد که به جسمانی است یا به روحانی**: اهل تضاد را به حکم: **مایُبْدِیءُ الباطِلُ وما یُعِیُد**، نه مبدأ است و نه معاد. نه به جسمانی و نه بروحانی. و اهل ترتّب را هم مبدأ است و هم معاد، هم به جسمانی و هم به روحانی. و اهل وحدت را از آنجا که حقیقةُ الحقایق است، نه مبدأ می توان گفت و نه معاد. نه به جسمانی و نه به روحانی. زیرا ایشان به حقیقت از عالم وحدت الهی نیفتاده اند تا رسیدنشان به آنجا حاجت باشد. اما از آنجا که اکوان اضافی است ـــ به اضافه با این اکوان، هم مبدأ شان هست و هم معاد. هم به جسمانی و هم به روحانی. زیرا اگر چه به

---

۵۳. T و M: ندارد.

[§۲۵۷] **امّا حشر اجساد و حشر ارواح:** حشر اجساد به چند گونه است: یکی اتصال آخر قوّت انعقادی به اوّل قوّت نمائی که حشری است انعقادی را، و اتصال آخر قوّت نمائی به اوّل قوّت حیوانی که حشری است نمائی را، و اتصال آخر قوّت حیوانی به اوّل قوّت انسانی که حشری است حیوانی را، و اتصال آخر قوّت انسانی به اوّل قوّت ملکی که حشری است انسانی را.

[§۲۵۸] ونیز نفس ناطقه ممیزه انسانی به اضافه با عقل به مثابت جسد است، و نفس خیالی به اضافه [۶۵] با نفس ناطقه به مثابت جسد است، و نفس حیوانی به اضافه با نفس خیالی به مثابت جسد است. و بر این تقدیر اتحاد نفس حیوانی با نفس خیالی و از آنِ نفس خیالی با نفس ناطقه انسانی و از آنِ نفس ناطقه انسانی با عقل ــ هر یك با ماورای او ــ حشر جسدانی باشد.

[§۲۵۹] ونیز جسم آلت کمال نفس است و نفس را که به اوّل وَهْلَه ضعیف می باشد در طلب کمال خود از توسط او چاره نیست و اکتساب فضائل و کمالات او به واسطه جسم می باشد. و مقصود از وجود جسم خود همین است. و هر وقت که این آلات[۵۲] جسمانی مناسب آثار روحانی شود، یعنی نفس را که تناول علوم و قبول فوائد به واسطه حواس روی می نماید چون به تأمل محسوسات و مرکبات تصور صُور معقولات حاصل کند، حشر جسدانی ببوده باشد به حکم معنی و حقیقت. هم جسم به نفس به کمال رسیده باشد و هم نفس به فایده هائی که از جسم اکتساب کرده باشد

۵۲. T: آلات، در سایر نسخ: اعمال.

[§۲۵۵] **وکجا خواهد شد**؟ به آنجا که این نظر عام خلقی و آن نظر خاص امری هیچ یك بر او تعالی دلیل نباشد، و او تعالی دلیل خود باشد و بس:

ألاکُلُّ شیءٍ ماخَلا اللّه باطل
وکلُ نَعیمٍ لامحالة زایِل

[§۲۵٦] وکون اوّل کون مبدأ است که انجا به حکم آفرینش عالم خلقی شهادت عام اضافی محقق می شود و دلائل فعل او تعالی که آثار قدرت او تعالی است برو دلیل می شود. ‹ و کون دوم کون وسط است که آنجا به حکم آفرینش عالم امری شهادت خاص حقیقی محقق می شود ›[۵۰] و دلایل قول او تعالی که آثار علم او تعالی است بر او دلیل می شود. و آنجا به واسطه مظهر عقل اوّل که همهٔ دلیل ها به آن یك دلیل می آید و همهٔ مثالها به آن یك مثال، نظر عام مشابهت به تعلیم خاص مباینت متحد می شود. و کون سوم کون معاد است که **إنَّ إلَینا إیابَهُمْ**، آنجا وحدت محض است و هویت بی شریك، و شهادت عام خلقی و شهادت خاص امری هر دو مرفوع:[۵۱] **ألالَهُ الخَلقُ وَالأمرُ** وآنجا نه نظر عام مشابهت کار دارد ونه تعلیم خاص مباینت: بِكَ عرَفتُكَ وأنتَ دَللتَنی عَلی نفسِك وَلَولا أنتَ لَم ادْرِمانت.

۵۰. M: ندارد.

۵۱. در تمام نسخ باستثنای T عبارت مغلوط و درهم ریخته است.

گردد. تا همچنان که آنجا کامل فی ذاته است، اینجا مُکمِل لغیره باشد و اکمال و اِستکمال ناقصان کند به کمال. بیت:

برگذشتی زان مکان کایزد در او امکان نهاد
وز وجوب اکنون نظر در عالم امکان تراست

[§۲۵۲] و بر این تقدیر کسی باشد که اگر چه معاینه می بینند که در این عالم است، هرگز در دنیا نیامده است به حقیقت. و کسی باشد که اگر چه معاینه می بینند که او از این عالم مفارقت کرده است، نه، هرگز از دنیا بیرون نشده است و نخواهد شد. و کسی هست که از دنیا روی به آخرت نهاده است و کسی هست [٦٤] که از آخرت روی با دنیا نهاده است. والسّلام.

[§۲۵۳] و اینکه مرد از کجا آمد؟ از عالم امر الهی به کون وجود مجاز و مشابهت عام خلقی. که آنجا همهٔ آفرینش دلائل اند بر او تعالی و تقدس: **وَلَئِنْ سَأَلْتَهُمْ مَنْ خَلَقَهُم لَيَقُولُنَّ اللهُ. وَإِن مِن شيءٍ إلا يُسبّح بِحَمْدِه. وَلِلّهِ يَسْجُدُ مَنْ فِی السماوَاتِ وَالأَرْضِ طَوعاً وكَرهاً**.

[§۲۵٤] و به چه آمد؟ به آنکه تا از این مشابهت عام خلقی به مباینت خاص امری رسد. **الالَهُ الخَلقُ وَالأمرُ**، به آن کون که آنجا یك متوسط دلیل است بر او تعالی وتقدس و آن یك متوسط مظهر عقل اول، آنجا که از اقرار اوّل که **وَلَئِن سأَلتَهُمْ مَنْ خَلَقَهُمْ لَيَقُولنَّ اللّهُ**، باقرار دویم رسد که **انّ اللّهَ مَولَىَ الّذينَ آمَنوا وأنَّ الكَافِرِينَ لامَولىَ لَهُم**.

[§۲۴۹] پس آمدن مرد در دنیا آن است که حقایق اشیاء برو مُشْتَبه شود و فطرتش به مخیّلات فاسده و موهومات کاذبه متبدّل گردد و بیرون شدنش از دنیا و رسیدن به عالم آخرت آنکه این حیرت و ظلمت و ضلالت از پیش نفس او بر خیزد و فطرتش از مخیّلات فاسده و موهومات کاذبه مجرّد باز شود وحقایق اشیاء باجابت این دعا که أرِنا الأشیاء کَماهی، نظر بصیرت او را تجلی کند واز میان این همه متقابلات احوال فرق و جدائی تواند کرد به صواب.

[§۲۵۰] و نیز دنیا و آخرت همچو حال طفل و بالغ است یا همچون حال دیوانه و عاقل، که طفل را چیزها در خیال آید که آن را هیچ اصل و فرع نباشد مثلاً صورت در آینه بیند و پندارد که آن صورت موجود است همچو او، و نه حال طفولیت خود داند و نه حال بلوغ. و بالغ داند که آنچه طفل داند و بیند همه خیالات بی اصل است و او هم حال بلوغ خود داند و هم حال طفولیت طفل. و دیوانه چیزهای هست را نیست بیند و چیزهای نیست را هست. و عاقل چیزها را چنان بیند که باشد، چه در نیستی و چه در هستی.

[§۲۵۱] و هر که در بدو خلقت فطرت او به مخیّلات فاسده و موهومات کاذبه متبدّل نشده باشد، اگر چه به حکم شکل و اضافه چنان نماید که در دنیا آمده است، اما به حکم معنی و حقیقت در دنیا نیامده باشد. و نمایش آنکه در دنیا آمده آن باشد که او از آخرت بدنیا و از حقیقت به اضافه و از وجوب بامکان [باز] می

[§۲٤٦] امّا حال دنیا و آخرت آنکه دنیا لفظی است از دُنُو و اَدْوَن و دَنی مشتق. دُنُو نزدیکی و اَدْوَن شیب تر و دَنی بیقدر، یعنی حواس مردم به آن نزدیك، و آن بحواس مردم. شیب تر یعنی درکهء اسفل و بیقدرتر یعنی حالات خسیس عدمی فانی. وآنکه این آسمان و زمین و آباء و اُمّهات و فوق و تحت و قُدام و خلف و یمین و یسار و طول و عرض و عمق و در و دیوار و اشجار و اَنهار و ازهار و زر و سیم و مال و مواشی را دنیا و دنیائی می خوانند از آن است که عالم محسوس است و حس ما به آن و آن بحس ما نزدیك و اگر نه دنیا هیچ از این نیست اصلاً والبته.

[§۲٤۷] بل دنیا کون مشابهت است که آنجا محق و مبطل و صدق و کذب و حق و باطل و صادق و کاذب، خیر و شر و شریر و خیّر همه همسر نماید. حالتی که در آن حالت همه متباینات متشابهات باشد و مرد چنان متحیّر و از حقایق محجوب که اینها که گفته شد هیچ از یکدیگر باز نتواند شناخت و میان هیچ یك از این همه تمیز نتواند کرد [٦۳].

[§۲٤۸] وآخرت کون مباینت است که آنجا حق و باطل و محق و مبطل و صادق و کاذب و صدق و کذب، خیر و شرّ و خیّر و شریر همه از یکدیگر جدا باشند، حالتی که در آن حالت همه متشابهات متباینات باشد و حق از باطل و محق [ازمبطل] به معرفت الهی روشن و معیّن.[٤٩]

---

٤٩. عبارت در T: تحقق حق و ابطال باطل بمعارف الهی ....

[۲٤٤§] ودر غفلت مردم از عالم معاد چنانکه مثلاً یکی را سکته گیرد و پندارند که بمرده است، در خاکش نهند و او نمرده باشد و در زیر خاك از آن حالت درْهَراسَدْ و حس او بیابد [۶۲] که کجاست، و توان دانست که چون استنشاق هوا بدو [به او] نرسد چقدر زنده بماند. و با آنکه داند که جسم آلتی عاریتی است که اگر از آن ورطه خلاص یابد امکان دارد که هم در آن حال که خلاص یافته باشد یا بروز چند دگر هلاك شود و این آلت بعاقبت فانی خواهد شد و نفس بضرورت از آن مفارقت خواهد کرد. و ببین که بیك ساعت نقصانی که بر آن آلت عاریت می بیند چه مایه غم و الم و حسرت و جَزَع و فَزَع و اضطراب و قَلَق بر او مستولی می گردد. پس آنجا که عین نقصان ابداً و سرمداً ملازم عین ذات خود بیند حسرت و ندامت او چند توان بود! نعُوذُباللّه من الحَسرت العُظمی والنَدامة الکُبری.

[۲٤٥§] و اگر چه این نقصان در این وقت که در این عالم است همچنان ملازم عین ذات اوست، اما او به سبب استعمال حواس ظاهر و باطن، حس و اِلم آن جهل بنمی تواند یافت و راست که مقارنت نفس از جسم سلب شد آن حواس بمی یابد و الم آن جهل بمی داند. و مثل او چنان است که کسی در برف می رود و پایهایش از سرما بشده باشد، اما تا حرکتی می کند از آن سرما خبر ندارد و چون با خانه گرم آید و از آن حرکت هاایستد، آن الم بتدریج اثر می کند تا به آن رسد که هر دو پایش بافْتَد. نعُوذُباللّه منه.

حجّت از دیگران همه زائل ماند. چون حال خلایق این باشد، نه قصد ایشان را باعمال خیر اثری تصوّر توان کرد ونه شفاعت نیکان را در باب ایشان محلی توان نهاد.

[۲٤۱§] و اینکه می فرماید تعالی و تقدّس: اگر رعیتی باشد به خود در بد کردار، و در جماعت امام حق[۴۸] باشد، بیامرزمشان و اگر رعیتی باشد به خود در نیکو کردار، و در جماعت امام حَق نباشد، نیامرزمشان. سخنی مجازی باشد نعُوذُباللّه منه.

[۲٤۲§] وآنکه بهری را تصوّر اینست که نفوس را پس از مفارقت بدن در آن عالم تَعَیُّن و امتیاز نیست، نه چنانست، زیرا که فعل و ادراك نفس در عالم به مشارکت قوّت متخیله که میان قوّت های جسمانی و روحانی متوسط است می باشد و بعد از مفارقت بدن هیأتی از آن با نفس باقی همی ماند. هم بر مثال آن اینجا در خواب حالهای گوناگون می بیند به واسطه خیال و این بصر جسمانی؛ ارواح هم در آن عالم بر این مثال، به واسطه هیأت خیال چیزها و حالها بینند و از حال خود و غیر خود با خبر باشند.

[۲٤۳§] حال ارواح نیکان در عالم آخرت چنان باشد که کسی خوابی در غایت خوشی و خرّمی بیند و در مقام سرور و لذّت و بهجت می باشد. و حال ارواح بدان چنانکه کسی خوابی بغایت آشفته و سهمناك می بیند و در مقام خوف و هراسی هر چه عظیمتر، پریشان و مضطرب می باشد. و تفاوت اینست که خواب ساعتی یا چند ساعت باشد و آن حالی همیشگی و جاودانی.

---

٤۸. T: وقت.

وجوب رسند و محققان قویّان اند وضعیفان. قویّان اهل وحدت اند و به حقیقت از وجوب نیفتاده اند تا حاجت رسیدن به آنجا شان باشد، و ضعیفان اهل ترتّب اند و اهل ترتُّب به درجات از امکان با وجوب رسند و نه به دفعة واحدة و رسیدن بهری از امکان با وجوب آن باشد که به تبرّا از اهل باطل جدا شوند و به تولّا در جماعت امام حق آیند و امر او را لذکره السّلام تسلیم کنند، صابراً لقضائه راضیاً لِحُکْمِه، و بهری آنکه نیّةُ المُؤمِن خیرٌمِن عَمَله.

[§۲۳۹] و چون در این عالم خیر کلی و جزوی هست و شرّ کلی و جزوی، و مردم [۶۱] به یکبار به خیر کلی یا خیر جزوی، یا شرّ کلی یا شرّ جزوی مشغول نه اند، و هریك یا در امور خیر در درجه ئی اند یا در امور شرّ در درکه ئی، و در آن حال که مرد از این عالم مفارقت کند حشر او در معاد به آن کنند که نفس او در آن حالت که از بدن مفارقت میکرد به آن مایل بود و آن را دوست میداشت. پس چون توان گفتن که در آن عالم درجات و درکات نیست، نه، که درجات است و درکات؛ درجات نیکان درجه ئی بالای درجه تا اَعْلی عِلیّیّن و درکات بدان درکه ئی شیب درکه تا باسفل سافلین.

[§۲٤۰] و[گرنه] به این فتوی که شما می کنید هرکه شرّ جزوی کند از زمره آنان باشد که شرّ کلی کرده باشد وخیرات جزوی را بعین واثر هیچ فایده نباشد ولازم آید که عفو و فضل او تعالی از جملهء خلایق عالم بیرون از یك کس که حجّت باشد یا به مثابت

مال از دست هادهند. و بعد ازآن با علم خواندند مشروط به آنکه تن و مال و غضب و شهوت از دست هادهند. بعد ازآن با کسی خواندند مشروط به آنکه تن و مال و شهوت وغضب و علم و عقل از دست هادهند. و بعد ازآن با خدای خواندند مشروط به آنکه خودی خود بیکبار از دست هادهند و تن و مال و شهوت و غضب و علم و عقل درآن مستغرق کنند.[٤٧]

[§۲۳٦] ومعلوم است که این دعوتها از روی شکل هر چهار یکی نیست میان هر یك تفاوت بسیار است و مقصود از این دعوتها نجات خلایق عالم بوده است و هست و آنکه تا به قبول آن از امکان با وجوب رسند و از اضافات به حقایق اضافات و از حقایق اضافات به حقیقت مطلق.

[§۲۳۷] و هم معلوم است هر کس که در آن دعوت که به وقت خود با او تقریر کرده اند قبول و تسلیمی داشته است، به نجات و کمال او حکم کرده اند. و ایشان همه در قبول و تسلیم بر درجهٔ متساوی نبوده اند بلکه در درجات متفاوت. [حال] اگر این درجات از میان بر گیرند و مطلق به آن آورند که هر که دفعةً واحدةً از امکان با وجوب رسد فَبِها وَنِعم و إلاّ بامتناع افتد، بباید دید که چه لازم آید!

[§۲۳۸] و قسمت خلایق خود بیرون از این دو نیست: مُحقّان اند ومبطلان. و مبطلان در امتناع بمانده اند و ممکن نیست که با

٤٧. عبارت در تمام نسخ باستثنای T و M مغلوط و در هم ریخته است .

هر دو در آید. وآنکه وجود کلّی یافت، مبدأ او مبدائی باشد عین معاد. و آن وجود که بالای جزوی وکلّی است، ما را نرسد که در آن جلالت و عظمت سخن گوئیم.

[۲۳۱§]و نیز مبدأ آن است که به عقل جزوی معیشتی عاقل شوند، و معاد آنکه از عقل جزوی معیشتی بر عقل شرعی نبوی و از عقل شرعی نبوی بر عقل قیامتی آخرتی ارتقاء کنند.

[۲۳۲§][٤٦] و نیز مبدأ خویشتن شناسی اضافی است یعنی آنکه بداند که اورا بسوی چه آفریده اند و معاد خویشتن شناسی حقیقی، [٦٠] یعنی آن کُنَدْ که او را بسوی او آفریده اند.

[۲۳۳§] هر مبدأ که با معاد نرسد و هر معاد که از مبدأ نخیزد، نه مبدأ باشد و نه معاد.

[۲۳٤§] و بهری را در معاد تصوّر چنین است که مراتب و درجات در این عالم است نه در آن عالم. و در آن عالم وجوب محض است یا امتناع محض و درجات اهل خیر درجه ئی بالای درجه و درکات اهل شر درکه ئی شیبِ درکه [درکه و درجه] ازمیان برگیرند ومی گویند چون نفس انسانی از جسم مفارقت کُند از دوحال بیرون نیست، یا از امکان با وجوب که آن خدا و خدائی است رسد و یا بامتناع که عدم جاودانی است افتد.

[۲۳٥§] بهری انکار این می کنند و می گویند: معلوم است که در روزگار پیغمبر مردم را با بهشت خواندند مشروط به آنکه تن و

٤٦. T+ و نیز مبدأ آن است که بدانند که با کسی باید بودن ومعاد آنکه با آن کس باشند که با او باید بودن ونیز...

یکی وجود جزوی که روی به کلّی دارد و یکی وجود کلّی ویکی وجود بالای کلّی و جزوی.

[§۲۲۷] وجود جزوی و بس وجود اهل کون عموم مشابهت، که محق و مبطل آنجا با هم اشتراك دارند. وجود جزوی که روی بکلّی دارد، وجود اهل کون وسط که روی از کون عموم مشابهت به کون خصوص مباینت دارد. وجود کلّی وجود اهل کون خصوص مباینت مطلق، که مجرّد است از اشتراك مبطل بکلّ الوجوه و در وجود بالای کلّی و جزوی، اگر کسی ها بَر اِزای خود سخنی گوید همین توان گفت که او را از عموم مشابهت و خصوص مباینت منزّه دانند.

[§۲۲۸] و مبدأ هرکس برحسب مرتبهٔ، است که در وجود از امر او تعالی یافته و معادش به آن: **كَمَا بَدَأَكُمْ تَعُودُونَ**.

[§۲۲۹] آنکه وجود جزوی یافت[45] مبدأ او مبدائی باشد بی معاد، چون صورت در آینه که به شکل هانماید و به حقیقت نباشد. و یا چون خبر دروغ که به اوّل در سمع آید و محتمل صدق وکذب باشد و چون بدوّم وَهْله خواهند که به اعیان آورند از سمع در بصر نیاید و از سمعش نیز بدر کنند. تا چون آخرش نباشد ازآن مبدأ که نمود و نبود برآید و نه مبدأش باشد و نه معاد: **وَما يُبْدِيءُ الْباطِلُ وَما يُعِيدُ**.

[§۲۳۰] و آنکه وجود جزوی یافت که روی به کلّی دارد، مبدأ او مبدائی باشد متوجه به معاد، چون خبر راست که در سمع و بصر

۴۵. M: آنکه وجودی نیافت؛ T+ وبس

[§۲۲۴] قوای حیوانی فیض نفوس جزوی [را] به واسطه تعلیمات ریاضی قبول کنند تا به تربیت نفوس جزوی به کلّ آن [که] عقل معیشتی دنیائی [ست] رسند، و آنجا به واسطه صورت انسانی قبول فیض عقل شرعی نبوی کنند و به واسطه عقل شرعی نبوی قبول فیض عقل قیامتی آخرتی کنند تا ارتقاء شان حاصل آید از قوای حیوانی بر نفوس جزوی و از نفوس جزوی برعقل معیشتی دنیائی و از عقل معیشتی دنیائی بر عقل شرعی نبوی و از عقل شرعی نبوی بر عقل قیامتی آخرتی. والسّلام.

تصور بیست و یکم

در مبدأ ومعاد و دنیا و آخرت

و آمدن مردم در دنیا و بیرون شدن از دنیا،

و آنکه مردم از کجا آمد و به چه آمد و کجا خواهد شد

[۵۹] و حشر ارواح و حشر اجساد[۴۴]

[§۲۲۵] اهل ظاهر که ایشان از بحث احوال آفرینش خلقی و امری دور باشند می گویند: مبدأ مردم آن است که باجتماع تراکیب اجزاء از مادر بزایند و معاد آنکه بانحلال تراکیب اجزاء از این عالم مفارقت کنند.

[§۲۲۶] و بندگان دعوت هادیه ثبّتها اللّه می گویند: اقسام وجود خلایق و اشتراکات آن بسیار است و به سبب آنکه متعلمان را صورتی هابندد با چهار قسم آورده اند. یکی وجود جزوی و بَس،

۴۴. عنوان تصور در T: تصور خواجه در مبدا و معاد.

تصور بیستم
درترقی ازجسمانیّات به روحانیّات
واز روحانیّات به عقلانیّات

[§۲۲۱] مردم را در طریق طلب کمال خلقی و امری، به اوّل وَهْلَه که از آلت جسمانی مستغنی نباشد قوّت حیوانی [معاون] است که حسّ وحرکت به آن تعلق دارد. پس نفوس جزوی که کمال اجساد بشری به آن حاصل آید، پس عقل معیشتی دنیاوی که علی العموم همه کس را کائناً مَنْ کان باشد، پس عقل شرعی نَبَوی که صلاح عامّ همهء خلائق در دنیا به آن نگاه توان داشت، پس عقل قیامتی آخرتی که غایت غایات است و منتهای نهایات.

[§۲۲۲] وقوّت حیوانی نفس جزوی را خادم است و مرکوب، و نفس جزوی عقل معیشتی دنیائی را خادم است و مرکوب و عقل معیشتی دنیائی عقل شرعی نبوی را خادم است و مرکوب و عقل شرعی نبوی عقل قیامتی آخرتی را خادم است و مرکوب.

[§۲۲۳] و ابتدای ترقی اینها هریك بردیگری از آنجاست که نفس حیوانی کلّی است متقوّم باجزای بخار لطائف اخلاط، و نفس جزوی کلّی است متقوّم باجزای نفس حیوانی، و عقل معیشتی دنیائی کلی است متقوّم باجزای نفوس جزوی، وعقل شرعی نبوی و عقل قیامتی آخرتی را متقوم باجزاء نتوان گفت زیرا که ایشان دو اصل معتبرند ــ بی اینها همه و اینها بی ایشان هیچ.

حسّی انفعالی ابتدا کند و از آن برنگذرد. ‹پری آنکه مقدمات معارف او از ادراکات عقلی ابتدا و از آن بر نگذرد و›[٤٢] فرشته آنکه مقدّمات معارف او از تعلیمات [ابتدا] و بر تأییدات ارتقاء کند و ازآنجا که معلومات حسی او عقلی و عقل او عین تأیید است، محقق بازمی گردد و ایشان کامل بذات و مکمل لغیر اند.[٤٣]

[§۲۱۷] و نیز دیو آن است که دنیا و آخرت او همه دنیای او باشد. و پری آنکه از دنیا روی به آخرت دارد و فرشته آنکه دنیا و آخرت او هر دو آخرت او باشد.

[§۲۱۸] و اگر جسمانی و روحانی [**۵۸**] وعقلانی [را] بر دیو و پری و فرشته قسمت کنند جسمانی باجانب دیو افتد، روحانی باجانب پری و عقلانی باجانب فرشته.

[§۲۱۹] و اگر تضادّ و ترتّب و وحدت [را] بر دیو و پری و فرشته قسمت کنند تضادّ باجانب دیو افتد و ترتّب باجانب پری و وحدت باجانب فرشته.

[§۲۲۰] و اگر عقل منکوس و عقل مقلوب و عقل مستقیم [را] بر دیو و پری و فرشته قسمت کنند عقل منکوس باجانب دیو افتد و عقل مقلوب باجانب پری و عقل مستقیم باجانب فرشته. والسّلام.

---

٤٢. M ندارد.

٤٣. تصحیح قیاسی است، متن در همه ی نسخ مغلوط و در هم ریخته است.

[§۲۱۳] و اهل حقّ که عاقل و مُمیِّز و با ادب از حَیِّز ایشانند و وصف حالشان اینکه : لَهُمْ قُلوبٌ سالمةٌ وَأَبْصارٌ صافیةٌ وآذانٌ واعیةٌ وَأَلسِنَةٌ بِتَوحِیدِ ربّها ناطِقةٌ وَأَعْیُنٌ إلی مَلَکُوتِ ربّهاناظرةٌ، بعدد اندك می باشند و ضعیف الحال.

[§۲۱٤] و اندك عدد و ضعف حال اهل حقّ و بسیاری عدد و قوّت اهل باطل هر دو در اوّل کار ومبدأ ظهورشان می باشد. امّا محقّان را ضعف بدایت است وقوّت نهایت، همچون صبح که بتدریج نور او زیادت می شود تا آنجا که آفتاب طلوع کند و عالم روشن گردد، و مبطلان را قوّت بدایت است و ضعف نهایت. نه، که در اوّل کمال استیلاء و غایت غلبه ایشان را می باشد ودر آخر نیست وناچیز می شوند، همچو سایه و تاریکی شب که اوّل غالب و مستولی می نماید و چندانکه از شب میگذرد و به صبح نزدیك تر می شود فنا می پذیرد تا در آخر شب که صبح بدمد سایه و تاریکی شب هیچ نماند. والسّلام.

تصور نوزدهم

در کار دیو و پری و فرشته

[§۲۱۵] اهل کون مشابهت دیو و پری و فرشته را وجود ذهنی اثبات می کنند و می گویند ایشان از چشم مردم پنهانند و روحانیات ایشان در اجسام عالم تصرّف می کند به آنچه خواهند. اهل کون مباینت گویند که ایشان را در این عالم هر یك وجود عینی است و در کون خود ظاهر اند.

[§۲۱٦] دیو آن کس است که مقدمات معارف او از ادراکات

[۲۱۰§] وگفته اند که همچنان که سنگ و سفال را یکی به یکی گذاره باید کرد تا باشد که چندانی لعل و یاقوت یابند که از آن نگینی سازند و جهان مردم مانای نه مردم را، یکی بیکی گذاره باید کرد تا باشد که مردمی یابند که مردمی به حقیقت باشند.

[۲۱۱§] و نصّ قرآن مجید بعبارتی که تعیین هر دو طبقه به آن محقق می گردد این است طبقه اهل حقّ که **قَلیلٌ مِنْ عِبادِیَ الشَّکُورُ**، وطبقه اهل باطل: **وَلٰکِنَّ أَکْثَرَ النّاسِ لایَعلَمُونَ**. ونیز اثر وخبر هم در این دو معنی وارد است: إنَّما الناس کَأبلٍ مائةٍ لایُوجَد فِیها راحِلَةٌ. ‹یعنی مردم همچنان است که صد شتر باشند [و] هیچ یك راحِله را نشایند.واوُلٰئك اَلاقلوُنَ عدداً الاعْظَمُون عِندَ اللّه قَدراً یعنی ایشان بعدد اندك اند و قدر ایشان بنزدیك خدای بزرگ [۵۷] است.›[۴۱]

[۲۱۲§] موجب این حال آن است که وجود در این عالم قَسْری است و عدم طَبْعی، و اینجا ظل حواس حجاب نور عقل می شود و حسٍّ عقلی زیاده می باشد از عقل حسّی و به این سبب اهل باطل که سفیه و اوُباشْ و رُنوُد از حیِّز ایشانند، و صف حالشان اینکه: **لَهُمْ قُلوُبٌ لایَفْقَهُونَ بِها وَلَهُم اَعْیُنٌ لایُبْصِروُنَ بِها وَلَهُمْ آذانٌ لایَسْمَعوُنَ بِها ،اوُلٰئِكَ کالأنْعَام بَلْ هُمْ أَضَلُّ**، بعدد بسیار می باشند و قوی حال.

---

۴۱. عبارت در تمام نسخ درهم ریخته و مغلوط است، متلاً درW : متل مردم همچنان است که صد شتر باشد... بعدد اندك اند و قدر هیچ یك راحله را نشاید... وشأن او بنزدیك خدای بزرگ است.

غرض محقان نشناسند، و چون سخن آن محق که گوید "منم که چشم فتنه بکندم،" نشنوند و آنهمه خلاف و فتنه بامیان آورده باشند ‹ و فرق نکنند میان حقّ و باطل و گویند نه چنین است که او چشم فتنه بِکنْد،›[٤٠] بلکه فتنه را اساسی چنان نهند که هرگز زوال نگیرد و انقطاع نپذیرد. وخدای تعالی هدایت کرامت کُناد. والسّلام.

تصور هژدهم

در سبب اندکی عدد اهل حقّ و بسیاری اهل باطل

[٢٠٨§] معلوم است که نبات از انعقاد شریف تر است و با این همه هرگز هیچ درخت اگر چه بغایت قوی حال باشد چَندِ کوهی نتواند بود. وحیوان از نبات شریف تر است و با این همه هرگز هیچ حیوان اگر چه به خلقت و جثه بغایت قوی حال باشد چَندِ درختی بزرگ نتواند بود. و انسان از حیوان شریف تر است و با این همه هرگز هیچ مرد اگر چه به بالا و پهنا از همهء امثال خود قوی حال تر باشد چَندِ پیلی نتواند بود.

[٢٠٩§] و هم معلوم است که شرف هریك از این بر دیگر یك نه به شکل و مادّت است بلکه بمعنی و صورت. وتقدیر او تعالی چنان رفته است که هر موجودی را که در قوّت شکلی افزوده اند از قوّت معنوی [او] بکاسته اند. و از این سبب مَثَل عُلما به لعل و یاقوت زده اند و ازآن جُهال بسنگ و سفال.

---

٤٠. M: ندارد.

دَمّ القَلب وفَوَرتِ مراره و حرکت اضطرابی در قَمعِ مُعاند.

[§۲۰۵] و نهایت غرض محکوم آنکه تا در حصول فرمان و طاعت حاکم بجذب منفعت و دفع مضرّت خود قیام نمایند و هریك به وسیلتی مستحقّ مکنت و ترتیبی[۳۹] گردند که بدان برامثال خود ترفُّع و تقدُّم طلبند و مرجع و منتهای کار حاکم و محکوم به آن آید که میل و اشتیاق به عالم جسم و طبیعت در نفوس ایشان زورگیرد و [این] غفلت ایشان [را ازعقلیّات] با نفسیّات و [از] نفسیّات با وهمیّات و [از] وهمیّات باحسیّات و [از] حسیّات با درکات هاویه افکند.

[§۲۰۶] وقوای طبیعی و شوائب بهیمی و وساوس عادتی و نوامیس امثله، نفس هریك راصورتی مجرّد شود که هرگز از او مفارقت نکند و ایشان از لباس کمال آخرت منسلخ مانند. و مثل آن همچنان باشد که اندك آتش بر بسیاری هیزم نهند و باد درآن دَمند تا آن آتش بر افروزد و آن هیزم را با هرچه دیگر [که] دریابد بسوزد. یا همچنان که خلائقی بمرض دقّ و استسقا بیمار شوند و مدقوقان عسل می خورند و مستسقی یخ آب و هیچ طبیب نباشد [۵۶] که ایشان را از آن منع کند تا همه هلاك شوند. نعُوُذبالله منه.

[§۲۰۷] و اینان چون از اسرار محقّان بی خبر باشند و همّت و هَمّشان از امور این عالم جسمانی بر نگذرد و بدایت و نهایت

۳۹. M: تربیتی.

باشد که به آن از پناه جناب عزّت احدیّت دور افتند. و براین موجب خشم و سخط و سیاست او عین شفقت و رحمت و رضا باشد و بخل و امساك و تقصیر او عین سماحت و موهبت و سخا. و از این روی گوید: إنّي فَقَأتُ عَيْنَ الفِتْنَةِ وَلَوْلم أكُنْ فِيكُم لايَفْقَأها اَحَدُ غَيْرِي. یعنی منم که چشم فتنه بکندم و کندن چشم فتنه را جز من کسی دیگر نیست و نباشد. ومعنی اِختِلاف اُمَّتی رَحمةٌ از این روشن می شود، زیرا از آن اختلاف مقصود اتفاقی چنین باشد.

[§۲۰۳] و اتّفاقی که به شکل اتّفاق باشد و به معنی اختلاف، آن است که اهل دنیا که از حقایق چیزها بی خبر باشند و در کارها دو وجهی و دو گونی نگاه می ندارند، اتّفاق همین دانند که متابعت رأی و هوای یکدیگر کنند و اختلاف اینکه از رأی و هوای یکی چیزی اقتضاء کند و از آن دیگری بعکس آن چیز، ‹ و ایشان بحث احوال آن نکنند تا مضرّت دنیاوی که منفعت آخرت را متضمن باشد ادا کند بمنفعت دنیاوی که مضرّت آخرت را متضمن باشد.›[۳۸]

[§۲۰۴] و نهایت غرض و غایت مقصود حاکم ایشان آن باشد که محکومان خود را ببذل مال و جاه دنیا به خویشتن مفتون و مغرور گردانند و به واسطه معاونت ایشان کسب مملکت و ضبط سلطنت کنند. و رحمت ایشان ضعف قوّت غضبی باشد و خشم ایشان غَلَیان

۳۸. عبارت در M: و ایشان بحث احوال آن نه کنند تا منفعت دنیاوی که مضرت آخرت را متضمن باشد ادا می کند یا مضرت دنیاوی که منفعت آخرت را متضمن باشد.

واین کس آن وقت قدم در راه این سعادت کلّی تواند نهاد که مستعد قبول کمال شود و این استعداد آن وقت حاصل شود که اخلاق او مهذّب و عادات اومتناسب گردد.

[۲۰۰§] واین تهذیب و تناسب بلطف و مدارا راست نیاید بلکه بیشتر وقت احکام و تکلیفاتی با میان آید که کم دلی طاقت آن آورد. زیرا که محق متابعت رأی و هوای هر کس نکند و گوید **وَلَوْ اتَّبَعَ الحَقُّ أهوآءهُم لَفَسَدتِ السَمَواتُ وَالارضُ.** ومثل او همچنان باشد که بیماری میل به عسل و گل شکر کند و طبیب او را از آن باز دارد و صبر سقوطری و شَحْم حنظل دهد.

[۲۰۱§] وچون غرض محقّ از این اختلافات کمال نفوس خلایق باشد از این منازعات باك ندارد و به آنکه از او برمند و خصم او شوند و فتنه و شمشیرزخم با میان آورند التفات و مبالات نکند. و عزّ و مرتبه‌ء که او بسوی انسان اختیار کند آن باشد که بعزّت او تعالی عزیز باشد[۳۷] و به کبریای او تعالی کبیر:

عزیزٌ بعزّة اللّهِ وعِزّة اولیائه من غَیر تَعَزُّزٍ بِحَسَبِه ونَسَبِه، أو تَکاثُرَ بجاهِه وَمالِه أوتَفاخُرَ بِعلمِه واَعمالِه، کبیرٌ بکبریاء اللهِ وکبریاء اولیائه مِن غیرتکبّرٍ علی عبادِه وتَجَبُّرٍ فِیْ بِلادِه.

[۲۰۲§] و رحمتی که او برحمت دارد آن باشد که به آن مستعد قُرب حضرت صمدیّت گردند و غضبی که او بغضب دارد [**۵۵**] آن

۳۷. فقط درT، در سایر نسخ : باشند.

هریك بگونه ئی دیگر تصور می بندند و درآن سخن می گویند. مثلاً چنین که یکی می گوید معامله او تعالی باخلق به جُوْر است و یکی می گوید به عدل، و یکی می گوید به فضل، و یکی می گوید به رحمت واسعه. و [٥٤] در هریك از این خلافی می باشد، و به وجهی همه راست می گویند و به وجهی همه دروغ. وجه راست آن است که حکم هر کونی به جای خود رعایت می کنند و وجه دروغ آنکه نمی کنند. زیرا که درجات و مراتب خلائق متفاوت است و حکم عموم و تساوی بر همه کردن محال باشد.

[§۱۹۸] جوابش آن است که معامله او تعالی به اضافه < به آن کس که در درکات کثرت مانده باشد و از همهٔ حقایق محجوب، جور نماید، و به اضافه >[۳۶] به آن کس که در ظلمات برازخ نفس او نوری پدید آمده باشد ــ که آن نور و ظلمت مُتکافئین باشند ــ عدل، و به اضافه با آن کس که نور نفس او از ظلمت نفس او زیاده باشد فضل، و به اضافه به آن کس که نفس او به نور خدای روشن باشد رحمت واسعه.

[§۱۹۹] امّا اختلافی که به شکل اختلاف باشد و بمعنی اتّفاق آن است که محقّ خواهد که مختلفات قوای حسّی مردم متّفقات [وهمی] شوند و متّفقات قوای وهمی متّحدات قوای عقلی ــ یك وجه که اورا یك حال همه حالات باشد و همه حالات یك حال ــ و آنجا نه زمان متغیّر باشد و نه مکان متبدّل و نه اضافات متکثّر.

---

۳۶. M: ندارد.

و نه با مبطل و شریر ومُفسد، زیرا که کون مشابهتِ عامٍّ خلقی و کون مباینتِ خاصٍّ امری هر دو ایشان را می باشد و ایشان [اگر] خواهند که لباس حقّ و خیر و صلاح در مبطل و شریر و مفسد پوشند [توانند]. و مبطل و شریر و مفسد که ایشان را کون مشابهت عامّ خلقی می باشد و از کون مباینت خاصّ امری نصیب ندارند، هم با خود مضادّت و مخالفت کنند و هم با محقّ و خیّر و مُصلح.

[§۱۹۵] وچون این هر دو قوم در این کون مشابهت بهم میمانند، محقّان امرالهی را که مباینت نیکان و بدان به آن می باشد برخلایق عالم بمی رانند و اهل کون مشابهت، به سبب آنکه آنجا هواس غالب می باشد و در آن کون دیو باخدای منازعت می کند، و متعلّم خود را بمقام معلّم فرود می آورد و شاگرد مرتبهء خود را از استاد زیادت می داند، و چون غلبه و قوّت شکلی با اهل این کون خاص می افتد، از قبول امر امتناع می کنند و بمجادله و محاربه محقّان بر میخیزند.

[§۱۹۶] و محقّان را بضرورت لازم می آید همچنان که حکم دعوت از آنروئی که: **أُدْعُ إلى سَبِيلِ رَبِّكَ بالحِكْمَة والمَوْعِظَة الحَسَنة** با میان آورده باشند، حکم شمشیر از آن روی که: **وَجادِلْهُمْ بالَّتی هِیَ أَحْسَنُ** بامیان آورند و به این سبب فِتنه های صعب روی نماید.

[§۱۹۷] و نیز عوام و خواص عالم در معامله او تعالی با خلق

چون میل و اشتیاق به عالم جسم و طبیعت و استغراق نفس در امور هیولانی و غلبهء هواس و شره بر لذّات این عالم فانی.

[§۱۹۱] وساوس عادتی چون اخلاق و عادات و مراسمی که میان هر قوم متداول گشته باشد و مدّت پذیرفته و تابحدّی در ضمیر و عقیدت هریك جای گرفته که اگر درمیان آن قوم کسی اندك و بسیار چیزی از آن هاگرداند قرار بنگیرند و بهری اضطرابها کنند و بهری [۵۳] استهزاء.

[§۱۹۲] نوامیس امثله چون سُنن و آدابی که محقّی نهاده باشد مثلاً قبله و قربانی و رسم وآئین معیّن کرده و طاعات و عبادات وضعی نهاده و هادست و زبان مردم داده، و آن جمله بنوعی در خیالات و اوهام ایشان هاایستاده باشد و راسخ و ثابت گشته که چون محقّی دیگر بیاید و خواهد که روحانیات آن اوامر و نواهی که از یاد ایشان باز شده باشد با یاد ایشان دهد و در رسوم و اوضاع آن محقّ گذشته بر طریق اکمال و استکمال تصرّفی کند ایشان بخلاف و عصیان او برخیزند و کشتن و سوختن خود و فرزندان خود اختیار کنند و آن دعوت هانگیرند.

[§۱۹۳] و اختلاف میان محقّان و مبطلان از آنرونی است که حقٌّ و باطلٌ ولکلٍ أهلٌ، یعنی حقّی هست و باطلی و هریك را اهلی. و از جانب محقّان خیّران و مصلحان اند و از جانب مبطلان شریران و مفسدان.

[§۱۹٤] و از جانب مُحِقّ نه بین محقّ و خیّر و مُصلح نزاع باشد

می کند و در آن حالت او را هیچ فکر و رَویّت نمی باشد.

[§۱۸٦] و چون قوّت نامیّه در قوّت حَسّاسه می پیوندد، در حفظ نظام و استقامت اعضاء استمداد از افلاك و انجم می کند و در آن حالت حواس او که آلات و ادوات کمال نفس او اند تمام می شود و ابتدای فکرو رویّت حاصل می آید.

[§۱۸۷] و چون قوّت حَسّاسه در قوّت ناطقه ممیزه می پیوندد و در اتّصال عقلیّات به علمیّات استمداد از نفس کلّی می کند، در آن حالت فکر و رویّت او قوی می شود.

[§۱۸۸] و چون قوّت ناطقه ممیّزه درقوّت عاقله بالغه می پیوندد و در اتّحاد عِلمیّات به عقلیّات استمداد از عقل کلّی می کند، درآن حال فکر و رویّت او به کمال می رسد.

[§۱۸۹] و در هروقت از این که گفته شد، اشتراکات مزاجی و حسّی و وهمی و خیالی بسیار است. و دراین همه مراتب و کمالات تا رسیدن بمرتبهء کمال آخر حسّ قوی می باشد و عقل او ضعیف. و هر تربیت از هر مُربّی که خواه، به او می رسد آنرا در نفس او تأثیر می باشد. کُلُّ مولودٍ یولَدُ عَلی الفِطرةِ فَاَبَواه یُمَجّسانه ویُهوّدانه ویُنصّرانه. یعنی کودك برفطرت راست از رحم مادر بفضای این عالم می آید و از پرورش پدر و مادر به گبری و جهودی و ترسائی می افتد.

[§۱۹۰] و هم از این جهت می باشد که شوائب طبیعی و وساوس عادتی و نوامیس امثله غالب و مستولی می شود. شوائب طبیعی

کواکب که فاعلان سماوی اند از سعد و نحس در اصول موالید خلایق، زیرا که >[۳۵] به حکم حکمت باری سبحانه و تعالی و قضا و قدر او، هیچ حرکت قولی و فعلی از هیچ مخلوق صادر نمی تواند شد إلاّ که قوّتی از قوّت های سماوی بر نطق و اعضاء و جوارح آن مخلوقات فائض می گردد.

[۱۸٤§] و در جزویات اعتبار به منفعلات ارضی مثلاً ترکیب جسد انسانی که از چهار جوهر متضادّ مُؤلّف است که از وقت تکوین او در رحم تا آمدن بفضای این عالم تا نهایت عمرش آب و هوا و تربت آن بُقعه که مولد و منشاء او بوده باشد در مزاج **[۵۲]** او تأثیر می کند، و تفاوت آن در اجسام و طبائع و اخلاق و عادات او ظاهر می گردد. و مذاهب و دیانات و آداب و عاداتی که ازحالت طفولیّت تا بحدّ بلوغ از پدرو مادر و از معلّمان و استادان و مربّیان برآن نشو و نما یافته باشند و باخون و گوشت ایشان برآمیخته، ازاین جمله است:

شَرِبْتُ بِكأسِ الْوَدِّ فِی المْهدِ شَرْبَةً
حَلاوَتَها حَتّی القِیامَةِ فِی الحَلْقِ

[۱۸۵§] چه طفل در اوّل ولادت که قوّت عقدی درنمائی می پیوندد و در تماسك اجزاء واستیفای بقاء استمداد از عناصر و طبایع

۳۵. آغاز مجدد M.

به آنجا رسیدند و از آنجا هرگز نیفتادند آن است که حقّ را اوّل و آخری است. زیرا به حکم آنکه به اوّل تضادّی می بینیم، می باید گفتن [که] باطلی هست، و به حکم آنکه به آخر ترتّبی می بینیم، می باید گفت که حقّ هست و باطل نیست. و حقّ ضعیف بدایت است و قوی نهایت، و باطل قوی بدایت است و ضعیف نهایت. و به این سبب باطل به اوّل حقّ مشابهت می تواند کرد و به آخر حقّ نه، و آنجا وجودش نمی ماند البته.

پس بهشتی که آدم در آنجا بود و از آنجا بیفتاد بهشتی بود در اوّل حقّ که کون مشابهت محق و مبطل است، و بهشتی که به آنجا رسید و هرگز از آنجا نیفتاد بهشتی بود در آخر حقّ که کون مباینت محقّ و مبطل است. و مبطل را در آن کون وجودی نمی ماند البته. و اصحاب تأویل دیگر مثالات و دلالات را که بر حال آدم و ابلیس وارد گشته است هم از این جنس تأویلات فرموده اند. والسّلام.

تصور هفدهم

در اسباب خلاف های گوناگون که میان اهل عالم واقع می باشد و کیفیّت آنچه از آن جمله که تعلّق بمحقّان و مبطلان دارد

[۱۸۳§] این خلافها را در کلیّات و جزویّات چندان علل و اسباب است که لایَعْلَمُها إلاّ اللّه. و در کلّیات اعتبار به موجبات احکام نجوم است و مسیرات و مناظرات اتّصالات و مطارح شعاعات

آن گِل علم نظری و تعلیمی ــ یعنی آتش علم تأییدی است و علم آدم نظری و تعلیمی ــ و آتش در علوّ و احاطت به مثابت تأیید و خاك به مثابت نظر و آب به مثابت تعلیم.

[§۱۷۹] و آنکه آدم را فرمود به این شجره نزدیکی مجوی یعنی گندم مخور، به آن شَجَرَةِ ٱلْخُلْدِ ومُلك لاَیَبلَی می خواهد یعنی علم قیامت. و آنکه [گفت] گندم مخور یعنی در علم قیامت شروع مکن و در اظهار آن نطق مزن که نه وقت آن است.

[§۱۸۰] وآنکه نافرمانی کرد و به قول ابلیس غرّه شد و گندم بخورد آن است که چون ابلیس به آن اَبا و استکبار که کرد بلعنت شد و به آن لعنت التفات ننمود و پس از آن بنزدیك آدم شد و بر دعوت قیامت آن قائم با او حجّت ها تقریر نمود، وآدم به سبب ضعف بدایت [که] داشت قبول آن بکرد و مَعْذلك باکسانی باز می گفت که نه از اهل آن بودند و به آن سبب در ورطهء عقاب قائم لذکره السّلام افتاد. و چون دانست که خطا کرده است بگناه خود اعتراف آورد و با دَرِ رحمت واسعه گریخت و عذر و توبه او قبول افتاد.

[§۱۸۱] و حواّ که گویند جفت آدم بود، معانی بود در آن شریعت و از احکام باطن و معانی خبر می داشت و کار شریعت [۵۱] آن دور بآدم و به او [کامل] می توانست شد. او نیز به اوّل قبول سخن حارث بکرد و به آخر بتُوبت و انابت با حقّ مراجعت نمود.

[§۱۸۲] امّا بهشتی که آدم و حواّ از آنجا بیفتادند و بهشتی که

ربّانی دَرِ آن دعوت قیامت که می گذرد دربست و دور ستر و دور شریعت بامیان آورد و نَبی به وحی الهی و الهام سُبحانی مخصوص گشت و هرممثولِ عقلی را مثال حسّی نهاد و شعار شریعت وضعی در جهان کشید، متعلمانِ قائم آن دور را یعنی فرشتگان را دشوار می آمد که ظاهر آن شریعت را که آدم بفرمان قائم می نهاد به خود هاگیرند و بر ایشان اعتراض بود و خواستند که به آن قدر که از علم قیامت شنیده [۵۰] بودند آن سَلاسِل واَغْلال از خود دفع کنند. و چون فرمان قائم لذکره السّلام به ایشان رسید که چیزی دانم که شما ندانید، ایشان خود را دریافتند و تدارك به عذر و استغفار واجب شناختند و به قبول آن اوامر و نواهی به آن شرف [و] مَنقبت رسیدند که برآن منظور بودند.

[§۱۷۷] و حارث مرّه یعنی ابلیس، معلمی بود از معلمان بقایای دور کشف که به اوّل دور ستر رسید. و چون در منصب معلمی فرشتگان یعنی اهل دعوت قیامت بوده بود و بَرْگِ معلّمی آدمش نبود گفت این شریعت وضع راه است و آن قیامت که درِ آن بستند مقصد کلّی و من بدان مقصد رسیده ام و مقصود حاصل کرده، چرا از مقصد و مقصود باز گردم و دیگر بار به قطع منازل و مراحل مشغول شوم، قبول شریعت بنَکرد و گفت من به خُلاصه و زُبده آن دعوت که آدم می کند محیط شده ام و به آن محتاج نه ام که در ربقهء طاعت و تکلیف درآیم.

[§۱۷۸] و آنکه گفت که من از آدم بهترم که تو مرا از آتش آفریده ئی و او را از گِل، به آن آتش علم تأییدی را خواست و به

[§۱۷۳] و آنکه مردم اوّل درعالم اوّل آدم است، گویم ادوار عالمهاست و تبدیل هر دوری تبدیل عالمی به عالمی باشد. پس چون دوری که عالمی دیگر باشد ابتداء کند واضع ملّت آن دور را که شکل و هیئت و زبان و لغت و قول و سیرت و فعل و طریقت او بجمله و تفصیل چیزی دیگر باشد، اوّلین مردم خوانند که در عالم نبود پس ببود، پدیدار آمده باشد. و جمله مردم را تا آن وقت که دور دور او باشد، همه را بدور او باز خوانند و همه را به فرزندی او نسبت کنند. و واضع ملّتی در این هفت هزارسال پدیدار آمده آدم بود و از این جاست که آدم و آدمیان می گویند.

[§۱۷۴] و دور هر پیمبر ظاهر شریعت او را دور ستر خوانند، و دور هر قائمی را که حقایق شرایع پیغمبران ظاهر کنند دور کشف، و ادوار بر هزاره ها مقدّر است و هر دوری هزار سال است.۳٤

[§۱۷۵] و چون هزارها ابتدا کند هر هفت هزار سال قیامتی بر خیزد و چون هفت هفت هزار سال [که] آن چهل و نه هزارسال باشد بگذرد و پنجاهم هزارسال ابتدا کند قیامت قیامات برخیزد. و در این هزاره ها دور ستر و دور کشف چون شب و روز بر هم می گردند.

[§۱۷٦] و حال آدم و ابلیس آن است که در مبدأ این هفت هزار سال که به آخر رسیده است، چون قائمِ آن دور به حکم وحکمت

۳٤. دوربی هر پیمبر ظاهر شریعت او را دور ستر خوانند و دور هر قائمی را که حقایق شرایع پیمبران که آنرا قیامت خوانند و دور کشف و ادوار شرایع او ظاهر کنند بر هزار ها مقدّر است و هر دور ...

گفت که آن دور و سنّت و ملّت که نبودی و بامیان آمد عالمی باشد که وقتی نبود و پس ببود. و مردم اوّل در آن عالم اوّل واضع آن ملّت بود [و] گرداننده آن دور و سنّت پیشین باشد.

[§۱۷۰] وآنکه این عالم را بشش روز آفریده اند، این شش روز ادوار اصحاب شرایع است، هر روزی هزار سال: **إنَّ یَوْماً عِنْدَرَبِّكَ كَألفِ سَنَةٍ مِمَّا تَعُدّوْن**، یعنی از آدم تا به محمد مصطفی علیه السلام. و این آن عالم است که توان گفتن که وقتی نبود و پس ببود.

[§۱۷۱] و آنکه مردم اوّل در عالم اوّل نه آدم بود و هرگز نبود که در این عالم مردم نبود آن است که [چون] مقصود از حرکات افلاك امتزاج [۳٤]< ارکانِ موالید بود، و مقصود از موالید نوع مردم، از ترتیب وجود چنان اقتضا کرد که اوّل انعقاد بوُد و پس نبات و پس حیوان و پس انسان، زیرا که اگر انعقاد نبودی نبات نتوانستی [٤۹] بود و اگر انعقاد و نبات و حیوان نبودی انسان نتوانستی بود. و همچنان که هرگز نبود که عالم نبود ــ که در عالم انعقاد و نبات و حیوان نبود و نوع مردم نبود ــ [پس] به این حکم نوع مردم من الازل إلی الابد [در عالم] بوده است و باشد.

[§۱۷۲] و از جهت آدم و آنکه به وجهی مردم اوّل درعالم اوّل آدم بود و به وجهی نبود گویند: بموجب تقریر حال او و عالم و موالید که به وقت معلوم شد که نوع مردم همیشه در این عالم بوده است و باشد، مردم اوّل در عالم اوّل آدم نیست.

پس بباید گفت که او تعالی همیشه خالق بود، وچون خالق بگفتی مخلوق یعنی این عالم خود لازم باشد. پس هرگز نبود که این عالم نبود.

[§۱٦۷] و اگر کسی گوید خدای و عالم هر دو به این وجه قدیم باشند و این شرك باشد، گوئیم ما نه انکار قدیمی برعالم کنیم و نه انکار مُحدثی اش و گوئیم عالم باعتبار خود محدث است و باعتبار با متمم و مکمل خود قدیم، وحدوث او امکان و نقصان اوست و قدم او رسیدن اوست ازامکان به وجوب و از نقصان به کمال.

[§۱٦۸] پس وقتی نبود، پس وقتی بود از آن سبب در خیال و وهم مردم میافتد که همهٔ موجودات عالم به حقیقت حال عالم نه میتوانند رسید. مثلاً عالم به اضافه با کرمی که درمیان سنگی باشد، و به اضافه با مرغی که در جوف هوا می پرد، و به اضافه با کودکی در رحم، و به اضافه با طفل، و به اضافه با بالغ، و به اضافه با بالغی که جاهل باشد، و یا عالم درمیان علما به اضافه باکسی که علمش نظری باشد یا تعلیمی و یا تأییدی هریك بگونه ئی دیگر نماید. و هریك از اینها صفت عالم از آنجا تواند کرد که او باشد.

[§۱٦۹] امّا این عالم که توان گفتن که وقتی نبود و پس ببود آن است که گویند عالم هژده هزار عالم است، و از آن جمله تبدیل هر دوری بدوری، و سنّت و آئینی به سنّت و آئینی و ملّتی بملّتی، هریك عالمی است. و از اینها هریك که بدیگری بدل شود، توان

از بهشت بنیفتادند.

[§١٦٤] و این [همه] رموز و اشارات است که بر ظواهر تنزیل مقدّر و کسانی که نظر بصیرت ایشان از کون مشابهت برنگذرد ‹ و به کون مباینت نرسد از این قواعد برنگذرند ›[٣٤] و براین هاایستند. و کسانی که نظر بصیرت ایشان از کون مشابهت برگذشته باشد و به کون مباینت رسیده به حکم ظاهر و تنزیل به این همه اقرار دهند و به حکم باطن و تأویل، هریك از این رموز و اشارات را حقیقت و معنویّت تقریر کنند. باذن اللّه تعالی وحُسن مشیّته.

[§١٦٥] مثلاً در نبودن عالم، که وقتی نبود پس ببود، چنین گویند که ما هم اثبات عالم کنیم که وقتی نبود، پس ببود، و هم اثبات آن کنیم که هرگز نبود که در این عالم انسان نبود، و هم اثبات آن که آدم اوّلین انسان در این عالم بود.

[§١٦٦] و ازجهت عالم گوئیم که تو به آن عالم که وقتی نبود، پس ببود کدام عالم را میخواهی؟ اگر این عالم را میخواهی که آسمان بر افراشته است بآفتاب و ماه و بروج و کواکب بیاراسته و زمین بازگسترده و کوه و دریا و نبات وحیوان و انسان بر او پدیدار آمده، نتوان گفت که وقتی نبود وپس ببود، زیرا که اگر گوئی که وقتی بود که این عالم نبود گفته باشی که خالق آن وقت خالق نبود، یا خالقی درو [٤٨] به قوّت بود و پس ازآن به فعل آمد واین سخن کفرباشد. نعُوذُباللّه منه.

میکنم. و فرشتگان را فرمود **أُسْجُدُوا لآدَمَ**، یعنی سجده کنید آدم را. وایشان گفتند: **أتجْعَلُ فيهَا مَنْ يُفْسِدِ فيها وَيَسْفِكُ الدِّمآءَ وَنَحْنُ نُسَبِّحُ بِحَمْدِكَ وَنُقَدِّسُ لَكَ**، یعنی تو کسی را برما حاکم میکنی که او در زمین فساد کند و خون ریزد و ما به تسبیح تو مسبّح و مقدّسیم. فرمود جَل وعلا: **إنّي أعْلَمُ مالا تَعْلَمُونَ**، یعنی من چیزی دانم که شما ندانید. ایشان گفتند **سُبْحَانَكَ لاعِلْمَ لَنَا إلاّ ماعَلَّمْتَنا**، [٤٨] یعنی پاکا ما هیچ ندانیم الاّ آنچه تو مارا آموخته ئی و سجده آدم کردند و بر فریشتگی بماندند.

[§١٦٣] و ابلیس اباء و استکبار کرد و گفت: **ءَأسْجُدُ لِمَنْ خَلَقْتَ طِيناً** یعنی من سجده کسی کنم که اورا از گِل آفریده ئی و قال: **أنا خَيْرٌ مِنْه، خَلَقْتَنِي مِنْ نارٍ وَخَلَقْتَهُ مِنْ طِينٍ**، یعنی من ازاو بهترم که تومرا ازآتش آفریده ئی و او را از گِل. و سجده آدم نکرد و از فرشتگی بدیوی افتاد و در لعنتِ او تعالی بماند تا به قیامت. و [ابلیس] پس از آن در بهشت شد و خود را بر صورت معلّم ناصح به آدم و حوّا نمود و ایشان را بفریفت و گفت از این گندم بخورید. و ایشان بسخن او غرّه شدند و گندم بخوردند و به عقاب او تعالی گرفتار شدند و از بهشت بیفتادند. و چون توبه کردند و گفتند **رَبَّنا ظَلَمْنآ أنْفُسَنا وَإنْ لَمْ تَغْفِرْ لنا وتَرْحَمْنا لَنَكُونَنَّ مِنَ الخا سِرِينَ** یعنی ما بر نفسهای خود ظلم کردیم و اگر تو مارا بنیامرزی و برما رحمت نکنی ما از خاسران باشیم. خدای تعالی توبه ایشان قبول کرد و هر دو را به بهشت باز فرستاد و پس از آن

عینی باشد. و شخص صراط منکوس آنکه از آخرت روی بادنیا کرده باشد و شخص صراط مقلوب آنکه وقتی روی به آخرت نگاه دارد و وقتی روی با دنیا و حالات آن کند. و شخص صراط مستقیم آن کس که دنیای او عین آخرت او باشد و او این رویهای اضافی همه بیکی کند و آن یك آن باشد که باحضرت صمدیّت دارد. والسّلام.

تصور شانزدهم
درکار آدم و ابلیس

[۱۶۱§] اعتقاد اکثر مردم و اهل اسلام این است که وقتی بود که خدای تعالی این عالم را نیافریده بود، پس بیافرید: **إِنَّ رَبَّكُمُ اللّٰهُ الَّذِي خَلَقَ السَّمٰوٰاتِ وَالأَرْضَ فِي سِتَّةِ أَيَّامٍ** یعنی آن خدای که پروردگار شماست آسمانها و زمین را به شش روز آفرید. و گویند اوّلین مردی که خدای تعالی او را بیافرید آدم بُود و حوّا را که جفت او بود از پهلوی چپ او پدید آورد. و نسل آدم ازصُلب او در رحم حوّا پدیدار آمد. و آدم و حوّا را اوّل به بهشت فرستاد و بخوردن هر نعمتی که دربهشت بود رخصت داد إلاّ گندم، که ازآن نهی فرمود و گفت **لاتَقْرَبا هٰذِهِ الشَّجَرَةَ** یعنی نزدیکی مجوئید به این شجره.

[۱۶۲§] ابلیس به اوّل فرشته ئی بزرگ بود و منصب معلمی بر فرشتگان داشت و چون خدای تعالی آدم را بیافرید گفت: **إِنِّي جاعِلٌ فِي الأَرْضِ خَلِيفَةً** یعنی من در زمین یکی را خلیفه خود

دو پای برزمین دارد و اگرچه به اضافه با انسان سر به همهٔ وجوه از زمین برنگرفته است امّا به اضافه با نبات برگرفته است و به قوّت طبیعت و اثر نفس در مادون خود که آن نبات است تصرّف می کند.

[§۱۵۸] و سوّم صراط مستقیم چون انسان که او سر بجانب محیط دارد و پای بجانب مرکز، و اگرچه به اضافه با فرشته به عالم اختیار محض نرسیده است امّا به اضافه با حیوان رسیده است و به قوّت طبیعت و اثر نفس و فیض عقلی و تأیید کلمهٔ اعلی در مادون خود یعنی حیوان و نبات و انعقاد تصرّف می کند.

[§۱۵۹] وآنکه صراط از موی باریکتر است و از شمشیر تیزتر آن است که نفس انسانی که به اوّل وهله در محل قوّت می باشد امکان دارد که چون به فعل آید فرشته ئی کریم باشد یا دیو رجیم. و از این دو طرف [٤٦] یعنی فرشتگی و دیوی، بهرطرف که بمثقال ذرّه ئی میل کند آن میل یا موجب مزید قوّت فرشتگی گردد یا موجب مزید قوّت دیوی.

[§۱٦۰] و آنکه صراط مردی است: اگر از حکم جُمل هاگیرند تا مردی نمی باشد که اثبات این صراط ها بکند هیچکس نام صراط برزبان نمی تواند گرفت و منکوس و مقلوب و مستقیم آن بنمی تواند دانست. باین سبب حقیقت صراط مردی باشد. و اگر از حکم تفصیل هاگیرند هر معنی ذهنی را که در عالم کلی هست، در عالم جزوی شخصی عینی باشد، پس هر صراط ذهنی را شخصی

شخص بهشت و آن یك شخص دوزخ.

[§۱۵٤] امّا برازخ: میان چیزی که به چیزی متوجه شود و دفعةً واحدةً به آن نرسد هرآینه وقفه ئی باشد، آن وقفه را برزخ می گویند. مثلاً می باید که حسّی وهمی شود و وهمی نفسی و نفسی عقلی و عقلی امری، تا مادام که ترقی هریك ازاینها بر دیگریك شیئاً بعد شیء به ترتیب و تدریج و اضافات باشد وقفه ئی باشد بعد از وقفه ئی و به این جهت برازخ و مقامات گویند.

[§۱۵۵] و همچنین میان خلق و امر برزخی است و میان امر و ثواب برزخی، و برزخی که میان خلق و امر است قوی تر است از برزخی که میان امر و ثواب است، و چون محسوسات دالّ اند بر معقولات، و ما در عالم محسوسیم، بضرورت از محسوس بر معقول مان دلیل باید گرفت و آن اینست که چون طفل در این عالم از رحم مادر بیرون می آید، تا صورت خلقی یعنی جسم، کامل نمی شود بامر در نمی پیوندد. و آنجا درآن عالم بر این تقدیر، تا صورت امری یعنی نفس کامل نمی شود ثواب در نپیوندد. پس آن حال که پس ازآنکه از این عالم بشود و پیش ازآنکه به ثواب رسد برزخ خوانند. و از این عالم بشدن نه این موت طبیعی است بل از مشابهت به مباینت رسیدن است و از مباینت به وحدت. والسّلام.

[§۱۵٦] امّا صراط سه است: اوّل صراط منکوس چون نبات که او را اصل بجانب مرکز است و فرع بجانب محیط و به قوّت طبیعت و اثر نفس درمادون خود که آن انعقاد است تصرّف می کند.

[§۱۵۷] دوم صراطی است مقلوب، چون حیوان که او دو دست و

طرف محقّان مردی می افتد که او بهشتی می باشد درعالم و عالمی در بهشت، و در طرف مبطلان مردی می افتد که او دوزخی می باشد درعالم و عالمی در دوزخ.

[§۱۵۲] و تفصیل آنکه هر طاعت و عبادت و [هر] حرکتی از حرکات خیر چون نماز و روزه و صدقه و علیهَذا شخصی است که چون خواهند که به آنها اشارت کنند به او اشارت باید کرد که مشارٌإلیه آن خیرات و حسنات باشد و فاعل آن. و هر هوای هاویه و معصیت و [هر] حرکتی از حرکات شرّ چون دزدی و دروغ و زنا و علیَهذا شخصی است که چون خواهند که به آن اشارت کنند به او اشارت باید کرد که [او] مشارٌإلیه آن شرّ و آن سیئه باشد و فاعل آن.

[§۱۵۳] و نیز هر فکر حقّ و قول صدق و عمل خیر روحانیتی ست یعنی فرشته ئی که نفس را در ترقی استعداد چنان دهد که قطع طریق کمالات ولحُوُق و وصول به کلّ مبدأ خود بر او آسان شود. پس این نفس فرشته ء کریم باشد و روحانیات فکری و قولی و فعلی همه اجزاء و آثار او وآن فرشته کریم به حکم **وَلَوْجَعَلْنَاهُ مَلَكاً لَجَعَلْنَاهُ رَجُلاً** مردی باشد. و علی العکس هر فکر باطل و قول کذب و عمل شرّ قوّتی باشد از قوتهای شیطانی که نفس را [از] درکه ء بدرکه ء تا [به] اسفل سافلین افکند، پس این نفس دیو رجیم باشد و آن قوتهای روحانی همه [۴۵] اجزاء و آثار او و این نفس شیطانی به حکم شیاطین الجنّ والانس هم مردی باشد، آن یك

آلت های کمال نفس اویند، می پیوندد آن کمال به مثابت بهشت او باشد و آن نقصانی که از آنش بر باید گذشت و به این رسید، به مثابت دوزخ او. مثلاً حال رحم که آنجا بود به مثابت دوزخ او و حال فضای این عالم که به اینجا آمد به مثابت بهشت او، و آن حال که در روشنائی آفتاب چشم باز نتواند کرد به مثابت دوزخ و آن حال که به آن مقام رسید به مثابت بهشت او، و آن حال که نتواند گفت و نتواند رفت به مثابت دوزخ او [٤٤] و آن حال که به آن مقام رسید به مثابت بهشت او، و آن حال که نتواند خواند و نتواند نوشت به مثابت دوزخ او و آن حال که به آن مقام رسید به مثابت بهشت او، و آن حال که بحدّ بلوغ نرسیده باشد و عقل غریزی در او نه پیوسته و آداب و هنرهای بزم و رزم و عزم و جزم نه دانسته به مثابت دوزخ او و آن حال که به آن مقام رسید به مثابت بهشت او. و آن حال که از معرفت دقایق حقّ و باطل و خیر و شرّ و صدق و کذب بیگانه باشد و به شناخت جسد خود بر احوال عالم جسمانی و به شناخت روح خود بر احوال عالم روحانی وقوف و اطلاع نیابد و از معنی مَنْ عَرَفَ نَفْسَهُ فَقَدْعَرَفَ رَبَهُ در حجاب ماند عین دوزخ او و آن حال که به آن مقام رسید عین بهشت او.

[§۱۵۱] و آنکه بهشت مردی ست و دوزخ مردی این سخن را جُمل و تفصیل است: جُمل آنکه چون کمال غایت فکر و قول و فعل خلائق عالم که بهری محقّ اند و بهری مبطل معیّن کنند در

آنکه دو دست از زمین بر گرفته باشد به هیچ تمیز و خاصیّت دیگر إلاّماشاءالله از حیوان جدائی ندارد، و بسیاری دیده اند که بوزینه از زنگی تعلیم پذیرتر بوده و دریابنده تر، تا مردمانِ راست صورتِ متناسب خلقت و متعادل بُنیتِ مستوی قد و قامت با غایت جمال و بهاء، مردمانی در امور معیشت کافی و داهی و در کیاست و حذاقت بارع و متمیّز و در فنون هر حرفت و صنعت که عمارت و زینت و طراوت این عالم کون و فساد و اسباب معاش عالمیان به آن باز بسته باشد ماهر و کامل و در مکارم اخلاق نادر و عجائب تا اکابر و اشراف، تا اصحاب مناصب و ارباب مراتب، تا پادشاهانی که به رأی و تدبیر و دست و شمشیر ضبط اقالیم و آفاق عالم بتوانند کرد و تا اهل علم یکی بالای دیگری تا عالمان [ربّانی] که آخر مرتبه ایشان به اوّل مرتبه ملائکه پیوسته است.

[§۱۴۸] وفرشته از کلّ انسان، به روئی که دارد یعنی تقرّب به کل مبدأ وجود، شریف تر است و آخر مرتبهٔ فرشتگی به اوّل مرتبهٔ حدود قُدْسی پیوسته است و مرتبه ی حدود قدسی آن است که لیس ماورائهُ غایةٌ للطالب.

[§۱۴۹] و براین تقدیر از معادن گرفته تا جوهر کانی، تانبات، تاحیوان، تا انسان، تا ملائکه، تا حدود قدسی، هرچه ماوراست به اضافه بامادون به مثابت بهشت است و هرچه مادون است به اضافه باماوراء به مثابت دوزخ.

[§۱۵۰] و اگر این معنی در انسان تنها گویند چنین توان گفت که چون طفل از مادر بزاید هرکمالی که به جسم و حواسّ او، که

که دارد شریف تر است و چون از اوّل هاگیرند و یکی به یکی رسانند آخر او به اوّل قوّت نمائی پیوسته است، امّا به أثر ضعیف، چون درخت بُسَّد که او را قوّت عقدی و نمائی هر دو هست.

[§١٤٥] و نبات از کلّ جواهر کانی به سبب قوّت زائد نموّ که دارد شریف تر است، و چون از اوّل هاگیرند و یکی بیکی رسانند، مثلاً از گیاهی به باریکی چون موی و به نازکی چون قطره آب، تا درختان بلندِ با اصل و فرع که ایشان را تولیدِ مِثْل باشد، آخر او به اوّل قوّت حیوانی پیوسته است، امّا به اثر ضعیف چون درخت خرما که تا او را از خارج گُشْن نمی دهند بار نمی آورد و اگر سرش بمی برند اصل وفرعش نمی جوشد.

[§١٤٦] و حیوان از کلّ نباتات به سبب قوّتی زائد و حسّ و حرکتی که دارد شریف تر است، و چون از اوّل او هاگیرند و یکی به یکی رسانند، مثلاً از پشه و مگس و کرمی که از عفونت هوا و مواد گوناگون بادیدار آید، تا مرغان که تکوین ایشان از بیضه باشد تا حیوانات تمام خلقت و قوی هیکل که تولد ایشان از صُلب و رحم باشد، آخر او به اوّل قوّت انسانی پیوسته است، امّا به اثر ضعیف چون بوزینه که او در چهره و فهم و ادراك بانسان تشبّه می کند [٤٣] و بعضی حرکات و اعمال انسانی به تعلیم بمی آموزد.

[§١٤٧] وانسان از کلّ حیوانات به قوّت زائد و به نطق و تمییزی که دارد شریف تر است، و چون از اوّل هاگیرند و یکی به یکی رسانند، مثلاً از زنگی در زنگبار ــ در آخر جنوب ــ که بیرون از

ابتدا کند و هَمْ آنجا هاایستد، آن تصور عین دوزخ او باشد در نفس او، و نفس او درعین دوزخ او. و اگر [از] تصور نفسی ابتدا کند و همانجا هاایستد آن تصور اثر بهشت او باشد در نفس او، و نفس او دراثر بهشت او. و اگر از تصور عقلی ابتدا کند و هم آنجا هاایستد آن تصور عین بهشت او باشد درنفس او، و نفس او در عین [۴۲] بهشت او.

[۱۴۲§] و نیز بهشت حقیقی عقل مستقیم است یعنی به امر متّحد، مثلاً: حسّی وهمی، وهمی نفسی و نفسی عقلی یَتَدرّجُ حِسّهُ فِی وَهمِه و وَهمُهُ فی نَفْسِه ونفسُهُ فی عقلِه وإطمأنت إلی معرفت العقل الساذجه راجعة إلی رَبِها راضیه. و دوزخ حقیقی عقل منکوس است یعنی از امر منفصل، مثلاً: عقلی نفسی و نفسی وهمی و وهمی حسی یتدرّك عقله فی نفسه و نفسه فی وهمه و وهمه فی حسّه و حسه إلی الهاویة و بئس المصیر.

[۱۴۳§] و آنکه بالای هر ثواب ثوابی است تا آنجا که مرد با خدا رسد، یعنی بالای هر بهشت بهشتی است یعنی هر قطع کمال بهشتی است بالای بهشتی تا به کمال آخر که **أنَّ إلی رَبِّك المُنتهاها [و] إنّ إلی ربِّك الرُّجعی.**

[۱۴۴§] امّا بهشت های اضافی کمالات است به حسب اضافات، و اگر این معنی از معادن و نبات و حیوان و انسان هاگیرند و با ملائکه و حدود قدسی رسانند چنین توان گفت که جوهر کانی از کلّ معادن به سبب قوّت زائد به صفا و لون و شفافی و خاصیّتی

مفارقت نفس از بدن بباشد، اگر میل نفس به همه‌ء وجوه بکسب فوائد معقولات بوده باشد و ظلّ حواس حجاب نورِ اختیار او نشده، ابداً در لذّت بی أَلم و سرُور بی حُزن و حیات بی موت بماند، و همه آن باشد که او را باید.

[§١٤٠] و اگر میل او به همه‌ء وجوه بکسب لذّت محسوسات بوده باشد، چون حواس که آلت ادراك آن لذّتهای محسوسات بوده باشد از او هاگیرند لامحاله در ظلمت خیال فاسد و وهم کاذب بماند، و همه آن باشد که او را نباید، و مَثل او مَثل مردی باشد نیم کشته و دو چشم بر کنده و بینی و زبان و دست و پای بریده و اندام و اعضایش قطع نموده و او نه مرده و نه زنده افتاده و خیال لذّتهای که او به آن آلات جسدانی توانستی یافت بر او غالب و مستولی شده [و] نا اُمیدی ابدی از آنکه هرگز به آن نتواند رسید حاصل آمده و حسرت کُبری و ندامت عُظمی لازم حال او گشته و معنی إنّماهی اعْمالُكُم تَرُدّ إلَيْكُم معاینه افتاده و چندانکه خواهد که او را یك بار دیگر با دنیا گذارند ــ تا آن کند که باید کرد ــ البته بنگذارند و او را آن تضرع و زاری که **نُرَدُّ فَنَعْمَلَ غَيْرَ الّذى كُنّا نَعْمَلُ** سود ندارد و آن دوزخ حقیقی باشد. نعُوذُبالله منها.

[§١٤١] و نیز بهشت و دوزخ مردم بر حسب حاصل تَصُّور مردم است و تصور مردم از این اقسام بر نه می تواند گذشت: تصور حسّی و تصور نفسی و تصور عقلی. اگر تصور از ادراکات حسّی

وآداب و قواعد و قوانین محتاج نباشند در آن تهاون کنند و مقاساة آن شدائد واغلال وآصار بر خویشتن فرض عین نشمارند، شریعت آن پیغمبر هرگز پای هازمین نیاورد واستقرار آن ملّت به هیچ وجه از وجوه ممکن نگردد.

[§۱۳۷] و نیز کون مشابهت که در او محقّ و مبطل و صادق وکاذب و خیِّر و شریر بهم میمانند و آنجا دیو ناخدای مناظره و داوری می کند دوزخ مطلق است. وکون مباینت که در او مُحِقّ و مُبطل و صادق و کاذب و خیِّر و شریر از هم جدا می باشند و آنجا دیو گِرد جناب عزّت صمدیّت نتواند گردید، بهشت مطلق.

[§۱۳۸] و عباراتِ تنزیلی از کون مشابهت است و بکثرت خاصّ و بر طبیعت دوزخ، و معانیِ تأویلی از کون مباینت است و به وحدت خاصّ [و] بر طبیعت بهشت. وهرکه از کون مشابهت به کون [۴۱] مباینت نرسد و از عبارات تنزیلی طلب معانی تأویلی نکند و به آن نرسد از اهل دوزخ باشد، و هرکه از کون مشابهت به کون مباینت رسد و از عبارات تنزیلی طلب معانی تأویلی کند و به آن برسد از اهل بهشت است. ونیز اختیار محض یعنی همه آن باشد که او را باید، بهشت حقیقی، و جبر محض یعنی همه آن باشد که وی را نباید، دوزخ حقیقی.

[§۱۳۹] و لذّت نفس از ادراک معقولات باشد که تعلّق بفکر حق و قول صدق و عمل خیر دارد و لذّت جسم از ادراک محسوسات باشد که تعلّق به لمس و ذوق و شمّ و سمع و بصر دارد. و چون

[§١٣٥] و اگر بهشت و دوزخ حقیقی چنانکه اعتقاد بیشتری از اهل اسلام است جایگاهی بود معمور[٣٤] از مواد جسمانی و مرکب از اشیاء هیولانی ــ مثلاً [٤٠] بهشت باغ و بوستانی با فضای هرچه بی اندازه تر مزیّن بانهار و اشجار و حور و قصور و آب و شیر و انگبین و شراب و دیگر نعمتهای گوناگون از اطعمه و اشربه که ایشان بر می شمارند، و مثلاً دوزخ مغاکی با طول و عرض و عمق هرچه عظیم تر و ابداً و دائماً پر آتش و ماران و کژدمان سهمناکِ بی قیاس که دندان و نیش میزنند، و زنجیرها چنانکه گفته اند بآتش بتافته و سرخ کرده و هر گرهی برآن چون کوهی که دوزخیان را در آتش اندازند و به آن عذاب کنند ــ هیچ فرق نبودی میان دنیا و آخرت. بلکه حالت بهشت در اعلی علیین و حالت دوزخ در اسفل سافلین از عظیمی ئی که هست وَهْم و فکر هیچکس در آن نمی رسد. و پیغمبران که از بهشت و دوزخ به این اوصاف جسمانی خبر داده اند همه سخنانی است بر حَسَبِ مقادیر عقول که از برای ترغیب و ترهیب گفته اند تا عوام به آن سبب بطاعت میل کنند و از معصیت بپرهیزند.

[§١٣٦] وخواص خود بر اسرار و حقایق آن واقف باشند و به حکم سیروا سیر اضْعَفِکم، وآنکه جامه برنگ صید باید پوشید، از روی ظاهر و شکل به حکم مصلحت عامّ به آن ایمان آورند و به آن کار کنند، نه که اضْعافاً مُضاعَفةً از عوام در آن راغب تر و بجدّ تر، که اگر ایشان که در حصول کمال و شرف نفس به آن رسوم

بالای هر دو محتاج. و این هر دو خطای عظیم باشد و کفر صریح. والسّلام.

تصور پانزدهم

در بهشت و بهشت ها و دوزخ و دوزخ ها و برازخ و صراط ها

[§۱۳۳] هیچ کس به حجّت نتواند گفت که در این عالم حقّ و باطل نیست، زیرا که اگر گوید حقّی نیست از نفی حقّ اثبات باطل لازم آید و اگر گوید باطلی نیست از نفی باطل اثبات حقّ لازم آید. و چون قرار گرفت که حقّ و باطل هست، قرار گرفته باشد که مُحِقّ و مُبطِل هست. و معلوم است که محق و مبطل را هر یك فکری و قولی و فعلی هست. فکر و قول و فعل محق، حق و راست وخیر، و فکر و قول و فعل مبطل باطل و دروغ و شرّ. و بر فکر و قول و فعل هریك به حکم **لِيَجزِیَ الذینَ أسَاءُوا بِمَا عَمِلوا وَيَجزِیَ الذّینَ أحْسَنُوا بِالحُسْنَی** جزائی واجب و متوّجه. جزای محق ثواب و جزای مبطل عقاب.

[§۱۳٤] وعالم ثواب را بهشت خوانند و عالم عقاب را دوزخ. و بهشت حقیقی یکی بیش نیست و آن ثواب ابدی و کمال سرمدی و وجود نامتناهی است و معنی اینها همه با خدا رسیدن است به همهٔ وجوه، و دوزخ حقیقی هم بیش از یکی نیست و آن عقاب ابدی و خذلان سرمدی و عدم نامتناهی، و معنی اینها همه از خدای بیفتادن است به همهٔ وجوه.

بر مأثم و خطیئات از سر فطرت بمی افتند و به آن دعوت و تکلیف که مَثَل آن با نفوس نیکان همچون طبیعت اکسیر است که در جوهر مس تأثیر می کند و آن را عیار زر خالص می دهد، آن مکتسبات نا صواب [را] از یاد باز میبرند و با فطرت اولی می رسانند ــ نه از برای بدان و آنکه بدی نیک شود که حاصل بدان در دعوت و تکلیف این است که: **لَیْسَ لَهُ دَعْوَةٌ فِی الدُّنیا** [۳۹] **وَلا فِی الآخِرَةِ.**

[۱۳۱§] ونیز اگر کسی گوید که فعل خلق متناهی ست، چرا از حضرت صمدیّت به جزاء نامتناهی مأخوذ می آید؟ یعنی چرا گناه متناهی را عقوبت نامتناهی می آید؟ جواب این است که از حضرت صمدیّت گناه متناهی را عقوبت نامتناهی نمی آید، امّا همچنان که نفوس نیکان بِه طَبْع مستحق ثواب می گردند و ابداً سرمداً در سرور و بهجت و لذّت و سعادت بمی مانند، نفوس بدان به طبع[۳۳] مستحق عقاب می گردند و ابداً سرمداً در آن ندامت عظمی و مصیبت کبری بمی مانند. نَعُوذُبِاللّه منها.

[۱۳۲§] و به این دلائل و مقدمات شناخته گردد که شرّ در ابداع وجود ندارد و خیر و شر را دو مبدأ نیست. و هرکه اثبات این دو مصدر متضادّ کند و یزدان را مصدر نور و خیر داند و اهرمن را مصدر ظلام و شرّ، یزدان و اهرمن را بدو ضّد هانهاده باشد و هرجا که ضّد با میان آید همچون دو خصم باشند [و] به حاکمی

۳۳. ظاهراً به تَبَع. نگاه کنید به یانوشت ۳۲.

[§۱۲۹] اگر کسی گوید چون نفوس بَدانْ، آن بدی از گوهر می آورند ــ که از آنند ــ چرا محقّان لذکرهم السّلام با ایشان جهاد میفرمایند و ایشان را تکلیف می کنند که نیك باشند؟ جواب اینست که همچنان که در مقدّمه گفته شد، نیکان از گوهرحقّند و بدان از گوهر[۳۲] باطل، و در این دنیا که کون مشابهت است نیکان و بدان هر دو بصورت و شکل بهم میمانند و محقّان را دعوی دعوت نه این است که ما بدی را نیك میکنیم، بلکه ایشان امر الهی [را] که مباینت نیکان و بدان به آن می باشد بر خلایق عالم همی رانند تانیکان به حکم: خُلِقَ اَلْمُؤمِنُ مِن [نُور] الحَقّ وإذا اَمرَ الحْقّ به عَرَفَهُ از بدان جدا می شوند و بدان به حکم **وَجَحَدُوا بِها واسْتَيْقَنَتْهآ أنْفُسُهم ظُلماً وَعُلُوّاً** از نیکان جدا باز می شوند. تا چون این مباینت بباشد، بدان را به حکم **لِئلاّ يَكُونَ لِلناسِ عَلَى اللهِ حُجَّةٌ بَعْدَ الرُسُلِ** بر او تعالی بهانه و حجّتی بنماند و محقّان لذکرهم السّلام اوّل به حکم **أُدْعُ إلى سَبِيْلِ رَبِّك بِالحِكْمَةِ وَالْمُوعِظَةِ الْحَسَنَةَ** حجّت الهی بر ایشان متوجّه می دارند و پس از آن به حکم **وَجَادِلْهُمْ بِالّتِى هِيَ أحسَنُ** حکم شمشیر بر ایشان می رانند و ایشانرا به مقاتلت و محاربت از کون مشابهت بیرون میکنند.

[§۱۳۰] و دعوت و تکلیف محقّان از برای نیکان است ــ و نیکان به اوّل وهله در این عالم به مکتسبات ناصواب و ارتکاب

۳۲. در تمام نسخ "گوهر" احتمالاً باید شکل جمله چنین باشد: و بدان از نیافتن حق در باطل...چراکه مصنّف [§۱۲۶] منشأ و مبدائی برای شرّ قائل نیست.

است و نیافتن توانگری درویشی است و نیافتن روز شب، نیافتن خیر [نیز] شر است.

[§١٢٧] و نیز همچنان که عقول جزوی که به عاقلان پیوسته است آثار عقل اوّل است که بامر او تعالی موجود شده، جهل جزوی [نیز] که بجاهلان پیوسته است آثار جهل اوّل است که به تقابل تضادّ در مقابل عقل اوّل آمده است تِلكَ النَّكْراء وَتِلْكَ الشَّيطنةُ وهَی شَبيهةٌ بِالعقلِ ولَيستْ بالْعَقْلِ. و به این سبب در نفوس تضادّ و ترّتب است که نفسی می باشد که در جانب ترتّب بر طرف کمال چنان می افتد که چون از قوّت به فعل می آید بهترین آفرینش می باشد و نفسی می باشد که در جانب تضادّ بر نقصان چنان می افتد که چون از قوّت به فعل می آید بدترین آفرینش می باشد. و نفسی می باشد [٣٨] که در جانب وسط روئی با خیر دارد و روئی با شرّ.

[§١٢٨] و همچنین که در نفوس تضادّ و ترتّبی هست، در موادّ اجسام همچنین تضادّ و ترتّب است که بعضی [از] مواد بر طرف اعلا می افتند و بعضی بر طرف اسفل و بعضی بر طرف وسط. و براین موجب به حکم کلُّ شیءٍ یرجِعُ إلی اصلِه مادّتی نیك می باشد ونفسی نیك [که] این قابل آن می شود وآن متصرّف دراین. ومادّتی بد می باشد و نفسی بد که این قابل آن می شود وآن متصرّف در این و مادّتی متوسطه می باشد میان نیك و بد ونفسی همچنین که این قابل آن می شود و آن متصرّف در این.

[§۱۲٤] وچون دانش و بینش ما به عواقب امور محیط نمی تواند شد و به رأی و قیاس خود اختیار حقّ نمی توانیم کرد از اختیار نا حقّ ما شرّ بمیان می آید. مثلاً احتیاج به متعلّم خاص است و خیر او در آن، و استغنا به معلّم خاص است و خیر او در آن. چون ما به متعلّمی گردن هانه نهیم وخواهیم که معلّم باشیم، احتیاج که بما لایق است و خیر ما در آن، از دست بدهیم و استغنائی که بما لایق نیست و شرّ ما در آن است خود را تصّور کنیم و از آن خیر برآئیم و در آن شرّ افتیم. نعُوذُبالله منه.

[§۱۲٥] و نیز شرکلّی و شّر جزوی باز باید دانست. مثلاً شرّ جزوی آن باشد که آتش در خانه زاهد افتد و دستار و جامهء او بسوزد و شرکلّی آنکه وجود آتش از عالم بر گرفته شود. و همچنین شرّ جزوی آنکه سیلی در خانهء قومی اطفال و ضعفا و فقرا افتد و آنرا خراب کند، و شر کلّی آنکه وجود آب از عالم بر گرفته شود. پس اسم شرّ بر ذات و فعل آتش و آب نمی نشیند به حقیقت، بلکه به مجاز و اضافه و عرض.

[§۱۲٦] ونیز وجود را در این عالم سبب می باید و عدم را سبب نمی باید، و توانگری را سبب می باید و درویشی را سبب نمی باید، مثلاً روز را سبب می باید و شب را سبب نمی باید. روز را سبب می باید و آن سبب خورشید است که از افق آسمان [می] تابد و شب را سبب نمی باید زیرا که خورشید غائب می شود و شب خود به همه حال می باشد. پس همچنان که نیافتن وجود عدم

[§۱۲۱] و از سبب های آن یکی آن است که خیر ضعیف بدایت است و قوی نهایت، و شرّ قوی بدایت است و ضعیف نهایت. پس چون خیر که او را بدایت ضعیف است ابتداء می کند شرّ در مقابل او به قوّت بدایتی که دارد پدید می آید و چنانکه خیر ضعیف تر می باشد شرّ قوی تر می نماید تا در آخر حقّ که آنجا قوّت خیر که بتدریج ابتداء کرده باشد بنهایت رسد و شرّ نیست و ناچیز گردد.

[§۱۲۲] و نیز قَدَرْ تقدیر اوّل است که بامر اوّل بر عقل اوّل برفته است و قضا تکلیف اوّل است که بامر اوّل بر لوح اوّل ثبت گشته است. و معنی تقدیر اوّل به حکم مثل چنانست که کسی خواهد >[۳۱] که سرائی سازد و اوّل اساس دیوار و خانه های آن هااندازد و معنی قضا هم به حکم مثل آنکه آن سرای با هرچه آنرا باید ساخته گردد.

[§۱۲۳] و بر قضا و قدر دو فرشته که یکی را سابق [سائق؟] خوانند و یکی را شهید موکل اند تا ایشان همهٔ موجودات را به کمال و غایتی که بهر یك خاص است و ایشان را بسوی آن آفریده اند بر می انگیزند و قصد ایشان خیر کلی است و در حرکت ایشان خیر مُضمر، و این شرّ که اینجا بامیان می آید نه از جهت قضا [۳۷] و قدر است بلکه از جهت آن است که حجابهای حسی و خیالی و وهمی در پیش نظرِ فکرت [و] بصیرت هامی ایستد و به آن سبب اختیار ما صواب نمی باشد.

---

۳۱. آغاز مجدد M.

[§۱۱۸] و بر این تقدیر عالم سه است: عالم عقلانی خیر محض، و عالم نفسانی خیر و شرّ باهم آمیخته، و عالم جسمانی شرّ محض. و هر یك از این عالمها را اهلی است. اهل عالم عقلانی اهل وحدت اند و اهل عالم نفسانی اهل [۳۶] ترتّب و اهل عالم جسمانی اهل تضادّ و حکم تضادّ اختلاف اهل دنیا است و حکم ترتّب اتّفاق اهل شرع و حکم وحدت اتّحاد اهل قیامت.

[§۱۱۹] و هرکه از اختلاف اهل دنیا روی باتّفاق اهل شرع نهد و از اتّفاق اهل شرع باتّحاد اهل قیامت رسد، به اضافه با او شرّ را به عین و اثر وجود نباشد، چه اعمال جسمانی او مناسب آثار روحانی شود و آثار روحانی مناسب انوار عقلانی.

[§۱۲۰] و نیز خیر از واهب الخیر به ذات فائض می شود و شرّ به عَرَض در راه ها میآید، مثلاً خیر همچون دانه گندم تصور کن که در زمین ریزند و آب هاآن کنند، و شرّ چون کَفی که در راهگذر آب از اجزای ترابی حاصل آید و بر روی آب بنشیند. و معلوم است که آن کف از راه گذر آب پدید می آید [و] نه از اصل و جوهر آب است و همچنان که وقتی باشد که غلبه و استیلا و قوّت [آن] برروی آب بدرجهٔ رسد که آب نبینند و پندارند که آب خود نیست، همه کف است. و وقتی باشد که غلبه و استیلاء قوّت شرّ بر خیر بدرجهٔ رسد که خیر نبینند و پندارند که خیر خود نیست و همه شرّ است و نزدیك باشد که نور خیر فرو نشیند و فساد در عالم آشکارا شود.

[§۱۱۵] فساد این تصور آن است که به این کس که گوید مبدأ دو است گویند به فتوای تو مبدأ دو است، بگوی تا این دو مبدأ در وجود و قدرت و احاطت با یکدیگر برابرند بی زیادت و نقصان یا نه، [۳۰]‹ یا یکی بخیر اولی باشد و یکی به شرّ؟ و اگر برابر نه اند لازم آید که یکی زاید باشد و یکی ناقص، و زائد محیط و ناقص محاط. و زائدِ محیط به مبدأ اولی باشد نه ناقص محاط. پس این دو مبدأ از این وجه که ایشان می گویند خیر و شرّ را نیست و کلّ اشیاء را یك مبدأ است و آن یك مبدأ امر او تعالی است.

[§۱۱۶] و معلوم است که خیر از لوازم کمال است و کمال از لوازم خیر و شرّ از لوازم نقصان است و نقصان از لوازم شرّ، پس خیر محض آنجاست که کمال مطلق است و شرّ محض آنجا که نقصان مطلق است، و خیر و شرّ بهم آمیخته آنجا که کمال و نقصان باهم آمیخته.

[§۱۱۷] مثلاً چون عقل اوّل از کلّ موجودات به جوهر شریف تر است و به وجود کاملتر و به درجه عالیتر، کمال مطلق اوراست، پس آنجا که اوست خیر محض است. وچون نفس کلّی از عقل اوّل به جوهر و وجود و درجه قاصر است و یك روی باکمال دارد و یك روی با نقصان، کمال و نقصان باهم آمیخته او راست. و چون جسم کلّ در عین نقصان است {و} نقصان مطلق اوراست، پس آنجا که اوست شرّ محض است.

---

۳۰. آغاز افتادگی در M.

نگردند.

[§۱۱۲] و علم تعلیمی آن است که چون آن علم از آثار قدرت او تعالی به آثار علم او تعالی ترقی کند و بحث احوال معرفت آن رود مسائلی بامیان آید که در آن به تعلیم معلم کلّی محتاج باشند، مثلاً آنکه تا معرفت توحید او تعالی چنان شرح دهد که نه تشبیهی لازم آید و نه تعطیلی، و آنکه صدور اشیاء از امراو تعالی [و] اعادتشان [به امر] او تعالی چنان تقریر کند که کثرتی به ذات او حواله نیفتد، و آنکه او را تعالی وحدتی که از آن وحدت منزّه باشد به چه وجه [**۳۵**] گویند؟

[§۱۱۳] و علم تأییدی آن است که چون در امثال این مسائل که گفته شد رُجوع با معلم کلّی کنند اگر تعلیم او مقدر باشد بر ظواهر عبارات و شیئاً بعد شیء به ترتیب و تدریج و اضافات قبول کنند تعلیمش خوانند و اگر مقدّر باشد بر بواطن و معانی [و] دفعةً واحدةً قبول کنند تأییدش خوانند. والسّلام.

تصور چهاردهم

درخیر و شرّ و آنکه شرّرا در ابداع وجودی نیست و وجودی که او را در این عالم می نماید چیست

[§۱۱٤] مردم چون در این عالم خیر و شرّی می بینند بعضی چنان می پندارند که خیر را مبدائی است و شرّ را مبدائی، چنانکه گبران را اعتقاد چنانست که یزدان مبدائی است و اهرمن مبدائی. نسبت نور و خیر به یزدان می کنند و نسبت ظلام و شرّ به اهرمن.

[§۱۱۱] و علم نظری آن است که در آن با بدیهه‌ء عقل به استعمال فکر خود محتاج باشند، مثلاً اوّل نظر کنند تا بدانند که خلق نبود پس ببود و دیگر بار نظر کنند تا بدانند که بودن او نه به اختیار او بود که اگر به اختیار او بودی ـــ هر کمال و مطلوب و مرتبه که او را بایستی با او برابر آفریده شدی ـــ و او اثر کننده بودی نه اثر پذیر و متصرّف احوال خود بودی به آنچه خواستی و هر اثر که پذیرفتی به اختیار خود پذیرفتی. و دیگر بار نظر کنند تا بدانند که نه چنین است و او اثر پذیر است نه اثرکننده و متصرّف احوال خود نمی تواند بود و البته او را در هر اثری که می پذیرد هیچ اختیاری نیست. و دیگر بار نظر کنند تا بدانند که آن اثر که اومی پذیرد از غیر اوست و اگر آن غیر نیز همچون او اثر پذیر باشد و آن دیگر همچنین إلی مالایتناهی مسئله متسلسل شود و هرگز به فیصله نرسد.

ودیگر بار نظر کنند تا بدانند که به ضرورت باید که نهایت این اثر پذیرندگان به اثر کننده مطلق رسد و او اثر کننده باشد نه اثر پذیر. و دیگر بار نظر کنند تا بدانند که آن اثر کننده مطلق مؤثر است و مؤثر صانع و خالق عالم است جلّ جلاله.

و دیگر بار نظر کنند تا بدانند که ابتداء اشیاء حسّی و صفات اعلا به او جلّ وعلا سزاوار است و این همه با هر چه به آثار قدرت او تعالی [نسبت] دارد و بحث احوال معرفت آن برود، به نظری بالای نظری بشناسند و در آن به تعلیم هیچ کس محتاج

طریق یَزید ولایَنقُصْ روی از قوّت به فعل نهاده واز علم و عقل و تصورات حقّ هر صورت که قبول می کند موجب کمال او می گردد.
[§۱۰۹] هر موصوفی که صفت را وجود دهد وحدت، وحقّ چون وحدت ‹ را وجود دهد موصوف صفت را وجود داده باشد. و وحدت چون [کثرت] باطل را وجود دهد صفت موصوف را وجود داده باشد. و چون وحدت از حق [وجودش] وجود حقیقی، و وجود[کثرت] باطل از وحدت [وجودش] وجودی مجازی.›[۲۸]
والسّلام.

تصور سیزدهم
در انواع علوم چون ضروری ونظری وتعلیمی وتأییدی

[§۱۱۰] علم ضروری که آنرا بدیهی خوانند آن است که ادراك آن بوهم و حس و خیال توان کرد و در آن [نه] باستعمال فکر خود محتاج باشند [و] نه به تعلیم غیر. مثلاً چون علم کلّ و جزء، که ببدیهه‌ء حال دانند که کلّ از جزء بزرگتر است و آنکه از پیشان خانه تا بدرگاه [۳٤] هم چندانکه از درگاه تا به پیشان [که] بر عاقل یك معنی و بر جاهل دو می نماید. مثلاً دریاها خون نشده است و کوهسار زر نشده است. ‹ مثلاً آنکه یك چیز در یك وقت در دو مکان نتواند بود امّا در [دو] وقت شاید.›[۲۹]

---

۲۸. بعد از کلمه وحدت متن در تمام نسخ مغلوط و درهم ریخته است.
۲۹. M: ندارد.

قوّت است بحرارت به فعل تواند آمد و نفس های گرم متواتر و متعاقب در او میدمد و چون به آن رسد که تکوین بچه در بیضه بیابد، وقت آنهم بداند و بیضه را بشکافد و بچه را بدر آورد.

[§۱۰۶] و بر عقل پوشیده نیست که این همه تمییز ذاتی فکری است متشابه به تمییز انسان، پس این تمییز فکری مطلقاً بانسان خاصّ نیست و چون به او خاص نباشد فصل ذاتی او را نشاید. پس فصل ذاتی خاصیّت بزرگترین اوست. و خاصیّت بزرگترین او ادای علم است مِنْ حَیْثُ الاداء والقَبول أوْ مِن حَیْثُ السّمع. و براین وجه انسان به حقیقت و فصل ذاتی او آن است که علم از ماورای خود به حکم قبول هاگیرد و بر مادون خود به حکم ادا فیض کند. والسّلام.

تصور دوازدهم
در کمالاتی که صفت موصوف و موصوف صفت را دهد باذن اللّه تعالی

[§۱۰۷] کمالی که موصوف صفت را دهد آن است که آن موصوف نفسی باشد بر خیر مَفطور، و آن خیر در او از قوّت به فعل آمده و آن صفت از جمله اخلاق باشد، و چون آن کس استعمال آن اخلاق کند آن اخلاق به او صورت مکارم و معالی پذیرد.

[§۱۰۸] کمالی که صفت موصوف را دهد آن است که آن صفت از جمله علمیّات وعقلیّات و تصورات حقّ باشد وآن موصوف نفسی خیّر باشد، امّا هنوز آن خیر در او از قوّت به فعل نیامده و بر

فیه ــ که مسلّم فراگرفته اند و بحث احوال آن نکرده اند، زیرا که فصل ذات هرچیزی به حقیقت آن باشد که هیچ چیز دیگر با او در آن مشارکت نتواند کرد و ما می بینیم که این نطق عامّ ظاهر در فصل ذاتی انسان معتبر نیست زیرا که طوطی را ›[۲۷] که حیوانی است این نطق ظاهر همی توان آموخت، پس وراء این نطق ظاهر فضیلتی دیگر می باید، مُبرا از اشتراك غیر و آن فضیلت تمییز فکر است، یعنی به حقیقت قوّت ممیّزه است نه این نطق ظاهر، و تمییز فکری را فصل ذاتی انسان هانهاده اند.

[§۱۰۵] و اعتبار سوم آنکه اخصّ الخواص گفته اند [که] آنانکه در فصل ذات انسان ورای این نطق ظاهر فضیلت دیگر طلبیده اند و آن فضیلت تمییز فکری دانسته اند به وجهی چنانست امّا ایشان نیز بغوامض سرِّ این مسئله نرسیده اند و از عهدهٔ آنکه گفتند [که] فصل ذاتی هر چیز آن است که هیچ چیز دیگر را با او در آن مشارکت نتواند کرد، بیرون نیامدند زیرا که ما می بینیم که بعضی حیوانات هستند که ایشان را قوّت ممیّزه هست که به آن در مبادی وعواقب کار خود و آنچه مصلحت و مفسدت ایشان در آن باشد چیزی همی دانند، چنانکه مرغ می داند که بقای نوع او در بیضهٔ اوست و آنچه در بیضه به قوّت باشد بحرارت به فعل آید و آن حرارت [**۳۳**] به آن حاصل شود که بیضه را در زیر بال گیرد. و کَشَف را چون بال نیست داند که آنچه در بیضه او به

۲۷. آغاز مجدد M.

ثوابت و سعد و نحس ایشان مقدّر باشد، [امّا] اراده‌ء باری جَل وعلا که خالق و مدبّر افلاك و انجم است بالای آن است و بفرمان و خواست او متعلق است. والسّلامُ عَلی مَن اِتّبع الهُدی.

تصور یازدهم

در فصل[۲۶] ذاتی هریك از اجناس و موالید یعنی انعقاد و نبات و حیوان و انسان

[§۱۰۲] معادن به حکم انعقاد با جواهر معدنی مشارکت دارند و فصل ذاتی جواهر معدنی قوّت انعقاد اوست. و جواهر معدنی به حکم [۳۲] انعقاد با نباتات مشارکت دارند و فصل ذاتی نبات قوّت نموّ اوست. و نبات به حکم انعقاد و خواصّ نشو و نما با حیوان مشارکت دارد و فصل ذاتی حیوان حسّ و حرکت اوست. و حیوان به حکم انعقاد و خواصّ نشو و نما و حسّ و حرکت با انسان مشارکت دارد و فصل ذاتی انسان به حکم آنکه در انسان عوام و خواصّ و اخصّ الخواص است سخن بسه اعتبار گفته اند.

[§۱۰۳] اعتبار اوّل آنکه عوام، چون مردم را ناطق یافتند شرف او از حیوانات به این نطق عامّ ظاهر تصور کرده اند و فصل ذاتی او همین نطق ظاهر نهادند.

[§۱۰۴] و اعتبار دوم آنکه خواصّ گفته اند [که] آنان که این نطق عامّ ظاهر را بفصل ذاتی انسان هانهاده اند بوجه چنان است، و امّا این حکم اینست که ــ مِنْ حیثُ النّاظِر لامِن حَیْثُ الْمنظُور

۲۶. در همه ی نسخ فضل، قیاساً تصحیح شد.

١٩٨ [illegible]

١٩٩ [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

از این جمله سه یعنی لمس و ذوق و شمّ در رحم حاصل آید و دو یعنی سمع و بصر آن وقتی که از رحم بدر آید.

[§٩٤] حواسّ باطن نیز پنج است، مشترك و مصوّره و مُفكّره و واهمه و حافظه. و این ها پیش از آنکه کودك در این عالم آید به وقت خود هر یك به ترتیب و تدریج در او می پیوندد و نفس ناطقه‌ء ممیّزه همچنین. و او به اوّل از دماغ ابتدا کند و [از] آنجا به اکثر باقی اجزاء و اعضای بدن برسد.

[§٩٥] حس مشترك در مقدّمه‌ء قسمت پیشین است از بطن اوّل دماغ، و او را بسوی آن مشترك خوانند که او را به هرحاسه راهی است و هر حاسه را به او اشتراکی. مثلاً آنچه چشم ببیند و گوش بشنود و لمس به جای آورد و ذوق بداند و شمّ بیاود اوّل به او رسد. و او را مورد حواس و خزانه‌ء صُور محسوسات خوانند.

[§٩٦] مُصوّره در مقدمه‌ء قسمت اوّل از بطن دوم دماغ است و این قوّت اگر مطیع و یاور عقل انسانی بود او را مُفکّره گویند و اگر به بدن مشغول شود و به بدنیّات مطیع خیال و وهم باشد او را مُخیله گویند.

[§٩٧] حس مشترك که صورت ها با او [٢٥]< سپارند [٣١] و او با خیال دهد، در مقدمه‌ء قسمت پیشین است از بطن سوم دماغ که آنچه مصوره به او داده باشد اگر حاضر باشد و اگر نه، او را نگاه دارد.

---

٢٥. آغاز افتادگی در M.

یکدیگر جدا گردد و حسّ آن بیاود که کجاست و دهان باز کند و لبها به جنباند و به زبان بلیسد و به بینی ببوید، وقتی بخسبد و وقتی بیدار باشد. و ماه هفتم در تدبیر قمر باشد تا به طبیعت قمر هاکار آید و حسّ کمال یاود و قامت راستی پذیرد و اعضاء قوی شود و مفاصل سخت گردد و حرکت او متواتر شود و حسّ تنگی مکان خود بیاود و قصد آن [۳۰] کند که بیرون شود. اگر در این ماه بیرون آید بزیَد و تمامْ خلقت بود. و ماه هشتم باز تدبیر به زحل آمده باشد و در جنین گرانی و سکون پیدا شود که اگر در این ماه بیرون آید بنزید، زیرا که هشتم خانه حوت است و زحل آنجا به برودت و یبوست خویش همهء قوّت ها را ساکن کند و جنین بمیرد. و در ماه نهم نوبت مشتری باز رسیده باشد و اثرهای جنین و حرکت و اختیار پدیدار آمده. و نهم خانه سفر به حوت است لابدّ بیرون آید.

[§۹۱] و از اجزای بدن آنچه صَلابت و اِمساك دارد اعضا و جوارح و آنچه سیّال باشد اخلاط چهارگانه و آنچه به شکل بخاری در غایت لطافت و صفوت و شفافی از آن اخلاط چهارگانه برخیزد و در همهء اجزای بدن سریان کند [روح حیوانی نامند].

[§۹۲] و روح حیوانی اوّل از دل ابتدا کند پس مجاری دماغ را پُر کند پس بمنافذ چشم و مسامع گوش و مسالك زبان و دیگر اعضاء از سر تا به قدم برسد.

[§۹۳] و حواس ظاهر پنج است لمس و ذوق شم و سمع و بصر و

[§٩٠] و چون می بایست نفس انسانی ــ که پیش از اتصال به بدن جوهری بود و اشیأ در او به قوّت بود ــ به واسطه افلاك و انجم به فعل آید، چون نطفه که شخص انسان در او به قوّت است به رحِم می رسد و در او قرار مي گیرد ماه اوّل در تدبیر زُحل می باشد زیرا که اوّلین روحانیتی که در عالم طبایع تأثیر می کند روحانیت زحل است و همهء مایه ها به او منعقد می شود. و ماه دوم در تدبیر مشتری، تا طبیعت مشتری به گرمی و تری آن مایهء منعقد شده را نشو و نما دهد و اجزاء نطفه که مستحیل شده باشد به علقه پیوندد. و در نوبت مشتری قوّت نامیه و غاذیه ابتداء کند. و ماه سوم در تدبیر مرّیخ می باشد تا طبیعت عَلَقَه مستحیل شود و بمُضْغَه انجامد. و اگر [در] مدت تدبیر مرّیخ حرارت زیاده شود و اندك یبوست پذیرد، نامیه قوی تر گردد و راه غذای جنین گشاده شود. و ماه چهارم در تدبیر آفتاب می باشد تا به طبیعت آفتاب [و] تخاطیط اعضاء که در مضغه پدیدار آمده باشد از جای بر خیزد و روح حیوانی ابتدا کند و جنین در حرکت آید و اندامهای او متمایز شود و سر و دماغ و دل و جمله اجزای بدن پیدا گردد. و ماه پنجم در تدبیر زُهره می باشد تا به طبیعت زهره بر قوّت های روحانی استیلا یاود [یابد] و خلقت تمام شود و بنیت به کمال رسد و نهاد چشم و بینی پدیدار آید و دهان گشوده گردد و سر از میان دو گوش برخیزد. و ماه ششم در تدبیر عُطارد می باشد تا [به] طبیعت عطارد حسّی دیگر یاود و حرکتی دیگر کند و اندامها از

جوارح و مفاصل و اوتار و عروق و عظام و اعصاب او سرای و کوی و محلّت و حُجره و خزانه و بازار و دکان و راه و هر چیزی دیگر که تمامی آن شهر را باید.

[§۸۷] و عقل و نفس چون پادشاه و وزیر، و حواس ظاهر و حواس باطن وقوّت های غاذیه و جاذبه و ماسکه و هاضمه و دافعه و هر قوّت دیگر که در طبیعت آن باشد و افعال آن قوّت ها به حرکاتی که به هریك خاص شد و از هریك در آخر از بدن ظاهر شود بمثابت ارکان دولت چون طبیب و دبیر، و همچنین دیگر اصناف و طبقات چون حاجب و وکیل و دربان و لشگر و خدم و حشم و رعیت و جاسوس و پیك و رسول و صنّاع و تجّار و هرکس کائناً مَنْ کان که عمارت و رونق آن شهر به آن تمام شود و ضبط شهر به وجود و واسطه ایشان ممکن باشد.

[§۸۸] و بُنیت این جسد و صورت این نفس مختصری است از آن عالم که قلم اَزَل به امرِ اوّل بر لُوح اَبَد نگاشته اند. و همچنان که نفس انسانی از همه نفوس دیگر شریف تر بود بایست که مادّتی که ترکیب جسد او از آن است از همه مادّت های دیگر لطیف تر باشد. [۲۹]

[§۸۹] و چون از حکمت باری تعالی چنان اقتضا کرد که تصّرفات و حرکات و افعال انسان همه عقلی باشد و در هر یك از آن تمییزی و در هر تمییزی تحقیقی، چنان بایست که مادّت جسد او در اعتدال بکمال تر و صورت خلقت و هیئت بُنیت و نهاد و قد و قامت او بر نسبت افضل موجود شود.

[§٨٤] و دیگر فایده آنکه عالم کبیر از محیط فلكِ اعلی تا مرکز تحت الثری یك شخص است که او را انسانِ کلّی خوانند و نشان انسانِ به حّد بلوغ آن باشد که مثل خودی باز تواند داد. و چون عالم کبیر که انسانِ کلّی است به کمال بلوغ رسید مثل خودی که باز داد انسان جزوی بود که به شکل ›[٢٤] عالم صغیر است در عالم کبیر و بمعنی عالم کبیر است در عالم صغیر.

[§٨٥] ومعلوم است که هیچ [٢٨] موجودی که به کمال خلقت و شرف نسبت خود که به کل عالم تَشَبُّه می کند شریف تر از انسان نیست. زیرا که انسان مجموعی است از لطایف انوار عقل اوّل و مآثر قوای نفس کلّی و عجایب تراکیب افلاك و اقسام بروج و حرکات کواکب و آثار ارکان طبائع و اختلاف جواهر معادن و فنون اشکال نبات و غرایب هیاکل حیوانات و امارات ملائکه و جنّ و انس و شیاطین و علامات برّ و بحر و کوه و هامون و آبادانی و خرابی عالم و بهار و تابستان و خزان و زمستان و در او بستانها است.

[§٨٦] و نیز مَثَل جسد انسان به این چهار عنصر ـــ که تا از یکدیگر جدا می باشند و سُورت هر یك بغایت قوّت خود می باشد متنافرند وچون مجتمع [و] ممتزج می شوند سُورت هر یك بدیگری شکسته می شوند متوافق ـــ بمدینه فاضله زده اند و گفته اند که انسان همچون شهری است از چیزهای مختلف ساخته شده با انشاء مُحکم و صورتی استوار، چنانکه از فَرْق تا به قدم جمله‌ء اعضاء و

٢٤. آغاز مجدد M.

[§۸۰] و دیگر نفوس بنا بر شرف و کمال و خیر مَفْطُور و از جُود الهی و فیض و سخاء نامتناهی چنان صاحب نصیب که ایشان را ادا و قبول بیك معنی می آید یَقْبَلُ بِالذَات دُونَ الآلات بِغَیرِزَمان، یعنی عالمان ربّانی. و فایده اتّصال ایشان به بدن آنکه تا به انوار تربیت و هدایت اِکمال و اِستکمال نفوسی کنند که ایشان مستعد قبول کمال باشند. و مَثَل ایشان چون معلمی باشد که خود را از مقام معلمی با مقام متعلّم آورد و او را اوّل الف و با هازبان دهد و به ترتیب و تدریج به درجات برمی گذراند تا به آخر عالم شود و به درجهٔ معلم رسد.

[§۸۱] و نفوسی هستند که به غریزت خود در خیرکامل نباشند امّا استعداد آن دارند که کامل شوند، یعنی مُتَعَلّمان بر سبیل نجات، و فایده اتّصال ایشان به بدن آنکه به اداء اصحاب کمال، [کمال] را قابل شوند و از مراتب کمالات آنچه در اینان به قوّت باشد به توسط ایشان به فعل آید.

[§۸۲] و نفوسی هستند شریر و در شریری به غایتی که هیچ خیر و شرف و کمال را قابل نشوند یعنی هَمَجُ الَرعاع که به نور علم مُنیر نباشند و پناه با ماوراء خود که رُکن واثق ایشان باشد نبرند. و فایده اتّصال ایشان به بدن آنکه تأثیری که در ایشان مستور باشد ظاهر شود و نیك از بد و پاك از پلید جدا گردد.

[§۸۳] و دیگر فایده آنکه اگر نفوس جزوی به اجساد بشری متّصل نشدی عمارت عالم و نظام موجودات و اثبات حجّت الهی و اقامت سنّت ربّانی ممکن نگشتی.

در غرض از پیوستن نفوس جزوی به اجساد بشری و شمّتی از ترکیب جسد انسانی

[§۷۸] از اسباب اتّصال نفوس جزوی به اجساد بشری یکی آن است که اگر چه به حکم حقیقت فاعل مؤدی می باشد اما به حکم اضافه اثر فعل در قابل که منفعل است پدیدار می آید. و اگر چه به حکم مَفْروغ فاعل امر می باشد اما به حکم مستأنِف اثر فعل در خلق که منفعل است پدید می آید. و اگر چه به حکم معنی فاعل جان می باشد، اما به حکم شکل اثر فعل در تن که منفعل است پدید می آید. یعنی ظهور مؤدی به قابل، و از آن امر به خلق و از آن روح بجسم می باشد.

[§۷۹] و از فوائد این اتّصال یکی آن است که صورت خیر در نفس خیّر و صورت شر در نفس شریر به قوّت می باشد و این هر دو نفس ــ مِن حیثُ النفس ــ به حکم وجود ذهنی متشابه اند و تا در وجود عینی نمی آیند متباین نمی شوند. و تباین این هر دو نفس و رسیدن نفس خیِّر از امکان به درجه‌ء وجوب و افتادن نفس شریر از حّد امکان به درکه‌ء امتناع به اتّصال بدن می باشد و کسب معرفت و حصول تجربت و ریاضت و لزوم فضیلت [۲۷] و منزلت و سیاست امور معاش و قطع کمالات از مبدأ به معاد به توسط این جسد می تواند بود که از خون و گوشت و دیگر مواد تألیف یافته است و می یابد.

[§۸۰] و دیگر نفوس بنا بر شرف و کمال و خیر مَفْطُور و از جُود

آتش، اینجا عین این بُعد و اثر این قرب به نفس حیوانی هاباید نهادن.

وچون به کوه چنان نزدیك شود که بی هیچ شبه بداند که آن آتشی است نه ستاره، اینجا عین این قُرب و اثر این بُعد به نفس انسانی هاباید نهادن. وچون بر سر کوه شود و بروشنائی آتش همه حوالی کوه با هر کس و بهر چیز که [۲۶] در حوالی کوه باشد روشن ببیند، اینجا عین قُرب بی هیچ اثر بُعد به عقل انسانی هاباید نهادن. و از اینجا گفته اند که عقل نور نفس انسانی است.

[§۷۶] ومعلوم می شود که نفس نباتی و نفس حیوانی و نفس انسانی و عقل انسانی هر یك به سر خود از منبع دیگر نه اند و هر چهار از یك اصل اند، چون چهار شاخ از یك درخت و چهار جوی از یك چشمه و چهار شعله از یك فتیله و اختلاف میان ایشان بحسب اختلاف افعال و حرکات ایشان است و قُرب و بُعد نسبت به کل مبدأ وجود.

[§۷۷] امّا حسّ و حاسه و محسوس و وهم و خیال: حسّ قوّتی جسدانی است و حاسه قوّتی نفسانی و محسوس چیزی که حس ادراك آن کند. خیال را رویِ شیب حس است و رویِ بالا وهم، و وهم را رویِ شیب خیال است و روی بالا نفس و نفس را رویِ شیب وهم است و روی بالا عقل. و عقل را [۲۳]> روی شیب نفس است و روی بالا امر. والسّلام.

---

۲۳. آغاز افتادگی در M.

دبیری نتواند کرد، اما استعداد و امکان آن دارد که دبیر شود.

[§۷۲] عقل مَلَکی قوّتی است که چون قابل این صورت ها ی مجرّد شود که به اوّل گفته آمد، آن صورت ها در او قرار گیرد و از ضروریّات به نظریّات و از نظریّات به ضروریّات تواند آمدن بآسانی.

[§۷۳] وعقل به فعل قوّتی است که قبول صورت مجرّده و شُدَنِ از ضروریّات به نظریّات و از نظریّات بضروریّات او را به فعل حاصل آید، نه بانفعال. و هر وقت که خواهد مطالعه آن کند.

[§۷٤] وعقل مستفاد قوّتی است که چون همهٔ این کمالات که گفته شد او را حاصل آمده باشد میان او و آن عقل که او را از قوّت به فعل می آورد مناسبتی پدیدار آید چنانکه هر صورت معقول که در او باشد در این یك بر مثال آینه زدوده که در برابر شخصی بدارند بی زیادت و نقصان پدیدار آید.

[§۷۵] وآنکه نفس نباتی و نفس حیوانی و نفس انسانی و عقل انسانی از یك اصل و منبع اند و چنان می نماید که چهار اند [اینست] که فرض باید کرد که کسی در شب تاریك بر دو سه فرسنگی کوهی باشد و بر آن آتشی بر افروخته باشند و او از دور بنگرد و پندارد که ستاره است نه آتش. اینجا عین این بُعد بی اثر قُرب به نفس نباتی هاباید نهادن.

وچون این کس بر سمت آن کوه می رود بجائی رسد که وقتی پندارد که آن آتشی است نه ستاره، و وقتی پندارد که آن ستاره است نه

[§٦٨] و حجّت ایشان این است که تساوی عقول از حجّت تساوی تکلیف است. و این نیز نمی دانند که اگر در عقول ترتُّب و تَفاضُل نبودی یکی را نرسیدی که تکلیف کردی و یکی را واجب نبودی که آن تکلیف به خود هاگرفتی. یکی مؤدی نبودی و یکی قابل و یکی آمر نبودی و یکی مأمور و یکی معلم نبودی و یکی متعلّم و یکی استاد نبودی و یکی شاگرد. و اگر در عقول مقادیر و تفاوت نبودی چه عامی ئی که سر از پا و کفش از دستار نشناختی و چه حکیمی بزرگ که بسیار چیزها دانستی، برابر بودندی.

[§٦٩] و نیز معلوم است که همهء خبرها که دهند راست مطلق نباشد و ‹دروغ مطلق›[۲۲] [نیز] نباشد، بهری راست باشد و بهری دروغ [و] هر که فتوی دهد که عقول متساوی است از آن فتوی لازم آید که هر خبری که دهند امکان راست و دروغ هر دو دارد، بر حال خود بباید گذاشت و راست و دروغ آن روشن نباید کردن.

[§٧٠] [ولی بباید دانست] که در عقول ترّتب و تفاضل است [۲۵] و به اوّل وهله در محل قوّت می باشند و تا از قوّت به فعل آمدن چهار مرتبه او را اثبات می کنند: یکی عقل هیولانی و یکی عقل مَلَکی و یکی عقل به فعل و یکی عقل مُستفاد.

[§٧١] عقل هیولانی قوّتی است که قبول صورت ها می کند مجّرد از موادّ، امّا هنوز قبول آن صورت ها نکرده باشد و لیکن شایستگی آن [را] دارد که قبول کند. مثلاً چون کودك طفل که

۲۲. فقط در M.

[§٦٦] چون خدای تعالی هر چیزی را که آفرید چنان تقدیر کرد که غذای او که قوام و بقای او به آن است از جنس او باشد، و جسم انسان از این [۲٤] چهار عنصر آمد و غذای او هم از این چیزها بُوَدْ که از این چهار عنصر خواسته است. و نفس انسانی از آنروئی که عقلِ به قوّت است و عقل نفسِ به فعل، از عالم عقل است و غذای او از علم و عمل آمد. و دلیل بر آن اینکه اگر کسی تا به آخر عمر هر روز از غذا های صالح لطیف و به تنعّم چیزی بسیار بخورد و کسب علم نکند عالم نشود. و اگر از غذا ها مختصر آن مقدار که رمقی یابد بخورد و کسب علم کند عالِم شود. والسّلام.

تصور نهم
در معرفت عقل انسانی

[§٦٧] اعتقاد بهری مردم آن است که عقل غریزی که مردم به آن از دیگر حیوانات ممتازاند ــ و آن بعد از آنکه ایام کودکی بسر رسد و ابتدای بلوغ روی نماید درو پیوندد و تا نهایت عمر به آن عاقل باشد ــ همهء خلایق را متساوی است. و مقرند که هر چه متساوی باشد اهل آنرا با یگدیگر خلاف نباشد. و با آنکه به این مقرّند مناقضهء سخن خود می کنند و پیوسته در معقولات مجادله می دارند و مخالفت یگدیگر ظاهر می گردانند و حسّ آن نمی یابند که اگر عقول متساوی بودی هیچ عاقل را با یکدیگر خلاف نبودی.

[§۶۳] ونیز نفس انسانی کمال اوّل جسم طبیعی آلی ذی الحیوة بالقوه است، یعنی مُحرّك اوّلین[۲۱] اجزاء و مُغیّر احوال و مُصَوِّر هیولای جسم، نفس است و او را مبدأ قوّت هیولانی است، که همچنان که شخص انسان در نطفه به قوّت است ــ کمال آخر انسان در او به قوّت است ــ و فعل خاص او آنکه به ترتیب و تدریج صورتی مجرّد شود و عین حیاتش به او تعالی به فعل آید.

[§۶۴] و کل جواهر نفوس از یك جنس اند و اختلاف ایشان بحسب اختلاف معارف و اخلاق و عادات و اعمال ایشان است، زیرا که نفس به اوّل ساده می باشد و به معرفت و رأی و قیاس و اخلاق و عادات و اعمال نقش می پذیرد و این حالتها هر یك صورتی می شود جوهر هر نفس را و آن [نفس] هیولای آن صورت می گردد.

[§۶۵] و شرف نفس به علم می باشد زیرا که ما می بینیم که هر نفسی که قابل علمی ازعلوم می گردد شریف تر می باشد از آن نفوسی که از آن علم بی بهره می باشند و معلوم است که نفس به قبول کمال علم از نفس دیگر قوی تر می افتد تا به نفوس حجّتان بزرگ می رسد که ایشان به صفای جوهر خویش قابل فیض انوار کلمهٔ اعلی می شوند و به تعلیم ربّانی از دیگر نفوس ممتاز می گردند و نفوس خلایقی را که غرقه بحر هیولی و بستهٔ بند طبیعت می باشند به افادت و استفادت از ظلمت خلاصی می دهند.

---

۲۱. M: ندارد.

خاطر می دارد و هیچ علمی از آن با علم دیگر بر نمی آمیزد، و آن کس از هر یك از آن شرحی مطوّل بمی دهد و همه جدا جدا در سمع مُستمع می آید.

[۶۱§] و نیز می بینیم که در اینجا مثلاً خانه ئی می باشد به تقدیر آنکه پنجاه مرد را در آن خانه جای باشد، اگر خواهند که صد مرد را در آن خانه بنشانند امکان ندارد و چندان زحمت افتد که لاقال. و نفس از صور معلومات و استماع معقولات هرگز زحمت نیابد، نه، که چندان که زیادت باشد مجال طیران و فضاء جولان او در آن واسع تر و فصیح تر و بهجت و مسرّت او به آن زیاده گردد.

[۶۲§] و اینکه تو می گوئی سر من و چشم من و گوش من و دل من و زبان من و دست من وعلیهذا، اینکه می گوئی هویّت نفس انسانی است که اینها همه مُضافات اویند مثلاً پادشاهی هست که اینها همه تَبَع و لشگر و حشم و خدم اویند یا [۲۳] صنّاعی کامل که اینها همه آلت و دست افزار اویند. همچنان که پادشاه را از لشگر و صنّاع را از آلت بسر نمی شود، نفس را از این همه بسر نمی شود. مثلاً هیکل بشری جسمانیش باید تا به آن ظهور کند و سر و دماغش باید تا فکر و تمیز میان چیزها به جای آورد، و چشمش باید تا ببیند و گوشش باید تا بشنود و دلش باید تا بداند و زبانش باید تا بگوید و دستش باید تا بگیرد و پایش باید تا برود وعلیهذا.

و نفس حیوانی که ایشان طلب غذا و نموّ و میل به مخالطت مزاج کنند [و] لاجرم بفساد مزاج فاسد شوند. بلکه نفس انسانی تعقّل ذات خویش و تعقّل معقولات و مفارقات نه به آلت جسمانی کند و به ذات خویش اینها همه دَرْ یابد. و به آن سبب نامتجزّی و نامنقسم است که هر چه [۲۲] انقسام پذیرد او را مقدار و کمیّت باشد و نفس را مقدار و کمیّت نیست.

[§۵۸] و اگر نفس قسمت پذیر بودی در یك جانب به چیزی جاهل بودی و در یك جانب به همان چیز عالِم، و از آنِ نفس نه چنین است. واوّل قوّتی از قوای انسانی ‹ که قابل فیض عقل می شود و مورد روحانیّات › [۲] و خزانه صور معقولات می باشد اوست. و تمییز میان چیزها که ادراك شکل ومعنیِ آن، آن چیز را ممتنع باشد او می کند.

[§۵۹] وقوف و اطلاع بر قوّت انعقاد که او از حسب خود و شرف قوّت نباتی خبر ندارد، و بر قوّت حیوانی که او از آفرینش خود و شرف مرتبهء انسان خبر ندارد، و حکمت در هر صورتی که بهر یك از انواع آنها لایق افتد بشناسد، او را می باشد.

[§۶۰] ونیز به آن سبب می توان تصور کرد که نفس انسانی جوهرِ روحانی بسیط است که یك کس می باشد که از انواع علوم چون ریاضی و طبیعی و منطقی و الهی چیزی بسیار می داند و نیز از قرآن و اخبار و اشعار و امثال و حکایات و روایات چیزی بسیار بر

۲. M: ندارد.

و بفنای بدن فانی می شوند و نفس انسانی نا متجزی و نا منقسم است و پس از مفارقت بدن باقی می ماند زیرا که او اگر جوهری ازلی نیست جوهری ابدی ست. ازلی آن است که نه از این طرف مبدأ دارد و نه از آن طرف نهایت، و ابدی آنکه از این طرف مبدأ دارد و از آن طرف نهایت ندارد.

[§۵۵] و نفس خیالی متوسط است میان نفس حیوانی و نفس انسانی. و او روئی با حس و محسوسات دارد و روئی با عقل و معقولات. اگر با نفس حیوانی متّحد شود تخیّلی به آلت جسدانی تواند کرد و محتاج آلت باشد و به فساد او فاسد شود. و اگر با نفس انسانی متحّد شود حفظ معانی بی آلت جسدانی تواند کرد و از آن آلت مستغنی باشد و به بقای نفس باقی ماند و هم در سعادت نفس شریك باشد و هم در شقاوت او.

[§۵٦] و چون نفس از بدن مفارقت کند از خیال هیئتی در نفس بماند و از هر چه نفس خیالی دانسته و کرده باشد و همچنین نفس به قدرآن ثواب و عقاب تعیّن یابد و نفس خیالی آن ثواب و عقاب را با یاد او می آورد و تعیّن نفوس در عالم آخرت به آن می باشد، چه انسان در این عالم روحانی ئی است به جسمانی باز پوشیده و در آن عالم جسمانی ئی باشد بروحانی باز پوشیده.

[§۵۷] و نفس انسانی نه جسم است و نه قوّتی در جسم زیرا که جسم قسمت پذیرد و نفس قسمت نپذیرد و جوهر او از عالم عقل است ــ جوهر نا مادّی مُفارق ــ و تعلق او به بدن تعلقی بر وجه تحریك و تغییر و تصرّف و تدبیر [است] نه چون تعلق نفس نباتی

در معرفت نفس انسانی

[۵۱§] معلوم است که جسم را ــ از آنجا که جسم است ــ هیچ فعل و حرکت نیست البته، زیرا که اگر جسم را به ذات خود حرکت و فعل بودی بایستی همهء اجسامی که در یك حدّ داخل بودندی همه را حرکت و فعل بر یك گونه بودی، و می بینیم که نه چنین است. و ما اجسامی می بینیم که هیچ حرکت و فعل از ایشان صادر نمی شود البته، و اجسامی می بینیم که افعال و حرکات از ایشان صادر می شود. و می دانیم که آن حرکات و افعال از قوّتی است که ماورای جسمیّت است.

[۵۲§] وما حرکات بعضی از اجسام بر یك سمت می یابیم مثلاً حرکت آتش از مرکز به محیط و حرکت آب از محیط به مرکز، و می دانیم که آب و آتش آن حرکت به طبع می کنند و آن حرکت را طبعی می خوانیم.

[۵۳§] و حرکت بعض اجسام بر چند نوع و سمت مختلف می یابیم. حرکت بعضی اختیار مانا و با اختیار مانا هیچ شعور و ادراك نه، او را نفس نباتی می خوانیم. و حرکت بعضی [۲۱] اختیار مانا، و با اختیار مانا با شعور و ادراك، و با شعور وادراك هیچ تمییز نه، آنرا نفس حیوانی می خوانیم. و حرکت بعضی با اختیار، و با اختیار با شعور و ادراك و [با] شعور و ادراك [با] تمییز کلّی، آنرا نفس انسانی می خوانیم.

[۵٤§] و این دو نفس یعنی نباتی و حیوانی متجزّی و منقسم اند و بفنای بدن فانی می شوند و نفس انسانی نا متجزی و نا منقسم

واسطه نفس کلّی تا اینجا در هر جسمی و طبیعتی یافته می شود و آن طبیعت مبدأ حرکت جسم می باشد و می بینیم که موجوداتِ جسمانی من لَدُن فلك المحیط [۲۰] إلی منتهی مرکز الارض در اماکن خود ایستاده اند و آن اماکن مکان طبیعی هر یك است علی الترتیب و چون این اجسام جزوی که هر یك را طبیعتی جزوی است که از جسم کلّ پدیدار آمده اند، هرآینه آن جسم کلّ را طبیعت کلّی باشد و چون جسم کلّ جسم فلك الافلاك است، طبیعت کلّی طبیعت او باشد. و نیز جسم کلّ قبول تأثیر نفس کلّی بی‹ واسطه نتوانست کرد، پس بایست که آن ›[19] واسطه قوّتی باشد زائد بر ذات جسمیّت [و] آن قوّت طبیعت کلّی بود.

[§۴۹] و اجسام ماتحت فلك قمر دو نوع اند یکی بسیط و دیگری مرکّب. بسیط چون آتش و هوا و آب و خاك، و مرکّب چون معادن و نبات و حیوان و انسان. و قوّت طبیعت کلّی که در کلّ اجسام ساری است هر یك را به بدایت در حرکت می آورد و در نهایت ساکن میگرداند. ذلك تقدیر العزیز العلیم.

[§۵۰] ونیز همچنان که نفسی بِمی بایست تا عقل او را این صورت بخشد و طبیعتی بِمی بایست تا نفس اورا این حرکت و سکون دهد، جسمی [نیز] بِمی بایست تا طبیعت او را به کمال دوم تحرّك و انفعال در دهد و بر نظام وجود بادیدار آورد. بمشیة اللّه تعالی وحُسن مُعاونته. والسّلام.

---

۱۹. M: ندارد.

جمله صورت ها باشد که بر او فیض کنند. والسّلام.

تصور هفتم
در طبیعت کلّی و جسم کُل

[§٤٦] چون نفس کلّ به جانب کمال حرکت کرد، مبدأ آن حرکت طبیعت کلّی بود و مبدأ قبول آن حرکت جسم کلّ، زیرا نفس را از حرکت بجانب کمال چاره نبود و از اینجا لازم آمد که مبدأ حرکت اوّل طبیعت اوّل باشد و مبدأ قبول حرکت اوّل جسم اوّل.

[§٤٧] و طبیعت کلّی قوّتی است از قوّت های نفس کل که جملهٔ روحانیات در این عالم اجزاء اویند وآن روحانیات را ملائکه هم خوانند و گویند از اشیاء محسوس هیچ چیز نباشد إلاّ که فرشته ئی با وی می آید و حفظ نظام وجود وی می کند. تا آن حّد که ولَها بطينٌ مع قطرة المطر، یعنی با هرقطرهٔ باران فرشته ئی می آید و به این آن خواسته اند که مثلاً قطره باران آن وقت از میغ فرو بارد که آن مقدار که تمامی صورت او باشد هاگیرد تا چون از میغ جدا شود اجزاء او در هوا متلاشی نگردد و به بمرکز خود رسد. آن روحانیت که حفظ ماهیّت او می کند فرشته خوانند. وهمچنین سنگی که به هوا براندازند، چون قوّتِ آن کس که او را بقدً هوا برانداخته باشد از او زائل شود و بالطبع به مکان خود باز آید آن قوّت به مکان خود باز آمدن را فرشته می خوانند.

[§٤٨] و اگر چه مُحرِّك[18] جمله اجسام که امر او تعالی است به

۱۸. در همه ی نسخ: تحريك.

چهارگانه تصرّف می کند و از آن صورمختلف چون معادن و نبات و حیوان بر می انگیزد.

[۴۲§] هیولای کل جسم مطلق است از فلکُ الاعلی تا به تحت الثَری که نفس کل در آن همچنان که صناعان عالم عنصری که عالم کون و فساد است در عنصریات تصرف می کنند او در جمله اجسام عالم جسمانی تصرف می کند.

[۴۳§] هیولای اولی جوهر بسیط معقول است ‹ که حس ادراك آن نتواند کرد.›[۱۷] و آن وجود است و بس؛ یعنی هویّت اشیاء. مثلاً هریك از موجودات وجودی دارد که به آن وجود موجود است، آن وجودی که شامل جملهء موجودات است و بر ذات موجودات سابق است و به نسبت با همه هیولای هر یك می شود. مثلاً خشبیّت که بر ذات همه آلات و اشیاء چوبین سابق است و به نسبت با هر یك هیولای هر یکی می شود و در بساطت هویّت بُود و کمیّت و کیفیّت [۱۹] هر یکی را وجودی و هستی.

[۴۴§] و چون هویّت قابل کمیّت شد جسم مطلق مرئی گشت که سه بُعد در او فرض ساز گشت، یعنی طول و عرض و عمق. و چون کمیّت قابل کیفیّت شد به تثلیث و تربیع و تدویر و غیر آن جسمِ مخصوصِ مشارٌإلیه شد.

[۴۵§] هیولی را از آن سبب جوهر منفعل گویند که او را به خود دَرْ هیچ فعل نیست و پیش از آنکه او را با چیز دیگر اضافه کنند در هیچ صورت به فعل نیاید. و کار او همین باشد که او قابل

۱۷. M: ندارد.

تأثیر او به اضافه با قبول هر جزوی از اجزای عالم [که] بحسب استعداد خود می کنند متفاوت است، چنانکه فعل و تأثیر او در آسمان حرکت است و در زمین سکون و درعناصر امتزاج و در معادن عقد و در نبات نموّ و در حیوان حس و حرکت و در انسان نطق و تمیز. و از این روی آن را محرِّك حرکات فلکی و مُسَكِّن سکون ارضی و مُعقِّد انعقادات و مُنمی نباتات و مُحیی حیوانات خوانده اند. والسّلام.

تصور ششم

در هیولی

[§۳۹] هیولی دو لفظ عربی است که چیزی ازو بیفکنده اند. هیو [و] اولی. هیو ساختگی و اولی اوّل، یعنی ساختگی اوّل. و ساختگی استعداد است یعنی ممکن است که قبول چیزی کند و چیزی را بشاید.

[§۴۰] و هیولی چهار است: هیولای اولی، و هیولای کلّ هیولای طبیعت و هیولای صناعت. هیولای صناعت هر جسمی[۱٦] است که در آن عمل توان کرد، چون چوب درودگر را و آهن آهنگر را و نیل رنگریز را و علیهذا.

[§۴۱] و هیولای طبیعت چهار ارکان عالم است که همچنان که درودگر در چوب و آهنگر در آهن و رنگریز در نیل تصرّف می کند و از هر یك آلات و اشکال مختلف میسازد طبیعت کل در ارکان

---

۱٦. M: هریکی حسمی

تعالی چیزی صادر شود، از اضافه و مبدأ خود گفته باشیم و اگر گوئیم نشاید که از او تعالی چیزی صادر شود، از حقیقت و معاد خود. و اگر گوئیم به وجهی شاید و به وجهی نشاید از دو وجهی خود و اگر گوئیم به هیچ وجه نشاید، از نفی دو وجهی خود. والسّلام.

تصورچهارم
درعقل اوّل وعقل فعّال وعقل کلّ
که عبارت سه است و معنی یکی

[§۳۷] عقل اوّل را از آن روی که اوّل موجودیست که از امر باری تعالی در وجود آمد و وجود بی توسط یافت، عقل اوّل خوانند و از آن روی که اشیاء به واسطه تأیید او از قوّت به فعل می آیند، عقل فعّال و از آن روی که عقول جزوی که در این عالم به عاقلان پیوسته است آثار اوست عقل کلّ. و از جمله صفات عقل اوّل یکی این است که دائم السُکُون بما تُفیِضُ عَلیه مِن اَنوارِ الکَلِمَةِ و دائِم التَّحْرِیك والتَّسْکِین لِلنفسِ[۱۵] المُقدسة. والسّلام.

تصور پنجم
در نفس کلّی

[§۳۸] این عالم از محیط فلك الاعلی تا به مرکز [۱۸] تحت الثَری یك شخص است که او را عالم کبیر خوانند و نفس کلّی او را یك روان است که در جسم او یك فعل می کند. امّا فعل و

---

۱۵. Q،M و W: النفس.

یا عنایتی ببعضٍ دون بعض، [امّا] هر یك از موجودات [**۱۷**] بر حسب مرتبهء که در وجود از امر او تعالی یافته است و به مقدار آثاری که از او در ذات[۱۳] خود مشاهده کرده در کار او تعالی سخن می گوید.

[**§۳۵**] مثلاً: عقل اوّل چون وجود از امر او تعالی بی توسط یافت، و واحد به وحدت بود، إلاّ واحد و وحدت را ندید و ندانست؛ به اضافه با دانش و بینش خود گفت: لایَصْدُرعَنِ الواحِد إلاالواحِد. وچون نفس کلّ وجود از امر به توسط عقل یافت و بتأیید عقل در جسم تصرّف و تدبیر کرد، به آن روئی ‹ که با عقل داشت واحد و وحدت را دید و به آن روئی ›[۱۴] که با جسم داشت کثیر و کثرت [پس] به اضافه با دانش و بینش خود گفت لایَصْدُرعَنِ الْوَاحِدِ إلاّ الوَاحِدُ والکثیر. وچون جسم وجود از امر به توسط متوسطان بسیار یافت و آنجا که او بود الاّ کثیر و کثرت نبود و الاّ کثیر و کثرت را ندید و ندانست، به اضافه با دانش و بینش خود گفت: لایصدرعن الواحد الاّ الکثیر. پس هر یك از این موجودات عقلانی و روحانی و جسمانی، آنچه در اصدار شیء از او تعالی می گویند به اضافه با دانش و بینش خود می گویند و او تعالی به حقیقت از آن منزّه است.

[**§۳٦**] و براین تقدیر لازم آید که چون ما گوئیم شاید از او

۱۳. آغاز نسخه خطی M.

۱٤. M ندارد.

حواله کرده باشم. و آن کس که ذات او متکثر باشد، خلق باشد نه خدای.

[§۳۳] و آنانکه می گویند صدور واحد و کثیر از او تعالی است، امّا از آنِ واحد به ذات و آنِ کثیر به عَرَض؛ اگرآن واحد که صدور او از اوتعالی به ذات است هم از او تعالی به چه معنی صادر شده است؟ صادر شده اگر نه اوتعالی است، لامحاله این نه او، بی صفت و صورتی باشد خارج [از] او تعالی، و اینهم کثیر باشد نه واحد. پس به آن آید که:

مَن قالَ فيْه، فَهُو جاهِلٌ ومَن سَكَتَ عنهُ فَهُو غَافِلٌ، ومَنْ ظَنّ اَنَهُ واصلٌ فليسَ لهُ حاصلٌ كلُّ مَا ميَزتموُه [بِاَوْهامِكم] في اَدقِّ مَعَانْيه مَصْرُوفٌ عنهُ، مَرْدودٌ إليكُم، مصنوعٌ ومخلوقٌ مثلكُم.

یعنی هرکه در او سخن گوید جاهل است، هرکه نگوید از او غافل است، هرکه پندارد که به او رسید، آن پنداشتن بی حاصل است. و هرچه شما در آن به اوهام خویش تمیز او کنید، اگر چه دقیق ترین معانی باشد، از او باز گردد و با شما مردود شود و مصنوع ومخلوقی باشد همچون شما.

[§۳٤] وچون خلق را به ضرورت از آنجا که خلق است، هابَر اِزای خود، در این مسئله چیزی بباید گفت، همین توانیم گفت که اگر چه امر او تعالی که سبب همهء موجودات و کاینات است یك فیض مطلق است که یکسان بر کلّ هژده هزار عالم می تابد، بی تجلّی

موجودات واحد و کثیر. و هم چنانکه وحدت و واحد از او تعالی صادر شده است، کثرت و کثیر هم از او تعالی صادر، امّا صدور واحد از او تعالی به ذات است و از آنِ کثیر به عَرَض.

[§۳۲] و بندگان دعوت که به خداوند همه‌ء مراتب و اکوان اقتداء کرده اند و به قوّت تأیید او لذکره السّلام، از بالای این هر دو کون می نگرند[۱۲] می گویند: اوّل بگوی تا خود می شاید که گویم از او تعالی چیزی صادر شود یا نشاید؟ اگر گویم شاید که ازو تعالی چیزی صادر شود، به او تعالی بنگفته باشم. زیرا که او تعالی را با هیچ چیز از اشیاء علاقه و اتّصال نباشد، به هیچ وجه از وجوه، و تا چیزی را به او علاقه و اتّصالی نباشد از او صادر نتواند شد. و ما چون این علاقه و اتّصال به او اضافه کنیم به وحدانیّت [۱٦] او تعالی بنگفته باشیم. و اگر گویم نشاید که از او تعالی چیزی صادر شود به خلق بنگفته باشم، زیرا که این اشیاء موجودات به اویند و معلومات او. چون گویم نشاید که از او تعالی چیزی صادر شود، گفته باشم که این اشیاء نه معلومات اویند و نه موجودات به او. و به این یك معنی، چون بگویم نشاید که از او تعالی چیزی صادر شود، انکار مجازی و اضافه کرده باشم و به آن یك چون گویم شاید که ازو تعالی چیزی صادر شود انکار عین حقیقت. و اگر گویم به وجهی شاید و به وجهی نشاید، دو وجهی گفته باشم و دو وجهی کثرت باشد. پس کثرت به ذات او تعالی

۱۲.N و W: منکرند.

مرتبهء ملائکه. وچون سلسله وجود در اعادت اشیاء به امر او تعالی، به کمال مرتبهء انسان سر با هم آورد و استعداد قبول [۱۵] این کمال که غرض از این اسباب عقلانی و آلات و ادوات جسمانی او بود، به او خاص گشت معلوم شد که اگر چه معادن و نبات و حیوان بر او متقدم الوجود بودند، مقصود از اینها همه به حکم اوّلُ الفِکرِ آخِرُالعَمَل، او بود.

[§۲۹] امّا اختلاف صور اصناف خلایق از آن است که تقدیر او تعالی چنان بود که آنچه در نفوس جزوی به قوّت بود به واسطه افلاك و انجم به فعل آید، و افلاك دائم الدوران بودند و سریع الحرکت، پس [به] اختلاف مناظرات کواکب در احوال موالید، صورت ها مختلف توان بود. والسّلام.

تصور سوم

در مسئله لایَصْدُرُعَنِ الْواحِدِ إلاّ الواحِد

[§۳۰] بعضی می گویند هر چه در وجود، اسم ماهیّتی برو نشسته است، همه از او تعالی صادر شده است. و اینان در وجود میان وحدت و کثرت و در موجودات میان واحد و کثیر هیچ فرق نمی نهند. و از آنکه کثرت به ذات او [تعالی] حواله افتد اجتناب و تحاشی نمی نمایند.

[§۳۱] وبعضی که از این مقام بر گذاشته اند و فطرت ایشان دقیق تر شده می گویند: در وجود وحدت و کثرت هست و در

عرش به کرسی پیوست و از کرسی به فلك زحل متعلق شد و همچنین به فلك های دیگر واحداً بعد واحد تا به فلك قمر. و مطارح و شعاعات کواکب به قوّت آن فیض به توسط فلك قمر بر ارکان افتاد و از آن سبب تحرُّك عناصر لازم آمد و از آن تحرُّك انفعالاتی که موجب اجتماع وافتراق عناصر بود لازم گشت و صورت هر یك از این کیفیّات بدیگری شکسته شد و از طرف تضّاد یعنی افراط و تفریط روی با وسط که اعتدال است نهادند و موادی که آنرا شایستگی قبول صور بود حاصل آمد.

[§۲۷] و واهبُ الصُّوَر موالید این عالم را، یعنی معادن و نبات و حیوان و انسان [را] صورتی که بهر یك لایق بود با لوازمِ خاص و لطایفِ اشکال و غرایبِ بُنیت و عجایب خلقت بداد و آنها هر یك به قدر استعداد خود اثری از آثار نفس کلی و نوری از انوار عقل اوّل قبول کردند. مثلاً در معادن عقد، در نبات نموّ، در حیوان حس و حرکت و در انسان نطق و تمیز. واجناس موالید را اشخاص بود و اشخاص را انواع، و هریك به فصل[۱۱] ذاتی از یکدیگر جدا.

[§۲۸] وموالید اوّل از انعقاد ابتدا کرد، پس از نبات، پس از حیوان، پس از انسان و آخر مرتبهٔ انعقاد به اوّل مرتبهٔ نبات متّصل گشت و آخر مرتبهٔ نبات به اوّل مرتبهٔ حیوان، و آخر مرتبهٔ حیوان به اوّل مرتبهٔ انسان و آخر مرتبهٔ انسان به اوّل

۱۱. N و W: فعل

دانند لذکرهم السجود، که به همهء آفرینش محیط و مُطّلع اند و بندگان آن قدر بر زبان توانند گرفت که از داعیان و حجّتان ایشان استفاده کرده باشند. وَمِن اللّه الهِدایَه وبِه التُوفیق.

[۲۵ §] امّا ارکان و موالید، نفس کلی بشوقی که او را به کمال رُتبت عقل اوّل است و تَشبُّهی که به او می کند افلاك را علی الدوام متحرك میدارد. و چون کمال غایت حرکت فلك اقتضاء قوّت حیوانی کرد و آن اشخاص توانست بود، مرکّب از ماده و صورت و آنرا اسبابی لایق و مناسب حال ببایست، پس به همین حرکت اشتیاقی[۱] که دوایر فلکی بر مرکز خود کردند، عناصر یعنی آتش و هوا و آب و خاك که اقسام طبیعی اند در جوف فلك قمر به نظام و ترتیب وجود مرتّب گشتند. و ازین ارکان چهار گانه هر یك که به فلك نزدیکتر افتاد [۱٤] جوهر او خفیف تر و لطیف تر توانست بود. مثلاً آتش که بالای هوا است به اضافه با هوا لطیف است و به اضافه با [اثیر که جسم] فلك است کثیف، و هوا که بالای آب است به اضافه با آب لطیف و به اضافه با آتش کثیف، و آب که بالای خاك است، به اضافه با خاك لطیف است و به اضافه با هوا کثیف. و خاك چون از فلك در نهایت بُعد افتاد کلّ کثافت به او خاص گشت.

[۲٦ §] وفیض امر که بر سبیل ابداع به عرش رسید به توسط

---

۱. S: استحقاقی، در بقیه نسخ اشتقاقی.

محجوب است اسم قبول فیض برو ننشیند. لابُد ادای قبول فیض را قابلی باید گفت که اگر قابلی نباشد معنی **أَفَحَسِبْتُم أَنَّمَا خَلَقْنَاكُم عَبَثاً** راست باز نخواند. هم از این وجه است که وجود خلق در این عالم از تقابل حق و باطل پدیدار آمده است، یعنی تقابل وجوب و امتناع، و وجود در این عالم همین ممکنات الوجود است که در میان این دو طرف [۱۳] یعنی وجوب و امتناع لازم آمده اند. و سبب [وجود آنها]، قبول فیض و امتناع قبول فیض ایشان می توان گفت.

[۲۳§] و هر موجودی که ما فرض کنیم یا ضروری الوجود باشد یعنی واجب، یا ضروری العدم باشد یعنی ممتنع، یا نه ضروری الوجود باشد نه ضروری العدم، یعنی ممکن. و هرجا که وجود ممکن لازم آمد هر آینه محتاج مُرَجِحی[۹] باشد تا طرف وجودش به لاوجود اولی کند. و طرف وجود إلاّ همین طرف قبول فیض نیست. و به این وجه امکان را توان گفت که او علت قبول فیض است.

[۲٤§] **سوال**: چه گوئی، افلاک به آن سبب نُهْ بود نه بیش و نه کم که به حکم عدد نهایت آحاد نُهْ بود، یا به آن سبب که هیولی بیش از این نبود یا به غیر این سببی دیگر؟

جواب: این عالم از آن جمله است که **لاَيُحِيطُونَ بِشِيءٍ مِنْ عِلْمِهِ إلاّ بِمَاشآء** و همین توان گفت که از حُکم و حکمت او تعالی چنان اقتضاء کرد که افلاک نه باشد و بروج دوازده و آباء هفت و امّهات چهار و موالید سه. در کمّیّت و کیفیّت آن خداوندان حَق

۹. S و W: مرجعی.

با یك تصور [كه] او را كنند، آن تصور موجب وجود چیزی شود، مادام كه عقل این تصور می كند، هم مُباینت امكاني است و ممكنی به ذات خود، پس امكانی است كه تصور امكانی می كند. و در مقدّمه گفته شد كه امكان امری عدمی است، تصور تو در این چیست؟

جواب: تصور من اینست كه امكان همچنان كه به همهٔ وجوه موجود نیست به همهٔ وجوه معدوم [هم] نیست. زیرا اگر به همهٔ وجوه معدوم بودی اسم وجود لفظی برو ننشستی. و اگر به همهٔ وجوه موجود بودی تصور امكان باطل گشتی. پس میان امری عقلی كه در ذهن وجود دارد، و میان عدمی كه نه در ذهن وجود دارد و [نه] در عین فرق و تفاوت بسیار است. مثلاً عدم صورت انسان در نطفه نه چون عدم صورت انسان است در نبات. زیرا كه آن یك عدم امكانی باشد و این یك عدم امتناعی. واین خود امكانی صِرفْ نیست كه تصور چیزی می كند، بلكه امكانی است در وُجوب مستغرق. و تصور امری وجودی است نه امری عدمی و كسی خود نمی گوید كه امكان از آنجا كه امكان است و بَسْ علت وجود چیزی باشد و این نتوان گفت، امّا توان گفت كه امكان علت قبول فیض است.

[§۲۲] آنجا كه سخن درین سه قسمت رود؛ واجب وممكن وممتنع، از برای آنكه واجب چون مُفیض همهٔ فیض ها است، از قبول فیض مستغنی باشد و ممتنع چون به همهٔ وجوه از قبول فیض

فلك زهره تا به عقل فلك عطارد، و از عقل فلك عطارد تا به عقل فلك قمر. هرعقلی را همین سه تصور لازم می آمد و آن سه تصور موجب ایجاد عقلی و نفسی و فلکی دیگر میشد. و هیولی و صورت هر فلکی از همان دو تصور که هر نَفْس میکرد، یعنی عقل را کامل می دانست و خود را ناقص، لازم میآمد. ذَلك تَقدیُرالعزیزِالعَلیم.

[§۱۹] آفرینش عالم افلاك بر این نُه فلك مُحرِّك، هر فلکی را نفسی مدبِّر، هر نفسی را عقلی مقدّر افتاد. و هر فلکی را نفسی و عقلی از برای آن بود که هر یك را مُحرِّك مُفارق و مُحرِّك مُباشری به بایست . محرِّك مفارق عقل و مُحرِّك مُباشر نفس. مُحرِّك مُفارق مثلاً چون مغناطیس که او به خود هیچ حرکت نمی کند و آهن را در حرکت می آورد و به خویشتن جذب می کند و محرِّك مباشر مثلاً چون باد که دَرْ درخت می پیچد و او را حرکت می دهد.

[§۲۰] و این عقل آخرین یعنی عقل فلك قمر، از آن روی که در این عالم اشیاء را او از قوه به فعل می آورد عقل فعّال خوانند و از آن روی که صور این اشیاء [را] او می بخشد عقل واهِبُ الصُّور.

[§۲۱] **سوال**: حکما بعضی بر[**۱۲**] بعضی انکار کردند در این دقیقه، که چون عقل اوّل تصور امکان خود کرد، آن تصور موجب ایجاد فلك الافلاك شد و گفتند امکان امری عدمی است، چگونه

جواب: هیولی و صورت از آنجا لازم آمد که نفس کلّی تصور ذات عقل اوّل کرد و او را کامل دانست. از دانستن او عقل را کامل صورت که از حَیِّز کمال است موجود گشت و چون تصور ذات خود کرد و خود را ناقص دانست، از دانستن او خود را ناقص، هیولی که از حَیِّز نقصان است موجود گشت، و این دو اعتبار از آنجا نفس را لازم آمد که او را دو روی است، روئی با وحدت دارد و روئی با کثرت.

[§۱۷] **سوال:** چون وحدت به عقل خاص است و کثرت به نفس، چونست که تو عقل را سه تصوُّر میکنی و نفس را دو؟

جواب: زیرا که آنجا که عقل است کلّ [۱۱] کَمال است و او را همهء رویهای اضافی به یکی بوده است، و آن یك روی آن است که به [امر] او تعالی دارد. پس یك تصور او همهء تصورات باشد و همهء تصورات یك تصور و نفس را چون از درجهء عقل منحطّه است و نقصانی در مرتبهء او لازم، حال نه اینست.

[§۱۸] **بقیه سخن** در نفوس و عقول و افلاك و ارکان و موالید: عقل فلك الافلاك را هم بر مثال عقل اوّل سه تصور لازم آمد یکی موجب عقلی دیگر شد، یعنی عقل فلك البُروج که فلك الکواکب و کرسی هم خوانندش، و یکی موجب ایجاد فلك البروج تا به عقل فلك زحل. و از عقل فلك زحل تا به عقل فلك مشتری و از عقل فلك مشتری تا به عقل فلك مرّیخ و از عقل فلك مرّیخ تا به عقل فلك آفتاب، و از عقل فلك آفتاب تا به عقل فلك زهره، و از عقل

دارنده و مؤلف و مُحیط به او. واین تصور سبب ایجاد بدایات کلّ اشیاء شد و جمیع مایحتاج هر موجود. مثلاً عقول [۱۰] و اشراقات[۸] آن، نفوس و تصرفات آن و افلاك تدبیرات آن و ارکان و تأثیرات آن و موالید و تناسبات آن با هرچه مصالح ایشان به آن قائم بود و احتیاج ایشان به آن دائم درضمن آن بیامد، مثلاً شدیداً شبیهةً بِاصابةُ العین؛ یعنی تا این تصور بکرد، این همه دَفعةً واحِدةً بر سبیل ابداع و اختراع در وجود آمد. و هر دو یکی بود. ابداع یعنی عقلانی که بی توسط از امر در وجود آمد و اختراع یعنی روحانی و جسمانی که به توسط عقل و نفس از امر در وجود آمد.

[§۱۵] امّا تفصیلی آنکه چون عقل اوّل، یعنی عقل فلك الافلاك که فلك اطلس و عرش هم خوانندش، تصور علت خود کرد که نسبت شریف تر داشت، آن تصور موجب ایجاد عقلی دیگر شد و چون تصور ذات خود کرد که نسبت وسط داشت، یعنی بدانست که واجب به غیر است، آن تصور موجب ایجاد نفس کلّی شد یعنی نفس فلك الافلاك و چون تصور امکان خود کرد که نسبتی اَدوَن داشت، یعنی بدانست که به خود ممکن است، آن تصور موجب ایجاد فلك الافلاك شد.

[§۱٦] **سوال**: چون هیچ جسمی بی هیولی [و] صورتی که بر او سابق باشد در وجود نمی آید، چونست که تو ذکر ایجاد فلك کردی و از هیولی و صورت هیچ نگفتی؟

۸. N و W: اشتراکات.

آمد؟

جواب: این از آنجا می گویم که از کل موجودات این جهانی و آن جهانی، هر موجودی که در کار او تعالی سخن گوید، بر حسب مرتبهء باشد که از او تعالی در وجود یافته باشد و اثر فیضی که از امر او تعالی در آثار روح و اعمال جسم خود مشاهده کرده.

مثلاً ما می گوئیم که آفریدگار ما حکیم است، او را تعالی به آن سبب حکیم می گوئیم که ما [که] آفریده و بندهء اوئیم اثر از حکمت می شناسیم و می دانیم. و چون می شاید که ما که آفریده و بندهء اوئیم به حکمت موصوف باشیم، آن واجب تر باشد که گوئیم که حکمت همه از اوست. و همچنین در وجود خود می یابیم که هیچ فعل از ما در این عالم صادر نمی شود إلاّ که تصوری بر آن سابق می باشد. پس چون می بینیم که تصور ماست که موجب فعل ما می شود، از این روی چون در کار او تعالی سخن گوئیم از حدّ همین استدلال یعنی مقام دانش و بینش خود بر نتوانیم گذشت [و] به اوّل وَهْله چنین باید گُفت علی الضروره.

[§١٤] **سوال**: صُدور عقل اوّل از علت اولی بگُفتی، در صدور دیگر موجودات چه گوئی؟ این را دو جواب است. یکی مُجمل و یکی مفصل.

جواب: امّا جُملی آن است که عقل اوّل به قوهء تأیید کلمهء اعلی غایات کُلِّ اشیاء روحانی و جسمانی تصور کرد. مثلاً اینکه مِن لدُن فلك المحیط إلی منتهی مرکز الارض، عالمی می باید براین شکل و هیأت که این ساعت هست، شخصی کلی، و او را جانی

دلیلی گیرند. نه به آنکه تا این مثل هم اینجا عین ممثول به حقیقت دانند. و اینکه خلق وُجوب و وحدت و بساطت و اختیار و ارادت و علم و قدرت وعلیهذا به دیگر صفات می گویند، این همه از آنجا که [امر] او تعالی یك نور محض و یك فیض صرف و یك جود و سخا و یك موهبت و عطاست که در مَفروغْ سبب و جود هژده هزار عالم است و در مستأنف سبب کمالِ ذاتشان و این تکثر و دوئی و بسیاری. وآنکه وجوب و وحدت و وجود و بساطت و اختیار و ارادت و علم و قدرت و همچنین دیگر صفات[٦] که هریك جدا می نماید پس خود معنی یکی است و این ازآنجا لازم آید که صفت کننده خلق است به اضافه با خلق. پس این اختیار و بی اختیاری که تو می گوئی آنجا چگونه توان گفت و از کجا لازم آید؟

[§۱۲] **سوال:** در ایجاد موجود اوّل از امر شرحی باید.

جواب: شرح این آن است که چون خدای تعالی خود را خالق دانست، از دانستن او خود را خالق [۹] مخلوق لازم آمد و آن مخلوق عقل اوّل بود و چون عقل اوّل واحد به وحدت بود مِنْ کُلِّ الْوُجُوه، حقیقت مسئله لایَصْدُرُ عَنِ الواحِدِ إلاّ الواحِد لازم گشت.

[§۱۳] **سوال:** تو این از کجا می گوئی که چون خدای تعالی خود را خالق دانست از دانستن او خود را خالق، عقل اوّل[۷] در وجود

---

٦. عبارت در تمام نسخ مغلوط و درهم ریخته است متلاً درQ: وهمچنین و دیگر صفات هریك جدا یس خود معنی یکی می نماید از آنجا لازم آیدکه خلقست ...

۷. S و W: ندارد.

تصور دوم
در صدور اشیاء از امر او تعالی[۵] و تقدّس
[۸] بر سبیل سوال و جواب

[§۱۰] **سوال**: بهری می گویند مبدأ موجودات یك است و بهری می گویند که دو و بهری می گویند که سه و بهری می گویند که چهار، تصور تو دراین چیست؟

جواب: تصور من آن است که مبدأ موجودات یکی است و آن یکی امر او تعالی وتقدّس که کلمه هم خوانندش. و موجود اوّل که به ابداع محض بی توسط از امر در وجود آمد عقل اوّل است و دیگر موجودات به توسط متوسطان از امر در وجود آمدند، مثلاً نفس به توسط عقل، و هیولی و طبیعت و جسم به توسط نفس.

[§۱۱] **سوال**: بعضی گفتند ابداع که از امر مُبدع تعالی بی توسط و بی زمان فائض می شود چنان تصور باید کرد که ضوء از چراغ، و بعضی گفتند که ضوء از چراغ بی اختیار است و اگر این معنی هم بر این مثال تصور کنند نه به مُبدع اقرار داده باشند نه به ابداع. دراین چه گوئی؟

جواب: ابداع از امر مُبدع تعالی که همچون ضوء از چراغ می گویند به حکم مَثَلی می گویند؛ از جمله این مصنوعات اضافی خلق، ها بَر اِزای خلق و ها بَر اِزای او تعالی، تا خلق به اوّل وَهْله از آن مثال بر مصنوعات امری الهی بر حسب فهم و ادراك خویش

۵. در همهء نسخ: علّت اولی. به قرینه فهرست مندرجات ومتن اصلاح شد

است.[٤]

وَحدهُ لاشریکَ لهُ   هُوهُو ولاهُو، فَهُو هُو

[§۸] و همچنین اگرکسی گوید دو قدیم است. او را گویند که این دو قدیم به حکم لفظ که هر دو را قدیم می گوئی مُشارك یکدیگرند و به حکم امتیازی که میان هر دو است، مثلا این نه اوست و او نه این مباین یکدیگر. پس از مابهِ الاشتراك که مشارکند، ومابهِ الامتیاز که مباینند، مرکب باشند ومرکب مُحْدَثْ باشد. و مُفردات برمُرکب که فرض کنند پا پیش وجود آن مرکب افتد و قدیم به حقیقت آن است که هیچ چیز پا پیش وجود او نیفتد. پس معلوم شد که دو قدیم نیست.

[§۹] امّا اثبات اوتعالی، خلق از آن روی اثبات او تعالی نتوانند کردن که مُثَبِّت همهء ثابتات به حقیقت اوست و هرکه گوید من اثبات او تعالی میکنم گفته باشد که من به حقیقت هویّت اوتعالی مُحیط شده ام و احاطت خلق به او تعالی محال ترین محال است و چون احاطت به او تعالی محال است، اثباتی که خواهند که کنند هم محال باشد. والسّلام.

---

٤. عبارت در تمام نسخ مغلوط و در هم ریخته است مثلاً در Q: واین دویی بصفت توان گفت بگوی تا آن صفت که به آن دو اند خدای است اگر خلق گویی خدا است این صفت بخدای داشتن صفت دیگر باید اینجامحالات شنیعتر می شود و اگر گویی خلق است لازم آید چون خلق بصفت ذات اوتعالی نشاید آن صفت آن حق اوتعالی باشد و...

عقابی و بهشت و دوزخی و این محال. و اگر گوئی هر دو با یکدیگر در وجود وقدرت و احاطت متکافی اند، چه معنی گفتن که دواند. و اگر گوئی یکی بر دیگر یك مُتفاضل، میان هر دو مقابله ی تَرتّب لازم آید و معنی تَرتّب آن باشد که یکی از هم جنس خویش بهتر باشد و مُعیّن شد که این دو وجه یکی مقابله تضاد[است] ویکی مقابله‌ء ترتّب و او تعالی از تضاد مقدّس است و از ترتّب متعالی. و اگر گوئی هر دو به یکدیگر مُحتاج اند لازم آید که هر دو به وجهی [۷] خلق یکدیگر!

[§۶] و نیز بگوی تا در اِستغنا و احتیاج هر دو با یکدیگر متساوی [اند یا متفاوت؟] اگر متساویند لازم آید دو خدای باشند وهر یکی بِسَرِ خود هم مستغنی و هم محتاج، هم قادر و هم عاجز! اگر گویی متفاوت اند لازم آید که دو خدای باشند، یکی بِه و دیگر بِهتر! این محالِ شنیع هم پوشیده نیست.

[§۷] و نیز این دوئی به صفت توان گفت، بگوی تا آن صفت که به آن دو اَندْ خدائی است یا خلقی؟ اگر گوئی خدائی است، این صفت را بیك خدای توان داشتن، یا صفت دیگر باید، و اگر گوئی خلقی است لازم آید که چون خلق به صفتِ ذات اوتعالی نشاید، آن صفت نه صفت اوتعالی باشد. و اینجا محالات شنیعتر می شود و دَوایرِ حیرت و ضلالت [چنان] برهم گردد که سَر از میان آن بیرون نتوان بردن. پس به نهایت این سخن به آن آید که او تعالی یکی

که او احتیاج خود به ولیُّ الأمر مِن قِبَل اللّه تعالی [را] بر خود بازمی پوشد و بر اقرارِ اوّلِ عامٍّ خلقی که: **ولئِنْ سَأَلْتَهُم مَّنْ خَلَقَهُمْ لَیَقُولُنَّ اللّهُ** می ایستد، و از اقرارِ دوم [٦][3] خاصِ امری به حکم **اِنَّ اللّهَ مَولی الذینَ آمَنوُا وانَّ الکافِرِینَ لامَولی لَهُم** که مباینت کافر از مؤمن آنجا می باشد امتناع می نماید. لاجرم از آن اوّل برمی آید و باقرار دوم نمی رسد، کافرش می خوانند.

[§٤] و همچنین نَعُوذُ بِاللّه، اگرکسی گوید خدا دو است، او را گویند که این دو که گفتی از هم جدا توانند بود به همه حال؟ زیرا که اگر ازهم جدا نبودندی، یکی بودی نه دو. اکنون به فتوای تو دو اند بگوی تا هر دو مُتّفق الاراده اند یا مختلف الاراده. یا هر دو با یکدیگر در وجود و قدرت و احاطت متَکافی اند، یا یکی بر دیگری متفاضل؟ اگر گوید مُتَفق الاراده اند بی هیچ زیاده ونقصان، چه معنی گفتن که دواند! و اگر گوید مختلف الاراده اند، لازم آید که اراده‌ء یکی برحیات و وجود چیزی مقدّر باشد و از آن دیگر بر موت وعدم همان چیز، تا آن چیز دریك حال هم حَیّ و موجود باشد هم مِیّت و معدوم، و این مقابله‌ء تضّاد.

[§٥] مستغنی اند، یا هر دو به یکدیگر مُحتاج؟ اگر گوئی هر دو از یکدیگر مستغنی اند لازم آید که هریك به ذات خویش خدائی باشد وهر یك را عالم امری و عالم خلقی باشد وعالم ثواب و

---

۳. شماره های داخل کروشه نمایانگر شماره صفحات نسخه خطی است که با تأسی به ایوانف وبرای سهولت ارجاع به چاپ نامبرده به متن اضافه شده است.

تصور اوّل

درکسر مقالات آن کس که نفی صانع کند جلّ وعلا، یا گوید خدا دواست یا دو قدیم است وآنکه خلق اثبات او تعالی نتوانند کرد

[§۱] اگر نَعوذُ باللّه کسی نفی صانع جلّ وعلا بر زبان راند، او را گویند این چیزها دراین عالم به خود هستند یا به غیری؟ اگر گوید به خود هستند گفته باشد همه واجب الوجودند، زیرا که معنی واجب الوجود آن است که او هستِ به خود است، و اگر گوید به غیری هستند هم گفته باشد که واجب الوجودی هست، زیرا که واجب الوجود آن است که این چیزها به او هستند.

[§۲] ونیز گویند که این چیزها را که در وجود آمده اند و می آیند سببی هست یانه؟ به ضرورتش بباید گفتن که باید، بباید گفتن آن سبب توئی یا غیری؟ اگر گوید منم، بگفته باشد که خدای هست، و به این هر دو وجه به خدای اقرار داده باشد و از اقرار خود خبر نداشته.

[§۳] وکافر را به این معنی کافر نمی خوانند که او می گوید خدای نیست، زیرا که هیچ کافر و مشرك نمی گوید و نگفته است که خدای نیست.

کُفرودین هر دو در رهت پُویان		وَحدهُ لاشریك لـه گـویان

او را به این سبب کافر می خوانند که کفر بازپوشیدن است؛ یعنی آنچه که او نمی تواند که بداند برخود باز می پوشد و آن اینست

دیو و پری و فرشته [۲۱۵-۲۲۰§]. **تصور بیستم:** درترقّی از جسمانیات به روحانیّات واز روحانیّات به عقلانیات. [۲۲۱-۲۲٤§]. **تصور بیست و یکم:** در مبدأ و معاد و دنیا و آخرت و آمدن مردم در دنیا و بیرون شدن از دنیا، وآنکه مردم از کجا آمد و به چه آمد و کجا خواهد شد وحشر ارواح و حشراجساد [۲۲۵-۲٦٤§]. **تصور بیست ودوم:** درتهذیب اخلاق [۲٦۵-۲۹۹§]. **تصور بیست و سوم:** در اقسام تسلیم [۳۰۰-۳۱٦§]. **تصور بیست و چهارم:** درکار نبوت و امامت و در نبوت ذکر مُعجز ومتنبّی و ممرور و در امامت ذکر معلم و متعلم و حجّت [۳۱۷-۸۹§]. **تصوّر بیست وپنجم:** درماهیّت سخن و گویائی و شنوائی و خاموشی [۳۹۰-٤۰۱§]. **تصور بیست و ششم:** درادوار شش پیغمبر اولوالعزم، از آدم تا به محمدعلیهم السّلام و امامانِ حق تَقدّسَ ذِکرُهُم و ظهوردعوت قائم و اظهار دعوت قیامت [٤۰۲-٤۸۲§]. **تصور بیست وهفتم:** در کار بت پرستان وکسر مقالات ایشان [۵] [٤۸۳-۵۱۸§]. **تصور بیست وهشتم:** درسوالاتی که مشافههً برمسامع همایون لایزال سامعاً للبشر امضا داده ام وجوابها که فرموده اند.[۲]

متشخص شده اند.

۲. عنوان تصور بیست و هشتم که قیاساً به وسیله ایوانف تصحیح گردیده فقط در نسخه های S و N ذکرشده اما متن مربوط به آن در هیچ یك از دو نسخه وجود ندارد. تنها در نسخه M که متأسفانه فهرست مندرجات، دو تصور اوّل و قسمتی از تصور سوّم را ندارد متن چندین سوال و جواب درج گردیده که احتمالاً باید قسمتی از تصور بیست و هشتم باشد. در متن حاضر دو مورد از این سوالات بصورت "ملحقات" به کتاب اضافه شده است.

فهرست[1] این تصورات

هوالله تعالی
اللهُ مُفَتّحُ الابْواب
رَبِّ یَسّر ولاتُعَسّر

هذاکتاب

روضهء تسلیم

من کلام خواجه کاینات وداعی الدُعات اختیار مولاالعالمین
مُحَقِّقِ طوسی نَصیرُالمِلّةِ والدِینِ مُحمّد، عَلیهِ الرَحْمَة

برادر اعزّ بدرالدین حسین حرسه الله ونصره؛ بعد ازسلام وتحیّات که خواننده باشد بداند که از تصوراتی که این ضعیف ترین بندگان دعوت را در مبدأ و معاد و اخلاق و معاملات برحسب فهم وادراك عاجزانه هاایستاده است تبتی کرده ام، از برای آنکه هرسخن که از قول درکتابت آید در مخیّله بهتر جای می گیرد و از مخیله بهتر با مُمیّزه رسد و از ممیّزه بهتر به حافظه پیوندد و در حافظه بهتر بماند، إن شاء الله العزیز.
خواستم که سخنی از آن به جهت برادر اعزّ حرسه الله بفرستم تا بخواند و از آن فایده یابد، وهُوَ تعالی موفِّقٌ للعباد و هادٍ للرشاد.
اگرچه غرض این فقیر ذلیل از این مجموعه که آنرا **روضهء تسلیم** نام نهاد این بود که نفس ناقص او به آن متنفع گردد، امّا اگر به مجالس بزرگان دین ومجامع اهل یقین نقل افتد و به عز تأمّل ایشان مشرّف گردد توقع این ضعیف، که دردنیا به مَحبّت ایشان مینازد و درعُقبی هم به آن وسیلت طمع نجات می دارد، چنان است که اگر در لفظ و معنی سهو و خطائی بینند، اصلاح خلل فرمایند نه مؤاخذت زلل کنند، تا ثواب یابند. انشاءالله العزیز.

ایزد همگنان را منفعت آنچه دانند و دانستن آنچه به آن منفعت یابند کرامت کناد. حَمْداً لله، حَمْدَ الشاکرِین،آمّین یاربَّ العالمین.

شفیع مورخ شانزدهم شوال ۱۱۸۰ ق که تنها مشتمل بر سه تصور ۲۱، ۲۲ و ۲٤ است، (٤): N به خط صفی الله بیك(A چاپ ایوانف) مورخ شوال ۱۳۵۳ ق، (۵): S به خط سید منیر(B چاپ ایوانف) مورخ بیست و ششم رمضان ۱۳٤۲ ق، و نیزنسخه چاپی ولادیمیر ایوانف که با علامت اختصاری W به آن اشاره شده تهیه و تنظیم گردیده است.

صورت جامع اختلافات نسخ در ضمن رساله دکتری اینجانب (اکسفورد، ۱۹۸۹م) گزارش و در اینجا تنها به ذکر مواردی پرداخته شده است که متن بطور مقایسه ای تصحیح و یا بازسازی شده باشد. اختلاف های قابل ذکر نسخه T به صورت پا نوشت گزارش شده و شماره صفحات نسخه خطی N که ایوانف با علامت اختصاری A به آن اشاره میکند با تأسی به نسخه چاپی ایوانف از تصور یك تا بیست و هفت به متن اضافه گردیده است تا مقایسه متن حاضر با چاپ ایوانف برای پژوهندگان آسان باشد. ارجاع شماره صفحات ملحقات ۱ و ۲ به شماره صفحات نسخه خطی M میباشد.

بخش انگلیسی کتاب شامل یادداشت های مترجم، مقدمه پرفسور هرمان لندلت، ترجمه کامل و مستند متن، اقتباس فشرده ای از مقدمه پرفسور کریستین ژامبه بر ترجمه فرانسوی، کتابنامه و فهرست جامع اسامی ولغات و اصطلاحات روضه‌ء تسلیم است.

در متن فارسی آیات قرآنی با حروف پر رنگ و در متن انگلیسی با ذکر شماره سوره و آیه مشخص شده و مآخذ احادیث و روایات و نکاتی که به روشن شدن متن کمك می کند بصورت پانوشت به ترجمه انگلیسی اضافه شده است. برای سهولت ارجاع بین متن فارسی و ترجمه انگلیسی، پاراگراف ها از ابتدا تا انتهای کتاب بصورت مسلسل شماره گذاری شده است.

س. ج. بدخشانی

مغول می پیوندد و با پشتیبانی آنان رصد خانه مراغه را تأسیس کرده وهمزمان به تألیف و تصنیف کتب علمی نیز ادامه میدهد. رفتار خواجه در دربار مغول، رویگردان شدنش از مذهب اسماعیلی و تشویق مغولان به براندازی خلافت عباسیان، از دیگر موضوعات بحث انگیز در زندگی خواجه است که تاکنون به دلیل وجود نقطه نظر های مختلف همچنان لاینحل باقی مانده است.

مجموعه آثار منسوب به خواجه بالغ بر ۱۳۵ کتاب و رساله است که پاره ای از آنها بسیار مختصر و گاه کمتر از یك صفحه و بقیه کتب و رسالاتی متقن و عالمانه در زمینه های نجوم، اخلاق، منطق، کلام، فلسفه، ریاضیّات، تاریخ، شعر و علوم متداول زمان اوست. قسمت اعظم این آثار بهنگام اقامت سی ساله او در قلاع اسماعیلیه تألیف و تصنیف گردیده است. خواجه اثر مهم فلسفی خود یعنی شرح اشارات ابن سینا را در قهستان و به خواهش محتشم شهاب الدین آغاز و بعد از مدتی در حدود بیست سال آنرا در الموت به پایان رسانیده است.

گرویدن خواجه به مذهب اسماعیلی از یکسو و مهارت او در زمینه کلام و فلسفه باعث شد که بهنگام اقامت در قهستان و الموت به تألیف و تصنیف و املاء کتب و رسالاتی در تبیین و تحکیم مبانی اعتقادی اسماعیلیان نزاری بپردازد. مهمترین این آثار عبارتند از سیروسلوك (لندن، ۱۹۹۸)، مطلوب المؤمنین (بمبی، ۱۹۵۰)، اخلاق محتشمی و تولاّوتبرّی (تهران، ۱۳۳۹ش)، جواب به کیا شاه امیر وکتاب حاضر یعنی روضهء تسلیم.

روضهء تسلیم یا تصُورات مهمترین اثر خواجه در باب مبانی اعتقادی مذهب اسماعیلی است که آنرا در الموت املاء کرد و حسن محمود کاتب آنرا جمع آوری نمود و سرانجام در روز سه شنبه منتصف شوال سنه اربعین و ستمأه (٦٤٠ق) پس از بازنگری نهائی بوسیله خواجه، منتشر گردید.

نسخه حاضر روضهء تسلیم با مقابله ی پنج نسخه ی خطی: (۱) M به خط کاتبی ناشناخته که عین کلمات خواجه را در پایان نسخه تکرار کرده، مورخ دوازدهم ربیع الثانی ۹٦۸ ق، (۲): Q به خط قاضی محمد مورخ شانزدهم ذی القعده ۱۱۷۵ ق، (۳): T نسخه کتابخانه ی مرکزی دانشگاه تهران به خط محمد

الدین که از دانشمندان مشهور خراسان بود سیری نمود. در همین احوال نسخه ای از «فصول مقدس علی ذکره السلام به خطی میانه و کاغذی کهنه در دست نا اهلی که نمیدانست آن چیست مشاهده و آنرا به حیلتی» به دست می آورد. مطالعه کتاب فصول مقدس که خواجه آنرا "نور دلها و چراغ ضمیر ها"می نامد باعث میشود که خواجه برای پیوستن به مذهب اسماعیلی مجدانه اقدام کند و "به یمن اهتمام مجلس عالی شهنشاهی" یعنی ناصر الدین محتشم حکمران اسماعیلی مذهب قهستان "سعادت اتصال به حماعت و انخراط در سلك مستجیبان دعوت" برای او حاصل می شود

در قهستان بین خواجه و مخدوم او ناصر الدین محتشم، که خود دانشمندی آگاه و روشن ضمیر بود، رابطه علمی صمیمانه ای برقرار میشود و خواجه گاه به درخواست ناصر الدین و گاه به میل خود به تألیف و تصنیف کتابهای علمی مشغول میگردد. در این ایام یافته های علمی خواجه در زمینه ی نجوم، منطق و اخلاق تا بدانجا میرسد که در مدت اقامت ده ساله خود در قهستان به تألیف آثار ارزشمندی همچون رساله ی معینیه، اساس الاقتباس و اخلاق ناصری موفق میگردد.

خواجه بعد از تألیف اخلاق ناصری در سال ٦٣٣ قمری، به همراهی ناصر الدین محتشم به الموت مسافرت میکند. این مسافرت و نیز گرویدن او به مذهب اسماعیلی یکی از موضوعات بحث انگیز در زندگی خواجه است که آیا به میل خود اسماعیلی شده و بعدها برای استفاده از کتابخانه کم نظیر الموت و مصاحبت امامان اسماعیلی به آن‌حا رفته و یا اینکه به اجبار ناصرالدین محتشم تن به این مسافرت داده است؟ نگاهی هر چند گذرا به رساله سیروسلوك، که انتساب آن به خواجه مسلم است، نشان می دهد که خواجه با اشتیاق قلبی به مذهب اسماعیلی گرویده و رفتن او به الموت نیز آرزوئی بوده که خواجه سالها منتظر برآورده شدن آن بوده است. مکاتبه او با ابن علقمی وزیر المستعصم آخرین خلیفه عباسی نیز شایعه ای بیش نیست زیرا مسافرت خواجه به الموت ده سال قبل از آغاز وزارت ابن علقمی صورت گرفته است.

پس از انقراض دولت اسماعیلی الموت به دست هلاکوخان (٦٥٤ق)، خواجه به دربار

چنین بنظر می رسد که ذهن وقاد خواجه و سؤالات زیرکانه اوکمال الدین را وادار می کرده است که بحث را کوتاه کند و به این بسنده نماید که "آنچه لب وخلاصه حقیقت است هنوز با تو گفتنی نیست که تو کودکی و روزگار ندیده، اگر عمر و توفیق یافتی طلب کن تا به آن برسی."

شاید اتکاء به تأثیر پذیری پدر خواجه از افکار شهرستانی و بابا افضل الدین کاشی که هر دو از طرفداران دعوت اسماعیلی بودند، و نیز انتخاب کمال الدین به سِمَتِ معلم، که خود احتمالاً از داعیان اسماعیلی مذهب بوده، ولادیمیر ایوانف را بر آن داشته که در مقدمه خود بر روضهء تسلیم (بمبی، ۱۹۵۰م) چنین ادعا کند که احتمالاً خواجه در خانواده ای اسماعیلی مذهب متولد شده و در مدارس شیعیان دوازده امامی تحصیل کرده است. حال آنکه بیان خواجه در سیر و سلوك با چنین برداشتی هماهنگ نیست.

خواجه در سیروسلوك خلاصه ای از یافته های علمی خود رادر باره کلام و فلسفه بازگو می کند ولی متعرض دیگر رشته های علمی و معلمین خود در آن رشته ها نمی گردد. بعد از فوت پدر و در اجرای وصیت او خواجه برای کسب دانش به شهرهای دور و نزدیك مسافرت کرد و در عنفوان جوانی در حلقه تدریس استادانی همچون قطب الدین سرخسی، فرید الدین داماد و معین الدین سالم بن بدران مازنی حاضر شد. خواجه در نیشابور فرید الدین عطار (م. ٦١٧ق) را ملاقات کرد و مدتی را نیز در بغداد به دانش اندوزی اختصاص داد.

تاریخ دقیق گرایش خواجه به مذهب اسماعیلی بر ما معلوم نیست. باحتمال زیاد در نیشابور که در آن زمان یکی از مراکز فعال دعوت اسماعیلی بوده کلیاتی را در باره این مذهب فراگرفته ولی به اطلاعات خود در این زمینه اطمینان کافی نداشته است "چون با کسی که با انصاف تقریر این مذهب دادی مخالطت نداشت و سخن آن جماعت از خصوم ایشان می شنید و می دانست که آنچه خصم از خصم بر حسب خوش آمد خویش باز گوید اعتماد را نشاید."

خواجه بهنگام بازگشت از عراق به خراسان، با تصمیم قبلی به گردکوه دامغان مسافرت کرد و چند روزی را به استماع "سخن دعوت" در محضر محتشم شهاب

پیشگفتار

نصیرالدین، محمد بن محمد بن حسن طوسی، که درکتب تذکره با القابی همچون محقق طوسی، استاد البشر و عقل حادی عشر و در متن حاضر بعنوان سلطان الدعات و خواجه کائنات از او یاد شده در روز شنبه یازدهم جمادی الاول سال ۵۹۷ در طوس متولد شد و در روز دوشنبه هیجدهم ذی الحجه سال ۶۷۲ هجری قمری در بغداد دار فانی را وداع گفت.

از شرح حال ایام جوانی او اطلاعی جز آنچه خود در رساله سیروسلوك (لندن، ۱۹۹۸م) ذکر می کند در دست نیست. به گفته خود او تولد و تربیتش "درمیان کسانی بود که ظاهر شریعت را معتقد و متقلد بودند و اقربا و عشیرات را جز اشتهار به علوم ظاهر حرفتی و صنعتی نبود." به عبارت دیگر، و چنانکه در سایر مآخذ نیز ذکر شده، خانواده او به کار رتق و فتق امور دینی به شیوه شیعیان دوازده امامی اشتغال داشته اند.

از بدو طفولیت، خواجه همچون شنونده ای کنجکاو به معتقدات اعضای خانواده خود در باب قواعد و قوانین شریعت گوش فراداده و در ذهن خود چنین پرورده بود که "بیرون از این شیوه مذهبی و طریقتی نتواند بود." ولی پدر او که مردی جهاندیده و تحت تأثیر آموزش های محمد بن عبدالکریم شهرستانی(م.۵٤۸ق) قرار داشت خواجه را "به تحصیل فنون علم و استماع سخن ارباب مذاهب و مقالات" ترغیب می نمود.

یکی از معلمانی که پدر خواجه برای او تعیین کرد کمال الدین محمد حاسب بود که خواجه او را از شاگردان افضل الدین کاشی (م. ٦١٠ق) قلمداد می کند.کمال الدین معلم ریاضی بود ولی گاه و بیگاه "سخن اهل ظاهر را کسری کردی و مناقضتی که متقلدان اوضاع شریعت را لازم آید بیان فرمودی" و این نکات برای خواجه دلپذیر بود.

روضهٔ تسلیم

یا

تَصَوُّرات

از کلمات

خواجه نصیرالدین طوسی

(۵۹۷-۶۷۲)

تصحیح وترجمه انگلیسی

از

سیدجلال حسینی بدخشانی

S. J. Badakhchani is a Research Associate at The Institute of Ismaili Studies in London, having obtained his doctorate in Islamic Philosophy at the University of Oxford in 1989. His previous publications include *Contemplation and Action*, a new Persian edition and English translation of Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī's spiritual autobiography, *Sayr wa Sulūk* (1998).

Jacket design by Judy Linard
Manufactured in the UK

Ismaili Texts and Translations Series

I.B.Tauris Publishers • London • New York

www.ibtauris.com

in association with



The Institute of Ismaili Studies • London

www.iis.ac.uk

